Why not defenestrations?

I am quite concerned about the emerging tacit consensus among the diverse unrecognized opposition in Russia, which suggests that the top leadership (yes, the very top) of the current Russian authorities and their friends from the “Ozero” cooperative, etc., cannot be publicly condemned, dekulakized, stripped of everything, left to rot in mines, or at least given a public, brutal death. Why should these “people” remain unpunished and even continue to live after what they have done to our country? I am concerned.

armchair hater

I have already had to answer a similar question, explaining the impracticality of terror against the security forces. In general, all these arguments, and even to a greater extent, apply to the state leadership as well. There is a well-known political observation that the less blood is shed during a transition of power, the more democratic and “herbivorous” the new government will be.

So, revenge is indeed best served cold. First, a peaceful transition of power instead of a bloody revolution. Then, a peaceful reduction in staff instead of lustration. And only after the deregulation of law has been carried out and confidence in the possibility of a fair trial has been restored, will the citizens themselves gradually begin to file lawsuits against the elderly former tyrants and their elderly former henchmen. Their dirty laundry will be aired in public, their crimes will be impartially and publicly examined, and billions will vanish to settle claims. The remainder of their lives will be spent in continuous, exhausting litigation. But at the moment of transition, nothing will foreshadow anything of the sort. They will even receive guarantees from a transitional government of public trust that it, the government, will not persecute them. And indeed, such important matters should not be entrusted to a government; this is a matter for private, legally equal individuals.

Just property claims, nothing more

If someone accidentally bumped me with their shoulder or stepped on my foot, and I shot the “aggressor” in response—would I be right from the perspective of the NAP?

anonymous question

For reasons that are unclear to me, in Russian libertarianism, the main emphasis is too often placed on the NAP, and the non-aggression principle is given not so much a legal meaning, but rather an ethical, or even mystical, one. All sorts of bastardized constructions like “I didn’t sign a NAP with you” or “he exited the NAP” stem from this intellectual imbalance. The violation of the NAP becomes a magic trigger that transforms a person from a legal subject into an object of legitimate violence.

As a reminder, the correct formulation of the NAP is “no one has the right to the unpunished initiation of violence.” And this principle is a derivative of the far more fundamental principle of self-ownership, which asserts a person’s inalienable property right to their own body. Violence, therefore, is an infringement on property. This infringement entails legal consequences if the owner so wills it.

The NAP, by asserting the lack of a right to unpunished aggressive violence, says nothing about the measure of punishment. Simply put, you have a property claim against another person: he stepped on your foot. You present this claim to him. In response, he suggests you don’t put your feet wherever you please, meaning he asserts that you created an obstacle for him, preventing him from moving freely across a territory that, for example, belongs to neither of you. By stepping on your foot, he avoided a trip-up that would have caused him property damage. You, in turn, are flabbergasted and suggest he wash his eyes and look where he’s going, meaning you assert that his behavior poses a constant systemic threat to those around him. He responds by saying he fucked your mother and tells you to fuck off. Thus, if one does not take his statement literally, he is asserting that he is ready to use violence against you if you do not stop making claims against him. You respond by telling him he’s out of line, a faggot, and that you will now make him lick your boots with his tongue. In other words, you promise the enforcement of the satisfaction of your property claims, but leave him the opportunity to bargain over the amount of compensation. He responds by promising to shove your boots up your ass, meaning he categorically refuses to satisfy your property claim in any form and expresses readiness to escalate damage in response to your attempt at enforcement. You, in turn, shoot him dead, meaning you apply ultimate economic sanctions against him, rendering his property useless.

Of course, in this case, there might not have been an argument, and you might have applied these economic sanctions immediately, without waiting for the counterparty’s refusal to pay compensation for damages. But to a potential judge, the case looks exactly like this: relatively small damage was caused to you, and in response, you caused significantly greater damage. Consequently, should you be required to make some compensatory payments to someone, should you be expelled from the local community, or should you be thanked for taking out a dangerous asshole who loved to pick on people but was, fortunately, not as skilled with a weapon as you—exactly what decision the court will reach will depend on many circumstances that the court must consider. Your reputation, the reputation of the deceased, community traditions, the compensation requested by the deceased’s friends, the personal moral beliefs of the judge, and possibly a number of other factors will play a role.

And these legal frameworks concerning permissible sanctions for a given property damage are a spontaneous order that will form in a libertarian society, optimally adapting it to the needs of people such that people’s satisfaction in society is maximized and conflicts are minimized. Because that is precisely the function of law—to resolve conflicts. 

