Ilidzhin
I have already answered a related question in a post about the continuity of pension payments during the transition to a stateless society. There, I noted that the transition mechanism will vary depending on exactly how ancap comes about.
The most peaceful and calm way to transition to ancap, from the perspective of state functionaries, is through minarchism, which is precisely why it is attractive. As a result of liberal reforms, the state’s share in the economy shrinks, taxes decrease, state property is gradually privatized, and all of this is replaced by private institutions. Over time, only the name of the state remains, and eventually, the last newly dismissed government official, leaving the last government office rented from a private company, turns off the light. The money received from privatization during minarchist reforms is spent on the bankruptcy procedure of the state pension system, the repayment of the national debt, and so on. And if, due to favorable market conditions, some unspent money remains after privatization, it is simply distributed equally among the citizens.
If the transition to ancap occurs through the formation of extraterritorial contractual jurisdictions, then after some time the state will simply become one of such jurisdictions, losing its right to legitimate aggressive violence and its tie to a territory due to the shift to contractual relations with clients. In this case, that state property which is found unnecessary for carrying out the functions of a contractual jurisdiction will simply be sold, as non-core assets are usually sold. The privatization of the state itself will most likely happen through a shareholding mechanism: each citizen receives one share, and then some hold, some sell, and some buy up shares, thereby gaining control over the ECJ. This mechanism is prone to corruption (see voucher privatization), so it is unlikely to happen without scandals.
Finally, ancap may emerge as a result of agorist practices bleeding the state dry until it collapses on its own. But in the process of being bled dry, it will sell off those assets that still hold some value, and by the time of liquidation, all liquid state property will already be in the hands of enterprising agorists, including former government employees who privatized it into their own pockets. Those who find this unfair can simply try to do it before others. Agorist logic is harshest here: state property has already been declared ownerless property, effectively controlled by a gang of accidental heirs to the great robbers of the past. Whoever manages to seize a piece of this property non-violently is a success. Whoever manages to seize it violently is not a success, and property claims may be made against them later.
