Рубрика: Answers

Answers to your questions

Does it not turn out that from all this libertarian freedom, the end result is one continuous nihilism? How does nihilism even mesh with libertarianism?

Nihilist (the question is accompanied by a donation of 0.00009₿)

Nihilism is a perfectly logical consequence of Hume’s guillotine. It is impossible to derive an “ought” from an “is”; therefore, there is nothing objectively obligatory. There is no objective morality (hello, Dobroum), no natural law (hello, Rothbard), and this whole objectivism of yours is some kind of stupid joke (hello, Ayn Rand).

But a nihilist is not a solipsist. He is aware that there are other individualities in the world besides himself, with their own subjective tastes, values, and needs.

Nihilists are often attributed an intention of opposing the entire world, pitting themselves against it, and even almost waging war upon it. This is understandable, as nihilism was born precisely as a negation of imposed values and duties toward higher powers and society. You think I owe someone something? Push kurats.

Similarly, early libertarians are known not so much for their positive agenda as for their criticism of all sorts of statist filth. Nevertheless, a libertarian is usually not very inclined to physically exterminate all statists; likewise, a nihilist, despite all his aggressive and cynical rhetoric, if left alone from the moralizing that irritates him, will still be forced to contact people, negotiate with them, and even unite based on the coincidence of specific values and interests—though, one might ask, where is the nihilism and where are the values? However, even a subjective will has preferences. And where there are coinciding preferences, the possibility of cooperation emerges. And so, Stirner’s Unique unites in unions of egoists.

Of course, if left to their own devices, nihilists will inevitably change their rhetoric. “No higher values exist, no one owes anyone anything by default.” “Well yes, that’s obvious, but what was your point?” Will nihilists necessarily appeal to the right of the strong? At first, quite likely, they will. Then they will realize that no single natural law exists, and this applies to the right of the strong as well, which means they will have to negotiate with each person individually and state obligations in an explicit form.

In short, any ideology that puts individualism at its core (and nihilism is exactly that) will inevitably arrive at more or less libertarian practices, even if at the start people are full of cynical bravado about the possibility of bending everyone over. Universal bending only works where there is the consent of those being bent. And why would nihilists give such consent?

Ugodan dan, prijatna kafica!

How do you feel about feeding neural networks all the content from the internet, disregarding copyright and without anyone’s consent?

M1inki

It has long been no secret to my readers that the copyright law appears to me as an entity that is hopelessly obsolete and extremely expensive in terms of enforcement, and therefore will immediately wither away as soon as the state ceases to carry out this very enforcement. However, with the appearance of large language models, all grounds have emerged to believe that copyright will wither away even and significantly sooner than the state.

There are various arguments in defense of copyright. There is the utilitarian one: if everyone takes someone else’s content for free, the incentive to compose this content will vanish, and that is the end of progress. There is the objectivist one: a person has a right to the product of their mind, and damn it, because that’s what Ayn Rand said. There is the ethical one: labor must be paid for.

And then it turns out that to train another, more advanced version of a large language model, it needs to be fed the entire corpus of texts ever created by humanity, and it will devour them and ask for seconds. If this is not done, then a promising direction of information technology development will hit a dead end. Those training the model are not concerned with the artistic merits of the text. For them, whether it is the Bible or a Harry Potter fanfic—it is simply text possessing a key quality: written by a human. Knowledge of the Bible is more important for a language model, but only for the reason that, firstly, it is more voluminous, and secondly, references to it are far more frequent in other texts and in user queries.

And that’s it, we have immediately lost the utilitarian argument, because it is precisely for the sake of progress that texts need to be fed to the neural network. In exchange, we have acquired very wealthy lobbyists for the abolition of copyright, since companies developing large language models can quite well compete in terms of capital size with digital publishing houses. Moreover, even if for particularly widely circulated texts the rightsholders manage to defend the right not to acquaint LLMs with them, who wins from the fact that in response to “summarize such-and-such story by Stephen King” the chatbot will answer “I don’t know a single work by this author, let me instead summarize such-and-such story by David Friedman”? Surely it won’t be Stephen King’s publishers nor Stephen King himself who will benefit from such a thing.

How will content for training neural networks be obtained? Very simple. Content is usually already physically present on the web in free access; it just has a “pirated” label, and therefore law-abiding companies have to pretend it doesn’t exist. However, this is too flimsy a little fence, and it won’t stop those who consider themselves entitled to step over it. The only person a neural network won’t get is some Rodion Belkovich, because he in principle does not post his books on the web, even for money))) This is a huge loss for the future interlocutors of intellectual chatbots, but what can be done, humanity has lost many valuable texts throughout its history, shit happens.

