Тег: Violence

The (In)effectiveness of Violence

Bitarch’s Column
(with editorial edits by Ancap-chan)

When you want to achieve a certain goal, you choose one of many available tools. Suppose a hostel has opened in your house, which constantly creates noise and a criminogenic environment near your home. What can you do? The simplest option at first glance is to force the owner to close their business by using physical violence.

But what if they have at least a pepper spray? Now, in the event of your attack, your potential costs have increased. Violence as a tool no longer looks as profitable as it seemed initially. So, willy-nilly, you have to look for other ways to influence them—persuading, explaining the situation to the property owner so they terminate the lease, giving the hostel a one-star review on online resources, and calling on other residents of the building to do the same. In short, you have a incentive to act civilly.

Initially, the simplest tool of coercion, physical violence, quickly loses its effectiveness when the potential victim is capable of applying counter-violence, even in the smallest amount. The former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, once praised violence as a tool of extremely high efficiency. But for this to be the case, he had to introduce some of the strictest rules for purchasing and owning weapons in Singapore, even for self-defense—because even a slight leveling of the balance of violence potential in society leads to a sharp decrease in the effectiveness of violence as a tool of coercion.

I can propose a hypothesis well-supported by facts: the costs of aggressive violence increase exponentially as the possibilities for counter-violence by the victim increase.

Suppose a stationary bandit (the state) wants to use violence to force someone to comply with its demands. If the victim of state aggression has no lethal weapon, a small operational group is sufficient for the arrest. But what if the victim has a pistol? Police special forces must be sent. For a minor reason, such as unpaid fines or the retail sale of psychoactive substances, no one will send special forces. In Alexander Rozov’s blog, there is a post with confirmation of this fact using the example of Sweden.

Suppose the potential victim of state aggression is not some tax delinquent, but a more significant target—for example, a clan leader in Somalia. He doesn’t just have a pistol, but a thousand fighters with Kalashnikov rifles, albeit poorly trained. As history has shown, the damage even from such “bandits” proved unacceptable for the US government.

Imagine that the followers of the Branch Davidians sect, who took refuge at the Waco ranch in 1993, had anti-tank grenade launchers in addition to shotguns and rifles. As we know, the FBI decided to use tanks at the time to ram the walls and release tear gas. If the defenders had anti-tank weapons, such an option would have had to be rejected as excessively risky.

In such a situation, the state could either turn the assault on the ranch from a police operation into an army operation, using mortars or other lethal indiscriminate weapons, or starve the ranch out, with the prospect that these fanatics would indeed all die of hunger. Both options in a democratic state are fraught with significant political damage, which for politicians is even more important than economic damage to the state. For more details on such factors, I recommend reading Martin van Creveld’s book The Rise and Decline of the State.

Finally, we have already analyzed a potential situation where a potential victim of state violence threatens the use of weapons of mass destruction. Currently, this is perceived as something extremely unlikely—not because the state effectively prevents the creation of WMDs by private individuals, but because people who have enough skills to create WMDs also have strong internal moral convictions that preclude the use of indiscriminate mass violence, including against innocent people. If a democratic state sets an example by being the first to use WMDs against its own citizens, this moral prohibition will be weakened, and over time will disappear altogether. No official in a relatively civilized state is ready to allow such consequences.

Conclusions can be drawn:

1) The costs of coercion by the state or any other aggressor increase exponentially as the means of counter-violence by the victim are strengthened. Minimal self-defense weapons, therefore, sharply raise the price of an attack, and against a cheap dirty bomb made from nuclear waste, even the nuclear arsenal of a superpower will be ineffective.

2) In order for a free society (a territorial or extraterritorial contractual jurisdiction) to protect itself from conquest by the state, it is more profitable for it not to invest in a single “wonder weapon,” but to provide incentives for clients to acquire personal weapons, skills for their use, and the readiness to use them for defense. This will also help society protect itself from its own coordinating bodies, should they decide to become a state, since it will ensure an even distribution of the potential for violence. This is discussed, in particular, in the previously translated work by Jack Hirshleifer, Anarchy and Its Dissolution.

Finally, I will provide a good quote from the book The Liberal Archipelago by Chandran Kukathas.

Take gamblers and casino owners. Their activities may be alien or even repulsive to us. However, would the fact that gambling takes place in another country be sufficient grounds for invading it?

Take “monopolists.” They may set prices for their products that we consider unfair. However, would we consider the fact that a country supplies its goods too expensively a sufficient ground for declaring war on that country?

