The Inadequacy of the Open Access Order

Voluntarist

One of the options for achieving a social order in which human rights are respected, property is protected, and there is the maximum possible absence of violence is proposed by the concept of open access order, described in the work of Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast titled “Violence and Social Orders.” Those seeking a solution to various social problems, including the problem of violence, while remaining within the framework of the institution of statehood, are increasingly turning to this concept. But is it truly workable, and can it solve these problems?

To begin, let us briefly familiarize ourselves with what is meant by open access order. We will do this in comparison with another concept – limited access order. In limited access, state power is held by a coalition of elites who mutually recognize and share rent-seeking income (income from monopolized economic spheres and natural resources, as well as the issuance of licenses to conduct activities). In contrast, open access means the impersonality of political management mechanisms, the influence over which is available to all citizens of the state.

Some conclusions can already be drawn from this definition. Political management mechanisms cannot, in principle, be made impersonal, since in any case they require managers and executors. Even if one imagines some kind of absolute direct democracy (the reality of which does not exist on a large scale), an infrastructure for executing decisions is still necessary, which, again, contains these groups of people. In this case, the managers are indeed the elites of the established system. Why? To explain this, we must point to another fact – rent from monopolies does not disappear upon the achievement of open access order. Economic spheres, natural resources, and types of activities that no one has the right to manage without appropriate state permission still generate income directed into the centralized budget of political management bodies, meaning directly into the hands of those same managers. I believe that corruption, lobbying of interests, and the embezzlement of budget funds, which currently exist in any state, should indisputably explain that these managers are merely another elite redistributing these funds for their own benefit, thus deriving income from them.

Another thing that clearly does not align with the reduction of violence in society is the fact that a mandatory prerequisite for achieving open access order is the consolidation of all security structures in the hands of a single organization. In effect, we have the complete elimination of the balance of violence potential in favor of a monopoly on violence, which, by the way, is an inherent property of the current state. And what reduction in the level of violence can be discussed if the monopolist of violence, due to the defenselessness of other subjects, has greater opportunities to commit acts of violence?

This can be particularly confirmed by examples of open access orders in the form of states that have reached this condition. The work “Violence and Social Orders” lists 20 such states. This list includes the USA, Great Britain and its former dominions, Scandinavia, Benelux, France, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Portugal, as well as some other states with certain reservations. And really, has violence been defeated in these countries? Does the monopolist of violence there never abuse its position?

And finally, I will give you a general fact – any state that has a monopoly on power, regardless of its structure, is an organ that commits violence. Even if one imagines the same absolute direct democracy, it is inevitably linked to the forceful coercion of the minority to the will of the majority. Furthermore, the very fact of the existence of a state, in which you are required to be a member by compulsory order, points us to the impossibility of eradicating violence with its help.