Тег: freedom of association

Freedom of association

A long question came in from Georgy Nemov:

I was discussing private jurisdictions with a friend, and when we got to the freedom to leave an association, he threw out the argument that this is impossible because, in such a case, the police wouldn’t even be able to detain a suspect until the circumstances were clarified.

I replied that the freedom to leave stems from the NAP, and therefore the jurisdiction agreement could certainly stipulate conditions under which a suspect of aggressive violence may be detained. And that there is no contradiction in this.

But his answer made me think. He said that in such a case, communities would use suspicions as a pretext for the forced retention of members. And that the freedom to leave either exists or it doesn’t.

How do you think this can be combated? Or will it be necessary to outsource the execution of punishments and searches to various bounty hunters?

Well, let’s figure this out.

Jurisdiction is “legal authority.” If a person is within someone’s jurisdiction, it means that the norms established by whoever exercises that jurisdiction apply to them. These norms concern both the measure of responsibility they must bear for their actions and the measure of protection they can count on while being in that jurisdiction.

Let’s imagine a world in which jurisdiction can be changed within the framework of explicit voluntary agreements. Let’s also imagine the worst-case scenario, in which the norms of different jurisdictions diverge significantly.

Anna, who is in the jurisdiction of the Ancap company, interacts with Boris, who is also in the jurisdiction of the Ancap company. Within the regulatory field of Ancap, Boris’s actions toward Anna are qualified as a violation of her rights, and Anna calls Ancap employees to handle the matter. While the employees are on their way, Boris contacts the Bandits company and agrees to switch to their jurisdiction, and notifies the Ancap company that he is terminating his contract with them.

Anna explains to the arriving Ancap employees that she suffered damages as a result of Boris’s actions, and she demands compensation from Boris. Boris claims that there were no damages, and in general, he is already in the jurisdiction of the Bandits. The Ancaps contact the Bandits, and the latter explain that in their jurisdiction, Boris’s actions, even if Anna is not lying, are not considered an offense, but if anyone outside should apply any sanctions against their client, they will certainly consider that an offense and will pursue it harshly.

The Ancaps conduct a quick investigation and are convinced that Anna’s testimony is quite credible. Now they face a dilemma. They can pay Anna the compensation for damages themselves and then forward the bill to the Bandits. Or they can shrug their shoulders and state that their competence ends here since Boris is not in their jurisdiction, so there will be no compensation. In this case, Anna contacts the Bandits, switches to their jurisdiction, and demands that they deal with Boris. Now the Bandits have to stand by their words, because even if Boris manages to slip out of their jurisdiction, they just promised that the violation of their client’s (Anna’s) rights by an outsider (Boris) must be harshly pursued by them, the Bandits.

Scenarios can be varied this way or that by changing the relative power and degree of ruthlessness of the jurisdiction providers — and different pictures will result. It is known that historically on Earth, jurisdiction providers with forced entry based primarily on place of residence became dominant. To erode this dominance and move toward extraterritorial contractual jurisdictions, an increase in the decentralization of money, easing of migration, and an increase in the armament of individuals are required. In other words, a movement toward the sovereign individual, who agrees on norms with equals, rather than receiving them from above.

We are working on this.

Forgive me that the answer turned out to be on a broader topic than the one indicated in the question.

How does a community (or one of the jurisdictions under panarchy) differ from a state?

The usual answer is that the difference lies in the right to freely leave. But the rules of life in a community can differ so much from the requirements of the outside world that leaving becomes practically impossible. Where would someone who leaves an Amish community, or a communist one, go? They are simply not adapted to life.

Where is the guarantee that some community won’t prepare for an aggressive war against others? Where is the guarantee that anyone wishing to leave the community will be allowed to? Where is the guarantee that someone who has left will be accepted elsewhere?

Anonymous question

States are territorial communities recognized by the leadership of other similar territorial communities as sovereigns over their territory. There can also be territorial communities that are not recognized as sovereigns. For example, condominiums. They may have their own customs, but the state remains the sovereign over that territory. There can be extraterritorial communities. An example is the church. The only church that also has its own state is the Catholic Church. It can be viewed both as an extraterritorial jurisdiction with sovereignty over a small territory and as a state with a very powerful diaspora abroad.

The freedom to leave does not separate communities from the state in any way; it has nothing to do with it here. There can be states with the freedom to renounce citizenship. There can be any other territorial and extraterritorial communities with the freedom to leave. And, similarly, all the same can exist without the freedom to leave. The freedom to leave is the characteristic by which we can judge whether a community is compatible with a libertarian order.

Your concerns regarding guarantees of how decent the order will be in various communities, and how dangerous these orders will be for both the members of the community and those around them, are quite justified, since current sovereign territorial communities aka states cannot provide any such guarantees and regularly demonstrate that such concerns are not groundless.

Today, a state can be coerced into observing propriety in three ways: by the threat of attack from other states, the threat of severing interstate economic ties, and the threat of internal regime instability. In a world without states, similarly, a community that is dangerous to others would have those same incentives to behave decently. So why abolish states at all?

In principle, there is no need. If the vast majority makes constant active efforts to ensure that territorial sovereigns do not violate individual rights, it will be a quite decent world. But in such a world, states would not have the opportunity to fight those who wish to associate in a different manner, for example, within the framework of a contract. Thus, a world of minimal states will inevitably be diluted by extraterritorial associations of people who maintain rules within themselves that are not tied to a territory.

As for the fear that people fleeing a highly exotic community will find themselves completely maladapted to life in a global world, it seems exaggerated to me. There are a huge number of migrants in the world who adapt to life in new conditions, and the easier it is, the more they like these new conditions. So this particular factor is not something to fear. Migrants are dangerous if they become a tool of politics. Purely economic relations benefit all their participants.

If the Amish are such maladapted folks, why are they so wealthy?