Won’t all the other states crush it with all sorts of sanctions, like they did with Belarus—banning all firms from flying here, all ships from sailing here, all banks from transferring money here, all goods from being delivered here… or will the black market and smuggling ultimately win?
Orlik
The fears are not unfounded. One recalls, for example, the initiative to unify tax rates worldwide and pressure countries where taxes are too low—to discourage them from poaching capital from welfare economies.
Or we don’t even have to go that far; we can simply remember that customs require the country of origin of the goods to be specified. If the state (recognized by that specific customs office) does not exist, the declaration cannot be filled out. This wouldn’t even be due to anyone’s malicious intent. Simply put, the ancap case does not fit into existing state regulations, and even the most well-meaning official will just shrug their shoulders, saying they can’t help.
Of course, the market will provide some kind of crutches. The most obvious solution is not to abolish the state on paper. Let other states interact with the ancap zone through an emulator. In the cheapest version, I see it roughly like this: there is a nominal head of state, elected by lot from everyone who expressed a desire to participate in a drawing held every, say, four years, who has one single power, which is also a duty: to issue any documents upon request to anyone within a specified timeframe on behalf of the state “let’s say, Ukraine,” in whatever format the client requires—without taking any fee for the transaction into their own pocket, but placing all costs for preparing the documents on the customer. The very first refusal to sign or a delay in delivery leads to immediate resignation and the start of a new drawing. That’s it.
Need a package of documents for trade with “let’s say, Germany”? Draw them up, bring them for signature to the head of state of “let’s say, Ukraine,” and he is obliged to sign. A troll wants permission to eat small children? Let him draw up the permission and bring it for signature. The state doesn’t care; it will sign. The state emulator simply has absolutely no authority to enforce any directive. And if some other state gets the emulator to sign a request to introduce a peacekeeping contingent into the territory of “let’s say, Ukraine” to prevent the genocide of mice by frogs—this will in no way increase the legitimacy of its actions should it begin to fulfill that request.
But let’s return to the actions of other states against “let’s say, Ukraine,” dictated by malicious intent. It might feel as though, without active interstate diplomacy, businesses in the ancap territory are unable to defend their interests, which would worsen the territory’s investment climate. However, on the other hand, this territory is completely free from protectionist norms and places no obstacles in the way of international investors. This means that any influential corporation will be interested in ensuring that its home state does not hinder its operations in a stateless territory. In other words, foreign business will begin to play the role of its own diplomats. So, the market has tools to resolve things here as well. Yes, certain rigid states will easily ban any business working with the ancap zone—fortunately, there are enough states that it would be difficult for them to consistently violate the interests of the businesses that feed them. Seriously significant sanctions require consolidated public opinion to support them—even sponsors of terrorism are not always met with a serious response, and a peaceful stateless society is even less likely to agitate the global public enough for serious economic sanctions against it to be introduced, and once introduced, maintained for long.