But why are we ready in similar cases to send armed men (police) to our fellow citizens, take them captive (prison), and take tribute from them (fine)? Probably because, unlike a neighboring state, they cannot defend themselves.

Doomsday Weapon and NAP, a discussion

Recently, I published a post in Bitarch’s column stating that current trends in technological development are easily extrapolated into the near future, and based on them, we see that the capabilities of private individuals to carry out indiscriminate mass killings continue to grow and could well reach the level of a global threat. From this, the author concludes that to eliminate this threat, not only the institution of the state must be rejected, but also any other factors that potentially place people in a desperate position where there is no particular difference for them whether to die alone or to take all of humanity with them.

Bitarch then expanded on the topic on his VKontakte page, responding to a number of objections. The response boiled down to the idea that the threat is closer than one might assume and that, in general, we need to be more responsible. Unfortunately, this rhetoric added few substantial arguments—how is such a call for responsibility different from Greta Thunberg’s appeals? She also threatens global consequences if we do not all wake up right now.

After that, Bitarch released a third article, and this time proposed a more specific case for consideration. Imagine a dangerous asshole (Harvey Weinstein is used in the example) or an organization (let’s say, for example, ELF) who are given a severe punishment, and instead of accepting it humbly, they demand immediate pardon under the threat of releasing some unpleasant virus according to the dead hand principle. The virus would not kill humanity, but as we see from current events, it is capable of seriously damaging the economy.

Will the emergence of such threats lead to state power beginning to bend? Yes, of course. We have a great experimental state, Israel, which over time moved from the doctrine of “we do not negotiate with terrorists” to the doctrine of “we exchange one of our prisoners for a thousand of yours.” Thus, in states where there is a possibility of holding leaders politically accountable, they will bend to the demands of terrorists; and when the threats of terrorists acquire a global character, whether or not to negotiate with terrorists will cease to be the choice of a specific dictator, and even Putin, in such a scenario, would have to bargain. “I, for instance, agree to make certain concessions to the terrorists, but you, dear Western partners, should lift sanctions on me for such compliance, because as you know, terrorism is so unpredictable.”

Under ancap, this problem is simplified. The terrorist loses a subject for negotiations. Yes, he may be ready to indiscriminately exterminate several million people if his conditions are not met. But what conditions? To whom will he address them? There is no state. He could address, for example, the management of some corporation. Let’s say the same “elves” demand that the management of an oil company stop oil production, otherwise, there will be a coronavirus. After this, the board of directors resigns, and the subject of negotiations disappears again. Of course, this will not prevent the elves from launching an epidemic, but the goal of the terrorist act was slightly different.

Of course, means of protection against such threats will also be improved. For example, total transaction transparency could allow for the rapid location of a terrorist network and the neutralization of the dead hand threat. Or it might be possible to change the terrorist’s motivation. Or even local time-stopping. The debate over whose fantastic assumption will be realized first is quite fruitless. Bitarch claims that defense technologies develop significantly slower than attack technologies. Nevertheless, for some reason, the general level of violence is steadily declining, and if state-initiated violence is excluded from the statistics, it becomes practically negligible.

Therefore, it is not that I disregard the threat being discussed. I simply believe it is not very relevant to ancap, and as for postulating the necessity of outgrowing states, I have other sufficient arguments.

Doomsday Weapon

Absolute NAP or the death of all humanity. There is no third option.

Bitarch’s Column

There is one currently not very well-known argument as to why humanity will sooner or later have to accept the impermissibility of initiating aggression: the simple survival of our civilization. After all, with the development of technology, the conditional total harm that one person can inflict is constantly growing.

For example, now even a poorly educated fanatic in a truck can knock down a hundred people, and if they try very hard and load a mixture of fertilizer and diesel into it, they can kill a maximum of a thousand.

Now imagine the world in 30 years. Gene engineering equipment has become cheaper; biohacking has become a popular hobby for schoolchildren. Genomes of pests such as natural smallpox, plague, and influenza A/H1N1 are available on the darknet. A psychopath could trigger an epidemic, killing, say, 1 million people.

Another 50 years pass. Flying cars with compact nuclear reactors have appeared. And along with them, ways to overload such a reactor, creating a new Chernobyl in New York or Moscow. 10 million people are now at the mercy of a psychopath.

The distant future. Space ships for flights to Alpha Centauri have begun to be built. Antimatter is used as fuel. If someone doesn’t value their own life, they can take the entire population of planet Earth with them, turning it into a stream of neutrinos.

