Harsh coercive measures have failed again

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Considering the concept of harm reduction, I have already shown why the best result is achieved not through prohibition and accusation, but through awareness and attempts to encourage a person toward less risky behavior. For example, the needle exchange program during the AIDS crisis in the 80s, which allowed drug users to take fewer risks by using fresh syringes instead of the same ones repeatedly and sharing them among several people, proved to be much more effective than strict prohibitions. Program participants began to use drugs less frequently, their health improved, and many of them eventually voluntarily sought help for addiction treatment.

Similarly, awareness and encouraging people toward less risky behavior could have been used instead of harsh coercive measures in the fight against coronavirus. Unfortunately, most governments chose the second method. However, it is good that not all of them decided to resort to force and strict prohibitions, so we can easily compare the results of these approaches. Research on the impact of strict measures, light measures, and all measures combined on the growth of infections has already long shown that both types of measures produce approximately the same effect. This means that the introduction of harsh coercive measures is unnecessary, or even harmful, given their consequences for social and economic life.

Sweden is a good example. From the very beginning of the pandemic, it refused to introduce harsh and coercive measures within its country; even the wearing of masks, which was mandatory almost worldwide, remained only recommendatory in Sweden. Initially, the number of infections and deaths greatly exceeded the corresponding figures in other countries (though in reality, this was not the case in all instances; for example, they were quite comparable to the figures in France). However, it was already clear then that compared to other countries, Sweden’s economy would suffer less and recover faster after the pandemic. And importantly, the last wave of the pandemic, which put many countries in a critical position, had almost no impact on Sweden. By the way, the inspiration for writing this post was the comparison between the situation in Israel, where people are already being given a third dose of the vaccine, where covid passports are being actively implemented, and where there were multiple lockdowns, and Sweden, where there is and was nothing of the sort. At the same time, in both countries, the vaccination level for the first and second doses is approximately the same, but the situation is fundamentally different.

Slightly stricter measures were introduced in other Scandinavian countries—Denmark and Norway. The governments of these countries, of course, called these measures extremely harsh, but if compared to measures in other countries, they also seem quite mild. It is also worth mentioning an experiment conducted in Norway. Fitness clubs were considered breeding grounds for coronavirus, so they were closed at first. Later, 5 clubs were opened, allowing half of their clients to attend classes and the other half not to. As a result, over two weeks of observation, only one case of illness was registered, although it was in the group attending fitness clubs, but the infected person had not even managed to reach the sports facility. Also, the director of the Norwegian Institute of Public Health claims that the country could have gotten by without quarantine and achieved the same results. In general, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have already lifted all restrictive measures (except for border controls) and were the first in Europe to return to the life they had before the pandemic. Other countries are still very far from this.

Thus, we are once again convinced that awareness and encouragement of less risky behavior can achieve at least the same, if not more, than strict prohibitions, control, and force. And in general, a huge price will have to be paid for harsh measures in any case. So what is the point if, in the end, they cause more harm than good?

Social credit rating and the monopoly on violence

Voluntarist, Bitarch

In today’s information world, the institution of reputation plays an important role. It is already difficult to imagine purchasing an expensive product or seeking a moderately serious service without first checking the provider’s rating. Ratings and reviews have become an essential part of many services. Most likely, over time, reputation tools will be used in all transactions, including direct deals between individuals. This leads us to the emergence of a social rating, in which different people will have different reputations depending on whether they fulfilled their obligations honestly, or whether they deceived others, violated the terms of deals, or even harmed their well-being through robbery or violence.

The institution of reputation and financial instruments, especially ostracism and transaction insurance, are capable of replacing coercive tools as a method of influencing offenders. The need to initiate forceful measures simply disappears, and in cases where the offender themselves has not committed violence, the need for any form of forceful resolution essentially vanishes (in the event of a violent attack, of course, self-defense is unavoidable). This would only contribute to solving the problem of violence and reducing its level in society. But at the same time, in a world of stationary bandits, where states hold a monopoly and the “legal” right to commit violence, reputation institutions and social ratings could well serve a harmful purpose.

