Тег: Ancap

Contracts

I had a debate yesterday. My opponent was pushing popular takes about how the state is no different from those contract jurisdictions of yours, and that obtaining a passport is like signing a contract. Where is the text of the contract? Right here, the body of laws. Much arguing followed, during which I formulated for myself why contracts are needed and how to view them.

A contract is merely a mutual promise. Promises are made, revised, disavowed, and broken; their violation may have certain consequences. The vast majority of contracts are not smart contracts. They cannot execute themselves; they must be executed by people. My interlocutor asks: if you ancaps reserve the right to break any contract in advance, and even explicitly state that you reserve the right to try to avoid harmful consequences of its breach—then why are contracts needed at all? How does a world with contracts differ from the state of nature, where nobody owes anyone anything?

Contracts are needed to make the world simpler, more predictable, and more understandable, providing the ability to make longer-term plans by relying on other people. But if a contract does not execute itself, then simply relying by default on the fact that it will be executed by other people is fraught with erroneous planning. And here there are two paths, both valid and not contradictory. One can invest in contract enforcement mechanisms. Or one can try to enter into contracts that the counterparty will want to fulfill.

For example, the traffic rule “in this area, it is customary to keep to the right side of the road” is a good rule. It is far better than its absence because it increases the predictability of traffic. It is cheap to follow, because what difference does it make which side you drive on; you can drive on the right. And it is expensive to ignore. There is no need to specifically enforce this rule; it is enough that everyone knows about it, and if they happen not to know, they quickly find out by observing the flow of traffic. And since those who love to stretch the truth tend to call the relationship between a citizen and the state a contract—implicitly concluded on the principle of a public offer—then this traffic rule is a good example of a healthy person’s social contract.

Now let’s imagine a situation. A person enters a certain territory. At the checkpoint, they are offered twelve volumes of rules of conduct on this territory—and a place to sign this contract, which will give them the right of entry. Since the person will not read these volumes, the procedure for them boils down to the following: you ask for a signature to let me in. Here is the signature, let me in. The contract on my part is fulfilled. And any further appeal to the contents of the sixth volume of the tomes gathering dust at the checkpoint will be perceived by them as lawlessness, and pointing out that you signed the contract will be perceived as mockery. Such contracts do not make the world simpler or more predictable. They are needed by self-proclaimed enforcers to have a reason to nitpick a violation, while the party who signed them for the right of entry will constantly violate them without any ulterior motive; therefore, one cannot rely on the existence of such-and-such a contract and people’s adherence to it in their planning. This means that under ancap, the natural emergence of a practice to accompany stay on a territory by imposing a voluminous code of rules is unlikely to take hold. More precisely, the maximum volume of rules acting on a territory will be proportional to the exclusivity of access to it and the ease of enforcement. An expensive, elite, closed club can afford complex norms of behavior. A public park cannot.

Of course, there are contracts where complexity is due to the complexity of the subject of the deal. For example, the merger of large joint-stock companies. But there, the contract is prepared by professionals from both sides, not provided by one party in a ready-made form without the right to make edits. So the complexity will be voluntary. And it is precisely this that will ensure the desire to fulfill everything exactly as written.

And finally, there are contracts where the subject of the deal is complex, but the text is standard. For example, a bank loan agreement. But for the bank’s client, this text essentially boils down to a short explication: you give me this much now, I give you this much monthly for this many years. As for what exactly should be done if something goes wrong—here, the presumption of the bank’s good faith applies. The client believes that the bank provides fair procedures for such scenarios and is not against following them specifically, because he did not think them through himself. But when it comes down to it, his opinion may change sharply. This is where the bank discovers that all these procedures, from the client’s point of view, are not sacred tablets. It is not a contract at all. These are the bank’s wish-lists. And the client has their own. And the more the bank insists on the observance of its wish-lists, the more dissatisfied the client will be, and the more costs he will try to create for the bank. Therefore, the more highly competitive the loan market will be under conditions of decentralized law, the more customer-oriented the contracts there will be.

The same applies to our ordinary life—most of the rules that others insist on observing are not contracts, but wish-lists. Some we respect, some we don’t, we resolve our conflicts ourselves—and it’s fine, we live. Quite peacefully and happily.

A wise guy who knows which wish-lists are worth voicing and which are not

What are the different variants of anarcho-capitalism? I only know about the Rothbardian and Friedmanite variants (I am not including Hoppe, as it is essentially a development of Rothbard’s ideas in one specific direction).