Is anarcho-capitalism based not on libertarian principles possible?

The concept of ancap emerged within the framework of libertarian philosophy. However, besides libertarianism, there are other philosophies of freedom, such as objectivism or classical liberalism. It seems that any intellectual tradition aimed at achieving freedom has its own version close to ancap.

Question from Dmitry

I am currently translating an interesting article that traces the anarchist roots of ancap (funny, but many consider ancaps to be fake anarchists) from Proudhon, who, in fact, was the first to declare himself an anarchist. But there are still a few days until the work is finished, so for now, I’ll reflect on how fundamental it is for an anarcho-capitalist society to have specifically libertarian principles at its foundation—self-ownership and all that other NAP stuff.

Let’s replace self-ownership with “we are all instruments of the Lord” or “we are but a third theme in the music of Ainur.” This is simply a shift in the locus of control. Well, okay, now it’s external. Will this shift hinder the construction of ancap? Not particularly. The Lord, in His mercy, gave people commandments. The elves left humans their powerful epic, filled with moral messages. Take it, use it. In songs, you read about loyalty to oaths, or a commandment requires you not to bear false witness—one way or another, you learn the idea of a contract and the obligations under it, which means we have the basis for capitalism.

Can we do without the non-aggression principle? That no one has the right to initiate violence with impunity? No, someone does. Will this hinder the construction of ancap? Well, it depends on exactly who turned out to be the lucky exception to this principle. For example, if we declare that holy fools, small children, and women with PMS can initiate violence with impunity, this will not hinder us in building an anarcho-capitalist society. But if we declare that a certain special knightly order, sworn to maintain peace and tranquility in the Galaxy, possesses the right to initiate violence with impunity—it will be harder, although even then the situation is not hopeless, but we will be critically dependent on the procedures regulating entry into and expulsion from this order.

To what extent can ancap be built on the principles of classical liberalism? Gustave de Molinari described this very clearly. He didn’t know any of the clattering libertarian technical terms like NAP and self-ownership; he simply described how a competitive market for security services would yield better results than a monopolistic one.

What about objectivism? Egoism is a virtue. Reason is a virtue. Demanding that people sacrifice themselves for you is yuck. How is this not a basis for ancap? The principles sound as unfamiliar as appealing to the Silmarillion instead of the Bible as a source of morality, but essentially, by implementing the principles of objectivism, we get the same ancap, only with intellectual property. And yes, the state will not exist, regardless of what Ayn Rand wrote on the subject, because collecting taxes by force is to demand sacrifice from taxpayers, and forcing government officials to work for free is to demand sacrifice from them. But, of course, if voluntary self-governance coordinated by volunteers at their own expense or via donations is “the state,” then okay, let it be the state, but for us libertarians, this is simply ancap.

Your opinion on the Arab-Israeli conflict?

To be more specific, do you agree with the opinion that in modern history Israel defended itself against the aggression of its neighbors and was more of a victim than an aggressor (insofar as a state can be considered a victim at all)? What is the most optimal and politically feasible solution capable of stopping the conflict in the region, and what prevents its implementation?

Question from Zigoter

Having started writing a book on the libertarian theory of war, I realized with some bewilderment that, despite all my methodological individualism, I cannot construct correct descriptions without operating with fictitious entities such as collective subjects. These speculative subjects were named by me as spirits.

The Jewish people are very ancient and managed to survive over millennia because they possessed and diligently preserved a very strong spirit of the people’s divine election. Nothing could shake the Jews’ loyalty to their spirit, but the 19th century brought them a strong temptation: the spirits of nationalism were born—a phenomenon known as the Spring of Nations. From the connection between the spirit of divine election and the spirit of nationalism, the spirit of Zionism was born. Those possessed by this spirit made efforts to create a national Jewish state that could become a home for any representative of the divinely elected Jewish people.

In the early period of its existence, the State of Israel represented a very peculiar combination on the spiritual plane: the old Jewish spirit of divine election, the new Jewish spirit of Zionism, the new global spirit of socialism, the mature European spirit of individual freedom, and additionally, the spirit of a victim-people born during the Holocaust. These spirits supported each other in some ways, but in many ways they were at odds. The result was a dynamic, expansive state that not only habitually survived in a hostile environment, as the Jewish people had survived in a hostile environment for many centuries, but also actively expanded its borders, creating a zone of quite decent security within the assimilated space.

