How do things stand with radio waves under ancap?

Under a state, practically no one ever jams signals from radio stations or telephone towers, because the perpetrator would be found instantly (this is a very simple task) and then forcibly compelled to pay fines, compensation, etc. (it is difficult to deny that this is fair).

Under ancap, however, such actions by this perpetrator would essentially not violate the NAP, would not infringe on someone else’s property, etc., which means, logically, they would not face punishment. But that is surely unfair.

Anonymous question (accompanied by a donation in the amount of 0.00047976 BTC)

As it happens, I have already answered a very similar question in great detail regarding how property rights to radio frequency bands are established under ancap, so first, please read that answer, and we will continue the discussion.

Having analyzed the principle of using radio frequency bands, I stated that in an economic sense, this is a scarce resource, and therefore it can be converted into property. Moreover, as you yourself note, the violation of property rights (unauthorized use of a reserved band) is quite easily recorded. In an ancap environment—that is, a developed market decentralized legal order—such disputes are easily taken to court. The grounds for filing a lawsuit are obvious: communication collisions lead to quite measurable losses, all logs are kept, so the damage can be calculated with very high precision.

Under the dominance of the state, it happens frequently that, for example, security forces jam communications in a certain area, and usually, these are states of a sufficiently authoritarian nature that they wouldn’t even bother with the issue of compensation for damages. Nevertheless, even under a state, there are precedents for the judicial protection of the right to use radio waves. For instance, a year ago, by a court decision in Sudan, the plaintiff’s access to mobile internet was restored, after the military junta had previously disconnected the entire country. Thus, if it is sometimes possible to restore property rights even under conditions of weak protection, then under ancap, where much more attention is paid to such things, similar problems would be extremely rare.

Lawyer Abdelazim Hassan guarantees: the right to use radio waves is respected even in Africa, let alone under ancap

An argument for BPN from evolutionary theory

Bitark’s Column

An interesting study by biologist Konrad Lorenz shows how natural “armament” in animals leads to the emergence of morality against aggressive violence. Similarly, restoring the balance of violence potential (BVP) in human society will lead to the adoption of the non-aggression principle (NAP).

There are many species whose armament is so devastating and whose methods of application are so lightning-fast that a real combat clash between rivals would end with the death of one of them, or even both. Take, for example, venomous insects and snakes. Therefore, it is not surprising that natural selection develops a prohibition against using weapons in intra-species clashes for such species. Ethologists, following Lorenz, call this system of instinctive prohibitions that limit animal behavior “natural morality.” It is stronger the more powerfully the animal is armed by nature. During a territorial clash, venomous snakes exaggerate their size by stretching out to see who can stand taller, swaying, and pushing each other, but they never bite, nor do they even demonstrate their weapons. Some species even threaten each other with their heads turned away. It is no wonder that not only ordinary people but also many zoologists mistook the tournament battles of snakes for mating dances.

Well-armed animals can threaten each other for a long time, and when one of them grows tired, it abruptly changes posture, exposing its most vulnerable spot to the opponent for a decisive combat strike. The moral prohibition acts on the winner like an electric shock: all their angry fervor evaporates, they turn away from the opponent and hide their weapon. Similarly, a proud boy, feeling that he will lose a fight, suddenly puts his hands behind his back, lifts his face to the victor and shouts: “Go on, hit me!” Unlike a wolf or a snake, a human may actually strike in response.

After analyzing many species, Lorenz reached a conclusion of stunning simplicity more than 50 years ago: a strong animal has strong morality, while a weak one has weak morality. In terms of its natural history, a human is a very poorly armed animal; unlike monkeys, humans cannot even bite properly. Therefore, humans initially have weak instinctive prohibitions and weak natural morality. An unarmed man cannot cause significant damage to another in a clash: one will tire of hitting, and the other can always run away. Innate prohibitions in humans correspond to this. But subsequently, humans began to create and improve weapons and became the most armed species on Earth. Morality, however, has hardly changed.

Shareholder Viktor Rafaelevich
“Ethological Excursions to the Forbidden Gardens of the Humanities”

How will ancap overcome the demographic pit?

Artem

Ancap is a free, unregulated market. That is, any decisions within ancap are made voluntarily and for mutual benefit. Now let’s look at who cares about demographics under ancap.

First, there are producers of goods and services. They are interested in increasing demand, and specifically, in increasing demand for children’s goods. Children are a very capacity-rich market because they need special nutrition, they quickly outgrow clothes, quickly change their preferences in toys, their safe outings require specially designed spaces, they need to be educated, treated, and so on. So I will receive various tempting offers, from “Today in our store we have a tasting of baby food, be sure to try it and see that your child would be satisfied” to “Planning a tour? Special group discounts for families with children!” I will be shown movies and clips on the internet praising the joys of motherhood. In general, I will constantly feel that with a child, I will be a welcome member of society.

