The problem of violence cannot be solved partially; it can only be dealt with completely

Voluntarist, Bitarch

When violence is divided into categories such as unacceptable, acceptable, or even necessary, a gross error is made in this division. It consists of the assumption that it is possible to fight only unacceptable violence without affecting other categories. The initiation of violence is supposedly useful in certain situations, and therefore this “useful” violence should be preserved.

However, dividing violence into different categories based on the indicator of acceptability and unacceptability is simply an absurd undertaking. Violence is indivisible; there are no people capable of committing one type of violent attack while being incapable of committing another. A person is either capable or incapable of committing a violent attack in general. You will be able to easily convince yourself of the truth of this statement after a brief explanation of the very nature of violent behavior and one interesting fact.

Violence is not a purely rational act to which a person resorts whenever it is profitable and does not carry serious risks. The manifestation of violence does not depend exclusively on social checks and balances. Regardless of the incentives, most people have never committed and will never commit an act of violence, at least not in its serious forms, such as causing significant physical harm to another person or murder. Throughout human history and in all circumstances, such as wars and genocides, fewer than 2% of people have committed such actions.

As a rule, humans possess natural deterrents to aggression—a violence inhibitor that causes a feeling of repulsion when attempting to commit an act of violence. This mechanism also plays an important role in the development of empathy, which is also inherent in most people. The ability of the average person to cause real physical harm to others is limited only to self-defense in the presence of an immediate threat to life.

Now it is worth mentioning one very important and interesting fact. As domestic violence statistics in the US show, it occurs up to 4 times more often in police families than on average in all American families. And these are only the cases that police officers reported themselves in anonymous surveys; surely many of them did not even admit to their violence in that way.

By preserving even one category of violence, it is inevitable that all other categories are also preserved. For a society to have police, soldiers, and even more so some kind of special services and “executioners” who carry out orders to eliminate someone, it is absolutely necessary for there to be a certain percentage of people in society who are capable of violence in general. Otherwise, there would simply be no place to get such employees. But if such a state of affairs is maintained, then private violent crime will never disappear. And the employees themselves will be a source of private violence. By day, someone is a highly successful employee, always ready to carry out any violent detention on command, and in the evening he returns home and beats his wife and children. Judging by the statistics, this is exactly what should be expected from a person who, in general, does not feel as strong a repulsion toward committing violence as other people do.

An attempt to merely limit, rather than eradicate, violence from people capable of committing it simply will not work. One can effectively fight only against all violence and all violent offenders at once. Violence cannot be divided into categories of acceptability and unacceptability (and even more so necessity), otherwise this problem will not go away, and that small percentage of people capable of committing it at any moment and in any form will continue to remain in society.

Violence attracts too much attention

Voluntarist, Bitarch

It is often claimed that the commission of brutal violence by humans, up to and including murder, is natural, based on supposed endless observation of human society. Not a day in history has passed without murders or some form of armed conflict, and this continues in the modern world. This implies that humans are extremely cruel and violent.

But such claims are based on a purely subjective perception of events occurring in the world. For example, 69% of Americans believe that domestic violence is widespread among American football players. This belief is fueled by media scandals surrounding players who actually commit such acts. However, if one relies on statistics rather than subjective perceptions, it turns out that domestic violence occurs nearly twice as rarely in the families of players than in American families on average. At the same time, in police families, it occurs up to 4 times more often than average. But American media are unlikely to talk about bad cops unless the case is either extremely scandalous or somehow beneficial to the government. Moreover, police officers are covered up in their violence. For instance, reports of domestic violence are often not considered at all if the accused is a police officer.

This is precisely how myths about violence are formed. Incomplete data can also be misleading. When the conversation turns to a certain number of dead in some genocide or war, it is often assumed that there were approximately as many killers. But this proves to be absolutely wrong if we look at cases where the number of killers was actually known. For example, the genocide of up to 2 million people in Cambodia was orchestrated by only 55-70 thousand Khmer Rouge.