Currently in Israel, the spirit of the victim-people has completely exhausted its potential, and the positions of the spirit of socialism have weakened somewhat; otherwise, the picture remains the same. As long as Israel’s environment remains hostile, abandoning expansion is fraught with destruction for it: passive defense in conditions of technological progress does not allow for the effective containment of enemies.

And why, exactly, is Israel’s environment so hostile to it? Initially, Israel faced the spirits of nationalism, and these are quite weak in the Arab world. Therefore, it was sufficient for Israel to achieve a decisive military victory over one coalition of states or another for the situation to calm down noticeably. It was only the spirit of Islam, which gained significant strength at the end of the 20th century, that made the situation truly complex, because this spirit has strong grassroots support, which is precisely what makes it a real spirit and not a propaganda facade, like Orthodoxy in the RF.

Having finished with history, let us move to libertarian recipes. First of all, the rhetoric of “we are launching preemptive strikes because otherwise we will be destroyed” is already being received with difficulty by consumers of propaganda, even if it is true. On the other hand, it is precisely now that the rhetoric of “freedom is coming” is on the rise; it would be a sin not to take advantage of it. Externally, Israel needs to appeal not to the spirit of its divine election—it will only work on the Jewish diaspora, and even then poorly. Nor to the Holocaust, which as a news hook no longer sells (now October 7th must be used instead). And certainly not to socialism; it is sinful to be proud of one’s internal illnesses. However, the slogan “We are expanding the space of freedom” is not only dignified but also effective. “We are not destroying terrorist regimes in Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, and Iran because they are against Israel, but because they are terrorist regimes. They are directed against all free people, whether inside the countries they control or outside. Islam is not a religion of slavery. It is quite compatible with the ideas of free trade. And those political regimes that are ready for trade rather than war, and in which their own citizens enjoy freedom, are welcomed by Israel.”

Of course, one should not confuse freedom with democracy; this mistake cost the USA dearly, there is no need to repeat it. What matters is not how a political leader took office, or if there even is one, but how free people are within that political regime, period. But, of course, such rhetoric imposes restrictions on Israel’s internal policy as well, which, however, is only for the better.

How would private military companies act under anarcho-capitalism?

Mauser

Anarcho-capitalism is a free market plus the decentralization of power. A private military company under ancap is a company operating in a free market to solve military tasks—that is, tasks arising from conflicts where people are willing to kill.

It is very easy to imagine the activities of private military companies during a society’s war of liberation against the state. Something similar to how this looks could be observed in the initial stage of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in those areas where the state was practically inactive, yet defense tasks were nonetheless being solved. What is characteristic of such a war? The emergence and decentralized coordination of numerous startups focused on three types of tasks: direct combat operations, supplying those on the front line, and crowdfunding to finance the first two. If the war drags on, the supply task becomes more complex, and a separate industry emerges for the development of new means of warfare.

But once ancap dominates the world, all this flourishing complexity is a heroic past. The grandfathers fought their wars. Military tasks become much more local; the duration and frequency of military conflicts decrease. Thus, private military companies under ancap will operate in survival mode. They will have to exert significant marketing efforts just to justify why they still exist at all, and many will prefer to liquidate instead, since there are many peaceful tasks on the market that will bring a much more significant income with far less effort.

Believe me, you wouldn’t want to work as a PMC employee under ancap. No romanticism, no heroism, very few actual tasks, existing merely as a formality, in conditions where people look at you askance and wonder why you even exist, and if you wouldn’t accidentally like to create a new state, because you seem kind of aggressive—maybe you need a little injection. So, I fully admit that almost no military companies will remain at all under ancap. There will be gamers. There will be reenactors. There will be some kind of brutal sport. There will be fans organizing into teams to vent aggression on one another under the pretext of supporting sports teams. There will be various book theorists imagining what war could be like under current material and technical conditions.

The production of specialized military equipment will inevitably be shut down. Old stocks will be gradually disposed of, and those that make no sense to dispose of will eventually become obsolete anyway. Cheap mass-market items for the civilian market can be adapted for war using blue electrical tape if necessary, but engaging in this—and especially starting to produce more serious military tools—will only happen in the event of a real war whose duration exceeds at least a couple of months. And where would this real war come from?