As can be seen, the population that one person is capable of destroying grows exponentially with the development of technology. Just like the trendy COVID-19 coronavirus. In such conditions, there cannot even be a thought of using violence against a person, because essentially each of us will possess not just a deterrent weapon, but a Doomsday Weapon (DDW). Humanity simply will not survive if it does not recognize the universal NAP, even toward the most unpleasant individuals like child killers.

I anticipate in advance the cries of etatists about the usefulness of the state. For example, they will say: “Look, you’ve just described the hell it will be without control by government bodies.” Only in reality, the state only increases the risks of uncontrolled use of DDWs—both by creating incentives for people to use it as a deterrent against aggressive violence from a stationary bandit (the state), and by spurring the development of such dangerous things in inappropriate conditions even without the goal of using them as DDWs.

The US government, of course, can limit biohacker experiments, but they will be gladly welcomed in some Mumbo-Jumbo, where they will work much more covertly from public control and possibly intentionally help in the creation of DDWs for the Mumbo-Jumbo government. Look at the ban on stem cell experiments in the US, which simply pushed developments to China and other countries, where they were carried out without any public notification.

I am also very surprised by the position of some libertarians who seriously consider the possibility of enforcing court decisions through physical violence. In reality, not only violence, but even harsh ostracism that puts the violator on the edge of physical survival (for example, refusing to sell food in a store) can provoke them to use a DDW (dying of hunger is no better than dying from a bullet, therefore complete ostracism can be perceived by the violator as physical violence). It is not for nothing that Kim Jong Un is not blocked from the sale of vital items, but is only forbidden from receiving luxury items like Ferraris and Swiss watches. And he doesn’t even have a DDW, but rather a fairly weak deterrent weapon.

So think about what is better for you:
1) A world with the enforcement of court decisions through reputation and soft forms of ostracism, which turn out to be sufficient in most cases.
2) A world with a slightly higher probability of enforcing court decisions through physical coercion, but with a tangible “bonus” chance of becoming one of the characters in George Stewart’s science fiction novel “Earth Without People.”

Ancap-chan’s Commentary

Morals are formed more by practice than by theoretical constructs. Trying to limit oneself now in legitimate means for the sake of possible consequences in half a century is roughly the same kind of panic-mongering as the desire to abandon carbon dioxide emissions to prevent global warming.

People indeed regularly face the question of conflict between tactical and strategic goals. The longer the planning horizon, the greater the probability that the issue will be resolved in favor of strategy. But it is unrealistic to influence someone else’s time preference with exhortations. So, either we gradually develop a stable ancap, with a habit of defending our rights and not permitting systemic violence, and then the planning horizon for people will be sufficiently distant—or we will continue to languish under the state, captive to purely short-term tasks, and watch with horror the increase in the potential for terror—both private and state—up until the collapse of humanity.

Perhaps Ancapistan is better built in fourth-world countries after all?

Well, let’s say, in Somalia, Micronesia, and other failed states, since it is easier there to achieve a more or less even balance of the potential for violence with relatively small resource expenditures (conventionally speaking, buying a Kalashnikov) due to the absence of an overwhelmingly powerful agent enforcing a monopoly on violence in that territory, as well as the culture of servility and economic structure that has formed around it?

L29Ah (the question is accompanied by a donation of 0.00013567btc)

I will remind the readers that the balance of the potential for violence is one of the criteria for the stability of a stateless society according to Hirschleifer. Other criteria are a stable community composition and the absence of a significant number of people pushed to the brink of survival. Indeed, some secluded tropical paradise where coconuts fall right at your feet and where peaceful, smiling natives with Kalashnikovs live can easily build an anarchic society. But it is not enough to have anarchy; what is desired specifically is anarcho-capitalism.

And anarcho-capitalism requires a bit more than the absence of a state. It requires capitalism, which means commodity-money relations. So our imaginary tropical paradise will need a full-fledged commodity economy integrated into global trade. But international trade requires international recognition, and that is a serious limitation.

While composing his Meganesian cycle, Aleksandr Rozov particularly emphasized that the stateless society in the Pacific Ocean is being built not by real natives, but by outsiders. In reality, they are full-fledged white people with the notions of property, freedom, and law appropriate for white people—they simply deny the state. They only pretend to be natives in order to legitimize their claims in the eyes of the international community and avoid becoming pariahs leading a miserable existence under economic sanctions.

