The recent case of the seizure of power in Afghanistan by the Taliban movement only further confirms the theory of the stationary bandit, according to which states arise not through a mythical social contract, but because nomadic bandits decide to settle down and move from irregular looting to stable tribute (or taxation) and the subjugation of people. Even the most liberal and democratic states continue this tradition, as in their case as well, a person has no right to disobey the orders and tax rates established from above—disagreement with this is punished by violence, exactly as in the case of a bandit attacking an unarmed and defenseless victim. And even the provision of certain socially useful services by the state does not change the essence—it is the same as so-called “protection rackets,” where you either agree to pay bandits for some form of protection, or they will attack you.
But it is also important to note that the legitimacy of a specific group on the world stage, that is, its recognition as a state by other states, is purely a question of victory and the seizure of power. Some states are already ready to recognize yesterday’s Taliban terrorists today, and there are even talks of cooperation, including from Russian government structures at the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Similarly, in their time, the Bolshevik bandits were recognized; after they seized power, the representatives of the previous Tsarist government suddenly became the bandits.
The winner is recognized and always spoken with, even if they were a mad bandit only yesterday. And this is the only thing, rather than any “social contract,” that distinguishes a “legitimate” and recognized political force from an “illegitimate” bandit-terrorist. But the essence itself remains the same.
