There is a fragile states index that takes into account many factors, including the state’s provision of public services, the stability of power, and other elements. Is it reasonable to assume that states with a high rating (coincidentally or not, it is easiest in these states to evade taxes, own weapons, and host information without a “censor”) will develop (or degrade) in the foreseeable future into full or nearly full “ancapistans,” after which an era of prosperity will begin?
Katsist
I have already written on a similar topic regarding the possibility of building an ancap state in fourth-world countries. In short: the pros and cons are listed, and some may believe the former outweigh the latter, while others believe the opposite. It is worth trying.
The same applies to forecasts regarding the developmental prospects of one ineffective state or another into an ancapistan. An anarchic regime—that is, the decentralization of law—is established there relatively easily. But it is far more difficult to understand how to preserve or, worse yet, grow capitalism from scratch in an anarchic society that either denies private property (the dream of the an-coms) or is based on clan interests and collective responsibility (the example of Somalia or Libya).
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear how to eliminate the influence factor of surrounding states. These are surprisingly jealous entities that are willing to deal only with other states, demand that their neighbors be as similar to themselves as possible, and if someone dares to start getting by without a state, they inevitably send their peacekeepers. However, the global trend is clearly changing now, and after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, it seems that violent attempts to reformat other societies in their own image will gradually go out of fashion.
It seems to me that if we are to talk about the prospects of transitioning to an ancap regime for certain states, the prospects for countries with parliamentary democracies look slightly more realistic—where, for example, a political layout has emerged that precludes the possibility of forming a government coalition, and if one can be assembled, it must be done by yoking together parties of swans, crayfish, and pikes in one wagon, as a result of which their ability for effective lawmaking and even budget adoption becomes blocked.
And so: unable to pay civil servants because the budget has not been passed, the government sends most officials home. People live almost entirely without government services, but they retain civilized traditions of respect for private property and the market; after some time, they begin to spontaneously use market substitutes for former government services, and at some point realize that they actually like it. The idea that we should fundamentally stop trying to choose a single government for everyone and each individual begins to find understanding among the people.
It is from such state incapacity that something might actually grow. To neighbors, it is still the same state, just experiencing a temporary parliamentary crisis, but that’s fine—someday the politicians will agree, and we will continue to settle matters with them. This is what politicians from surrounding countries think, so they don’t force their recipes for state organization on them. How many years it will take for a temporary crisis to finally solidify into a stable status quo—I cannot say.
In short, it seems to me that to build an ancap society, it is far more important to have a mature, rational society rather than a gathering of supporters of simple and effective solutions that are just as bandit-like as those of the state.
Nothing special, pay no attention, just a small crisis, it will definitely pass, like May thunderstorms, so to speak
It is believed that the state is something absolutely necessary for people, without which there would be chaos, banditry, and ruin. Yet, in different eras, the perception of what the state is and what it should be has differed radically. No matter which government textbook you look at, it always says that in the past, the state was very bad, oppressed people, and they rebelled. But now, the state is good, it does not oppress people, and stability is very important to us all. At the same time, the structure of the state in different countries also differs greatly, and the greater the difference between what is there and what is here, the more “incorrect” the model there is, and the better it would be for those unwise people to do as we do here. Meanwhile, we need to defend ourselves so they don’t do here what they do there.
Why the National State is Needed
Strong national states formed as a response to the constant threat of foreign invasion, as well as as a tool for such invasion. But although territorial seizures continue to this day, this is becoming less justified in the eyes of residents of other countries and less popular among their own citizens. The globalization of the economy has made trade wars far less effective. In other words, the unified national state is becoming less in demand—tasks simply cannot be found for this expensive and inconvenient tool.
The main threat to the state today is not external aggression, but the lack of civil consensus. In democratic states, candidates who rely on the people’s dislike of the political establishment are coming to power one after another. This means that people are not dissatisfied with individuals—they are dissatisfied with the system itself.
Problems of Democracy
Why is democracy providing civil consensus worse and worse? Because it is a dictatorship of the majority. If power stably belongs to the same political force, a stable dissatisfied minority forms, convinced that its interests are not being observed by the government, and therefore completely unmotivated to maintain any loyalty to the government. If the government and opposition regularly switch places, it results in an endless tug-of-war where policy becomes a compromise. Regulations are loosened, then tightened; taxes are decreased, then increased. No political program is implemented, and the voter’s frustration grows.