Second, there is me. If I know that my relationship with my child concerns only the two of us, then I will have no fears that I will be deprived of parental rights over some nonsense that bothers neither me nor the child. If I know that people will be happy to sell me any technically possible product or service, from ectogenesis to caring for the child while I feel the urge to take a break from them—then I will have no fears that I will be alone in the face of many accidents, because specialists will help me deal with all the unpleasant chores. So, in essence, the only things separating me from having a child will be money and desire.

But at the same time, if I am too lazy to earn good money, too carefree to save anything or use contraception during sex, and too squeamish to care for an infant—then at least I will know that parental rights to a newborn can be profitably sold to those who, for some reason, have problems having their own child. So it will be completely unnecessary for me to have an abortion, especially if the process of carrying the child is easy enough and doesn’t stress me too much.

From this, it can be concluded that under ancap, the birth rate will be higher than in miserable countries with powerful juvenile justice and a heap of regulations related to children. But lower than in traditionalist cesspools where a woman is property, and if her purpose is to give birth, then go, fulfill your purpose and don’t complain. In short, there will be as many children as those who decided to raise a child need, and whether reproduction ends up expanded or the human population declines in certain periods—I have no idea, it’s not my business.

By the way, here is another category of consumers ready to raise children

Critique of Absolute Non-aggression

With some delay, I saw an article by Anton Epikhin on the RLN.Today channel, in which he discusses the idea of absolute NAP voiced by Bitarch. These thoughts seemed very interesting to me, as they appear more practical and illustrate that the same goal, if pursued as a tactical one, requires certain methods, whereas if pursued as a strategic one, it sometimes requires the exact opposite.

From the position of prioritizing a radical interpretation of the primacy and absolutization of the NAP, for example, a contract army is clearly better than a conscripted one, and the complete absence of an army is even better than its presence.

However, if the NAP is understood as a project-based direction of movement rather than a religious dogma, it becomes obvious that the existence of a national army ensures collective sovereignty for society. Therefore, it is better that it exists than not, and the presence of mass military conscription, unlike a compact conscript army, distributes power within society by involving broad layers of the population in the defensive function, preventing the repressive apparatus from being concentrated solely in the hands of the government.

Therefore, the optimal defense system for moving toward the NAP would be a ubiquitous, albeit currently compulsory, militia-volunteer force, rather than a purely “professional army,” or even more so, the elimination of the state’s repressive apparatus as such, as this would only guarantee the establishment of someone else’s repressive apparatus that is not subordinate to the local community. Gradually, once they become an accepted norm, the practices of local militias united into a nationwide defense system can become purely voluntary; however, for the NAP, the physical presence of such a militia is more important here than the voluntariness itself.

Read the full article on Dzen

Good day, Ancap-san! Have you heard about the parrot whose intelligence was at the level of a 4-year-old child? It would be interesting to know the position of libertarianism regarding the rights of sentient non-humans, especially property rights.

The Anal Magician

For a modern person, broadly speaking, it doesn’t matter who their counterparty is, as long as that party performs valid actions. What difference does it make to me whether I buy bitcoins from a person or a bot? I simply create a buy order, and whether a Black man, a gay man, a Rosgvardia officer, a parrot, or a network intelligence responds to it, I don’t care, as long as they send me the bitcoins upon receipt of the rubles.

The same applies to situations where counterparties encounter each other face to face. If one of them asserts their rights, the second analyzes the claim and either recognizes it or doesn’t. What difference does it make who is asking me to give way—a car (autonomous or not), a person, or a dog? If I consider it a reasonable request, I will yield.

The same applies to property rights. If a parrot reacts to an intrusion into its cage with a piercing “Trespassers will be shot!”, I either decide that it understands what it wants to say, or I remain convinced that some ancap simply taught it various funny phrases. When further interaction with the parrot leads me to the conviction that its will, expressed in human language, indeed corresponds to its desires, I will take those desires into account. In the same way, I would have to find a mutual understanding with some cat that does not intend to express itself in human languages, but has needs and is capable of signaling them.

In general, a parrot could fly to the nearest store for food on its own, and it would face no more difficulties with this than a four-year-old child. It likewise cannot open a door, but it can ask adults to do so. And it can likewise hand a crumpled banknote to the seller and ask for a bag of sunflower seeds. For the seller, both the child and the parrot would be legitimate owners of the banknote, which gives them the right to receive the goods.