It is important to understand that states often monopolize services that are important to society. Previously, they took strict control over roads, the financial system, fire services, medicine, the extraction of many resources, social security, and—most importantly within the framework of our topic—the quality control of services and goods supplied to the market. It is quite reasonable to expect that if, at some point, the vast majority of people begin to rely on the institution of reputation, states will take control over it as well. Officials will claim that private solutions are unreliable and that there is a need to issue strict rules for the operation of reputation services, or even create a single state reputation service for everyone, banning private rating and review systems. In a world where some states decide which charging device standard people should use (referring to European Union states), such a scenario has a high probability of becoming a reality.

Thus, the institution of reputation will not only become bureaucratized and inefficient, it could also become a tool for persecuting and punishing people disliked by the current political power. This is already happening in China—a minus in one’s social rating can be received for friendship with an opposition member or for statements against party policy. By a single order from above, any person can be deprived of access to many state benefits. And never mind these benefits—if the state were not a violent monopoly, alternatives to its benefits would exist. But under states, there are no alternatives, as private activity is heavily controlled or prohibited in the spheres they have monopolized. In the end, instead of being a method to fight violence, robbery, and deception, the institution of reputation becomes a supporting tool for strengthening state power and coercive control.

A simple conclusion can be drawn from all this: the institution of reputation is very useful in ensuring the security of transactions, and it is also important for the transition from coercive methods to non-violent influence as the basis for maintaining public order. But when combined with violence, especially state violence, it loses these positive qualities and begins to work toward the strengthening of state power and coercive control. Therefore, it is very important to fight violence and prevent the institution of reputation from being taken under the control of any coercive agents. After all, we cannot fight violence if the institution of reputation is used only by violators for their own benefit, as is currently happening in China.

The Milgram Experiment – is a person truly capable of easily harming another person on command?

Voluntarist, Bitarch

In 1963, psychologist Stanley Milgram decided to conduct a series of experiments to clarify a question: how much suffering are ordinary people willing to inflict on others, completely innocent people, if such infliction of pain is part of their job duties? He wanted to understand how the residents of Germany during the years of Nazism could have participated in the destruction of millions of innocent people in concentration camps.

The essence of Milgram’s experiment is that participants are assigned the role of the teacher (in reality, they think they receive this role by lot, but everything is arranged so that a plant actor always becomes the student). Then the “teacher” goes into another room, sits at a table before a high-voltage device, and reads a list of associative word pairs to the “student,” which the student was supposed to memorize. If the student did not memorize the words and subsequently gave a wrong answer to the teacher’s question, the teacher was to use the device to deliver an electric shock to the student. Starting from 15 volts, with each new error, he was to increase the shock in increments of 15 volts up to a maximum of 450 volts, after which he was to continue using the maximum shock. Of course, the actor playing the student received no shock, but only pretended to receive it and experience pain. In different variations of the experiment, the student and teacher were separated either by a soundproof wall (meaning the teacher could only hear the student knocking on the wall), or by an ordinary wall (meaning he could hear screams, pleas to stop, and complaints about supposed heart problems).

As for the results, for example, one series of trials showed that 26 out of 40 subjects (65%) increased the voltage to 450 volts and did not stop delivering electric shocks until the researcher gave the order to end the experiment. And only 5 subjects (12.5%) stopped at a voltage of 300 volts when the victims showed the first signs of distress. Replications of the experiment under different conditions and with different people showed approximately the same results.

What does this mean—that most people are indeed ready to discard all humanity and inflict pain, or even harm, on other people simply by the order of an authority? If we look at the data from Milgram’s experiment that were not published, it is easy to see that this is not the case at all. By analyzing data from 656 post-experimental questionnaires, researchers found that 56% of participants actually stopped the experiment at one point or another because they believed the person behind the wall was truly experiencing pain. Another study, examining 91 interviews conducted immediately after the experiments, showed that among the 46 participants who continued the experiment after the victim’s distress, 33 participants (72%) did so simply because they did not believe that the victim was actually being caused pain (which was indeed the case—the victim-actors only simulated it).

