Тег: VPNs

The crap that in the RF is delicately called an “internet accelerator”

Someone contacted me claiming to be developing their own VPN service and offered collaboration in the format of “here’s a referral link, maybe someone will buy a subscription, and you’ll get half of what they spend.” I don’t live in Russia and have no idea which services are considered decent or rubbish by local standards, so I cannot consciously recommend this product. I had thoughts about setting up some kind of VPN on my own VPS and offering it to the few remaining relatives and acquaintances in the RF, but it seems that today they are all universally far more competent in such matters than a sweet summer child like me, who has never known real censorship. So, I decided not to embarrass myself.

I asked if there was a way to verify whether the offered service actually doesn’t keep logs. I was told that a buyer of the service can see from the configs that the open-source xray core is being used. As the wise neural networks explained to me, this core is indeed open-source and indeed knows how not to write logs, but it also knows how to write them, and you certainly won’t see that from the client configs. The second question I was interested in was whether payment via more or less anonymous crypto was available. In response, I received a screenshot with a ton of payment methods; Monero, for example, was present. So, even if Comrade Major gains access to the non-existent logs, he won’t be able to link your traffic to personal data, but you’ll still have to mask your IP additionally.

I think there are currently more VPN service offers in the RF than there are cocaine offers in Montenegro, and anyone who wants can choose something from a very impressive list. I don’t think the service I was asked to promote stands out in any particular way—cocaine is cocaine, nothing extraordinary. If your current VPN subscription is expiring anyway, or if this one seems more convenient, or if you feel that sending me donations directly is too much of an honor but doing it via a referral link is fine—then welcome. Here is the link to the service website, and here is the link to the Telegram bot, if the privacy of the purchase doesn’t concern you particularly.

VPN in Russia 2026: a guide for those who do not want to live in a digital GULAG

The current internet situation in Russia resembles a joke: “We have freedom of speech, but no freedom after speech.” Only now, it’s no longer a joke, but daily reality. Roskomnadzor has blocked 800+ VPN services, TSPU has learned to recognize protocols in seconds, and since March 2026, “white lists” have even begun to be tested in Moscow—meaning only what is approved from above is allowed. Welcome to the sovereign internet! But we aren’t the type to give up, are we? So let’s break down what actually works.

Why are options like NordVPN and ExpressVPN no longer viable? In short: mass commercial VPNs are dead in Russia. OpenVPN is detected in seconds by the first byte of the packet. WireGuard is detected by its UDP structure. L2TP, PPTP, and SOCKS5 have been blocked since December 2025. Classic Shadowsocks is identified via entropy analysis. What works? Next-generation protocols: VLESS + Reality (mimics regular HTTPS to a legitimate site), AmneziaWG (a modified WireGuard with mimicry), Hysteria2 (based on QUIC), and xHTTP (fragments traffic to bypass TCP Freezing). But which VPN provider should we choose then?

1) Mullvad (Sweden) – the absolute gold standard of privacy. It doesn’t require an email—it generates a random account number. It accepts cash in an envelope (yes, literally put euros in an envelope and send it to Sweden), Monero, and Bitcoin. In 2023, Swedish police conducted a search at the request of Germany—and didn’t find a single byte of user data. This is the best proof of a “no-logs” policy imaginable. Of course, there is a downside: Roskomnadzor deliberately blocks Mullvad IP addresses, so you have to cycle through servers. The app has been removed from the Russian App Store.

2) IVPN (Gibraltar) – Mullvad’s closest competitor in terms of paranoia (in a good way). Also no email, just a random Account ID. Cash, Monero (they have their own Full Node—no third-party payment gateways), and Bitcoin. A security audit by Cure53 has been conducted. V2Ray obfuscation (VMESS/QUIC and VMESS/TCP) is built into all clients. Exemplary split tunneling—both direct and inverted. Ideal for those who need to access Gosuslugi and read blocked media simultaneously.

3) Proton VPN (Switzerland) – Stealth protocol, four Securitum audits, and a history of rejecting all legal requests for data. There is a free plan with unlimited traffic. However: it requires an email (you can use an anonymous ProtonMail registered via TOR), it doesn’t accept Monero directly, and Roskomnadzor actively tries to block it. Lifehack: manually loading WireGuard configs often works when the app cannot connect.