Dmitry

I don’t think there is a clear typology anywhere, but the question is interesting; let’s reason through it.

The Rothbardian version: it is derived from natural rights, and therefore presupposes a certain unified ethical-legal system described in “The Ethics of Liberty,” or derived in some other way on the same methodological basis (for example, Molliqneux expresses his views in this same vein in his Practical Anarchy). Consequently, questions arise regarding it: who will force everyone to be guided by a single legal system?

The Friedmanite version is based on the economic analysis of law, specifically on the basis of the Chicago School of Economics, which implies the possibility of engaging in interpersonal utility comparisons to a certain extent. Accordingly, in the Friedmanite version of anarcho-capitalism, different legal systems are traded on the market, capturing those segments where they prove to be the most efficient.

Nevertheless, both versions of social organization imply, as a kind of successor to the key state function of enforcing its own decisions, certain law enforcement agencies, as in the case of Friedman and the Tannahills, or strictly non-violent dispute resolution agencies, as with Molliqneux, which nevertheless possess truly totalitarian regulatory power—in short, some “larvae” of the state, about which one must somehow explain what reasons will prevent these larvae from growing into full-fledged states.

Following Vladimir Zolotorev, I adhere to a praxeological approach to the analysis of law and, quite independently of him, predict that in an anarchic society with developed market relations, the effect of the division of labor will push cumbersome monsters—those attempting to gather completely diverse functions, which are currently appropriated by the state, under one roof—out of the market. There are no grounds to believe that the services of detectives, forensic experts, or blockchain analysts must necessarily be provided by the same firms that offer security services, debt collection, resolve economic disputes, maintain cadasters, insure life and property, or issue certificates stating that a person knows how to drive a car or, for instance, shoot a pistol.

The practice of living in the libertarian community of MonteLibero further strengthens me in my originally purely theoretical views that people do not need detailed, written-out legal institutions all that much. On the contrary, in an anarchic society, people tend to resolve conflicts on the spot, forming situational coalitions if necessary. The need for complex specialized services in the field of legal protection arises quite rarely; therefore, in a free market, this need will likely be met by relatively small companies that nevertheless have a wide geographical reach—otherwise, a sufficient client base cannot be gathered.

Returning to the question, we see that different descriptions of ancap mainly boil down to how conflicts will be resolved in such a society—because regarding issues such as the functioning of a free market, libertarian theorists have no particular disagreements. Accordingly, if some previously undeveloped idea occurs to you about how law could otherwise function—congratulations, you will add another version of ancap to the collection of existing ones.

Ancap-paternalism

Something peculiar happened in Montelibero recently. Someone appeared who wanted to enter our tokenomics with a large sum. Most likely, he read the instructions and began to follow them. He obtained dollar stablecoins from some external exchange and went to exchange them for our euro ones. Meanwhile, the order book usually looks something like this:

What do we see here? There is a certain number of tokens trading in both directions with a more or less reasonable spread, and then orders begin at completely absurd prices; for example, 5 EURMTL are offered for sale at a price of 1000 USDC each. For such an order to be triggered, someone would first have to buy more than four thousand EURMTL at a price of around 1.12, and under normal conditions, this of course never happens. But when someone, without looking and with a broad gesture, throws, for example, 40,000 USDC into the market, they will buy up all the cheap euros, and with the remaining amount, they will stock up on overpriced ones. That is exactly what happened.

According to libertarian principles, this deal, like any other voluntary transaction, is completely legitimate. A person has every right to sell a glass of water for a diamond in the heart of a desert or a kilogram of flour for an antique icon in besieged Leningrad. Likewise in our case—there were no more favorable offers on the market, and the buyer agreed to what was available.

What is the difference between our case and the aforementioned cases of buying under conditions of extreme scarcity? In our case, there was no real scarcity in the market. It would have been enough to buy as many tokens as were listed for sale at an acceptable price, then wait a bit and make sure that other traders arrived and placed new orders at prices not much worse. One could also have written in the chat: “I want to buy euros for forty kilobucks, but there aren’t that many on the exchange, who is ready to sell more?” Finally, one could have contacted the MTL fund directly, saying, “Guys, you’re emitting a stablecoin here, how about you issue more coins against my dollars.”

But to do this, one must understand the specifics of the acquired asset and the specifics of the trading tools. And this leads us to a discussion of paternalism under ancap.

