In Stefan Molynieu’s “Practical Anarchy,” which I have never fully translated, there is a chapter Stateless Prisons, where as an alternative to the loathsome state penitentiary system, an equally loathsome non-state one is proposed, based on what resembles cancel culture in the US, the social credit system in China, or, for instance, the “foreign agent” label in the RF. The idea is to make an undesirable person an outcast with whom everyone is afraid to deal to avoid secondary sanctions. The mechanism is described using the example of retribution for something sufficiently loathsome to the vast majority of readers (sexual violence), but there is no reason to believe that the exact same mechanism cannot be used to punish anyone for anything: it is enough to incite moral panic around certain actions, and suddenly the very mechanisms that yesterday cancelled rapists are today cancelling smokers. Or those leaving an excessively large carbon footprint. Or those infringing on intellectual property. Or formally the same rapists, but with an expanded interpretation of rape, extending even to initially voluntary sex with post-coital disagreement.
What I love about moral philosophers is that they adore pushing ideas to the point of absurdity with the utmost seriousness, thereby teaching others precision in phrasing, provided these others do not wish to resemble holy fools.
So let us talk about the institution of reputation more carefully.
Anya caused damage to Borya. Borya is a peaceful man; he wants restitution for the damage, but he does not wish to extract it by force. Additionally, he is offended, no longer wishes to have dealings with Anya, and generally does not want to see her in his social circle. Unless, of course, she apologizes, first making amends for her guilt.
Anya considers Borya an asshole who fully deserved all the damage received. She also does not wish to deal with him and simply rides off into the sunset.
Anya has no incentives to compensate for the damage. What is needed for her to have some? One of two things. Either Borya must spend significant resources on damaging Anya’s reputation, or these resources must be spent by someone else, in which case Borya only needs to send a low-cost control signal that triggers a chain reaction of cancelling.
How do you organize a system that allows for the cheap cancelling of people under conditions of decentralized law? Only through mass hysteria, which sharply lowers the threshold of arousal in people, after which they decide to abruptly sever relations with a person previously unfamiliar to them. Admit it, it’s convenient: you say a person is, say, a pedophile—and that’s it, no one will shake their hand. But who will verify this claim? No one can. Verification is a costly process. Adding it to the scheme kills all the profit from the idea of cancelling.
Fine, “no one can” is too strong a statement. One could add certain moral authorities to the scheme who verify the labels being applied. Borya called Anya a fraud—that is just noise. Guru Vasya called Anya a fraud—Anya becomes an untouchable. Borya’s only task is to grease Vasya’s palm. In other words, this scheme is also easily corrupted.
Of course, I am not suggesting the abolition of the institution of reputation. I am suggesting that one should not expect that under ancap it will be possible to cancel people without extremely destructive consequences for ancap itself. Yes, you can release information about Anya’s actions into the network, accompanied by reliable confirmations. Those intending to enter into a serious deal with Anya may come across this information and adjust their initial opinion of her reliability as a counterparty, after which, for example, they may demand payment upfront. But that is the maximum you can hope for. She will still be sold bread at the store, no matter how angry Stefan Molynieu is about it.
