Detailed question from Zanudny (not backed by any donations, but it’s always better to give a bore what they want without dragging it out too much)
In the event of abandoning the territorial principle, how will relations between two sovereign entities not linked by any ECU/FPCU, etc., be regulated?
Let’s imagine a statistically realistic situation under conditions of competition among sovereign jurisdictions for territory. Those that establish mandatory laws for citizens (but not for all people in general, including stateless persons, as existing states do for the “human and citizen”). Since they are contractual, not all residents will enter into the proposed agreements. If sovereign jurisdictions are extraterritorial, then opportunists cannot be driven away. Who can convict them and under what laws, if they do not create their own LJ? What will protect citizens from the arbitrariness of “stateless persons,” including violence, if they are not separated territorially and there are no zones of responsibility? What will protect the opportunists themselves from violence by individual “citizens”?
Please note, I am not considering non-recognition or conflict between jurisdictions here. If there are no common rules of the game and no higher authority, looking at history, this seems inevitable. Nor is this a question about the dictate of a local majority, although in the absence of claims to territory, claims to benefits will remain (otherwise there would be no private property). This will not necessarily trigger the “market,” because even entering into trade relations is a contract, and we are talking about sovereign jurisdictions that may autarkize for the sake of security or create a monopoly. The question is: what will guarantee the freedoms of those who would simply like to leave (or even stay) in a given territory without recognizing the legal system of their neighbors, in the event of a conflict, if they have no “protection” behind them?
Answer from Ancap-chan
The questions are getting longer. On one hand, this shows that people are absorbing the previous material. On the other—posts are stopping fitting into the Telegram channel format. Oh well, to hell with the format, I’m used to it.
So, in a certain territory, there are several contractual jurisdictions, as well as a number of individuals who couldn’t care less about all these jurisdictions and do not want to join any of them. This is quite logical, because what is a jurisdiction for? To resolve conflicts with other people using some kind of mediator. But the vast majority of conflicts are perfectly settled without any mediator! How many of you have had to sue someone even once in your life? At the same time, people constantly find themselves in the zone of influence of someone else’s rules. If these rules are known to them in advance and they agree with them, the rules are usually obeyed. If the rules are unknown in advance, people behave as they are used to, and then they are told that there is a different order here, and they adjust their behavior accordingly. If the rules are known and people disagree with them, they try to bypass the rules, sabotage them directly, or obey them but with visible reluctance.
As I have already written, panarchy is an unstable transitional state from territorial monopoly jurisdictions to pure ancap. You are touching upon the problem of how people for whom ancap has already arrived should behave toward those who still have panarchy in their heads. And that’s exactly how they should behave: according to ancap. As long as everything is settled amicably, live as good neighbors. When it stops being settled, organize a movement in your support, with or without the participation of hired professionals.
The most important thing for the unstable situation of panarchy to shift toward ancap, rather than toward the good old territorial monopolists, is the absence of demand for uniform rules, a single order, or a higher decision-making body. On one side of the scale, we have the maximization of convenience—everyone wants rules to be adapted to their ideas of what is right. On the other side will be the desire to save mental effort. It is easier to remember uniform rules than to keep different options in mind.
Thus, the simpler the set of regulations, the more likely it is to become nearly universal. The more complex it is, the greater the chance it will remain purely niche. In a simplified explanation, all libertarian theory boils down to one or two principles. Indeed, based on the bare principles of self-ownership and non-aggression, one can interact superficially with almost anyone, but for various highly specialized legal issues, more substantial codes, longer than a single page, will be required. Fortunately, they will not be needed by everyone and not very often.