When it comes to violence, only physical violence is mentioned. But various methods of psychological violence can cause physiological problems with the CNS, with the brain. If one arranges constant quarrels, doesn’t let [someone] sleep, and other “breathing into the tube.” One could say that “one can leave this,” just as one can hire security.

anonymous question

When the actions of one person cause damage suffered by another, and the evidence of damage and its assessment can be demonstrated, this is sufficient to demand compensation for damages, and it is completely irrelevant whether physical violence specifically took place.

It is another matter that damage resulting from non-violent actions is much harder to prove, which is why an external arbitrator may deny compensation for damages in such cases. This is precisely why, in the case of psychological violence, a more successful response tactic may be not a lawsuit, but, for example, retaliatory psychological violence.

Of course, when a victim of psychological violence receives such recommendations, they have reason to despair.
What can be said here? Just as it is very useful to possess a weapon and know how to use it for direct protection against physical violence—and only after successful self-defense to file lawsuits against those who survived—so too, for direct protection against psychological violence, it is useful to train the psyche and know how to use psychological weapons—and only after successful self-defense to engage in ruining the reputation of the unsuccessful abuser, if they haven’t already put their head in a noose.

If you beat up a clerk, he will lie in the hospital for a couple of days and return to work, having lost very little. But if you beat up the president, for example, his diplomatic visit will be disrupted; the damage is great. It turns out that different compensations are due to them as well. How does this correlate with the principle of equality before the law?

Alexey Ryazanov

Values are subjective; this is an axiom of economic theory.
Even the same clerk will incur different costs depending on at what point in his life he gets punched in the face. Therefore, in the case of a drunken brawl in a pub, half an hour later he will be merrily drinking with the person he was just fighting with, but if because of the fight he misses the trip of his dreams with his beloved girlfriend, it will be fraught with consequences for him more serious than the failure of some shitty diplomatic visit.

More or less quantifiable damage from violence is covered by an insurance policy, and the insurance company then recovers it from the person who applied the violence, if it so desires. Here, the president and the clerk are equal: the more expensive the policy they bought and the higher the premium provided for under it, the greater their chance of receiving it. As for moral damages, recovering them is even more difficult for the president. The clerk can be litigious, trying to prove to an arbitrator how seriously he was offended, but the president, as a public figure, will have to weigh his words so that his behavior in court does not cause more damage to his reputation than the violence under consideration. I don’t know about anyone else, but if I were the president, I would limit myself to demanding a public apology and profit from beautiful photos of conciliatory hugs.

here, take an example from the Greeks

I will gladly accept bitcoins from you as donations, and I won’t even consider their absence as moral damage. Wallet 1A7Wu2enQNRETLXDNpQEufcbJybtM1VHZ8

If a libertarian penitentiary system is aimed at restitution, then how will it work in the case of a murderer?

anonymous question

The system will work exactly as it does with a robber. Compensation for damages resulting from a murder will be demanded by those who suffered that damage. This is precisely why insurance companies play such an important role in theoretical developments regarding ancap: they suffer direct financial loss from the death of the insured person, and therefore, a developed insurance market will obviously lead to a reduction in the murder rate.

If one attempts to limit feedback to such archaic mechanisms as blood feuds, this also works, of course, but it looks rather primitive in modern society; more effective market mechanisms have been developed in our time.

And what about global warming?

I think it would be foolish to deny this phenomenon. The consequences of warming include the melting of glaciers and the flooding of lands, and consequently, the violation of property rights. Who should bear responsibility for this? And how can the market be used to prevent it?

anonymous question

For the vast majority of Earth’s inhabitants, global warming is, of course, wonderful. History clearly shows that during periods of climatic optima (which is why they are called optima), it was far more comfortable for people to live than during periods of cooling: at the very least, they didn’t starve to death as actively.
However, for the inhabitants of the atolls of some Kiribati, warming provides no benefit, as it is already warm at the equator; instead, the rise in ocean levels is a very real problem.

So yes, indeed, some people benefit from certain climatic changes and others from different ones, and if climate change is anthropogenic, then those for whom this externality is negative have grounds to file a claim for damages against those involved in anthropogenic climate change.
Let’s imagine how this could be implemented under ancap, that is, in a free market system. A native of Kiribati goes on the internet, first looks for theoretical information about the industries contributing most to global warming, then finds specific companies operating in those industries, and then starts flooding them with lawsuits? It seems unrealistic. Too many competencies are required from the victim; it is too difficult to calculate the amount of compensation for damages. When the damage is finally calculated, it may easily turn out that the calculation cost more than the amount of compensation. What is left?

Only private charity remains. Eco-activists create hype by filming videos about unfortunate natives disappearing underwater. Companies and individual media personalities capitalize on the hype by creating a fund to help those affected by flooding. With the fund’s money, individual natives who wish to do so are solemnly helped, in front of cameras, to move somewhere to Hawaii, the Philippines, or the Solomon Islands, or are simply given money, with which they acquire a yacht and then decide for themselves which harbor to dock in. Voilà, everyone is happy, everyone profits, the market has solved it!