What is paternalism? It is a demand for a social arrangement that reduces the cost of a mistake. Is there such a demand under ancap? Of course, yes. Even looking only at tokenomics, it exists, firstly, from the side of beginners who do not yet fully understand the principles of how it works and therefore risk losing a lot through carelessness. Secondly, there is a demand from the developers of tokenomics tools: if a tool is dangerous to use, people will use alternative solutions. Thirdly, there is a demand from community activists: it is important to them that people come and stay, rather than fleeing in horror after hitting such pitfalls.

How was the case described above handled?

Firstly, additional checks were added to the MTL-Wallet. If a user wants to exchange a large amount at market price, the bot compares the effective exchange rate for the proposed amount and for an amount a hundred times smaller. If they differ by more than 10%, the bot issues a warning.

Secondly, the trader who made a fortune on their order was found and persuaded to return the earnings (I am not aware of the details; perhaps they kept some for themselves, but the victim, nevertheless, remained completely delighted). This was the hardest part, as the ancap community has no tools for forced coercion to return funds, nor should it have any.

Thirdly, the fund plans to place protective orders for all main trading pairs so that it would be extremely difficult for a careless buyer to break through them.

What conclusions can I draw from what happened?

Firstly, paternalism is natural, and there is no need to fight it.

Secondly, under ancap, paternalism is limited by libertarian principles, namely self-ownership and the non-aggression principle.

Thirdly, even with such limitations, fully functioning paternalistic tools can be created in society.

So here is another argument for your collection of debates with statists, proving that ancap is not cannibalism, and that private paternalism is more effective than state paternalism.

How will prostitution work under ancap?

Digit

I thought it would be interesting to discuss this issue specifically after a couple of posts about a hypothetical cellular stimulator that allows one to gain serious short-term advantages at the cost of premature wear and tear on the body. Professional prostitution in a free market is exactly the same trade-off. Intensive exploitation of one’s body while it is young and beautiful, and after that, it is a personal matter how to dispose of the fruits of this exploitation: one can squander it, invest it successfully, or invest it unsuccessfully.

The fewer the barriers to entry into the market, the higher the competition, the lower the prices, and the lower the chances of exchanging youth and beauty for a sufficiently serious income that such an exchange would make sense at all. Therefore, of course, prostitution as a mass profession under ancap is unlikely. It is far more likely that it will be used as a side job while searching for more suitable permanent employment, including during the period of study. Roughly for the same reasons people go work as couriers, taxi drivers, or waiters.

Naturally, as is the case now, various activists will speak in defense of these low-paid unskilled service workers, with varying degrees of clumsiness. But, since under ancap they will not have options like “achieving a ban on the activities of aggregator platforms” or “achieving the criminalization of the purchase of services,” this activism will be reduced either to demands for the reduction of platform commissions or to campaigns such as “I always pay service workers good tips, do as I do.”

As is well known, the activity of taxi aggregators currently faces active opposition from professional licensed taxi drivers. Under ancap, this activity is not licensed, and professional licensed taxi drivers simply disappear, so competition for freelance taxi drivers using various aggregators is provided only by those who prefer to be behind the wheel themselves, including those who give friends rides for free. The same applies to prostitution—permanent marriage unions and ordinary friendly flings will not go anywhere; both have their costs, but direct payment is usually not discussed here. However, somewhere at the junction between full-fledged prostitution and completely free sex, work for donations may well be located: a person may be shy about stating a fixed price but clearly makes it known that they would be glad for a voluntary reward.

This is exactly how I create my texts. They will appear for free because I enjoy the creative process, but I will give preference to a question with a donation, even if it is not as interesting as a free one—because I need money, and because the fact of payment creates a moral obligation. Moreover, this provides a simple ranking of those for whom my answer is more important and those for whom it is less so. Roughly the same mechanism will operate within ancap and with donations for sex: if one party basically enjoys the process but does not want to make a hobby a profession, and the other represents an undefined circle of people, then instead of a long and careful search for an exclusive partner, such a donation scheme is quite likely.

As a reminder, it is better to ask questions here, and the ways to donate are listed here.

How much did they donate? Right, the get-together with girlfriends is canceled, I’m scheduling a meeting.

Is it legitimate to sell weapons to a mentally ill and potentially dangerous person?

If it is illegitimate, when exactly does it become illegitimate: at the moment of sale, or when that same unstable person commits a crime?

Ancapman

We are, of course, considering ancap, because under a state, this issue is resolved through political games surrounding regulations, and we are interested in what is the correct way.

Ancap is a free market plus the decentralization of law enforcement. The market means that the seller decides for themselves to whom and for how much to sell a gun. Anarchy means that conflicts are resolved on an ad hoc basis.