In real life, a similar project of anarcho-colonialism was attempted by the Seasteading Institute, but it encountered numerous legislative and technological restrictions, and now, judging by the website, it has degenerated from a libertarian project into something smelling of eco-activism.

So it is hard to say what is easier: to ensure the transition to anarchy in a capitalist state, to ensure the transition to capitalism in a failed state, or to organize a “freedom landing” in some toy state in Oceania. One thing can be said for sure: the matter is not limited solely to the balance of the potential for violence.

A white man with an automatic rifle in a tropical paradise

The social contract is a fiction

or
silence does not mean consent

Bitarch’s Column

The notion that the state is a product of a social contract is an important factor in legitimizing the state; therefore, etatists cling to this theory with all their might, despite the fact that, for instance, the stationary bandit theory explains reality far more accurately. A bandit indeed behaves like a bandit, whereas no one has ever seen a social contract, nor can anyone produce its text.

You may have heard about the laws against sexual violence recently adopted in several European countries, known as “No means no.” Their essence is that sexual abuse (violence) is now considered not only the commission of “lewd acts” amidst active physical resistance by the victim (when she uses all possible strength to fight back), but any resistance where she unambiguously makes it clear that she wants to leave. Among Russian social media users, these laws were received ambiguously and were mainly used as an excuse to once again mock “Gayrope” for having lost all traditional values. Nevertheless, there is common sense in these laws. All criticism should be directed at the states in these countries, which, as always, will distort the essence and apply these laws with bias.

Let’s return to the state. I think a significant portion of people, most likely more than half, would similarly like to say “no” to the state. However, the bureaucrats in power are not fools either; they intuitively understand game theory and do everything possible to ensure that for an individual, any expression of discontent carries the highest possible costs, while the benefit from such a request should be zero! Look, even a request as trivial for the state as building waste processing plants instead of simply dumping trash in landfills remains unanswered. The authorities understand—if you concede such a trifle, in a couple of years they will demand the recognition of the right to create their own sovereign jurisdictions. The cattle must clearly know that they will get nothing, while the costs will be enormous (sleeping in tents near Shies in the freezing cold and constantly being hit on the head with clubs is not exactly like going to a picket line once).

It is exactly the same with the “social contract”—every person understands perfectly well that they alone can do little to change the status quo (depriving the state of its territorial monopoly on governance), but they will get into deep trouble if they start complaining. And so they nod along with the stationary bandit, like a fragile girl with a rapist, even though in their soul they fiercely hate him!

Therefore, I suggest that fans of the “social contract” stop mincing their words and say it straight: “They are raping you, and you aren’t resisting? Then how is that violence; it’s completely voluntary!”

Decision-makers and security forces

Many have expressed optimism regarding the recent series of searches of LP members, claiming that this is a mark of quality and a sign that the party is on the right track. I would say that today, repression against political activists is not a sign of fear among those in power, but rather a businesslike scurrying, carried out with a cold heart and without much thought. The grass has grown—it is time to mow. Meanwhile, the grass may comfort itself with the thought that the more it is mown, the thicker it grows.

To be honest, I had a vague hope that since the LP differs from other parties in its radical rhetoric of freedom, this would also be reflected in its behavior in the face of repression. It was not. Protest as performed by the LP is just as legalistic as that performed by Navalny. When security forces burst into a libertarian’s home, they leave just as intact and with the loot as if it had been an ordinary Navalny volunteer or an employee of Open Russia.

So, if anyone believes that Russian libertarians are grim, armed anarchists who will not let themselves be stepped on, or that an attempt to break into one of their homes will immediately trigger a spontaneous rally under their windows—they will have to part with these harmful illusions. Libertarian ideas are not so deeply rooted in the libertarian community that rhetoric regarding the state has translated into practical actions against it.

After all this, I even feel somewhat awkward discussing what the libertarian doctrine of action is in the event of one aggression or another: such discussions begin to look very irrelevant.

Therefore, in this post, I am not providing recipes, because I do not know them. I do not know how I would behave if I were a member of the libertarian party, against whose elected leader blatant state aggression has been undertaken. For me, this is a serious reason to continue refraining from joining the party. I fear that if I begin to declare my views openly, then when the state reaches me—which will happen quickly—I will find myself alone before its functionaries, and at most, I will receive a few pickets in my support.

Please be responsible for your words; there is already too much empty chatter in the world. If you do not feel the resolve to bite the boot that tramples you, do not raise the banner with the motto “Dont Tread On Me.” It is better to hide your libertarianism than to openly discredit it.