In total, we find that about 86-88% of Milgram’s experiment participants actually either stopped their participation as soon as it seemed to them that they were truly causing the victim pain, or continued only because they did not believe in the authenticity of the experiment and the victim’s pain. These conclusions, based on unpublished data, do not align with the results that were demonstrated in the original studies and shown to a wide audience. Perhaps the methodology of the experiment itself has nothing to be criticized, but the results were clearly cherry-picked to suit the views of the experimenters. An ordinary person cannot be forced to harm others simply by an order from above. And the multi-million victims of Nazism are the result only of the passive acceptance of the regime by the majority of people, while the acts of violence themselves were committed by a minority of security agents working directly for the Nazi state.

https://miro.medium.com/max/2500/1*5HhrlUm_x87sFT1-UiYaOA.png

In a world of violence, there is nowhere to escape to

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Support for certain social norms through coercive methods provided by states, as well as state violence in general, is often not considered a problem at all, since a person is supposedly absolutely free to move to the territory of another state whose conditions will satisfy them. This possibility is also frequently compared to a voluntary change of service provider, as in a free and competitive market. But this assertion is fundamentally incorrect, as several arguments tell us.

First and foremost, moving between states should not be compared to changing a private service provider or moving within a state due to the colossal difference in accompanying costs. As a rule, this requires significant funds, which is far from always achievable for people in difficult situations or living in poor countries. One should also consider the fundamental change in cultural environment, ways of life, and the need to learn a foreign language. For many people, these costs prove insurmountable; because of them, most people never leave their homeland and resign themselves to violent power in the absence of an opportunity to resist it.

One might say that while all these costs are serious, they do not make escaping violence unrealistic for a specific individual. After all, the minimum action required is simply to move to the territory of another country. But even this is difficult. Consider North Korea, from which it is almost impossible to leave; only a few manage to illegally cross the border, risking their lives. Or even less brutal dictatorships, such as Turkmenistan, which is also very hard to leave. It would be interesting to know how the residents of these countries would respond to the assertion that one can simply get up and leave.

In general, movement between states is possible only through border checkpoints; otherwise, forcible detention awaits you. That is, leaving a state is possible exclusively according to the rules imposed by it through force. And rules can change at any moment, becoming stricter. One does not have to look far for examples — just a month ago, leaving Afghanistan was no more difficult than leaving Russia, and now people are ready to cling to the landing gear of a plane to escape the violence of a new stationary bandit in the form of the Taliban. This also applies to civilized Western countries, where historically strict border controls and passport-visa regimes emerged as a means of tracking the movement of people during world wars but were not eliminated upon their conclusion. Additionally, those who are already being persecuted by the state cannot legally leave its territory.

And finally, living in a world where coercive power is the norm, you are not escaping from violence to non-violence; you are merely escaping from one perpetrator of violence to another. The fact that you crossed the border guarantees nothing. Upon entering the territory of another state, your fate is entirely in the hands of its government. It will set certain conditions, and if you do not meet them, you will be detained and sent back, even if you have already socialized in the new place. For instance, a number of countries return fugitives from North Korea. Not long ago, there was a case where Russia deported a woman to Afghanistan who had fled from the Taliban, who were trying to force her into marriage. And even from Western countries, people have often been deported to whom violent retribution threatened in their homeland, for example, because of their sexual orientation.

After all these arguments, it is hardly possible to speak at all about the idea that one can simply get up and run away from violence, especially state violence. In a world of stationary bandits possessing a coercive monopoly on power, doing this is extremely difficult, and in some cases completely impossible. Even in the most favorable scenario, you have no choice but to live without the threat of coercive power from above. Violence is in the foundation of every current social system, and this is another reason to fight it worldwide and as a phenomenon in general, rather than only its individual forms.

