At the end of last year, I published a translation of Mike Mazar’s article On the Doctrine of Deterrence. Later, in the video of the same name by Libertarian Band, I placed this doctrine into the overall sequence of my story about libertarianism. I thought that this was generally enough, and why repeat it ten times. But in discussions, it is often evident that opponents interpret the doctrine of deterrence in a one-sided way. So, I want to present to you a short article by Bitarch with some reflections on this matter.
In RAND’s theory of deterrence, there are two different approaches that are usually mixed into a single concept in Russian-language literature: “deterrence by threat of unacceptable damage.” It is very important to be able to distinguish them, as they are essentially two completely different defense strategies. We are talking about deterring a group aggressor, such as a hostile state or a contractual jurisdiction.
1) Deterrence by denial. Defense is organized in such a way that the opponent cannot achieve their stated goal (for example, to subjugate the residents of a certain country through violence, thereby gaining more benefit than the damage from military action). This strategy arises naturally in a society with a uniform balance of violence potential (BVP), i.e., where practically every resident of a certain territory has a common weapon like a Kalashnikov rifle and the skill to use it. An opponent can, of course, “genocide” the residents of a given territory using weapons of mass destruction, but why?! You get no profit from the dead, while economic sanctions and international isolation for using WMDs are guaranteed. For deterring any rational opponent, this strategy is quite sufficient.
2) Deterrence by punishment (deterrence by punishment). Defense is organized through the threat of inflicting some harm on a potential adversary in the event that they initiate aggression. In the classical sense, this is a synonym for the phrase “nuclear deterrence.” It assumes the delivery of nuclear strikes against the enemy in case of aggression, and in some scenarios, even against the civilian population in cities. It is clear that such actions will provoke a counterstrike, and both sides, if not the entire world, will be destroyed. According to most experts, a limited nuclear war using only tactical warheads against military targets cannot exist in practice; therefore, nuclear deterrence can be taken as a synonym for “Mutually Assured Destruction” (M.A.D.) or “doomsday weapons.” It follows that choosing nuclear weapons specifically for a deterrence by punishment strategy is extremely disadvantageous in terms of the resources required to create and maintain them in combat readiness. Developing a new type of virus will cost one-tenth the price of a single nuclear missile or less, storing an ampoule in a refrigerator costs almost nothing, and the fact that, if used, the virus could turn against you as well is also not a problem if you think in the category of “we will go to heaven, and they will just die.”
The concept of deterrence by punishment has well-known disadvantages in specialist circles, which is why the authorities of many countries are consciously abandoning it:
1) Proxy violence. The aggressor attacks not in their own name, but by supporting “ihktamnets” [unidentified combatants], remaining as if uninvolved. The “ihktamnets” act on their own and deny any connection to the aggressor’s government. As a result, there is simply no one to retaliate against using WMDs.
2) “Salami tactics.” The aggressor acts in very small steps, gradually encroaching on the victim’s interests. Each of these steps is so small that it cannot serve as a reason for the use of WMDs (which would, naturally, entail the mutually assured destruction of both sides).
In the modern world, all states act quite rationally, so the most profitable defense strategy against them will be deterrence by denial—or more specifically, the presence of simple weapons (non-WMDs) held by absolutely all residents of a specific territory. This will also help a stateless society prevent the creation of a stationary bandit (its own state) from within.