A minority is ready to obey the majority if it sees the need to unite in the face of external danger. But when there is no external danger, people realize there is no reason to tolerate it. And if external danger is fabricated, in our age of informational transparency, this causes even more irritation and distrust toward the establishment. The “make it the same for everyone” approach is rapidly losing popularity also because in all other sectors, a person easily receives individual service according to their requests—and only in those spheres for which the government is responsible must they somehow put up with unification. The future lies in transferring the individual approach into the political sphere.
For now, the individual approach in politics manifests in how the same candidate is tried to be sold to different categories of voters under different sauces before elections. In other words, political technologists already see the demand of the voters, but, unable to satisfy it, they try to at least give the dish different shades of flavor. But such a marketing strategy cannot work for long. More and more people want to somehow unite with those who share similar views and somehow peacefully separate from those to whom these views are offensive.
Separation
The simplest way of separation within the existing legal political tools is spatial separation. Chechens pushed all Russians off their land and now demonstrate a touching national unanimity to the outside world. American libertarians are moving to New Hampshire—and the state is rapidly deregulating its legislation.
However, physical relocation is only one way of changing conditions. If you don’t like the water company, you have to change your place of residence, but if you don’t like the mobile operator, it is enough to change operators without any moving. Government services have more in common with the services of a mobile operator than with utility infrastructure. At least, most government services look quite mobile.
Panarchy
Today’s state, through taxes, provides citizens with benefits such as education, healthcare, pension provision, law enforcement, control over fire, sanitary, ecological and a bunch of other safety measures, courts, and other small trifles—as well as that for which a strong central government was actually established: border protection against foreign invasion and services for seizing other states. Practically all these services can be perfectly provided on a competitive basis. After all, each of you calls your own insurance company when you get into an accident, so why can’t everyone contact their own police when protection is required?
Market solutions have already been invented and have a practice of successful implementation for absolutely all services that people need. Need, in this case, is determined by the willingness to pay for these services. A system of social relations in which all goods and services are supplied on a free competitive market is called anarcho-capitalism, and this is the liberal ideology brought to its logical limit.
However, such fine fragmentation of government service providers may not seem convenient to everyone, otherwise we would have long lived in such a fully competitive society. There is indeed a demand for a paternalistic state that cares for a person from the cradle to the grave, and it is even quite large. The entire twentieth century passed under the banner of armed struggle between socialism and liberalism, and despite the loud fall of odious totalitarian regimes, it must be admitted that both sides lost in this struggle: classical liberal states have also mostly vanished into oblivion. Therefore, the main challenge facing humanity today is the peaceful separation of socialists and liberals without violating the integrity of national entities (clustering by nationality, having one language and similar cultural norms, is also convenient for people). In fact, we are talking about the simultaneous coexistence of one or several socialist and liberal governments on the territory of one country or block of countries. Such a system is called panarchy, and this idea is being actively developed by intellectuals worldwide, in both developed and developing countries.
Transition Scenarios
Of course, the simplest path to embodying major social transformations is dictatorship. A coup or revolution is not mandatory. It is enough for a populist to come to power, concentrating a constitutional majority in parliament in their hands, subordinating the courts and, most importantly, having broad popularity among the people. A hypothetical Lee Kuan Yew or, conversely, Chavez.
The simplest path, however, also carries the greatest danger. Over time, someone else will replace the dictator and begin to repeal everything that was adopted.
A more complex but more reliable path is a broad public campaign. When very many people demand reforms—loudly, demonstratively and at every convenient opportunity—eventually their inevitability becomes obvious. Once they occur, they are much harder to repeal.
There is also a very simple and familiar path for Russia—catch-up development. Wait until panarchy works in the European Union and the USA, in China and Korea, in South Africa and Brazil—and then finally carry out the necessary transformations, while the lag behind Nigeria still doesn’t look completely hopeless.
And finally, those citizens who require separation can simply present the rest of the state with a fait accompli. Here is your state, here is ours. One territory, different norms. We pay taxes to our government according to the agreement, and we do not pay them to yours. Will you try to use force to return us to your jurisdiction? Guys, a civil war is not budgeted for, and in general, let’s live in harmony, because we have already charged the batteries of our drone. As the famous political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann states, the motto of our time is becoming “What, was that allowed? Yes, it was.”
And if there is no transition?
Well, what will happen if no transition to panarchy occurs?