The same goes for emancipation. A child can declare their desire to live independently, followed by a conversation about whether they properly imagine the consequences and if they are ready for them. Similarly, a parrot can demand not to be held, and if it can convince a human that it can handle an independent life, then it is within its right to fly away. How do we feel about an adult who holds a child against their will? From the moment the child is able to explain this will to outsiders, we view such a thing poorly. Likewise, a parrot that begins to complain about the restriction of its freedom to the first outsider to come within earshot would not add to the society’s sympathy for its owner.

Of course, not everything is so rosy. Until a person becomes accustomed to regularly contacting sentient non-humans, every such non-human will have to explain their rights anew to every person they meet, until everyone in the neighborhood knows that a sentient parrot lives in this park, and entry to the clearing under this tree is by its invitation only.

But which rights of sentient non-humans would face difficulties in recognition? Primarily those that cause danger or serious inconvenience to humans. For instance, people respect the right of ants to have an anthill in a city park, and are even ready to undertake efforts to protect it—but they do not recognize the right of ants to live in wall niches and steal sugar from the table, a non-recognition of which can easily lead to ant genocide on the part of humans.

The Only One and His Property

Stéphane Molinier, Practical Anarchy. Chapter 4.

I edited the fourth chapter of Practical Anarchy by Stephan Molneux. The text is an impressive exercise in rhetoric. The author continues to motivate us to abandon the state in favor of anarchy using the following logical construct: the state is absolutely horrific, therefore, the absence of a state could be cool; if it turns out that coordination in a society without a state is possible in principle, then we should go for it. If this creates minor inconveniences, they can be tolerated, but the whole point is that no, it won’t, but on the contrary, it will only be better, and then it turns out that you endured the evil, ugly state just so that life would also be inconvenient—aren’t you idiots?

Election Commission Strike. New video on Libertarian Band.

A video of atypical content has been released on Libertarian band. One of the team members, Alexei Nefedov, also works in a precinct election commission. He decided to join the strike of election commission members and briefly explains the motives why other members of election commissions should follow his example.

For my part, I will add that on one hand, it is useful for as many election commission members as possible to strike, and on the other — it is useful to create as much workload as possible for those remaining, so that they curse everything and regret not joining the strikers. Call the commission to your home; for once, this is allowed for everyone, so we should take advantage of it and let them run around. Are we agorists or what?

Once more about intellectual property law

Suppose I am a writer. I live in Ancapistan. I wrote a book. I posted it on my website, free for readers. At the top, I put a banner that rotates with every view and brings me a little bit of money. At the bottom, I put a donation button.

A malicious pirate copied my book to his own site. He threw out a couple of chapters he didn’t like. He put his own banner at the top. He put his own donation button at the bottom.

If I take a little shotgun and go to kill him, will the jury acquit me?

анонимный вопрос

This is a supplement to the question proposed by the King of Sex and Tea Bags, but this time without a signature.

Oddly enough, I quite often do exactly what you described. Some Bitarch or Vitaly Tizun posts an article. I take the text, correct the commas, remove paragraphs I don’t like, accompany it with some comment of my own, and post it on my own site, not forgetting to place a “donations” button under the post. As it happened, none of them have come at me with a little shotgun for this; in fact, some even praise me, saying the edited text is easier to read. Perhaps it’s because I credit the author and provide a link to the original post. Therefore, the authors see their own benefit in my behavior and do not object.

But what if I ignored the norms of netiquette, took anyone’s texts, edited them however I liked according to my taste, and posted them in a channel under my own name? One thing would be obvious in this situation: it would also be unnecessary for others to observe the norms of netiquette in their attitude toward me. Perhaps the slandered authors would rain attacks on me in social networks and tediously explain to the public that they are the actual authors of the text, that the originals should be obtained from them, and that they are the ones who should be donated to if the work was liked. And I would continue my strange approach to content creation, focusing on exactly what and how I change in the posted texts. For example, I might post the text of the Iliad, leaving only the first half of the second song, and refer all those who are outraged to Mandelstam. Over time, I would gain a community of connoisseurs of my specific edits. Or perhaps the readers would quickly get bored. That’s the market.

Now, if I focused not on self-assertion through edits, but on simply posting as many “tasty” texts as possible, I would end up with a very ordinary electronic library. In this case, it would be redundant for me to cut out even the author’s name and substitute my own; I would post it as is, but I would take care of fast servers, providing the text in all popular e-reader formats, and other things valued by users. I would try to ensure that I have everything people are interested in, in the most convenient form for reading. I would develop a reader community, interview authors, and so on. And the authors would come to me themselves, suggesting, “Look, I have a fresh book here, take it, and give me a percentage of the donations.” I would say: ok. I would allocate a personal section for the author in my library, make them a moderator there, let them answer readers’ questions and entertain them in every way, and we would split the income in an agreed proportion.