Note that as of May 2026, the Ministry of Digital Development has required large platforms to block access via VPN. The solution: split tunneling—route banks and government services outside the tunnel, and everything else through the VPN. There is also an advanced scheme against “white lists”: Client → Russian VPS (on the white list) → foreign server. TSPU sees domestic traffic and leaves it alone.

Why will you never be punished for the mere fact of using a VPN?! This is a favorite scare tactic of propagandists, but it collapses against reality. First, TSPU physically cannot distinguish VPN traffic from regular HTTPS with 100% accuracy—that’s exactly how VLESS and Reality are built. Fining people for “suspicious traffic”? How many people and on what grounds would they even have to sue. Second, VPNs are the backbone of legal business. Every bank, every corporation, every remote worker uses a VPN daily. And third: introducing liability for the “fact of using a VPN” would immediately lead to millions of people connecting via other people’s Wi-Fi networks. We would end up with millions of criminal cases against 80-year-old grandmothers whose routers “used a VPN.” Imagine the headlines: “Pensioner from Saratov fined for bypassing blocks.” No government can afford such a level of absurdity—it would be political suicide. Therefore, the state’s strategy is different: not to punish users, but to make VPNs as inconvenient as possible. Our task is to stay one step ahead. After all, freedom is not something given, but something taken!

Voluntarist, Bitarch

The Rule of Hostile Jurisdictions

In a world where various states are divided into antagonistic blocks, there is one interesting possibility for ensuring personal security for agorists, dissidents, and others who hold any positions or engage in any activities that their own stationary bandits do not approve of and may threaten with punishment. It can be called the “rule of hostile jurisdictions.”

The essence of this idea is simple: if you are physically located in the territory of a state belonging to one block, you should use services, host websites, seek clients, store and exchange money, register companies, and employ intermediaries from states belonging to a different block. For example, if you live in Russia, you can use a VPN from Sweden or the USA, an email client in Switzerland, a crypto-card in Lithuania, a shell company in Estonia, and not worry about your security. And if you live in Europe, it will be many times safer for you to use “police-monitored” VK and Mail.ru than Facebook and Gmail.

Many services provide users’ personal information upon request from government authorities of a friendly block. This is inevitable, meaning you need to adapt to the realities of geopolitics. In reality, you only need to be afraid if the service provides information specifically to your own stationary bandit. At the same time, a resident of the RF does not care what some service reveals about them to security forces from the USA. Just as a resident of the USA does not care what security forces from the RF learn about them. As long as it does not involve committing large-scale acts of terrorism resulting in the deaths of hundreds of people—which no sane person would do anyway—it is unlikely that any risk of cooperation between jurisdictions from hostile blocks will arise.

Various fraudsters have long been aware of this. For instance, in the past, Russian hackers intentionally avoided users from Russia and targeted Americans or Britons, which made it very easy to evade punishment. Now, Ukrainian scammers do the same, calling Russians with proposals to transfer money to some “safe account” and then forcing them to perform various “tasks” allegedly to get the money back, since they know no one can do anything to them. Of course, we are absolutely against such fraud, but these cases show that the rule of hostile jurisdictions works.

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Fighting the state without risking one’s own hide

Bitarch

The main problem for any socio-political movement opposing state power is the threat of repression against its participants. This applies first and foremost to libertarians, as from the authorities’ point of view, we are nothing other than the most “non-systemic” opposition (i.e., those who refuse to adjust their positions according to the state’s directives). The risk of repression severely limits movement participants in conducting effective actions, and this is quite explainable: if one can receive a heavy fine just for distributing leaflets, then engaging in more serious activism is fraught with the risk of “sitting on a bottle.” There are very few passionate libertarians ready to create new ideas and promote them to the masses; therefore, the arrest of even one of them can significantly weaken the entire movement. Understanding the situation, they are forced to severely restrain themselves in their words, avoid participating in actions, and generally live in constant fear.