Market relations and relations with a stationary bandit

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Imagine you have entered into a contract of any kind with someone, whether it’s purchasing a product or employment. But later, the other party to the contract decides to “screw you over.” What are the consequences of such an action? This question can be answered based on who your now former partner actually is. If it was an ordinary person or a company, the worst you will experience is financial loss, and perhaps to some extent moral damage. You will be left without money, your property may be taken through deception, but overall you will still be okay and free. No market entity that does not use violence as a tool in its activities can deprive you of this.

But what happens if some bandit decides to screw you over? And a bandit can do anything, up to a beating resulting in lifelong disability, or even murder. Maintaining relations of any kind with a bandit is always dangerous because there is a significant probability that at a certain point he will decide to get rid of you. The state can also be categorized as bandits, since it is itself a stationary bandit that is not at all averse to committing violence against its citizens if it allows it to achieve certain goals. This means it is dangerous to conduct any kind of business with it, just as with any other bandit. It is enough for you to displease some official once, or even just to be disliked by them, for them to take a serious interest in you and for you to end up either behind bars or in a cemetery.

For example, let’s recall the recent case with Group-IB, a cybersecurity company. Its founder was arrested, and searches were conducted within the company itself. Although it had previously cooperated closely with the FSB, this is certainly not something that can guarantee the absence of violence on its part. From older stories, one can recall the “Seventh Studio” case, when members of a theater troupe that received government subsidies were eventually imprisoned for the alleged misuse of those subsidies. It is dangerous even to engage in work provided by the state or heavily regulated by it. Recently, two honored doctors with heroic pasts were sent to a pretrial detention center for the most ordinary provision of medical care to an elderly patient.

It turns out that it is somewhat risky to hold a government position or even simply cooperate with the state, because in such a case, any mistake or even simple dissatisfaction from the “partner” will cost you not only the loss of funds—you could be left without freedom, or even your own life. Your connections with the state certainly do not guarantee your safety from the state itself.

Question to Bitarkh

Bitarch, although I only recently became acquainted with libertarianism, I have already read about voluntarism and realized that it is exactly what I need! I am so tired of living among the abusers, boors, and rapists who surround me now! I wish a vaccine that destroys the ability to initiate aggressive violence would be invented as soon as possible, and along with it, universal prosperity would arrive! My father used to beat me, my ex-boyfriend beat me too, and once some thug even tried to rape me in an alleyway! Well, until the vaccine is invented, I want to ask for your help. Bitarch, I want to have a child with a strong Lorenz inhibitor, who would be guaranteed never to initiate violence and yet be able to stand up for themselves, just as you, strictly speaking, do. I am not a poor woman; I can sign a written waiver of alimony; all that is needed is conception from a carrier of a strong variant of the Lorenz inhibitor. Otherwise, there are two extremes around: either mama’s boys and wimps unable to protect themselves, or alpha males with testosterone overflowing and absolutely unrestrained in the manifestation of violence, but something in the middle is needed. Do you agree? And if so, how much do your services for the conception of non-violent offspring cost?

Katya Latysh

I am glad that you liked the ideas I promote and that you believe it is necessary to eradicate violence. As for your delicate request—unfortunately, I cannot 100% guarantee perfect genetics on my part. Although I am a non-violent person, who knows, perhaps I am a carrier of recessive genes that determine a weak variant of the violence inhibitor. There is no genetic test yet to determine the variant of the Lorenz mechanism (the violence inhibitor). Moreover, it is unnecessary to ask me specifically—most people are non-violent anyway; it is unlikely that I can offer anything more than they can. You have simply been unlucky so far, crossing paths with those same 2% of crazed degenerates who have an extremely weak variant of the inhibitor. The distribution of degenerates can be quite uneven, and it is possible that you found yourself in an environment with an increased concentration of them. Perhaps a good solution would be to slightly change your surroundings and your social circle?