Of course, if I behaved like a textbook “mudesa,” treating authors with disdain—saying, “be grateful that you talentless hacks are published anywhere at all, you should actually be paying me for this”—or, say, inserted scenes into someone’s books that made the author look like an idiot—well, then perhaps I would drive someone to the point of coming at me with a little shotgun. But I could just as easily drive anyone to that for any other reason; here, the activity of posting other people’s texts is no longer the principal issue. And the more vilely I behaved, the more people wondered how I hadn’t been shot yet—the more satisfaction they would feel upon the occurrence of that fact. Of course, those who demand compensation from the killer for my murder would find it difficult to find a sufficiently impartial court, but not everyone in the world is a fan of literature. So, they’d hardly be acquitted, but they probably wouldn’t be judged strictly either.

States are not private organizations

Vitaly Tizun’s Column

When criticizing the state, it is very common to hear that if you don’t like it, you should just leave for another “pen.” The argument is that states are also private competing organizations; they survive on funds paid by their clients (meaning citizens), and every person has a choice among many states, which means we already live in a free society. In reality, this is a very inadequate explanation of what the state is and how it works. Why? Let’s find out!

What does replacing one private agent with another usually mean? You need to terminate the old contract and enter into a new one with another agent. Of course, this process can sometimes encounter some difficulties, but overall it does not carry any unacceptable burdens. In this matter, you most likely will not even have to change your place of residence. And if you do (for example, you decide to change residential complexes or find a job in a neighboring city), the environment surrounding you still will not change fundamentally.

What does changing a state mean? You need to renounce your culture, your language, your loved ones and acquaintances, your familiar living environment, incur significant monetary expenses, fulfill a series of conditions regarding the termination of your previous citizenship (sometimes difficult to fulfill; I know one person who could not renounce Russian citizenship due to the need to “pay the debt to the Motherland”), and also fulfill a series of conditions to obtain new citizenship (you cannot move to another country simply by buying housing or finding a job—meaning, while getting the approval of some local residents, you still need permission from the state), and so on.

The process of changing states faces significant costs. An ordinary person will not move to another country simply because they have a poor knowledge of the local language and lack sufficient funds. Most people will flee their country only if the government starts simply shooting everyone indiscriminately (however, such governments usually also close the borders). In any other situation, no matter how bad it is, the majority of the population remains where they were.

One might say that you simply should not belong to the majority, that you need to develop yourself, strive, learn other languages, accumulate funds for relocation by all possible means, prove your reliability and usefulness to another state, and then everything will work out—and if you don’t do this, it means you don’t really want to change anything in your life.

However, even if you strive and successfully move to the territory of another state, this still provides no guarantees regarding the policy of the new sovereign. Regardless of the circumstances, the majority of the population of any state (the very ones who will never move) will not escape paying taxes and obeying state regulations. The state has the ability to use these people and their resources to pursue its own goals. This gives it the opportunity to make mistakes in its policy, or even adopt very inadequate and irrational decisions, since it always has the means to cover the resulting costs.

A private organization needs to function as efficiently as possible because it lives entirely on the sale of its goods and services. Any manifestation of inefficiency is unacceptable for it, as this would lead to the goods it provides being either more expensive or of lower quality than those of its competitors; it would thus lose clients and its income.

The state, however, does not need to strive for maximum efficiency. A specific government only needs to conduct a policy that is efficient enough to keep citizen indignation below a certain critical level. But no more than that.

States in no way resemble private organizations; they do not compete for people, but exploit the population belonging to them. The state is always slavery. To say that states are market and competing organizations is nonsense!

Ancap-chan’s Comment

Any analogy should not be taken completely literally. Of course, states compete for people, although this does not at all negate the thesis that they strive to exploit them for the purpose of obtaining income—if there were no such goal, there would be no sense in competing. Citizenships of different states have different values, although, of course, different people value different advantages provided by one citizenship or another.

But with equal success, we could consider the preferences of slaves regarding which master it is better to be owned by. It is known that some slaves successfully changed masters according to their preferences, although the bulk of them were unable to do so, or did not even perceive it as a need.

In short, the slogan “if you don’t like it—leave” should never be dismissed. In this regard, I want to remind you of an excellent article by Savva Shanaev, Mathematics in the Service of Libertarianism, as well as my brief comment on this article.

Mechanics of Freedom, Chapter 51

I continue to publish the translation of The Machinery of Freedom by David Friedman.

In the chapter Bargaining in Anarchy, the author analyzes how, in a Hobbesian state of nature where there are no means to compel each other to abide by agreements, these very agreements can arise and be observed at all. In other words, how people exit the state of war of all against all without any state. To explain this, a rather curious concept from game theory is introduced: Schelling points. I don’t know about you, but for me, the material was completely new, so I sincerely enjoyed the process of editing the text.