A psycho wants to buy a gun. The gun owner wants to sell it. A bystander fears that the psycho will shoot someone and would like the gun not to be sold to him. In other words, he has a conflict with the seller. But how will this bystander know that the buyer is a dangerous psycho? Do we have a society of total control, which is dreamed of by the author of the book Practical Anarchy, Stephan Molignon?

Of course, it is easy to imagine a society where all the dangerous psychos are known. This is a village or a small town where everyone knows everyone. This one isn’t a psycho, but a harmless hippie; he’s skating on the promenade. But this one is constantly shouting at his wife, and it seems there are fights. And when someone tries to reason with him, he becomes even more agitated and spews incoherent threats. Maybe he shouldn’t have a gun? And the owner of the only gun shop in the area would prefer not to take on extra responsibility. Or he sells it carelessly, and then tomorrow at the barbershop, he’ll be asked if he’s an idiot.

But people, you know, sometimes choose to live in megacities for some reason. Will megacities remain under ancap? I fully assume so: people cluster because many types of offline businesses have a significant positive effect of scale, and they will continue to have it even in the absence of state regulations.

In a megacity, generally speaking, all people look the same to each other. A gun can be sold in a thousand places. No one will voluntarily chip in to maintain a complex system of weapons registration and total medical examination, which means there won’t be one. Therefore, let’s simply accept as a fact that under ancap, any solvent psycho will always find a way to buy a gun, including anonymously, and even that loudmouth from the small town can easily do it simply by going to a megacity.

How to protect oneself from the consequences? In a small town, it is much easier for a dangerous psycho to be refused an apartment rental. He will be forced to move from time to time until he settles in the outskirts, where landlords won’t constantly receive complaints about their tenant. In a megacity, it may be unclear who to complain to about a violent neighbor, because generally, you simply don’t know who owns the neighboring apartment. But if it’s very irritating, you can, again, move yourself to a more decent district where more attention is paid to the peace of the residents.

Well, if the violent psycho does get a gun and intends to use it, the situation becomes very simple: get your own and neutralize the psycho. Or someone else who gets there first will do it. There is no time here to reason whether it was legitimate to sell that person a gun, or who to blame for the resulting situation. The probability of accidentally getting hit by a bullet is significantly lower than the probability of accidentally getting hit by a car or drowning, but that doesn’t make people give up cars or swimming.

In general, the question about psychos and guns was already asked to me about five years ago. Goodness, five years! How long I’ve been running this channel!

What to do with the “free rider” effect in the case of ancap in the sphere of defense, security, and law?

Evgeny Fishkin

I have had to answer something like this many times, but it’s easier to answer briefly once more than to search for links to old posts.

General recommendation: increase the level of decentralization. The more decentralization there is in a particular sphere, the fewer free riders there are—there are no incentives left for them.

Decentralization in the sphere of defense means arming oneself. To a neighbor with a rifle, you are no longer just a neighbor, but also someone who will provide friendly cover fire. There is a non-illusory danger of an attack by a serious enemy—this is a great excuse for regular team-building activities. Have a few shots, then go drink beer.

Decentralization in the sphere of security is, conventionally speaking, about keeping private keys yourself rather than on an exchange. Installing an alarm system in your apartment so that security you’ve hired arrives on call, rather than some state police. And so on.

Decentralization in the sphere of law means settling things yourself, and if you cannot, turning to those you trust, rather than those appointed by other people. Most conflicts are resolved out of court even with a state, although, one would think, here is a centralized conflict resolution service provided to you, why not use it? Inconvenient? Exactly!

Why doesn’t this picture surprise us? Because it is natural behavior when there is no state.

Preventing nuclear war under ancap

Hi! I really dislike your answers regarding the prevention of nuclear war. You say that ancaps will shift the costs onto the nomenklatura, but these answers are far from reality. A bounty of 11 million euros was placed on Lukashenko’s head, yet there weren’t even any attempts to eliminate him.

Suppose there is a nomenklatura sitting in a very deep bunker under a densely populated city. They are protected by loyal security services.
What will libertarians do if this nomenklatura starts a nuclear war against Ancapistan (=what do they threaten with to prevent it)? It would be preferable to provide some specific military measures.