Libertarianism ex machina

Bitarch, Ancap-tyan

In many plays staged in ancient theater, an unusual technique for resolving character conflicts was often used — “Deus ex machina” (“God from the machine”). It consisted of the sudden appearance of a new god-like character on stage at the end of the work, who had not been mentioned previously in the performance and had the ability to quickly resolve the heroes’ problems. Simply put, external forces solved the heroes’ problems without delving into the essence of the conflict. This technique is suitable not only for works of art, but can also be useful for political transformations aimed at the destatization of society.

Let’s look at any libertarian public page on social media, chat, website, stream, podcast, or channel. What will we see? Most likely, an endless discussion of the same topics — how libertarian courts work, who will build roads under ancap, contractual slavery, abortions, the agency of children, nuclear weapons, drugs, the Austrian School of Economics versus Keynesianism and state planning, minarchism versus ancap, ancap versus panarchy, territorial communities versus ECUs. Often, this boils over into an endless holy war, where people spend many days in a row defending their point of view.

But the thing is, if you argue endlessly among yourselves and spend all your resources on it, you won’t achieve much! And is it even necessary? Perhaps there exists a single universal recipe for how to resolve all these problems at once and spend our scarce resources for the benefit of the movement?!

Yes, it exists and is found in the very nature of the state — a stationary bandit can conquer a society only when the balance of violence potential (BVP) is disrupted, while when this balance is maintained, a stateless society exists quite stably, as proven within the methodology of neo-institutionalism. You can hear about this briefly and clearly in the first part of Alexander Auzan’s lecture “Evolution of the Stationary Bandit.” After the formation of centralized coercive structures (the state), movement in the opposite direction toward a decentralized society becomes impossible without applying external effort to the system (this pattern is analogous to the second law of thermodynamics: heat will not spontaneously transfer from a colder body to a warmer one).

If we restore the BVP, the costs of initiating violence become higher than the costs of defense, and the territorial monopoly of the state simply disappears. Beyond that, everything else simply doesn’t matter! Of course, it is better to know the answer in advance as to who will build roads or how to determine the agency of children, but even without that, people will have no choice but to solve this without the state. It simply cannot exist when the BVP is maintained. If you are a programmer or simply know Boolean logic, you understand well: after calculating the value of the first operand in a conjunction (&&), you don’t need to calculate all the other operands if it is FALSE, as the result of the conjunction will be FALSE anyway. Or for a disjunction (||), you can skip calculating the other operands if the first is TRUE, because the result will be TRUE anyway.

It follows that a sufficient condition for the transition to libertarianism is merely bringing the violence potential in society to a more uniform distribution. As you have probably already guessed, this can be achieved by creating and spreading tools for the doctrine of deterrence (DD).

The advantage of this approach is that the development, production, and implementation of DD tools into wide use can be carried out by a much broader circle of people than those currently involved in political campaigning and protest actions. Co-opting techies who can assemble a drone, a blinding laser, or other interesting tools from freely available parts to fight the regime is far more promising in terms of expanding the protest base than limiting recruitment to humanities scholars and economists who are well-versed in the nuances of ideology. Even more useful is the involvement of engineers and managers capable of organizing the mass production of such items, which is also a very numerous category. It should also be noted that semi-cottage production or writing a software product is easily hidden from the state and is therefore safer than attending rallies, which serves as an additional stimulating factor.

When reliable, mass-produced, and inexpensive tools for deterring aggressors are available even to a grandmother, it won’t be long before the “market decides” the fate of the state. After the deus ex machina does its work, all of today’s theoretical disputes about how to organize under ancap will abruptly move into the practical plane. We observed something similar relatively recently, when economists argued about whether it was possible to return to the gold standard in the era of fiat money, and then Satoshi arrived, and now instead of the gold standard we have the bitcoin standard. That’s it, the subject of the dispute has vanished; the agenda is now the widespread practical implementation of private hard money.

How will ancap prevent the formation of the state?

Deterrence doctrine? Yes, yes, hilarious — 25 people against one. He’ll stop them with a deterrence doctrine, uh-huh. He’ll blow up his own house with a “dead hand” system so the bastards get nothing. Sounds like nonsense. It’s like saying: if I have a weapon, 25 people with the same weapon won’t stop me because they’ll miss.

Gangs and organized crime under ancap cannot be stopped by any means whatsoever. Self-organization? Sure, look at the protests — there’s your free and voluntary self-organization for you.

The market will sort it out, so they can only be stopped by a PDA (Private Defense Agency) or another gang — that is self-organization, just for money — everything according to the market.

