There is a fragile states index that takes into account many factors, including the state’s provision of public services, the stability of power, and other elements. Is it reasonable to assume that states with a high rating (coincidentally or not, it is easiest in these states to evade taxes, own weapons, and host information without a “censor”) will develop (or degrade) in the foreseeable future into full or nearly full “ancapistans,” after which an era of prosperity will begin?
Katsist
I have already written on a similar topic regarding the possibility of building an ancap state in fourth-world countries. In short: the pros and cons are listed, and some may believe the former outweigh the latter, while others believe the opposite. It is worth trying.
The same applies to forecasts regarding the developmental prospects of one ineffective state or another into an ancapistan. An anarchic regime—that is, the decentralization of law—is established there relatively easily. But it is far more difficult to understand how to preserve or, worse yet, grow capitalism from scratch in an anarchic society that either denies private property (the dream of the an-coms) or is based on clan interests and collective responsibility (the example of Somalia or Libya).
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear how to eliminate the influence factor of surrounding states. These are surprisingly jealous entities that are willing to deal only with other states, demand that their neighbors be as similar to themselves as possible, and if someone dares to start getting by without a state, they inevitably send their peacekeepers. However, the global trend is clearly changing now, and after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, it seems that violent attempts to reformat other societies in their own image will gradually go out of fashion.
It seems to me that if we are to talk about the prospects of transitioning to an ancap regime for certain states, the prospects for countries with parliamentary democracies look slightly more realistic—where, for example, a political layout has emerged that precludes the possibility of forming a government coalition, and if one can be assembled, it must be done by yoking together parties of swans, crayfish, and pikes in one wagon, as a result of which their ability for effective lawmaking and even budget adoption becomes blocked.
And so: unable to pay civil servants because the budget has not been passed, the government sends most officials home. People live almost entirely without government services, but they retain civilized traditions of respect for private property and the market; after some time, they begin to spontaneously use market substitutes for former government services, and at some point realize that they actually like it. The idea that we should fundamentally stop trying to choose a single government for everyone and each individual begins to find understanding among the people.
It is from such state incapacity that something might actually grow. To neighbors, it is still the same state, just experiencing a temporary parliamentary crisis, but that’s fine—someday the politicians will agree, and we will continue to settle matters with them. This is what politicians from surrounding countries think, so they don’t force their recipes for state organization on them. How many years it will take for a temporary crisis to finally solidify into a stable status quo—I cannot say.
In short, it seems to me that to build an ancap society, it is far more important to have a mature, rational society rather than a gathering of supporters of simple and effective solutions that are just as bandit-like as those of the state.
