I will reflect a bit on the topic of the protest’s collapse and hope that after this, I can move on from the Navalny theme for a long time.
What did Volkov tell us on the February 4 stream? That they, of course, anticipated the possibility of imprisonment, and for this occasion they have a plan: to seize the assets of Putin’s circle abroad, thereby causing a split among the elites and bringing about the “tabaquero” scenario (or the final transformation of the RF into Belarus, where the dictator’s circle doesn’t show their noses abroad, but instead enjoys themselves fully at home).
Svetov reacted to this, stating that stopping the street actions was a good idea, but it would have been even better not to start them at all: simply come to Russia and silently go to jail.
And here I cannot help but be outraged. Why go to jail at all? What, was the task of seizing the property of Putin’s circle unsolvable without the imprisonment of one Navalny and sixteen thousand people outraged by Navalny’s imprisonment? Is it impossible to speak before the European Parliament or the US Congress without this? Actually, it seems the opposite: imprisonment only hinders this, as colleagues have to speak instead. Can’t you release new exposés without being in jail? No, videos with Alexei are clearly more lively than without him. Or would fewer people have watched the video about the palace if he hadn’t arranged a promo tour from Berlin to the Kremlin Central prison? Yes, perhaps fewer. Maybe by ten million. Is that so critical?
In short, Volkov did not convince me, and I continue to believe that Navalny was completely mistaken to fear that he would fade away abroad and become uninteresting as a politician. By going to prison, he created many difficulties for many good people, and yes, this is pure victim-blaming on my part: you shouldn’t fly to such a dangerous country wearing such a short skirt.
Of course, there is a certain probability that foreign elites didn’t fully believe Bellingcat’s investigation into Navalny’s poisoning, and the self-sacrifice became simply a final demonstration: yes, look, they have truly lost their minds over there, now live with this and fight, if you can. If this is the case, it certainly casts a shadow on the impeccable moral qualities of Grandpa Biden and Grandma Merkel, and portrays them as cannibals.
But anyway. Putin successfully survived another crisis involving tens of thousands of protesters taking to the streets; the security forces stretched their legs after Covid, and are now cheerful, spirited, and ready to arrest everyone on weekends even without any mass actions. Detainees are fined, they bill the FBK, and then they win these cases in Strasbourg, but that is a slow process. And people have only just felt the drive, and now they are talking about a “drain” precisely because all activity ended so abruptly, while they had only just woken up from a year-long Covid slumber.
Forgive me, but the FBK is not your helper here. It is a machine for conducting and promoting anti-corruption investigations. The FBK will continue to act using FBK methods. And Navalny’s headquarters will not help you. That is an electoral machine. They will continue to use the doctrine of smart voting. If you desire something more—not just going to the street when asked, and donating and liking the rest of the time—you will have to organize yourselves. The main thing here is not to chase glory or mass appeal. You simply spend pleasant time in the company of reliable friends you managed to make in some other setting. And then you read in the news: “unknown persons decorated the mayor’s office building with fresh graffiti” or “unknown persons slashed the tires of a judge’s car.” “How strange,” you send the news to your friends, “what a weird story, what did the car do to offend them?”