I also want to note—one child cannot fix the situation as a whole. If you have financial resources, perhaps it is worth considering investments in biotechnology, obtaining the appropriate education, or some other way to help eradicate violence in degenerates? After all, the sooner it becomes possible to create a genetic test for the violence inhibitor variant and gene therapy to strengthen it, the faster the problem of rapists will be solved and no one will ever apply violence to you again. And in this way, you will be able to precisely guarantee both the non-violence of your children and that they themselves will never encounter violence.

Think about this; if violence is so unpleasant to you and you have certain opportunities, perhaps then it would be a good idea to dedicate your life to the fight against violence and bring closer the day when this problem is finally solved?

Bitarch

The Role of Violence in the Survival of Species and Populations

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Intraspecific violence is often credited with the role of a mechanism important for maintaining the life of individual populations and even entire species. For example, violence is a tool for establishing a dominance hierarchy, excluding weak individuals from competition, allocating limited resources in favor of the strongest and most adapted members of the population, etc. To a certain extent, these statements are true, but what is definitely incorrect is to look at the phenomenon of violence in isolation from other factors—an error often made when presenting violence as a mechanism that works the same way in all cases.

Factors such as the innate armament of population members and the possibility of avoiding violence through flight play an important role in intraspecific violence. In cases where the armament of individuals is quite weak, the population is not limited by a strict habitat (it has room to expand), and individuals generally possess a good ability to flee, then certain benefits can indeed be derived from intraspecific violence without encountering an unacceptable level of negative externalities created by it. In short, in such cases, the benefits outweigh the losses.

But everything changes with an increase in the armament of individuals, with the limitation of their habitat, and if their ability to flee is less developed. The more pronounced these factors are, the more negative externalities the population will experience—violence will begin to threaten its survival. This was noted in ethological research by Konrad Lorenz, who also did not deny the positive aspects of violence, but at the same time took into account factors capable of turning this phenomenon into a catastrophe. He also described the concept of a mechanism that inhibits (restrains) intraspecific violence. I will provide an excerpt from his book “Aggression, or the So-called Evil”:

“A raven can knock out another raven’s eye with a single blow of its beak; a wolf can rip open another wolf’s jugular vein with a single bite. If reliable prohibitions did not prevent this, neither ravens nor wolves would have existed for a long time. A pigeon, a hare, and even a chimpanzee are unable to kill one of their own kind with a single blow or bite. Moreover, such poorly armed creatures possess an ability to flee that allows them to escape even from ‘professional’ predators, who are far more skilled in pursuit, capture, and killing than any superior fellow of their own species. Therefore, in the wild, it is usually impossible for such an animal to harm its own kind. Consequently, there is no selective pressure creating a prohibition against killing.”

From all this, a simple conclusion can be drawn: intraspecific violence can be useful, but only as long as factors such as armament and the inability to flee from violence do not become so pronounced as to create too many negative externalities. And the more pronounced these factors are, the greater the harm will be, which will ultimately lead to selective pressure toward stronger inhibitors of aggressive behavior among population representatives.

Now let us briefly consider the case of humans. Their innate armament is quite weak, and they have not yet fully adapted to the artificial armament that emerged during the development of civilization and scientific and technical progress. But this armament, along with the current lack of possibility for significant expansion of living space (humans have already spread across almost all habitable territory on the planet), creates a great threat to the survival of humanity. Intraspecific violence may have been useful for the distant ancestors of humans, but since they began using artificial weaponry, the situation has changed fundamentally. It is also worth adding that when discussing violence, the characteristics of humans and human society that distinguish them from animals and the animal world are often overlooked. Violence has an extremely negative effect on human psyche and behavior. Violence also disrupts economic relationships. This creates even more negative externalities.

