For example, there is a large amorphous country in the north of the continent; the climate there is cold, there are few valuable resources, and a freedom-loving people live there, where almost everyone has an AK under their bed. There are cities in Ancapistan, where order is maintained by private companies and a small PMC for special operations.
Suddenly, some valuable resource is found in this beautiful country. A neighboring country, Etatistan, is an ordinary country with corruption and standing armed forces (of a sort). And Etatistan decided to seize this resource. It failed to acquire it through market methods (the landowner did not sell his land, and blackmailing him to get it also failed), and Etatistan declares war on Ancapistan.
And my question is: how can Ancapistan defend itself in order to maintain its independence and remain Ancapistan?
How can an armed people, who have plenty of firearms and light armored vehicles (like jeeps and BMPs), withstand an army with aviation and heavy equipment?

Baker

This question has been hanging for a long time; I was too lazy to answer it because I had already answered a very similar one. And then a post on the Freedom pride channel appeared, which touches upon a related topic. Why not take advantage of such a free ride?

As is easy to see, the topic of direct military confrontation between a non-state society and a state military machine worries many, because war is historically the most important thing a state had to be able to do if it wanted to survive; and thanks to its competencies in military affairs, practically the entire Earth is today divided among states, while non-state societies lead a marginal existence on the fringes of civilization.

Zolotorev, whom I am quoting, emphasizes that the ancap community, all other things being equal, is definitely wealthier than the state; due to decentralization, it can afford more flexible tactics, and the costs of implementing a state from scratch on the territory of Ancapistan conquered by the state would be disproportionately high for the state—in other words, the game would not be worth the candle.

Freedom pride shows why it would be difficult for a single gang to seize power in a conditions of an already established ancap. But it also states that if it were not a gang, but a state, it would become a problem.

Therefore, in conclusion, I want to suggest you read my longread on the doctrine of deterrence, which shows exactly that a means has already been invented to prevent a state from attacking you—the threat of guaranteed destruction of the state leader. The state is centralized, and this is its weakest point: it is enough to demotivate a very small circle of people from attacking, and the attack will not take place.

So, of course, an AK under the pillow is great sports equipment, but the key role in the conflict will be played by that very small PMC for special operations you described. This “department for working with difficult clients” at the insurance company, in the event of military action, simply captures the commander-in-chief of Etatistan and twists his balls until he agrees to withdraw the troops and pay a penalty. And if they can’t capture him alive, the problem will be solved by a dozen Tomahawks or something along those lines. This is significantly cheaper than heavy armored vehicles and other means of destroying large military formations that Etatistan possesses.

I will note that Etatistan cannot respond symmetrically, as there is no government in Ancapistan. And even sabotage at a PMC military base would only lead to the insurance company simply having to hire another PMC somewhere else, or simply announcing a substantial reward for the head of the dictator of Etatistan.

Although, to be honest, personally I don’t quite understand why the deposit could not be acquired through market means. Everything has its price, and if a price per share with a large premium to the market is offered, what is the point of refusing? But since that is the condition of the problem, then the word goes to the Tomahawks, provided that the shareholders of the deposit are willing to pay for it.