Тег: China

The Art of Leaving People Alone: How Libertarianism Was Invented in Ancient China

What if the concept of the free market, spontaneous order, and the minimal state wasn’t devised by Mises, Hayek, or Rothbard, but by guys in robes sipping tea in the mountains of China 2,500 years ago? Does such a claim surprise you? Then today we will talk about Wu Wei—the ancient philosophy of “non-action,” which, of course, does not mean lying on the couch with a beer, but refers to how the Universe (and the economy) works.

What is Wu Wei and what does it have to do with the free market? “Wu Wei” literally translates as “non-action,” but this is a terrible translation that makes Daoists look like slackers. It would be much more accurate to translate it as “action without violence” or “non-interference.” Imagine a surfer. He doesn’t try to beat the ocean with his fists to force the wave to go where he wants (which is how any government behaves). The surfer catches the wave and uses its natural power. He acts, but does not contradict the nature of things. In libertarianism, we call this “spontaneous order.” People, interacting voluntarily, create highly complex systems themselves: languages, money, markets. And a bureaucrat’s attempt to step in with his wrench and standards only breaks the mechanism. The Daoists understood this even before paper was invented.

Let’s transport ourselves to Ancient China (the Warring States period). Complete chaos, kings slaughtering each other over territories. Against this backdrop, the Confucians appear—ancient etatists of a sort. They walk around with tablets saying: “We need more laws! More officials! More subordination and taxes!”. And then Lao Tzu comes along and drops the “base,” which exactly mirrors modern libertarians: “The more prohibitions and restrictions there are in the world, the poorer the people become. The more laws and decrees are issued, the more thieves and robbers appear.”

Lao Tzu argued that the best ruler is one who rules so unobtrusively that the people forget he even exists. The ideal policy according to Wu Wei is to lower taxes, remove prohibitions, and leave people alone. Let them plant rice, trade, and make agreements on their own.

Some might say: “Sounds great in theory, but did it work in practice?” It worked, and brilliantly! Let’s recall recent history: Mao Zedong, wanting to take everything under his control, ordered the destruction of sparrows. A typical example of anti-Wu Wei (“I am smarter than a complex system”). The result: locusts devoured the harvest, and tens of millions of people died of hunger.

Now let’s rewind 2,000 years. The Han Empire (2nd century BC). After the brutal tyranny of the previous Qin dynasty (which tried to control every sneeze and predictably collapsed), Emperors Wen and Jing came to power. They were convinced fans of Daoism. And what did they do?

– Reduced agricultural taxes first to 3%, and then abolished them entirely for 12 years!
– Deregulated the economy, allowing peasants to freely mint coins, extract salt, and smelt iron.
– Abolished repressions for criticizing the authorities and abolished corporal punishment.
– Stopped waging senseless wars and reached agreements with neighbors.
 
The state simply stepped aside. What did this lead to? The economy exploded with growth. The standard of living soared, granaries were overflowing with grain, and the population grew rapidly wealthy. This period is still considered the Golden Age of China. No state plans—just give people freedom, and they will build everything themselves.

By relying on Wu Wei, we can learn two things:

1) Macro-level: Do not believe in saviors. Any political program that promises to “make everything good for everyone” through new prohibitions and regulations is doomed to fail. The system is too complex. The market will always find a way, just as water finds a crack in the asphalt.

2) Micro-level: Agorism and the black market. Do not waste energy on head-on collisions with the leviathan. Water does not fight the stone; it flows around it. Use crypto. Build parallel institutions. Find loopholes. Mind your own business without attracting the attention of the “sovereign’s eye.” Be like water.

The state is heavy, rigid, and fragile. While freedom is fluid, flexible, and unstoppable. And in the long run, water always wears away the stone!

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Social credit rating and the monopoly on violence

Voluntarist, Bitarch

In today’s information world, the institution of reputation plays an important role. It is already difficult to imagine purchasing an expensive product or seeking a moderately serious service without first checking the provider’s rating. Ratings and reviews have become an essential part of many services. Most likely, over time, reputation tools will be used in all transactions, including direct deals between individuals. This leads us to the emergence of a social rating, in which different people will have different reputations depending on whether they fulfilled their obligations honestly, or whether they deceived others, violated the terms of deals, or even harmed their well-being through robbery or violence.

The institution of reputation and financial instruments, especially ostracism and transaction insurance, are capable of replacing coercive tools as a method of influencing offenders. The need to initiate forceful measures simply disappears, and in cases where the offender themselves has not committed violence, the need for any form of forceful resolution essentially vanishes (in the event of a violent attack, of course, self-defense is unavoidable). This would only contribute to solving the problem of violence and reducing its level in society. But at the same time, in a world of stationary bandits, where states hold a monopoly and the “legal” right to commit violence, reputation institutions and social ratings could well serve a harmful purpose.

It is important to understand that states often monopolize services that are important to society. Previously, they took strict control over roads, the financial system, fire services, medicine, the extraction of many resources, social security, and—most importantly within the framework of our topic—the quality control of services and goods supplied to the market. It is quite reasonable to expect that if, at some point, the vast majority of people begin to rely on the institution of reputation, states will take control over it as well. Officials will claim that private solutions are unreliable and that there is a need to issue strict rules for the operation of reputation services, or even create a single state reputation service for everyone, banning private rating and review systems. In a world where some states decide which charging device standard people should use (referring to European Union states), such a scenario has a high probability of becoming a reality.

Thus, the institution of reputation will not only become bureaucratized and inefficient, it could also become a tool for persecuting and punishing people disliked by the current political power. This is already happening in China—a minus in one’s social rating can be received for friendship with an opposition member or for statements against party policy. By a single order from above, any person can be deprived of access to many state benefits. And never mind these benefits—if the state were not a violent monopoly, alternatives to its benefits would exist. But under states, there are no alternatives, as private activity is heavily controlled or prohibited in the spheres they have monopolized. In the end, instead of being a method to fight violence, robbery, and deception, the institution of reputation becomes a supporting tool for strengthening state power and coercive control.

A simple conclusion can be drawn from all this: the institution of reputation is very useful in ensuring the security of transactions, and it is also important for the transition from coercive methods to non-violent influence as the basis for maintaining public order. But when combined with violence, especially state violence, it loses these positive qualities and begins to work toward the strengthening of state power and coercive control. Therefore, it is very important to fight violence and prevent the institution of reputation from being taken under the control of any coercive agents. After all, we cannot fight violence if the institution of reputation is used only by violators for their own benefit, as is currently happening in China.