A mass war under ancap would require a combination of two factors. First, the appearance of a sufficient number of sweet summer children convinced that war is a fun festival of courage. Is this possible under ancap? Of course it is, and it is even inevitable. And second, a talented psychopath is needed who can convince them that the world is rotten to the core, society has lost its purpose, and it is time to shake up these bloated pigs so they scream in terror. Is this possible under ancap? Of course it is; you can’t assign a Bitarch to every psychopath.

As for what happens next, that is also generally clear. There will be bewilderment. There will be distrust of news channels, claiming they are creating hype out of nothing. There will be helpless attempts to counteract this by service agencies involved in maintaining order and security. Then, more and more people will begin to realize that they are actually being fought against. Mostly, they will simply flee far away from the danger zone after receiving insurance payouts (if policies still imply coverage for civil unrest risks). But entrepreneurs will emerge who begin to solve the arising problem. And then the market will do its work, and it will be the hour of glory for private military companies. They will emerge from nowhere, attract all the necessary resources, deal with the war, and disappear again.

Such a boring story.

What is the guarantee of freedom of speech under libertarianism?

Fyodor Svetlov

In short: the guarantees of freedom of speech under libertarianism are the same as under liberalism.

Now, in more detail.

Originally, the concept of “freedom of speech” is a liberal doctrine implying that citizens deny the state the right to prosecute its citizens for their utterances. Usually, freedom of speech is promoted in conjunction with freedom of religion, the press, and so on, because citizens, understanding that the state will inevitably find loopholes in a general prohibition, separately specify spheres where the state is not just forbidden, but completely prohibited from prosecuting citizens. What guarantees freedom of speech according to liberal doctrines? Of course, the separation of powers. The executive branch encroaches on freedom of speech, the legislative branch describes exactly what limitations the executive has, and the judicial branch interprets what the legislative branch has dreamt up; as a result, the branches of power trip over each other, and if they suddenly start marching in step, citizens have the right to rebellion, interpreted as the right to reconstitute the government if the previous one, through a long series of abuses, has completely discredited itself as a bearer of liberal values.

Libertarianism implies that the only permissible function of government is the protection of private property rights (since not everyone believes that private property rights can also be effectively protected in a decentralized manner without any government at all).

Can a libertarian government prosecute its citizens for their utterances? Yes, easily. For example, a certain citizen slanders another citizen, and the latter suffers losses because of it. There is a loss—there is a reason to sue. The court may award compensation to the victim of slander at the expense of the slanderer, and this, certainly, can be interpreted as a violation of freedom of speech. Another example is fraud. No slander here; on the contrary, the product is praised so much that it makes your mouth water, but the real qualities of the product fall far short of the description. Could a court consider this statement a violation of private property rights if the transaction took place and is subsequently contested? It could.

Finally, there are countless examples where freedom of speech is not entirely correctly understood by people as the right to make any statements without punishment on any private platform, provided that the platform is fundamentally intended for making statements. Can the owner of the platform ban someone who prevents them from developing their business? Of course, it is their private property. Will a libertarian government support such an encroachment on freedom of speech? It is obliged to support it. But what if the platform belongs to a member of the government? Here we have a clear legal conflict.

What follows from all these arguments? Yes, a libertarian government has fewer powers than a liberal one. But it does have the power to encroach on freedom of speech. Could it begin to abuse these powers? It could. What is left for citizens as a last resort? The same sacred right to rebellion.

Don’t forget to water the garden bed with oil.

The tomatoes, grandson, might wither, but the machine gun won’t rust

A question from Georgy Nemov regarding non-accession to contract jurisdictions

Let’s simulate a situation:

Territorial and extraterritorial contractual jurisdictions are formed, as well as a decentralized cross-arbitration mechanism linking them. Natural law continues to be supported only by religious or ethical organizations, in whose understanding the guarantor of rights is God/karma. Thus, these organizations remain the only ones who guarantee the life and freedom of a person in territories with a population that has not entered into contract law. These people may be marginal, fragmented, poor, or simply very far from the ideas of ancap. And these people flock under the protection of such religious organizations.

1. Do you think such a situation is possible?
2. If so, is this process natural, and is it a legal objectification of the human being?
3. If this happened, how should our union of contractual jurisdictions proceed? Should it be perceived as a threat, and how should it be fought? Or, conversely, supported?

