Sorry, I’m focusing on current events again, which is actually not very characteristic of my channel about theory.

The year has been quite rich in events. So much so that some of them, which seemed very important when they occurred, are now almost forgotten. Who remembers that at the very beginning of the year, a war between the USA and Iran almost broke out? It didn’t happen, so that’s fine. Nevertheless, each such surprise, even if it was managed quickly, rocked the boat. Perhaps the global economy would have digested another fallout between the USA and Iran, but then the coronavirus happened. Perhaps it too would not have caused a global recession, but then the cartel agreement between OPEC and the RF collapsed. If the global economy miraculously digests this as well, tomorrow some new horror will surely happen that will break the camel’s back.

One of the business cycle theories, the so-called real business cycle theory, argues that crises occur not because of some internal reasons and accumulating contradictions in the economy, but exclusively due to external shocks that sharply change consumer behavior. I am not ready to fully adhere to this theory (essentially, it is an application of Taleb’s black swan idea to the theory of economic cycles), but it is hard to deny that external factors are quite significant. However, it is also hard to deny that external factors become quite significant precisely when enough internal contradictions have accumulated.

And as if we didn’t have enough external shocks, the Russian leadership is bustling with activity in domestic politics as well. The resignation of the government, the first wave of constitutional amendments, the second wave of amendments, the idea that the constitutional amendments reset presidential terms—all of this is a reflection of active mental churning at the top. No one knows what ideas will surface in public policy tomorrow, but it is perfectly obvious that fish are easily caught in muddy waters. This must be taken advantage of.

The notorious plebiscite on constitutional amendments is an attempt to scoop up at least a drop of legitimacy from the people. And since legitimacy is needed, populism can be expected. This means it is the perfect time to announce a public demand.

Of course, I don’t know exactly which demand will be widely supported, because even sociologists can only provide support percentages for a closed list. As for us, we have yet to toss that list out there.

I already suggested the first proposal in connection with the Litreev case: the repeal of Article 228 of the Criminal Code of the RF, at least regarding the criminalization of possession without intent to sell. The beginning collapse of the Russian economy provides additional support for this idea: by reducing the prison population by a quarter, the FSIN budget can be significantly cut.

It is unlikely that ideas for tax cuts will be pushed through—we now have a former tax official as prime minister. But it is still necessary to complain about the unbearable tax burden, so that they at least don’t try to exacerbate it. On the other hand, there is a chance to simplify regulations—if presented under the guise of budget savings. For example, trying to replace the abolition of fire supervision with mandatory fire insurance. Or pushing for the easing of control over the circulation of hunting weapons. Or canceling the licensing of various types of activities.

It is very possible that it will be possible to selectively expand the rights of local self-government and bring back mayoral elections in some places.

In short, right now, supporters of reducing the state through political methods have a good opportunity to make progress. Even if success cannot be achieved in all areas, at least they can build up competence. As for the fact that Putin intends to rule forever, it’s too early to worry. Maybe tomorrow he’ll catch the coronavirus, and in a month he’ll kick the bucket—there’s no need to predict so far ahead; Putin currently plays no role in our calculations at all.