At first glance, free capitalism, unrestricted by the state, has one fundamental characteristic — the inevitable concentration of all capital in a few hands. This leads to a situation that is no better than “state capitalism” in the USSR (roughly speaking, if 1% owns 99% of the capital now, it is clear that over time 0.1% will own 99.9%, and so on). In other words, the absence of state intervention in the market leads to the emergence of such an omnipotent monopoly capitalist that the state would seem like the lesser evil.

Where can I read, if available,
1) A refutation (preferably empirical) of the thesis on the concentration of capital.
2) What can stop concentration, other than non-economic (read: state) intervention?

The question is accompanied by a donation in the amount of 0.00080000 BTC

Unfortunately, any attempts at empirical confirmation or refutation of the thesis on the inevitable concentration of capital under capitalism run into the distorting influence of the state. One can provide examples of how capital concentrates because large capitalists successfully lobby for their interests, and as a result, regulations are adopted by the state that benefit large businesses and disadvantage small ones. Meanwhile, the market reasons for capital concentration remain behind the scenes. One can demonstrate how state antitrust services hinder the notorious concentration of capital, while the purely market mechanisms that also oppose it remain behind the scenes. Therefore, I would like to focus specifically on the market mechanisms working in one direction or another.

Concentration of Capital

The main market reason for the concentration of capital is the positive effect of scale. A large company can afford to use a greater amount of capital goods that increase labor productivity, which allows it to generate more profit and reinvest it, again, into increasingly capital-intensive factors of production.

It is also worth noting that consumer goods are becoming more complex, and the production of many of them inevitably requires the involvement of significant capital. For example, a small shipyard cannot build a cruise liner, and a small studio cannot film a blockbuster.

Diffusion of Capital

Now let’s look at the reasons that contribute to the decrease in the concentration of capital.

First, besides the positive effect of scale, there is also a negative one. The larger the structure, the more costs are attributed to parasitic processes. Orders move through the chain of command more slowly than they would in its absence. An order in a chain of command is more likely to be distorted than in conditions where an individual entrepreneur sets tasks for themselves or directly for the executors. Employees in large structures are no longer motivated by the company’s profit, which they influence only very indirectly, but by artificial KPIs. As a result, they are more focused on achieving KPIs rather than on the interests of the business. All this reduces margins. At a certain size of the structure, the negative effect of scale becomes stronger than the positive one. A business that has grown beyond its optimal size begins to eat away at its capital, yielding market share to smaller competitors.

Second, it is small businesses that implement the lion’s share of innovations. Even in a large company, pilot production is relatively small in size and relies on a small number of scarce specialists. Sensing excess profit as a result of implementing their idea, such a specialist can quite easily leave the company and open their own startup, which then skims the cream off the market. Successful startups grow, and the share of old capital decreases.

Third, for the sake of reducing risks, a large entrepreneur will prefer not to put all their eggs in one basket and will invest money in several companies. This dilutes the ownership structure of companies; the owner can no longer closely monitor the development of their business, responsibility is shifted to management, and it is the top managers who become the primary beneficiaries of the process, while the relative income of investors falls.

Finally, the factor of capital dilution upon inheritance does not disappear. The larger the company, the greater the chances that a bunch of people, as well as various funds, will be mentioned in the will, whereas a small enterprise is more likely to go to a single heir.

And what does this tell us?

Nothing. The optimal size of a business for each industry, and often for each region, is different and constantly changing; it is determined by the level of technological development, which can contribute both to increasing the returns from centralization (for example, auto repair shops were quickly displaced by auto plants after the introduction of the assembly line) and to increasing the returns from decentralization (for instance, broadband internet sharply increased the number of content producers and decreased the average size of a newsroom).

The concentration of capital in the hands of a few may increase or decrease; in essence, this is not important. What is important is that in a free market, the welfare of the poorest grows even when the welfare of the richest grows even faster. And there are indeed many empirical studies on this topic (although, of course, one must remember here as well that empirics will inevitably be distorted by state intervention). You can read more about this in one of the chapters of David Friedman’s *Machinery of Freedom*, which I am translating, titled “The Rich Get Richer, and the Poor Get Richer”. The desired empirics are also present there.