Kiribati

Well, you understand that the mention of private charity wasn’t just for nothing, right? How about chipping in for a yacht? 
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Let’s say my property (whether it be a cow, or perhaps just an ordinary ball) ends up on my neighbor’s plot, but we have concluded no agreements for such cases. Can the neighbor in such a case take my ball, kill my cow?

anonymous question

To begin with, the neighbor must be prepared to prove that it was not he who stole the ball or the cow, but that it landed on his land on its own. Then, he must be prepared to prove that the landing of a foreign object on his property caused him damage. And finally, he must be prepared to prove that he did not know and had no simple ways of finding out who owned the object, and therefore considered the appropriation of the object as the most logical way to compensate for the damage, rather than approaching the owner of the object with a demand for compensation.

The title of ownership to an object does not transfer from one subject to another simply because the object changed location. But, of course, in a situation where it is unknown whose cow grazed on someone else’s plot for two years, managed to calve, and then the owner of the cow appears, the owner of the plot would probably be able to justify his rights to the calf. Similarly, if the owner of a ball comes to claim it after a week, the owner of the ball is unlikely to be entitled to demand rental payment for the fact that the ball was used to play football.

Trespassers will be shot

There is an owner of land and a warehouse with ammonium nitrate on it. And then it explodes, causing a lot of damage to the adjacent territories (see the Tianjin explosion). The owner was blown to smithereens, there are no heirs. Will the victims have a preemptive right to a share of the land under the warehouse, or is it first come, first served?

Anonymous question

If the land was owned by the warehouse owner, then it, of course, like other remaining property, must go toward the partial compensation for damages to the neighbors. If any of the neighbors wish to receive their share in kind, it will be necessary to deal with and conduct a land survey; however, if everyone agrees to money, there will be fewer problems, and the plot can be divided into lots of arbitrary configuration for ease of sale.

Tianjin

I am glad if this simple consultation helped you. It is best to express gratitude in monetary form: 1A7Wu2enQNRETLXDNpQEufcbJybtM1VHZ8

Petya killed Vanya

Petya killed Vanya. Petya is on trial. During the trial, it is revealed that Vanya was a serial killer. By killing him, Petya eliminated a violator of the NAP and saved many lives. The problem is that Petya had no idea about his victim’s sins—Petya is simply a scumbag and a murderer.

Should we condemn Petya for murder or acquit him because Vanya violated the NAP?

In other words, at what point does a violator of the NAP exit the NAP—at the moment the crime is committed, or when a third party finds out about it?

In this problem, we are operating within the zone of libertarian law.

Evgeny Kvasov

Elevating the NAP to the rank of the primary principle of libertarianism leads to many disagreements and linguistic monstrosities, such as “violation of the moral NAP,” “I didn’t enter into a NAP with you,” or “exiting the NAP.” People perceive the non-aggression principle as something like a contract that can be entered into, terminated, and supplemented with additional conditions.

It is far more convenient to derive everything directly from the basic axiom of libertarianism—the axiom of self-ownership. Petya killed Vanya, thereby infringing upon Vanya’s private property—Vanya’s body. It does not matter whether Petya was a bounty hunter for the “Sonechko” insurance company hunting Vanya, a former contractor for the Moscow Kingdom, or a drunkard who killed a stranger for a sideways glance, or even if Petya was defending himself from Vanya’s attack. In any case, Petya damaged someone else’s property, and he must now be prepared to bear responsibility for it.

If someone is found who wants to, or is contractually obligated to, deal with Vanya’s killer, then Petya will have to either fight back or try to reach an agreement—either amicably or in court.

According to the conditions of the problem, Petya agreed to a trial. In the trial, in our case, it is revealed that Vanya in no way encroached upon Petya, and Petya was not acting on behalf of those to whom Vanya had previously caused harm. This means that there was a violation of the NAP on Petya’s part, and the plaintiff—for example, Vanya’s insurance company—can demand compensation. It also emerges in court that Vanya is a long-time violator of the NAP, and a reward has been placed on his head by another insurance company.

The most likely outcome of the case: Petya receives a reward for killing Vanya from one insurance company and pays compensation for killing Vanya to another insurance company. And that company, in turn, had already paid an insurance premium to Vanya’s heirs before any trial took place.

Obviously, the outcome of the case could be different: there might have been no reward for Vanya, and then Petya would find himself in more difficult financial circumstances.

By the way, speaking of difficult financial circumstances. I very much hope that everything is fine with your money, and you might even decide to thank this channel in monetary form. My wallet: 1A7Wu2enQNRETLXDNpQEufcbJybtM1VHZ8