A couple of inertial scenarios are possible. In the first, Russia sluggishly democratizes, the screws are loosened little by little, and the country gradually turns into something quite decent in Eastern Europe, no worse than some Moldova. In the second, Russia just as sluggishly tightens the screws, pushing particularly active opposition figures abroad, and gradually turns into something bleak in Eastern Europe, like Belarus.
It is also possible that what today exists more in journalistic articles than in regulatory documents will finally take shape. The sovereignization of regions, state corporations, and special services will occur, and the country will slide into clan feudalism. The tendencies for this exist, and as the current president weakens, they may become stronger.
But as long as the state, without reforming in the proper key, continues to somehow degrade, society may simply, by a process of attrition, begin to transition to alternative means of coordination—alongside the state, in spite of the state, and remaining invisible to the state. When people make deals under the table, using private money, resolve their conflicts in a private court, use the services of private security companies and so on, then from a certain moment, the uselessness of the state becomes obvious to literally everyone. In this case, Russia will transition to anarcho-capitalism, bypassing the stage of panarchy.
What to do?
So, you have encountered a fairly long text where unfamiliar terms are introduced, an unusual social structure is described, and strange predictions are made. What to do with this next?
Even if you are a supporter of the status quo, it is still useful for you to know that such a discourse exists and is gaining popularity. You can warily observe the penetration of these ideas into the masses or actively oppose them—but one way or another, it won’t hurt you to familiarize yourself with them, just as it is useful for liberals to know the basics of socialist doctrine, and for atheists—the New Testament.
If you are a convinced democrat, then perhaps you have simply never eaten any fruit sweeter than a carrot. Take a look at what is being proposed to replace modern liberal democracy; it’s possible you will find a grain of truth in these proposals.
Finally, if you like what has been presented, then it is all the more worth studying the texts on this site, discussing them with acquaintances—and from there, it may lead to gradual implementation.
I am quite concerned about the emerging tacit consensus among the diverse unrecognized opposition in Russia, which suggests that the top leadership (yes, the very top) of the current Russian authorities and their friends from the “Ozero” cooperative, etc., cannot be publicly condemned, dekulakized, stripped of everything, left to rot in mines, or at least given a public, brutal death. Why should these “people” remain unpunished and even continue to live after what they have done to our country? I am concerned.
armchair hater
I have already had to answer a similar question, explaining the impracticality of terror against the security forces. In general, all these arguments, and even to a greater extent, apply to the state leadership as well. There is a well-known political observation that the less blood is shed during a transition of power, the more democratic and “herbivorous” the new government will be.
So, revenge is indeed best served cold. First, a peaceful transition of power instead of a bloody revolution. Then, a peaceful reduction in staff instead of lustration. And only after the deregulation of law has been carried out and confidence in the possibility of a fair trial has been restored, will the citizens themselves gradually begin to file lawsuits against the elderly former tyrants and their elderly former henchmen. Their dirty laundry will be aired in public, their crimes will be impartially and publicly examined, and billions will vanish to settle claims. The remainder of their lives will be spent in continuous, exhausting litigation. But at the moment of transition, nothing will foreshadow anything of the sort. They will even receive guarantees from a transitional government of public trust that it, the government, will not persecute them. And indeed, such important matters should not be entrusted to a government; this is a matter for private, legally equal individuals.
Now, as you probably know, the majority of the pension budget consists of transfers from the federal budget, where the working generation supports pensioners through taxes. The PFR (Pension Fund of Russia) exists purely on paper; without transfer payments from the budget, it would be exhausted instantly; accordingly, its privatization would achieve nothing. In a stable libertarian society, it is clear how the pension system will work (private insurance, assistance from children, charity, capital income, etc.), but what should be done during the transition period before this has been created?
The state, by forcibly seizing money from people, does so under the pretext that it assumes certain obligations in return. In the case of pension contributions, this is the obligation of a lifelong annuity, starting from an age determined by the state. After the liquidation of the state, the fate of its obligations may vary depending on exactly how the state was liquidated.