Ancap-chan’s Answer

1. In fact, this describes a fairly ordinary case of tribalism. While some people, in the event of legal conflicts, rely on those organizations that are obliged to provide assistance by contract, others simply rely on the help of coreligionists/like-minded people. There is nothing surprising about this; there are currently many extremely decentralized communities of interest in the world, from hitchhikers and fencers to libertarians and Krishnaites. They already generally provide primary legal assistance to their members, especially locals to newcomers. I don’t see why these mechanisms should suddenly look different in our model world with greater decentralization of law.

2. I realize that you and I interpret the model situation somewhat differently. You likely view “jurisdictions” as organizations to which a person is legally attached, and those who are not attached are as if outside the law. I view jurisdictions more as “areas of norm imposition,” into which a person may fall both according to contracts and outside of them. And since in the model situation states, as organizations of general jurisdiction on their territory, exit the stage, a huge number of situations arise in which the jurisdiction is unknown in advance. If I’m having sex in a car parked opposite a church, whose jurisdiction is it? The parking owner’s? The church’s? The wife of the person I’m having sex with? It all depends on the context. If the car is parked incorrectly, the parking owner deals with us. If the parking owner is a church, its employee may suggest we have sex elsewhere and not distract the parishioners from pious thoughts. If my partner’s wife has an agreement with him that such things are not accepted between them, then demanding information from me about how aware I was of his availability is entirely within her jurisdiction. But some universal jurisdiction, which cares about everything and can dictate its norms in any sphere—that is already the dark etatist past; in our model situation, these dinosaurs died out long ago and ignominiously.

3. Let’s consider the situation where, say, in some locality, some people call their insurance company during a conflict, while others write in a thematic chat “alarm, ours are being beaten!”, and people from the surroundings start gathering, ready to defend the interests of a member of their community. Should such a thing be perceived as a threat? That depends on what interests the community defends in the conflict. If it is determined to protect its own at any cost in any conflict, then it is a clear threat, and a conditional insurance company must be ready for war with this gang in such cases. But if it is determined to extinguish the conflict, then there are no problems; this is one of the most important functions of communities. A person feels comfortable in them, but in order to belong to them, they accept that other members of the community care about their behavior. In this situation, from the insurance company’s point of view, the community acts as an “insurance cooperative” and can be viewed as an equal counterparty.

How does libertarianism propose to solve the problem of blackmail?

Suppose one company threatens another with sanctions if they do not enter into a contract, and the sanctions could be genuinely serious and severely damage that company’s budget; how do you see the solution to such hypothetical problems?

Matvey

Let’s introduce different terms depending on what kind of sanctions are envisioned, because the reaction to the threat will heavily depend on this.

Let’s define robbery as the demand for a predatory deal under threat of physical violence, extortion as the demand for a predatory deal under threat of economic sanctions, and blackmail as the demand for a predatory deal under threat of disclosing information that the target of the threat would prefer to keep hidden.

The reaction to robbery depends on the balance of power, the determination to resist, and an assessment of the situation regarding the possibility of receiving outside help. For instance, under current conditions, it often turns out to be cheaper to comply with the robbery demands of a state, although sometimes one can try to negotiate a way out, provided, of course, that state officials respect at least some principles—for example, those considered official laws of that state, or any others. (For example, in Montenegro, an attempt to negotiate a way out is the most obvious response to any attempt at state robbery.) Cases of forceful resistance to the state are also possible, and if such cases are frequent, political scientists say something like “state X is a failed state.”

Robbery demands from private individuals are far more likely to encounter forceful opposition, as such opposition is much more likely to be supported by bystanders, and in some relatively sane state jurisdictions, even by representatives of that very state, especially if the robber acts completely recklessly.

Extortion is perceived by many economic agents as lawlessness and a direct invitation to bypass the sanctions. If the bypass proves successful—that is, if the losses of the party applying the sanctions are almost higher than the losses of the party bypassing them—then the sanctions will be quickly lifted, perhaps even with apologies. However, if the author of the economic sanctions is the state, its officials may, in turn, consider the evasion of sanctions as lawlessness and move from extortion to robbery. Fortunately, the state is not a single organism, but a multitude of actors with their own interests, and bypassing sanctions usually implies that certain officials are interested in making it work.

Finally, in a blackmail situation, the target must solve a difficult dilemma: agree to let all interested parties find out something about them that they would prefer to hide (which is usually something unsightly), or enter into a predatory deal, usually without guarantees that the blackmail will end there. We often encounter such stories in detective novels, and it is easy to see that a wide variety of outcomes are possible. The most boring stories are those where the blackmailer honestly fulfills their part of the deal, and the target of the blackmail, accordingly, escapes with a mild scare. A note to potential blackmailers: act exactly this way. A note to potential targets of blackmail: do not abuse deals with your conscience; in the long run, honesty and openness pay off more.