Nenavision

Okay, let’s imagine such a picture. Zelensky arrives at the front to hand out another box of medals, and there he is suddenly kidnapped by an enemy sabotage and reconnaissance group and taken to the RF. Next, they push a peace treaty on him, which he agrees to sign publicly. At the solemn signing ceremony, he inevitably gets within handshake distance of Putin, after which he clenches his jaw, breaks a fake tooth—in short, some trash in the spirit of Frank Herbert happens, only Vladimir Putin turns out not to be as lucky as Vladimir Harkonnen, and also dies.

In the RF, power is seized by a club of angry patriots, who move into a bunker under Moscow, surround themselves with loyal security services, and give the order for an immediate general mobilization, as well as bring the Strategic Missile Forces to a state of highest combat readiness.

Meanwhile, in Ukraine, the central government is paralyzed by another Maidan; control over the supply of the front, as well as other state functions, are taken over by volunteers; the Maidan declares the complete abolition of taxes and complete freedom of private initiative, as well as general armament—in short, literally a month after the incident with the kidnapping of Zelensky, Ukraine becomes an ancap society in a first approximation.

Great, a minimally plausible picture of a deadly deadlock between a fanatic dictator and an ancap society with clear territorial borders has been established. How do the ancaps defend themselves against Girkin? They have no nuclear bomb, no medium-range missiles, no strategic aviation, no unified command, and no time to waste.

The ancaps react to the threat in their favorite manner: everyone does what they are best at. For the most part, this means occupying themselves with matters far more important than war. For example, importing goods from the EU into Ukraine duty-free, and also exporting them duty-free through the leaky Russian border in the area of a conditional Shebekino, and selling them there for bitcoins.

The front gradually collapses because the mobilized realize that there will be no criminal prosecution for desertion, provided their own don’t shoot them in the back immediately. Armaments and ammunition from warehouses gradually and mysteriously disappear into someone’s private stores. Several highly motivated groups prepare for partisan warfare, while the less flexible prepare to stand to the death on their tiny section of the front, but for some reason the enemy prefers to attack where they are not.

Girkin realizes that he no longer needs general mobilization, and that he can do without nuclear weapons as well. He focuses on organizing an effective occupation administration, plus he is forced to pay more and more attention to the internal agenda. He has to climb out of the bunker more and more often, travel through the regions, solve purely civilian issues—and after three months he is finally killed by Ukrainian partisans, somewhere on the way from Vladivostok airport to the city. The first car hits a mine, then the motorcade is shelled by mortars, and then the survivors are cleaned up with small arms. This episode becomes the occasion for previously scattered attacks on representatives of Girkin’s occupation administration to turn into a full-scale hunt.

Power in Russia is taken by Sobyanin, who orders an immediate retreat to the 2014 borders and begins bargaining with the international community for the lifting of sanctions in exchange for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Crimea as well, replacing them with UN peacekeepers. Along the way, he releases Navalny, stating that he would be happy to see his former opponent in the post of Moscow mayor, as he is not in doubt that this time he will definitely win the election. But that is a completely different story.

A column of light armored vehicles is an easy target

How should the poor, who cannot afford private police or buy weapons, defend themselves under ancap?

Is there perhaps a benefit for the rich in protecting the poor? And what if there are no rich people somewhere, but only gangs providing “protection” to neighborhoods under threat of violence? Or will such a “ghetto” eventually heal itself over time?

Anonymous question

Today, the weapons market is extremely regulated and largely stigmatized, as a result of which the demand for weapons is predictably lower than it would be in a completely free market. Therefore, there are every reason to believe that due to the expansion of the market under ancap, weapons will be more accessible in terms of both variety and price, not to mention the absence of any arbitrary restrictions. And if even now certain types of self-defense weapons, such as pepper sprays, cost mere pennies and are available even to those with the most modest incomes, then under a free market, things will be quite good in this regard.

What should people do who do not want to pay some security organizations to maintain order in the area where they live? Naturally, do it themselves. After all, we maintain order in the house if we don’t want to pay cleaning services. Similarly, there is no problem in sticking a barrel out the window upon a neighbor’s alarm signal and ensuring that everyone in the line of fire has calmed down and returned to peaceful activities.

In essence, the only thing for which professional help is more likely to be needed under ancap in terms of maintaining order is searching for stolen goods, since theft is a clandestine misappropriation, and a pistol in the pocket does not protect against it by default. Well, here either insurance works, or a simple desire for revenge, corrected by economic expediency. Either way, the victim either searches for the missing item themselves, hires detectives, or the insurance company hires detectives wishing to recoup the cost of paying the insurance premium.

