Bitarkh’s Column
Original publication on VKontakte
Critics of ancap constantly cite the well-known argument from Robert Nozick’s 1974 book Anarchy, State, and Utopia regarding the impossibility of ancap. Its essence is that different protection agencies may reach contradictory decisions regarding a particular case, enter into an armed conflict when attempting to execute them, and ultimately, one strongest agency will remain, becoming an ordinary mini-state with a territorial monopoly. In his work on the conditions for the stability of anarchy, Jack Hirschleifer demonstrated the conditions under which this occurs, leading to a war for hegemony instead of a state of anarchy.
But this argument applies exclusively to models of a stateless society where the use of violence is still permissible for certain purposes (enforcement of contracts, collection of compensation). For example, this position is partially held by Murray Rothbard and fully by David Friedman (the book The Machinery of Freedom). For a fully voluntarist society, the problem of conflict between protection agencies, as well as the determination of a higher court instance (which makes the final decision), is completely absent.
In any model of a voluntarist society, conditions are created where the initiation of violence is impossible or instantly extinguished (there is a uniform balance of violence potential (BVP) “everyone has weapons” and a deterrence doctrine (DD), i.e., the readiness of the majority of society to use counter-violence to stop aggression). Counter-violence can only be applied during a direct attack, but one cannot start a war to “punish a violator” or “collect compensation.” An offender, if they are not initiating violence at that moment, can only be boycotted—that is, no business is conducted with them. By the way, this is standard behavior between all subject players with BVP, such as stationary bandits (SB, “states”) in their relations with each other.
Under ancap, a trial (as is currently the case in relations between SB) can occur only by the mutual consent of both parties. The parties also agree in advance on the conditions for appealing the court’s decision if it does not satisfy them. And what if one party does not want to go to court? In a voluntarist society with BVP, no one can force them to go, but the refusal may be viewed as an admission of guilt, leading to a demand for compensation for the plaintiff, and in case of refusal—a decrease in reputation and possible ostracism. If the violator does this constantly, the severity of the ostracism will increase; eventually, they will simply stop being provided with utility services and sold goods in most stores, and they will be forced either to agree to cooperate or to move far away, to where their reputation is not taken so close to heart. Although with a ruined reputation, entry into all more or less decent jurisdictions will be closed to them.
As we can see, there is absolutely no room for the conflict described by Nozick.
Commentary by Ancap-chan
Nozick shows how a system of competing protection agencies can turn into a system of minimal states without violating the gentlemanly principle of compensating damage to clients affected by their activities, as well as to third parties. Bitarkh shows that if we take away from protection agencies this convenient pretext to coerce anyone for their own good, the problem of the state’s renaissance is resolved. Then the question arises, “well, how do we actually coerce if we really want to,” and to this Stefan Molinier answers. Which scenario is less realistic—the emergence of ultra-minimal states based on protection agencies or the emergence of a voluntarist society based on universal armament and readiness to actively counteract violence directed at oneself—we leave for the reader to judge.