It is entirely realistic to get rid of this problem — all real-world activity must be outsourced, while remaining 100% online, beyond the reach of the stationary bandit (“the state”). Libertarian activists should ideally not show their faces in the real world at all and perhaps not even disclose their views, but upon opening a virtual machine with a VPN, they should not hesitate in anything, for the FSB is absolutely powerless in the fight against the virtual! You can boldly post any calls on social networks, publish the personal data of convinced etatists, and organize the most radical actions — from distributing leaflets and hanging banners on houses and bridges, to the open harassment of active etatists (for example, writing “A maniac lives here” on an etatist’s front door and posting flyers in their residential area with a photo and information about their tendency toward aggressive violence).

All real-world actions must be carried out by people who are in no way connected to libertarianism. We receive donations from anonymous sponsors in cryptocurrency and pay “Vasya-types” from the darknet in bitcoins—people who normally place drug stashes and paint asphalt and house walls with advertisements for “pharmacies.” They are skilled at hiding from the police and know what to do in case of arrest. That is why they take their money for this risk, which, to be honest, isn’t even that much. Even if one of the executors is caught by the cops, he will only give up an anonymous online contact, where the FSB will be met with a VPN service’s refusal to provide a real IP address (or TOR, if you are a complete paranoid). Thus, the true passionaries, whose arrest could weaken the movement, become absolutely invulnerable to repression, while the arrest of depoliticized executors in the real world does no harm to the movement — in place of one arrested graffiti artist, ten new ones wishing to make some extra money will appear.

Skeptics will probably say now that online anonymity is a myth and the FSB will deanonymize you in a minute. I have already written why this is not the case and will never be: since the very emergence of states, according to the theory of the stationary bandit, every state is in constant confrontation with others. Of course, there are temporary alliances, but in the long run, one state is always a competitor and enemy to another! The authorities of any given state are usually always interested in helping the opposition weaken their competitor; therefore, they will not only refrain from disclosing the personal data of oppositionists but will even help in the development of anonymization tools (for example, the TOR network was created with the support of the US federal government). Do you think it is accidental that the laws of most countries in the world contain clauses prohibiting the disclosure of personal data and the extradition of people accused in their homeland for political reasons?! It is not accidental at all, and this must be utilized; as Mikhail Svetov says — maneuver between different states to carve out your own freedom. Given the current geopolitical layout, by living in Russia and using a VPN in Switzerland, the USA, Great Britain, Sweden, and Norway, you are completely safe. Provided, of course, that you do not personally carry out any actions in the real world.

Connecto VPN

During the period when Roskomnadzor was going crazy and using a scattergun approach in attempts to block Telegram, a proxy from Vee Security helped many Russian users. Now Roskomnadzor has toned down its fervor, Telegram has become smarter, and for most of the time, it no longer requires a proxy.

However, this episode demonstrated that people in a repressive state (and potentially all states are repressive) should learn the rules of network hygiene in advance. In particular, one means for this is the use of VPN services.

Of course, if you have specific tasks such as surfing from behind the Great Firewall of China or watching movies on Netflix from a country where it does not distribute content, you have likely already found reliable, fast, and expensive services for this. However, for the vast majority of users, this is excessive functionality that they do not want to overpay for.

Connecto VPN by Vee Security is exactly such an optimal solution for our modest market. On one hand, there is a clear emphasis on security. No logs, no mandatory personal data when connecting, and if desired, the service can be paid for with cryptocurrencies. On the other hand, with monthly payment, the price is only four euros per month, while the market leaders ask for around ten.

The company has only four servers so far, but I read winter reviews, and there were three back then. Steady growth as the company scales is a good, sustainable business model. Vee Security is located in the safe Estonian jurisdiction, so Russian clients have nothing to fear in this regard.

For everyone who decides to connect to the Connecto VPN service via my link, I will receive 2 euros for a monthly subscription, 5 euros for a semi-annual one, and 8 euros for an annual one. So, if you were thinking about donating some money to me anyway, you can combine business with pleasure. The service is truly good; I have read many warm reviews about it, not only immediately before writing this article while trying to find any pitfalls, but long before that, from my acquaintances. Usually, they praised it.

At the same time, I recommend subscribing to the channel of the owner of Vee Security, dedicated to cybersecurity. Security issues can also be discussed in the corresponding chat.