Relative to all people, violence is committed by a very small percentage of them. Only subjective assessments, based on incomplete data or common misconceptions, may suggest otherwise. If you observe violence every day, it absolutely does not mean that violence is committed by a large number of people. It is simply that a minority commits it quite frequently, and violence itself attracts too much attention compared to other events.

What every supporter of the security forces must understand

Voluntarist, Bitarch

The existence of compulsory coercive power in society is most often justified by the need to solve certain tasks using violent methods. At the same time, it is assumed that people will still possess some freedoms and rights to a significant extent. I am sure that the etatists themselves—supporters of coercive power—want to have freedoms and rights, and want to be treated as individuals and be taken into account. It is unlikely that anyone, even among representatives of rigid etatist views, would want to turn into a willless slave or state property, whose entire life is strictly controlled without being given any freedoms.

Of course, etatists make a great mistake in counting on the fact that coercive power will treat them with respect, will take them into account, and will somehow limit itself. The coronavirus pandemic clearly showed how the world’s top-ranked democracies, such as Australia and Canada, can almost instantaneously turn into authoritarian regimes, and authoritarian China can turn into a brutal dictatorship where people are treated precisely as state property, livestock, and expendable material. History also contains many cases where governments, even those quite democratic and liberal in their orders, deliberately neglected the freedoms and rights of people, or even persecuted and killed ordinary citizens.

Any etatist, even one adhering to the concept of a minimal coercive state, must renounce the recognition of any freedoms and rights for themselves in order to be consistent in their position. At any moment, any coercive power can do whatever it wants with a person. It cannot be limited solely to the performance of some specific tasks. If it has at its disposal agents capable of committing murder to fulfill one specific task, it means they can do so for any purpose whatsoever. A stationary bandit only needs a pretext or a reason to give the corresponding order. Does anyone disagree that this is exactly how it works?

Continuing to hold etatist views, a person must admit that within the framework of their preferred system, they will be treated as state property, livestock, and expendable material. Coercive power can neglect any person, or even deliberately sacrifice them. It may, of course, stand up for the protection of ordinary people, but only in cases when it is profitable to do so. And if it suddenly becomes profitable to neglect or sacrifice people, that is exactly what will happen.

Even direct democracy will not save them, where in theory the majority can still “dispose of” the minority, and in practice, this can be done unilaterally by a very small number of executors of the democratic will. For example, this will be done by some coercive structures, whose direct employees and managers will, of course, never be the majority. Nothing will prevent such a body from committing any act of violence, unless the citizens themselves are massively armed and ready to defend against encroachments on their lives.

If someone considers themselves an individual, wishes to possess freedoms, rights, and choice, then they categorically should not adhere to even minimal etatist views. Otherwise, their position will be absolutely inconsistent.

Learning to understand decentralized systems

Voluntarist, Bitarch

One of the mistakes often made regarding the concepts of certain systems is the inability to understand their decentralized nature. I will give an example of an absurd, yet still frequently encountered question about cryptocurrencies: what happens if the “owner” of Bitcoin decides to create as many new coins as they want or otherwise change its system? Here, there is a clear inability to understand how a currency can not have an owner. The traditional understanding of currency always assumes the existence of a specific issuer who releases new monetary units and possesses the exclusive right to do so. And many truly cannot imagine how it could be otherwise.

The example of Bitcoin is telling, as it is already a functioning system without a centralized governing body. In its case, there is no issuer; no one can unilaterally make any decisions regarding the operation of its system without the direct consent of holders of more than 50% of the computing power involved in it. Each such holder (miner) possesses their own copy of a network node, and each such copy is identical. This is precisely what decentralization consists of—there is no central node. Once launched by its creator, such a system, upon involving a sufficient amount of computing power, never again passes into unilateral control.