Please review this video by Alexander Tatarkov

The request is accompanied by a donation in the amount of 0.00003084 ₿

It’s been a while since I listened to this author. He is still as wordy as ever and still doesn’t provide timecodes, but it seems I’ve become slightly more tolerant of this genre, so I resubscribed to Alexander’s channel. Sometime in my free time, I’ll listen to what he’s managed to say over the last three years. If you are subscribed to him and can recommend any specific episodes, drop the links in the comments, preferably with a brief introduction.

Essentially, for two hours, Alexander spends his time explaining a single thesis: that Putin’s regime looks like a clumsy cosplay of Hitler’s. Examples cited include the style of propaganda, Freikorps, concepts of Lebensraum and Lebensborn, ressentiment, and the fight against sects, same-sex relationships, and migrants.

There is no particular moral here, just a simple observation that this is another confirmation of the heuristic that farce tends to repeat tragedy.

In general, I like collections of historical anecdotes, but Tatarkov’s thoughts specifically always have a lot of room; there’s no point in listening slower than at 1.5x speed.

Freedom of association

A long question came in from Georgy Nemov:

I was discussing private jurisdictions with a friend, and when we got to the freedom to leave an association, he threw out the argument that this is impossible because, in such a case, the police wouldn’t even be able to detain a suspect until the circumstances were clarified.

I replied that the freedom to leave stems from the NAP, and therefore the jurisdiction agreement could certainly stipulate conditions under which a suspect of aggressive violence may be detained. And that there is no contradiction in this.

But his answer made me think. He said that in such a case, communities would use suspicions as a pretext for the forced retention of members. And that the freedom to leave either exists or it doesn’t.

How do you think this can be combated? Or will it be necessary to outsource the execution of punishments and searches to various bounty hunters?

Well, let’s figure this out.

Jurisdiction is “legal authority.” If a person is within someone’s jurisdiction, it means that the norms established by whoever exercises that jurisdiction apply to them. These norms concern both the measure of responsibility they must bear for their actions and the measure of protection they can count on while being in that jurisdiction.

Let’s imagine a world in which jurisdiction can be changed within the framework of explicit voluntary agreements. Let’s also imagine the worst-case scenario, in which the norms of different jurisdictions diverge significantly.

Anna, who is in the jurisdiction of the Ancap company, interacts with Boris, who is also in the jurisdiction of the Ancap company. Within the regulatory field of Ancap, Boris’s actions toward Anna are qualified as a violation of her rights, and Anna calls Ancap employees to handle the matter. While the employees are on their way, Boris contacts the Bandits company and agrees to switch to their jurisdiction, and notifies the Ancap company that he is terminating his contract with them.

Anna explains to the arriving Ancap employees that she suffered damages as a result of Boris’s actions, and she demands compensation from Boris. Boris claims that there were no damages, and in general, he is already in the jurisdiction of the Bandits. The Ancaps contact the Bandits, and the latter explain that in their jurisdiction, Boris’s actions, even if Anna is not lying, are not considered an offense, but if anyone outside should apply any sanctions against their client, they will certainly consider that an offense and will pursue it harshly.

The Ancaps conduct a quick investigation and are convinced that Anna’s testimony is quite credible. Now they face a dilemma. They can pay Anna the compensation for damages themselves and then forward the bill to the Bandits. Or they can shrug their shoulders and state that their competence ends here since Boris is not in their jurisdiction, so there will be no compensation. In this case, Anna contacts the Bandits, switches to their jurisdiction, and demands that they deal with Boris. Now the Bandits have to stand by their words, because even if Boris manages to slip out of their jurisdiction, they just promised that the violation of their client’s (Anna’s) rights by an outsider (Boris) must be harshly pursued by them, the Bandits.

Scenarios can be varied this way or that by changing the relative power and degree of ruthlessness of the jurisdiction providers — and different pictures will result. It is known that historically on Earth, jurisdiction providers with forced entry based primarily on place of residence became dominant. To erode this dominance and move toward extraterritorial contractual jurisdictions, an increase in the decentralization of money, easing of migration, and an increase in the armament of individuals are required. In other words, a movement toward the sovereign individual, who agrees on norms with equals, rather than receiving them from above.

We are working on this.

Forgive me that the answer turned out to be on a broader topic than the one indicated in the question.