Libertarian Theory of War. 3. Application of the Theory of War.
3.1.1. Individual versus Individual
Here, we will examine the conduct of war by an individual bound by libertarian principles against another individual whose principles may differ. The key libertarian principle regarding war is, of course, the NAP: no one has the right to initiate violence with impunity. In essence, all legitimate reasons for a libertarian to start a war come down to the opponent having violated the NAP: either they attacked, and the libertarian is defending against aggression, or they attacked in the past, and the libertarian is now clearly demonstrating that the aggressor has no right to impunity.
However, a person does not carry a “libertarian” stamp, and third parties may be unclear as to which side of this war justice is on. And since this potentially lethal conflict may also pose a threat to bystanders, it is quite likely that they will simply demand an immediate end to the war without figuring out who is right. Additionally, one should not forget the elephant in the room: at the time of writing this book, the monopoly on war has been usurped by states. In most state jurisdictions, an individual will be considered a criminal simply for the fact of conducting their own private war.
Therefore, when planning a possible war, a person must think not so much about how to achieve victory over their immediate opponent, but about how to avoid war with other people and especially with the state.
3.1.1.1. If you are attacked
Since an attack is often unexpected, the course of action must be simple: survive, eliminate the immediate danger, and then conceal or justify your actions. You do not dictate the circumstances of the attack, meaning you will likely not have the opportunity to hide the conflict itself and your participation in it. This means that either you will manage to justify yourself, or we move to section 3.3.1, where the state attacks the individual.
Both preparation for defense and immediate self-defense are thus heavily distorted by the motive of avoiding state prosecution. Even if you have serious grounds to expect an attack, you are unlikely to build yourself a bunker, mine the approaches to it, and set up AI-controlled automatic turrets. Rather, you will simply choose crowded, well-lit streets for movement, perhaps carrying something non-lethal, like pepper spray. This way, you will get plenty of evidence that you were attacked first, and sanctions against you for non-lethal self-defense will be quite lenient. And even then, you may still need corrupt connections, a good lawyer, and a lot of time, money, and nerves to comply with all these idiotic statist rituals. But you likely didn’t sit down to read a book on libertarian theory of war for a list of such things.
3.1.1.2. If you attack
Here, you choose the time and place of the attack yourself, meaning you have a chance to hide from the state, if not the fact of the attack itself, then at least the identity of the attacker.
There are very few competent guides on how to do this; furthermore, the state is constantly improving surveillance technologies, so preparing a lethal attack in a way that avoids state punishment can be very difficult. Now, if you are conducting an open attack and do not intend to hide, then two pieces of advice. First, do not miss, otherwise you will be remembered as a failure. Second, prepare a manifesto: for some time, news-hungry ordinary people will discuss its content, and you will have a chance to enter the pantheon of freedom fighters.
3.1.1.3. Statist restrictions
Individual war under conditions of state dominance usually turns into a short skirmish and resembles a jungle hunt more than a classical war. However, situations are possible where it is so important for the opponents to be able to kill each other without state interference that they are willing to cooperate to achieve this goal. Thus, individual war turns into a ritual duel, where the parties invent a confrontation scenario in which, for the state, it will look like a common accident with the loser, while the winner remains clean.
3.1.1.4. Libertarian restrictions
In the case of self-defense, libertarian principles are unlikely to restrict you more than the burdensome necessity of complying with state laws.
If you are the one preparing the attack, libertarian principles dictate that you avoid harm to bystanders. Therefore, when preparing an FPV drone to hit an opponent, choose a charge that is not too powerful; when preparing to fire, ensure that bystanders are not lingering in the background on the line of fire—in short, do not abuse movie special effects and cinematic dramatism.
3.1.2. Individual versus Group
In this section, we consider an individual’s attack on a group. Regarding the dynamics of such a war, it is unlikely to be prolonged, as in the case of war between individuals. But we are, again, interested in what characteristics such a war takes if constraints dictated by libertarian principles are imposed upon it.