Even greater decentralization is given to the entire cryptocurrency system by the fact that anyone who wishes can attempt to launch a new cryptocurrency with their own operating principles. There is no such rule (nor the possibility of implementing one) that only one specific cryptocurrency exists and is used on the internet (as is most often the case with ordinary currencies within the territories of states). There can be as many as people themselves decide to use for various purposes.

If a currency can be decentralized, then why can other systems not be as well, for example, a system of public governance? Its traditional understanding is that in a certain territory there must exist one single body (the state) possessing the “legitimate” right to impose a single order on everyone, if necessary resorting to the threat of violence. But do you think it would not be just as much of a mistake to consider this option the only one possible, as it is a mistake to consider the existence of currencies possible only in the presence of specific issuers?

It would be a great folly to dismiss the possibility of achieving a free, non-violent society in which different, freely choosable systems of public order exist in parallel, simply due to a fundamental unwillingness to understand and accept the possibility of the existence of decentralized systems in principle. Those who still continue to think in a purely “centralized” way, where every system must have some single center of control, should finally learn to understand the possibility of the decentralization of various systems.

Why is there a significantly higher percentage of violent people in law enforcement agencies

than in society as a whole, and what this says about current social systems

Voluntarist, Bitarch

American statistics on domestic violence in police families show us interesting things. As it turns out, up to 40% of police officers in the USA practice violence against their loved ones. The level of violence in police families is up to 4 times higher than that in American society as a whole. It is worth noting that this is the result of several anonymous surveys of the officers themselves. Their families rarely complain about violence or seek help, as they do not expect it from the colleagues of their abusers. And officers are indeed rarely brought to actual charges of domestic violence—while 92% of reports are generally investigated, in the case of officers, this figure is only 42%. This means that the level of domestic violence in police families may actually be much higher than 40%. Also, among representatives of all professions in general, police officers turned out to be the most prone to domestic violence.

Of course, this is only American statistics, but there is no reason not to assume that employees of security forces will be significantly more violent than the rest of the population in all countries. And there is no need to be surprised by this. Obviously, it is more violent people—those who do not feel strong resistance or aversion to committing violence, and who have weaker empathy—who will be more inclined to choose a profession where the initiation of violence is a professional duty.

What does this mean for society? In effect, existing systems of social management and law enforcement worldwide, based on the “legitimate monopoly” of a certain body (the state) in the application of violence, become tools in the hands of violent people. A small percentage of abusers gains power over everyone else—normal people, who for the most part never commit violence. And obviously, these abusers will use coercive power in their own interests, not limiting themselves to certain norms and laws, or interpreting and rewriting them to suit themselves. Nor will they certainly renounce violence in their private lives, considering it generally a normal tool for achieving certain goals, or even resorting to it to relieve stress and aggressiveness, taking it out on the people around them.

It is important to understand that the issue is why some people commit violence. They may, of course, be provoked or prompted by certain events and goals, but more importantly—they simply do not feel sufficient resistance and aversion to violence, including having weaker empathy compared to other people. This is precisely how violence in human society can be explained, if we refer to the concept of the violence inhibition mechanism, which asserts that every normally developing individual possesses innate restraints against aggression toward other people, the presence of which is also important for the development of empathy.

Can we expect people capable of easily committing violence due to a lack of such restraints to limit its use only as a tool for maintaining the law and some kind of justice? No, of course not; for them, violence is the norm, they feel nothing negative toward it, and they will resort to it whenever they deem it necessary. That is why any social system, the enforcement of whose order requires violent reinforcement, can hardly be called just or working for the benefit of the ordinary person—such systems only provide advantages to abusers and strengthen their power over normal people.

There is only one killer, and the victims are thousands

Voluntarist, Bitarch

A very common mistake in the study of phenomena such as wars and genocides is the incorrect correlation between the number of those who actually committed killings and other forms of violence and the number of victims who suffered from that violence. Some may even think that the number of killers is roughly equal to the number of killed, which would mean that wars and genocides with millions of victims prove the capacity for brutal violence even in the average person. But to think this way would be a grave error.

