Libertarian Theory of War. 2. Theory of War.
Just in case, let me remind you once again that this book is not a manual on the art of war, but a worldview essay. In other words, it is not about “how to fight,” but “how to think about war.”
War is a high-intensity conflict; such a thing does not arise out of nowhere, but develops from less intense conflicts, or even a whole series of them. Therefore, a serious increase in the probability of war is usually quite noticeable. This does not prevent many wars from coming as a complete surprise.
2.1.1. Preventing War
War is always expensive, which means that, more often than not, it would be preferable simply not to allow it to happen. Unfortunately, this requires the application of two opposite strategies.
On one hand, to prevent war, one must demonstrate a clear commitment to peace. On the other hand, to prevent war, one must demonstrate that fighting you is extremely dangerous.
The untimely application of these strategies, by contrast, can provoke war. Demonstrating one’s peacefulness in the face of an obvious aggressor may encourage them to attack, as they will consider you a weak target. Demonstrating one’s danger to those already in conflict with you may lead them to a decision that they will consider a preemptive strike.
The application of the opposite strategies, of course, leads to even worse results. Showing yourself as weak and aggressive at the same time is a direct path to being crushed.
Finally, not behaving in any particular way means simply leaving yourself to the mercy of circumstances. This, however, is the most economical and quite effective strategy for a person within a peaceful society: simply exclude war from the circle of one’s interests.
2.1.2. Studying the Potential Adversary
It makes sense to start by roughly ranking potential adversaries by their aggressiveness and military potential. This will save effort in studying them.
Low-aggression potential adversaries will not attack on their own and will not join someone else’s attack, even if they consider the war to be just. Therefore, libertarians can simply exclude them from the list of potential adversaries—because libertarians themselves will not attack such entities, meaning war between them is extremely unlikely.
Moderately aggressive ones are ready to join someone else’s war if they consider it just, but are not inclined to attack on their own. Therefore, libertarians should instead focus on studying the value systems of such potential adversaries, so as to keep them as allies or neutrals whenever possible.
Finally, those who are ready to attack if they assess their military potential as higher and/or are convinced that the attack is just can be classified as aggressive. Libertarians should show primary interest in them, ascertaining both their value system and their military capabilities.
In such a study, it is important not to lapse, on one hand, into wishful thinking, and on the other, not to take at face value how a potential adversary publicly presents themselves. This is difficult, so it is better to accept in advance that the results of studying potential adversaries will suffer from inaccuracies.
2.1.3. Developing War Strategies
From general considerations, it is clear that when drafting strategies, one should pit one’s own strengths against the opponent’s weaknesses to inflict maximum damage, and in contrast to the opponent’s strengths, develop ways to minimize one’s own damage.
The trouble is that potential adversaries can be different, their strengths and weaknesses can vary greatly, and this means that the best war strategies against them will also differ. The task of preparing in the best possible way for war with a broad class of adversaries would mean a disproportionately large expenditure of resources. Such an arms race could bankrupt the overly cautious more severely than the war itself.
Therefore, most likely, the development of a strategy for libertarians will come down to making their strengths whatever is cheapest to strengthen, and upgrading weaknesses only to the level where they do not overly hinder the application of strengths.
Since different people have different comparative advantages, an approach to creating complex strategies suggests itself, implying joint actions with allies in which each ally maximizes their own comparative advantages.
2.1.4. Building Military Potential
Military potential consists of the availability of means of waging war, the skills to use these means, the readiness to use them, and the readiness of others to tolerate their use.
2.1.4.1. Means
To generalize greatly, the means of waging war are the means of reducing the military potential of the enemy. However, if one thinks only in such general categories, it will lead to strategies being reduced to a war of attrition of military potential, which is insanely wasteful.
Of all the components of military potential, the most tempting is to affect the enemy’s readiness to use their own means of waging war. Moving from the individual level to the collective level, this means affecting the command system of the armed forces and the enemy’s morale. In terms of the price-to-reduction-of-military-potential ratio, such effects are potentially far more efficient than simply grinding down troops.
This approach also aligns well with the libertarian principle of individualism: those who make more significant decisions in a war bear more responsibility for it, and the use of violence against them, up to and including lethal force, is more justified in the eyes of a libertarian than violence against simple order-followers, especially those who are coerced.
It is also worth mentioning means of defense. According to the subjective theory of value, the value of the protected property is higher for the protector than for the one trying to destroy it (otherwise, they would at least try to capture it intact). Therefore, it would be quite reasonable for libertarians to invest in means of direct property protection, preferably to the level where the price of its destruction becomes higher for the attacker than their satisfaction from the result of the attack. But, of course, keeping costs in mind, so that the cost of defense does not exceed the value of what is being protected.
2.1.4.2. Skills
The same means can be used with greater or lesser efficiency, depending on the ability to do so. However, both the acquisition of means of waging war and the acquisition of skills to use them have their own cost. Therefore, someone preparing for war must solve an optimization problem: how much to invest in tools and how much in the skills to master them, so that the final efficiency of using these tools is optimized. Various subtleties also arise when solving this problem, such as the realization that tools are consumed or worn out during use, and may, for example, become obsolete, which would make part of the acquired skills useless.
One must also keep in mind that while means of waging war can be transferred to an ally fairly quickly, the transfer of a skill usually takes much longer, and in some cases is impossible. On the other hand, this same circumstance can make the possessor of a skill a valuable ally whose help will be in demand and whose interests will be taken into account.
2.1.4.3. Readiness to Use Means of Waging War
Not everyone is psychologically ready to use violence, especially lethal violence, even for self-defense. This is especially noticeable when people participate in a war that they do not perceive as their own—that is, when they are not so strongly possessed by the spirits that inspire this war.
Strong possession by spirits, conversely, can greatly increase a person’s readiness for battle. The inclination toward violence depends on genetics and hormonal background, but possession by spirit can correct these factors.
How compatible is possession by spirits with a libertarian worldview? Generally speaking, yes. The result of such possession may look, for example, like a person who seriously believes all property is sacred, zealously defends the boundaries of their land, and is ready to start their killdozer at any moment for this purpose. Such people represent an obvious value for a libertarian society. But fanaticism also carries risks—it reduces the capacity for rational decisions and can lead to thoughtless actions; for example, a person might rush into battle under the influence of misinformation.
Is it possible to somehow lower the level of fanaticism while maintaining a high degree of readiness to enter a war? Yes, for example, through participation in a paramilitary organization. Imagine a certain Order of Ancap Defenders. People join it to defend the freedom of the community in direct military conflict. The Order collects donations, accepts volunteers, conducts training and combat coordination, organizes demonstrations, promotes itself in every way—and at Hour H, it sounds the alarm and enters the war. This would be a familiar, repeatedly practiced activity, with an established division of labor, a need for creative solutions to combat tasks, and other benefits of combining a hobby with work.
2.1.4.4. Tolerance of Others
While building one’s military potential, one must not forget how it will be perceived. Rights are claims that have been accepted. If you are denied the right to kill an enemy in the way you would like to do it, you will have problems: either you must find other means, or the number of your enemies will multiply.
In this regard, it is important to:
- Choose means of waging war that minimize collateral damage and demonstrate this;
- Create an image for yourself as a peaceful but determined subject who will not tolerate aggression against them, but is always ready for reconciliation;
- Acquire allies;
- Discuss with them the boundaries of what is permissible during war.
By thus demonstrating a high level of responsibility, you will earn a reputation as someone who, if they did strike, did so for a reason.