Bitarch, Ancap-tyan
Every time we mention the deterrence doctrine, it sparks a discussion. The first time, we spoke with the host of the Antistate channel, and now it has caught the attention of Alexander Elesev, the host of the Dobroum channel. Thus, the idea is controversial, and it is worth continuing to provide clarity, but not for too long, so that the reader does not get bored.
Alexander is far from the first person to voice this reproach: “You intend to fight the state; it’s useless, you will be declared terrorists and destroyed like the militants in Chechnya.”
However, the deterrence doctrine has nothing to do with war. If it can be used with the word “war” at all, then only as “cold.” The confrontation between the USSR and the USA in the 20th century, often called the “Cold War,” was in fact a manifestation of DD.
War is a conflict between several parties, the goal of which is to impose one’s will on the opponent. War is generally conducted by violent means (even if it is a cyberwar, there is an infringement on property). War can be waged until a peace treaty is concluded or until one of the parties completely loses its agency.
Deterrence is also a situation of conflict, but the main goal of deterrence is to make the use of aggressive violence disadvantageous for the opponent. Deterrence in itself is not violence, but only the threat of some damage, which may not be associated with violence at all, if we are talking, for example, about reputational damage. For example, you may not like that a gay couple is walking hand in hand, and you may want to throw filth at them. If they are unarmed, you will easily do so and receive moral satisfaction. But if they are armed, besides moral satisfaction, you have a non-illusory chance of catching a bullet. Weighing the benefits and costs, you will likely prefer not to interfere in other people’s affairs and send the filth you carefully prepared where it belongs: down the drain. Also, you might decide not to stand in the way of even unarmed gays if the name of the previous attacker is currently being dragged through the mud on every corner in the most unpleasant way. In this case, the fear of non-violent punishment will work as a deterrence mechanism.
Another important difference between DD and war: as long as deterrence takes place, there are winners, but no losers. Everyone continues to live their life, without violence and coercion to act, because deterrence is coercion to inaction. In the case we are discussing, when a person carries out secession and unilaterally exits the jurisdiction of the state, he does not overthrow the government and does not call for its overthrow. He does not interact with the state at all and suggests that state representatives reciprocate.
Let’s imagine this situation as a game and draw a simple matrix that describes this game:
If the official does not hinder the secession, his loss is minimal: from slight irritation to dismissal. If he successfully hinders it, the gain is also minimal: from slight moral satisfaction to a professional reward. If a person does not care about deterring the state but encounters no opposition, his gain is maximal. If he has to take deterrence measures and no opposition occurs, the gain decreases. Finally, if the person suffered from state opposition, or the official suffered as a result of the realization of the threat stated by the person, they lose to the maximum, and roughly to the same extent.
What can we see from this matrix?
If the game is a one-time event, then the person, wishing to maximize gain, relies on luck and applies no measures to deter the state. The official, however, wishing to maximize gain, hinders the secession and receives a reward from superiors.
If the game is repeated time and again with the same or new players, then the person more and more often incurs additional costs and chooses the deterrence doctrine, and the official, fearing this circumstance more and more, more and more often closes their eyes to the secession, preferring a small loss to a large one.
Nevertheless, there will still be free riders in society who prefer not to take any measures. If the officials are sufficiently frightened, the bluff will work.
An example of a similar game is the interaction between citizens who have the possibility of concealed carry and criminals. A weapon works as a tool of deterrence, and in a society where a citizen has the right to armed self-defense, violent crimes decrease. At the same time, unarmed free riders benefit from such a positive externality as increased safety, without spending on weapons themselves — but only as long as there are not too many of them.
A gun is a very compact and convenient deterrence tool against a person or a small group of people, but not against the state. That is exactly why we propose various more or less successful options for protection from the state, available both to organizations like ECU and to individuals.
Based on theoretical calculations that do not contradict historical examples, we indicate that the optimal deterrence doctrine against the state is the threat to specific functionaries who make decisions or execute them.
It is quite rightly pointed out to us that if the threat looks too intimidating, the state figures may take the risk of being under attack for a while and begin preventive purges, in other words, start a war. Similarly, harsh opposition to low-level security forces can cause a feeling of solidarity with fallen comrades. To minimize the danger of such an outcome, we suggest, first, to maximize the anonymity of those carrying out the threats, and second, to make threats non-lethal whenever possible, emphasizing ridicule and other types of humiliation, or, in the worst case, property damage. Here, one really wants to refer to the project announced recently by Alexander Litreev with the very telling name Russian Elephant. Alexander regularly deanonymizes various offenders in power, and it seems he now intends to put this on a conveyor belt.
And if we are to delve into philosophical generalizations, then maxims such as “live and let live” and “do not do to others what you would not want done to yourself” are not just good wishes. These are lines from a safety manual, written, as usual, in blood. This is the same kind of life wisdom as “don’t eat yellow snow” (remade by domestic meme-makers into “don’t eat yellow snack,” with an obvious reference to the NAP) — and this wisdom appeared precisely because people have successfully practiced the deterrence doctrine for many centuries.
If you have fresh interesting ideas about what non-violent threats and mechanisms for their implementation could be applied by a citizen against state employees of various ranks, share them in the comments or via DM. Authors of the most successful ideas can expect a reward in bitcoins.