The newly translated chapter of Practical Anarchy by Stephan Molinieu is dedicated to the problem of collective folly. If a certain community, from the perspective of an outside observer, decides to go crazy and begin adhering to idiotic rules, who will stop it in an anarchic society?

The author’s argumentation proceeds from two directions.

First, he reasonably asks: why have we decided that this problem must be solved in any way at all? As long as a certain whim is voluntary, people tend to leave those who practice it alone.

Second, what if certain moral attitudes prevent people from leaving alone those who practice a certain voluntary whim? Here, the author shows that a proactive legal system, which interferes in the relations of third parties without a request from them, is simply expensive. And if the funding of this legal system is voluntary, a powerful economic incentive arises to evade this funding. At the start, people may strongly dislike drug addicts and, out of old statist habit, ganging up on them. Later, they will pick all the low-hanging fruit, realize that addicts are no longer lying in every alleyway, and are actually hard to find—and searching costs money—and they will calm down. A certain dynamic compromise will emerge: one set of eccentrics does not offend the eyes with their stoned bodies in public spaces, and another set of eccentrics does not offend the ears with scandals on this topic. And so it goes with any moral foundations.

Here, credit must be given to the author: the social theorist has triumphed over the moral philosopher within him—that is what life-giving economics does!