The Myth of the Attacker’s Advantage

Voluntarist, Bitarch

The idea of universal armament and armed self-defense is often attempted to be portrayed as untenable by resorting to the argument of the attacker’s advantage. After all, what difference does it make whether the victim is armed or not if the attacker is still better prepared for the clash, since he is the one who planned it, while the victim expects nothing. And in general, few attackers will risk encountering a stronger opponent; they will prefer to choose a weak victim and bypass a strong one. The attacker always has the advantage; he is most often stronger, and freedom of armament will only give him more of an advantage since he will be able to arm himself freely.

To begin with, it should be noted that it is precisely the restriction of the freedom to arm oneself that gives the attacker an advantage. The ban only works for law-abiding citizens. If we take statistics from the USA, then 94% of mass shootings occur in gun-free zones, and 80% of armed criminals obtained their weapons illegally, most often on the black market, rather than simply buying them in a regular gun store; furthermore, 57% of criminals fear armed citizens more than they fear the police. All these facts directly indicate that it is precisely the regulation and prohibition of armament that gives the attacker an additional advantage.

And even if, after this, the attacker still retains some advantage over the victim, in general, this still decides nothing. The attacker cannot guarantee success; in the best-case scenario for him, his chance of success is merely higher than that of his victim. However, the risk of his failure in the event that the victim is armed is also high, and he will expose himself to this risk with every attack. Victory in one individual clash will not make him a winner overall; soon he will face a failure that could cost him his own life. And violent criminals make up an overwhelming minority of the population; as analysis of Russian crime shows, in the worst case, we have one violent criminal per year per 695 people (and that is considering not only murders, rapes, and the infliction of serious physical harm, but also, for example, battery). This means that, purely statistically, rapists and violent criminals have no chance of defeating an armed civilian population, or even inflicting any serious harm on society.

There can be no rights and freedoms to violence

Voluntarist, Bitarch

To the question of whether a person has the right to commit violence, we have only one answer — they do not! No single person in the world should possess the right to initiate an act of violence against another person. But some people (most often supporters of authoritarian-conservative views and force-based methods of solving problems) may say that this is a restriction of freedom. Freedom to commit violence is a freedom like any other, which means we are contradicting ourselves and are authoritarians ourselves, wanting to forcibly impose a single life scenario on everyone.

This is a rather inadequate manipulation in essence, which ignores the fact that violence leads to people being deprived of their freedom. That is, when one person initiates an act of violence against another person, they thereby deprive them of their freedom. Accordingly, violence is non-freedom. The right to violence is the right to deprive people of their freedom. However, the elimination of violence, the striving for its complete eradication as a phenomenon as a whole, is the elimination of the factor that leads people to non-freedom. And no verbal manipulations will change the essence of the phenomenon of violence!

“Legitimate” and “illegitimate” bandits

Voluntarist, Bitarch

The recent case of the seizure of power in Afghanistan by the Taliban movement only further confirms the theory of the stationary bandit, according to which states arise not through a mythical social contract, but because nomadic bandits decide to settle down and move from irregular looting to stable tribute (or taxation) and the subjugation of people. Even the most liberal and democratic states continue this tradition, as in their case as well, a person has no right to disobey the orders and tax rates established from above—disagreement with this is punished by violence, exactly as in the case of a bandit attacking an unarmed and defenseless victim. And even the provision of certain socially useful services by the state does not change the essence—it is the same as so-called “protection rackets,” where you either agree to pay bandits for some form of protection, or they will attack you.

But it is also important to note that the legitimacy of a specific group on the world stage, that is, its recognition as a state by other states, is purely a question of victory and the seizure of power. Some states are already ready to recognize yesterday’s Taliban terrorists today, and there are even talks of cooperation, including from Russian government structures at the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Similarly, in their time, the Bolshevik bandits were recognized; after they seized power, the representatives of the previous Tsarist government suddenly became the bandits.

The winner is recognized and always spoken with, even if they were a mad bandit only yesterday. And this is the only thing, rather than any “social contract,” that distinguishes a “legitimate” and recognized political force from an “illegitimate” bandit-terrorist. But the essence itself remains the same.