Consequently, panarchy is the future structure of society, and ancap is a fantasy about what would happen if people didn’t organize into gangs, just like in ancient times.

анонимный вопрос

When making predictions about what society will look like, a person holds a certain image of society in their head. Following Laksi Katal (and perhaps for the same reasons, namely the experience of the nineties, which I myself didn’t have enough time to fully drink in), you see society as a collection of people who are eager to unite for joint looting, but extremely reluctant to unite for mutual assistance in defending against looting.

I am constantly asked how ancaps can withstand millions of Chinese hordes and other collectivist bullshit — behind all these questions lies the same fear of being alone in the face of an aggressive crowd.

So here it is. The dominance of anarcho-capitalist (i.e., free market) relations in society is possible only when being part of an aggressive crowd is far less profitable than not being part of it. Just as in South Korea any schoolchild knows that while you sleep, your competitor is studying, under ancap it should be a fairly common belief that while you are risking your life snatching phones behind garages, your competitor is launching a startup — and you’ll be lucky if it’s not a startup for delivering remote kicks to those who snatch phones.

As a salvation from gangs, you suggest PDAs or other gangs (meaning something like the insurance rackets described by the aforementioned Laksi Katal). This truly is capable of reducing organized systematic aggressive violence in society, if there is a lot of it. The other thing is that the reduction of violence will quickly reduce the demand for expensive insurance services against violence. For instance, in earthquake-safe areas, people are unlikely to insure against earthquakes. For this very reason, I am quite ready to consider the PDA system as a transitional stage to ancap, but I find it hard to believe that they would have a noticeable influence for long enough. Right now, the most profitable business in the world is running your own state. But competition will quickly lower the margin, and the lack of sacred reverence for this field of earnings will do its part. Protection rackets in a society with a developed free market will be about as significant as pest control companies are today. Yes, someone suffers from harmful rodents and uses the services of specialists to exterminate them. And someone had their phone snatched, and they also turn to specialists to eliminate this inconvenience.

Rats, cockroaches, the state, and other problems that can arise in society are the result of poor hygiene. Assuring people that the only way to get rid of rats is to bring out the rat king, and the only way to eliminate armed gangs is to hire other armed gangs, looks like a quite reasonable idea, but only when society is very poor and the mentioned plagues are literally at every step. Wealth and social hygiene skills provide a greater variety of methods to prevent all this nonsense.

The state from the perspective of a rich and developed society

Who will protect children from violence (on the part of parents)? How can a child prove their agency?

Immanuel Kant

In fact, with the same justification, we could ask: “Who will protect the individual from state violence? How can a person prove their agency?”

In response to state violence, a person can resist directly, attempt to appeal to one branch of government regarding violence committed by another branch, flee to another state, or to a place where state orders do not operate. Finally, a person can resign themselves, repent, and become an exemplary citizen so that the state violence directed at them becomes more or less tolerable. None of this will help them prove their agency to the state, but it may somehow influence the severity of the violence.

As is easy to see, a child can do exactly the same in relation to their parents. They can fight with their parents and even kill them, complain to the father about the mother or to the mother about the father, run away to other people, or simply try to survive on the street. Finally, they can become an exemplary child and fulfill all parental whims. None of this helps them prove their agency within the existing orders, but it may somehow influence the severity of the violence they are subjected to.

The power of the state over its subject and the power of parents over a child are equally total in the absence of external factors. To protect human dignity from the power of the state, people organize into a civil society that directly opposes the state, both using tools provided by the state and through direct moral pressure on individual state representatives (we leave political terrorism outside the scope of this consideration, although it glares quite menacingly from the sidelines). Similarly, the family’s power over a child is limited by society, both through official channels, such as complaints to state authorities, and through direct moral pressure on the parents (methods of physical coercion glare menacingly from outside the scope of this issue).

To summarize. The power of one human over another is dangerous and undesirable in itself. Wherever possible, the “ruler-subject” relationship should be transitioned into relationships between negotiating subjects. Wherever this is not possible—for example, due to the weakly expressed agency of one of the parties—power can and must be limited through pressure from other subjects who form public opinion.

Of course, public opinion should not be idealized—it is a tool for interference in private relationships by third parties; it is not for nothing that public opinion is often called the opinion of those who weren’t asked. Libertarianism provides the principle by which the legitimacy of public opinion’s interference in private relationships can be determined: the now-clichéd NAP. The more obvious its violation within the family, the more the opinion of those who weren’t asked becomes sought after.