3.1.2.1. If you attack
So, you have a compelling reason to start a war with an opponent who outnumbers you. Most likely, this is some gang or other cohesive community that has violated the principle of non-aggression toward you. How did it happen that you are fighting alone? Most likely, bystanders believe it is none of their business. Another possible reason: you believe that the only chance for victory is a covert surprise attack, meaning the risk of losing surprise by searching for allies is higher than the risk of the operation failing due to lack of forces.
Thus, most likely, at the moment of attack, your opponents will be together, and you will use a weapon of mass destruction—say, an explosion, poisoning, or shooting with something multi-shot, and preferably with an automatic fire mode. Libertarian restrictions are obvious: avoid endangering bystanders as much as possible. It is quite likely that this will prove impossible or extremely difficult. You will have to resolve a dilemma: endanger an innocent person or look for another chance to attack. What are the general recommendations in this situation?
If you have every reason to assume that there will not be a second such chance, then you are left only to evaluate what you desire more: to destroy the enemy or to leave an innocent person unharmed. Most likely, the identity of the innocent person will be the determining factor in your choice: the dearer they are to you, the greater their chance of thwarting the entire war.
If you have reason to believe that if you hesitate, the opponent will continue to violate the principle of non-aggression toward someone else, then the trolley problem is solved simply: the risk to innocents who may suffer from your attack versus the risk to innocents who may suffer from your hesitation. Since innocents are at risk in both cases, you should apparently prefer the attack: then, at least, you also eliminate the violators of the non-aggression principle.
Of course, all arguments from the previous section regarding concealing traces of your participation in the operation from the state remain fully in force.
3.1.2.2. If you are attacked
Now let’s consider a situation where a lone individual attacks your group with the goal of destroying all or many of its members. Of course, if they succeeded, there is nothing left to discuss. But if for some reason they gave you time to recover, then congratulations! You are very lucky. Boldly eliminate them, and preferably as a group. In the eyes of the state, you will almost certainly be justified. Even if you happen to accidentally harm one of your own—the war will write that off too, because all the blame will be placed on the attacker. Of course, innocents who suffered from your carelessness during defense should be offered possible compensation.
Of course, the attacker could be a state agent. This would only mean that you misjudged the situation, and it is not a lone individual attacking your group, but the state as a whole. However, it is extremely uncharacteristic for state agents to begin actions without overwhelming numerical and fire superiority, so an error is unlikely.
3.1.3. Individual versus State
There is no point in detailing a situation where some individual attacks the state in which you, a libertarian, reside. Your interests here can only be affected if you accidentally end up in the line of fire. In all other cases, there is only to quietly rejoice and perhaps even think about how to help the attacker.
A far more interesting situation is when you attack the state.
If you act alone, then the motive for its beginning is most likely a war of hatred. Although, of course, one cannot exclude Robin Hood-like motives of restitution of state resources in favor of those from whom they were taken, for example, yourself. However, it would have to be an extremely weak and sluggish state for a lone individual to be able to take resources from it by armed means and remain unpunished. Such are a rarity now.
So, the most likely scenario: the actions of certain state agents, or the state machine as a whole, have caused you immense suffering, and you begin to take revenge. Most likely, you have preferences regarding which specific state agents or which specific state structures are subject to attack. Say, military commissars. Or prosecutors. Or generals. Or the top officials of the state.
You know best whether to limit yourself to a single action or try to repeat them. Whether to do it openly or covertly. Whom to include among state agents and whom to consider private individuals. Whether, for example, to consider retired executioners as legitimate targets or to write off their crimes upon their resignation. Or to include among those to be destroyed voluntary assistants of the state, such as media statists without official positions or grants.
It is extremely unlikely that your war will be long. Either you will be detained and, quite likely, killed, or you will manage to flee to the territory of a state hostile to the one you are fighting. In both cases, your experience will not be wasted—it can become the basis for a future, more organized war. But we will discuss this in section 3.2.3.