Bitarch posted reflections on his VKontakte page regarding the idea that instead of bombs, weapons and ammunition should have been dropped on the Third Reich. As justification, he cites the same Hirschleifer model in the form presented by Auzan — with conclusions that the stable existence of an anarchic society requires maintaining a balance of the potential for violence. If so, the artificial equalization of the BPN (Balance of Potential for Violence) in Germany during WWII would have led to the fall of totalitarianism and, consequently, to a swift end to the war.

One thing can be said for sure: if small arms and equipment were dropped on concentration camps, it would indeed have immediately led to an armed uprising, followed by attempts to leave the Reich or seize a certain area for the subsequent effective deterrence of punitive units.

To what extent the same tactic would have led to an armed uprising against the regime throughout the rest of the Reich’s territory depends solely on the degree to which that remaining territory resembled a concentration camp. Conversely, the more complacency toward power existed in a given social stratum, the more likely it is that the weapons gifted from the skies would have been disciplinedly handed over to the authorities for subsequent shipment to the front.

These obvious considerations follow directly from the Hirschleifer model as well: the higher the bitterness parameter and the lower the overall level of resources, the greater the probability that a battle for hegemony until total victory will occur in the system instead of peaceful anarchy. Conversely, the lower the bitterness and the higher the relative prosperity, the fewer efforts the parties are inclined to spend on fighting each other, and the more they leave for production.

The greater the legitimacy of the regime, the less likely it is that the artificial equalization of the potential for violence through the distribution of firearms will lead to any problems for the regime. The reason is quite simple: under conditions of low bitterness between parties, firearms simply will not be used for political struggle. It doesn’t matter if I have a gun if I express my dissatisfaction with the regime in the form of a solo picket and signatures on open letters, and the state politely takes my dissatisfaction into account without hindering me in any way. Having a gun begins to play a role when I encounter direct illegitimate violence and realize that I have a chance to solve the problem with counter-violence.

So, overall, the idea of artificial BPN equalization is good as a thought experiment, but it should not be taken literally: today, peaceful public discontent far more often becomes a weapon against the state, and to evoke it, I would likely need not a gun, but a boost to my info-resources. And here, of course, a humanitarian bombing in the form of, for example, a retweet of me by Mr. Trump could indeed produce a significant effect.