One can recall that according to some military researchers, such as Dave Grossman, 98% of soldiers on the front line experience strong resistance to committing murder, and only 2% lack such resistance. The deaths of up to 2 million inhabitants of Cambodia under the Pol Pot regime were the fault of only 55-70 thousand Khmer Rouge (averaging about 30-40 killings per killer). And one researcher of the Rwandan genocide claims that there is nothing impossible about even 25 thousand people killing hundreds of thousands, if not a million people in 100 days—for this, one killer would have to commit on average only one killing every 2.5 days (or 40 killings in total).

In peaceful everyday life, as a rule, there are 2.5 violent crimes per one violent criminal. Less than 0.1% of people commit more than a dozen violent crimes. But what level can such “recidivism” reach in the case of wars, genocides, or repressions, when killing becomes something acceptable, permitted, or even required?

Let’s look at some well-known extreme cases. You have probably heard of the following figures at least once:
— the Croatian war criminal Petar Brzica, who personally killed up to 1,360 Serbs in one night (according to the most conservative estimates, 670 killings were committed);
— the NKVD officer Vasily Mikhailovich Blokhìn, who personally shot between 10,000 and 20,000 people throughout his service.

In the case of wars, genocides, and repressions, one killer can indeed personally commit hundreds and thousands of killings. In principle, such figures can be expected from any person who is capable of easily committing murder without experiencing any resistance or disgust. Does a killer have any incentive to stop and kill less when they have been given an unlimited right to do so? It would be absurd to expect such a thing from a killer; rather, he will kill until the very end, and if the opportunity arises, he will personally kill hundreds and thousands of people.

Based on what we know about genocides, in practice, one average killer in a state of “violent omnipotence” is most likely to manage to commit several dozen killings. Of course, this still indicates that the actual killers in any situation are a tiny minority of people, meaning that the number of victims of mass killings significantly exceeds the number of killers themselves. Wars, genocides, and repressions never work on the principle of “one day a million people took to the streets and killed another million people.” If a million people were indeed killed somewhere, it means that only several tens of thousands of killers took to the streets with violent intentions.

Gun laws – a tool in the commission of genocides

A rather interesting pattern can be traced in a great many genocides. They were preceded by the introduction of regulations and bans on civilian weaponry. Often, such bans directly preceded the genocides. Very convenient for government thugs and other bandits, isn’t it? To strip the common people of their weapons, and then calmly and almost without any resistance exterminate the undesirable part of the population.

To advocate for gun laws and against the natural human right to defend one’s own life means supporting the exclusive armament of a minority of perpetrators. After all, bans only work against peaceful and law-abiding citizens, who would never in their lives use a weapon to commit an attack, but only for the purpose of self-defense. Meanwhile, government agents and lawless bandits will keep their weapons regardless. Is this really what opponents of the freedom of armament and self-defense desire—that governments hold totalitarian power over people, and bandits have complete freedom to commit violence without facing resistance from their victims?

What genocides can tell us about human violentness

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Recalling the genocide of the Tutsi ethnic group in Rwanda, it might seem to us that nearly the entire Hutu people, egged on by supporters of the idea of exterminating the Tutsis, simply turned into killers. Or we might recall how horrific Pol Pot’s regime was, when up to a quarter of Cambodia’s population perished. Do this and other similar examples of mass genocides show us that humans have no natural restraints against killing other people, and that with enough conviction, almost anyone could easily do it?

In assessing phenomena such as war or genocide, it is certainly not worth relying on subjective feelings. It would be much better to conduct detailed calculations. Based on the most widely accepted research, between 500 thousand and 662 thousand Tutsis died as a result of the genocide in Rwanda, with some estimates reaching 800 thousand deaths. But how many Hutus took part in the genocide? One study estimates the number of killers at 50 thousand people [1]. Another study estimates the number of genocide participants (those who attempted murder, committed murders, rapes, torture, and other forms of serious violence) at between 175 thousand and 210 thousand people [2]. At the start of the genocide, the population of Rwanda was over 7 million people.