Minarchism
In the event of a minarchist government coming to power, everything is relatively simple and predictable (and for me personally, this is almost the only argument in favor of minarchism as a transition period to ancap). For example, the transition period is described in the LPR (Libertarian Party of Russia) program, and the proposed mechanism generally satisfies me completely:
At the initial stage of reforms, all obligations of the state to pensioners and persons who have begun to pay pension insurance contributions will be fulfilled through the creation of a special State Pension Restitution Fund, to which current profits from the privatization of state enterprises and corporations will be directed. All those who made mandatory pension insurance contributions will have them returned as funds from the sale of state property (including the property of the Pension Fund of Russia itself) enter the State Pension Restitution Fund.
Upon completion of the restitution, the LPR program envisions the liquidation of the fund and the transfer of the remnants to charity, which is an unfair and corruption-prone measure; therefore, it would be much simpler and more logical upon the liquidation of the fund to distribute the remainder equally to all citizens as a one-time payment.
Anarcho-capitalism
But no minarchism may happen at all. The moral and financial bankruptcy of the state may lead to its liquidation occurring not from the top, with payment on state obligations, but from below, from the side — yes, from everywhere people can reach, without the formation of any successor structures. In other words, state property will be partially bought up by private individuals and partially stolen by state employees at the pre-bankruptcy stage, and the least liquid assets will be scavenged by anyone and everyone once the state is actually liquidated.
How much will pensioners be able to grab for themselves at the pre-bankruptcy stage? Perhaps some land, since as difficulties with paying pensions grow, the demand for land for personal farming will increase, and the distribution of land to pensioners and “persons of pre-retirement age” during this period is quite likely.
How much will pensioners be able to grab at the stage of scavenging the remains? Working budget employees will scavenge the most because they are closer. Some of these working budget employees will be pensioners; they will get something. Non-working people will get something if they hustle, using old connections and similar tools.
Bleak? I’m sorry, I have no other ancap for you in Russia. But there is also good news. If, as the state gradually goes bankrupt, people manage to prevent a collapse into socialism, then by the time of the final liquidation of this parasite, society will already be ready: it will have developed most of the necessary institutions for ancap, primarily mechanisms for private protection and the establishment of property rights, and then the transition period will pass relatively painlessly.
Now, if the state is socialist at the moment of liquidation, then, I’m sorry, instead of ancap, you get Somalia. This is exactly the process we are seeing now in Venezuela.
(now this is called an easement, i.e., the owner of private land is required by law to provide passage/access through their property for transit traffic, the installation of water pipes, sewage, access to water, etc.)
Personally, I think there will be an analogue of the concept of neutral (international) waters in maritime law for land transit, but how will they decide which part of the land can be considered an easement?
It is quite easy to imagine how, under conditions of the absolutization of private property rights to land, some landowner demands absolute inviolability of the land, refusing to enter into any negotiations. A person has the right to misanthropy as long as they are willing to pay for it and do not encroach on someone else’s property.
However, it is very difficult to imagine that commercial companies, especially those with multiple owners, would adhere to such misanthropy. As a rule, the goal of a company is to make a profit, not dominance and self-assertion. So, if there is a demand for the installation of utilities across a company’s territory, whether it be a cable or a path, this will generally be perceived as an opportunity to profit by meeting that demand.
Under ancap, any voluntary transactions are legitimate; as for forced ones, they can also easily occur, but apologies and compensation are assumed for them by default.
David Friedman, in “The Machinery of Freedom,” gives as an example of completely justified behavior a lost traveler who breaks into someone’s empty house to make a phone call and call for help, but upon leaving, leaves cash in the house in an amount sufficient to compensate for the inconvenience caused.
But we don’t need to go that far when we have our own taiga nearby. Any winter hut in the taiga is private property, but the doors are not locked, and there is always a certain supply of firewood, grains, and other equipment stored there. Any random passerby can spend the night in a winter hut, and before leaving, they replenish the supplies for the next visitor. This is the established spontaneous order. No one specifically engages in enforcing its observance; these rules of courtesy simply help people live. A society that does not develop such orders is less successful.
Warm, sated, and spontaneous order
Similarly, in Rome, the very concept of easement was invented without any state, within the framework of private law, and there are no grounds to believe that a stateless society of the future would be less sensible than a stateless society of the past.
Thus, under ancap, in sparsely populated areas, the needs of people regarding transit territories will be guarded by a conceptual “bear prosecutor” who upholds the “law of the taiga,” and in densely populated areas—by the desire to obtain market benefit from providing transit through one’s territory. As for the plots of the few misanthropes, who, although they will inevitably be encountered like any other rude people, in the vast majority of cases can be bypassed via some alternative routes.
