Anonymity, protest, division of labor

A post from the Telegram channel “IT criminal cases SORM rossiyushka” is actively spreading across the network about how important it is for everyone to set the correct privacy settings in Telegram, after first updating it to the latest version. The update was made following the outrage of protesters in Hong Kong, who discovered they were being deanonymized by adding all possible phone numbers to the contact list, after which Telegram’s friendly interface immediately gave up the activists’ accounts by phone number. The hole has now been patched, but the old settings are still there by default; they must be changed manually.

Not long ago, I also mentioned a post from the Cryptoagora channel about how to obtain fake bank cards and SIM cards without intermediaries (spoiler: realistic silicone masks are used).

And very recently, Bitarch spoke out regarding the fact that automatic facial recognition systems are inevitably doomed to false positives, meaning that one can not only cover their tracks this way, but also try to feed the opponent members of their own gang: other security forces, odious officials, and so on.

In light of the fact that the Russian authorities are actively purchasing cameras for facial recognition at mass protests, the opportunity arises to provide the press with headlines like: “Zhirinovsky threw feces at a Rosgvardiya officer,” or “Three Putin doubles urinated on a cop.” But—no.

The complication of the protest and the tightening of the screws by the regime currently dictate a clear maintenance of the boundary between legal and illegal actions. During a legal protest, whether agreed upon with the city administration or not, a person limits their toolkit and also expects other protest participants to do the same. Any other behavior will logically be perceived by them as a provocation. At the same time, at other times when the streets are not flooded with security forces, nothing prevents anonymous individuals from carrying out well-prepared actions that discredit the regime, appearing on camera in the images of, for example, Petrunko or Kusyuk.

It is also worth considering in advance which role in the protest suits you best and not striving for versatility. You can sit anonymously on the internet and write articles of a quasi-extremist nature, or you can speak from a podium—but it will be very difficult to combine both functions, as attention to a known activist increases the probability of deanonymizing their persona. You can attend agreed rallies, appearing on surveillance cameras and in cell operator logs, but it will be difficult to combine this with posting flyers or smashing police windows, deanonymized using Russian Elephant. Finally, you can donate to projects you like, although earning money for this may not leave you, for example, with opportunities for serious offline activism.

There will be no post tomorrow; in my offline incarnation, I am going to observe the elections. But if the whim of running for office myself had entered my head, I would have had to hand the channel over to someone else. There is no helping it; every choice entails costs. So let’s drink to the hope that tomorrow we will not regret the choice we made today!

Put on a mask — don’t get caught