Can gangs that forcibly hold a particular territory under their “protection” exist stably under ancap? Actually, such gangs are called states, and the only thing that keeps them from being destroyed is the consent of those under their protection to put up with such a state of affairs. This will also determine the stability of criminal ghettos under ancap. An additional factor of instability for them is complete freedom of migration. Overly active thugs will simply discover one fine day that everyone has fled their territory. This can be easily observed in criminal enclaves such as certain US cities managed by overzealous Democrats: people simply move away to quieter places. So there are indeed incentives for such ghettos to eventually heal themselves or disappear, and the only thing that can prolong their existence is stupid, irrational submission. It is precisely to eliminate this that ancaps like me conduct their propaganda)))

Now give the purse back to the girl and get the hell out of here!

Tell me everything about inheritance under ancap

How will the order of inheritance be distributed without a will? What if there are no heirs? And if my debts exceed the inheritance and there is no guarantor/insurance, will they pass to someone else?

Neprizivnoy

Ancap implies the decentralization of dispute resolution procedures, which automatically means the absence of rigid rules imposed from above regulating the issue of inheritance. Therefore, I cannot say exactly how a particular piece of property or debts will be divided, but I can speculate on how this issue will be resolved locally in substance.

Rights are claims that have been accepted. Upon the death of a person who owned certain property, various people may raise claims to that property. Who eventually gets the property and in what shares depends primarily on who accepts the corresponding claims and how easily. In the most obvious cases, for example, if the deceased had a bitcoin wallet and their household members also had access to the keys, it is unlikely that anyone would be able to contest their claims to own the bitcoins. Similarly, if the deceased lived in their own house, their household members automatically become the factual owners of the house after their death, and contesting their rights to this inheritance would mean putting forward a claim to evict them, which requires extremely strong grounds. It is likely that relatives or friends of the deceased living separately would find it difficult to justify their rights to any share in something where other people were already factual co-owners with the benefactor.

But what about property that the deceased owned solely and to which their cohabitants have no direct access? For example, they owned a company. The keys to the company office are held by the cleaning lady, but it is unlikely that her claims to seize the office based on factual access to the premises would be taken seriously by anyone. Nevertheless, if none of the deceased’s relatives took a direct part in the business and no instructions regarding the property were left by the deceased, it would not be surprising if the company were stripped by its employees or misappropriated by someone in management — either individually or in cooperation with some colleagues. This would simply mean that the property rights to this business were poorly established. Of course, the more established the surrounding market, the less likely such a situation is, and most likely the ownership of the company has long been tokenized, and the rules for the transfer of tokens to other hands were described, including taking into account the possible death of the owner. For instance, the Montelibero Foundation and the entire tokenomics developed around it are only a year and a half old, and we already have such possibilities fixed in certain agreements — after all, predictability of rules is a very important element of the investment climate.

Finally, let’s talk about debts. Of course, a creditor’s claim for the return of a debt is quite strong. Therefore, it is clear that in conditions of a developed market and properly recorded obligations, it will not be difficult for the creditor to recover a share of the deceased’s property toward the debt. If the amount of debts clearly exceeds the amount of divisible assets, then we have a bankruptcy case. In this situation, all claimants to the property will have to agree on who gets how much, and if an amicable agreement cannot be reached, then recourse to a court will be inevitable — they cannot exactly go to war, after all.

In general, I want to note that ancap is not only anarchy, but also capitalism, meaning developed market relations. All existing legal findings, especially from the sphere of common law, will not disappear, and in various disputed cases, they will certainly be appealed to. Foolish litigation, reducing to a competition of whose lawyer is more expensive and who paid the judge more, is unlikely under ancap due to the decentralized nature of law enforcement. But the desire to assert one’s rights itself will not disappear, which means that work for lawyers will not vanish.

Finished the book about ancap. Hurrah.

The final chapter, summarizing the third part of the book, is finished. Now, everyone who dislikes ongoing works can finally download the book in its entirety and devour it in one evening. Those who postponed their donation until the completion of the work, not wanting to spend money on something that might not be finished, can also relax and open their wallets. By starting to write a book and continuing to do so, you eventually finish it. By starting to achieve ancap and moving in the right direction, you eventually achieve it. That is the way things work.

Next, the book will undergo editing (please send in your valuable comments), and after that, I will handle its distribution, and I, of course, urge you to do the same. Prepare your publishing capacities for the distribution of hard copies, consider which resources to spread links to the text on, write reviews—everything helps.

It was a great pleasure working on this project. I believe it allowed me to seriously systematize my own views. I hope it allows you to do the same.