What does this mean? According to the highest estimate, only 2.5-3% of the population of Rwanda, or 3-3.5% of the Hutu population itself, committed violence during the Tutsi genocide. According to the lowest estimate, the killers constituted less than 1% of the population. This is considering the fact that movements advocating for the extermination of the Tutsis called upon the Hutus to commit murders by all possible means and through all information channels. And the killings themselves were indeed mass in nature.

There should be no doubt that such a percentage of people could organize a genocide. It is unlikely that a person who is urged to kill, who feels no repulsion toward committing murder, and whose potential victims have no serious means of defense, would stop after only one or two episodes. Rather, one should expect that he would kill everyone who crossed his path. Small groups of such killers could wipe out thousands of people at once, especially if they were armed. The study that estimates the number of killers in the Rwandan genocide at 50 thousand people asserts that there is nothing impossible about even 25 thousand people being able to exterminate hundreds of thousands, if not a million people, in 100 days.

Another well-known example of genocide is the extermination of 1.5 to 2 million Cambodians by the “Khmer Rouge” from 1975 to 1979 under Pol Pot’s regime. The forces of the Khmer Rouge by 1975 can be estimated at 55 to 70 thousand people [3][4]. The population of Cambodia at the beginning of the genocide was about 7.8 million people. Based on these numbers, it is obvious that less than 1% of the population was responsible for the death of 20-25% of Cambodia’s population at that time.

Genocides cannot tell us that the majority of people are ready to carry out the extermination of groups or even entire peoples who do not share their views. The direct killers and other perpetrators of violence in genocides are an overwhelming minority of the total population. Therefore, they cannot serve as evidence of human violence; rather, the opposite is true—they only confirm that, for the most part, humans are non-violent.

Sources:

  1. Jones, B. D. (2001). Peacemaking in Rwanda: the dynamics of failure;
  2. Straus, S. (2004). How many perpetrators were there in the Rwandan genocide? An estimate. Journal of Genocide Research, 6(1), March, 85–98;
  3. Carney, T. (1989). The Unexpected Victory. In Karl D. Jackson, ed., Cambodia 1975–1978: Rendezvous With Death. Princeton University Press, pp. 13–35;
  4. The Crime of Cambodia: Shawcross on Kissinger’s Memoirs New York Magazine, 5 November 1979.

Corruption always accompanies the power structures

Voluntarist, Bitarch

The very existence of power that is forceful and “mandatory” for everyone leads to the emergence of corruption. Regardless of what anyone says, all governments in the world are corrupt; it is simply that not all are ready to admit it and call this phenomenon by its true name, often hiding behind a term such as “lobbying.” And this is not surprising—if a certain public body possesses the “legal” right to a monopoly on establishing and controlling orders in society, including through the use of force, then various interest groups will always turn to it in an attempt to achieve their goals at the expense of infringing upon the rights and freedoms of other interest groups. This is inevitable even in the most liberal democracies, for in them as well, nothing prevents a particular interest group from inducing a sufficient number of officials to adopt a decision necessary for them.

As long as coercive power-based governments exist, corruption and the infringement of the interests of some people in favor of the interests of others are unavoidable. Only in a free market can different interests stably coexist parallel to one another, for it is sufficient that each interest has at least a minimal group of “consumers.” Politics, however, can at any moment issue a law according to which all alternatives to a certain single interest will be discriminated against or even completely liquidated within a specific territory. And such a law will be backed by the threat of violence in the event of non-compliance.

Power Control and the Failure of State Democracy

Voluntarist, Bitarch

The events of the coronavirus pandemic clearly demonstrated how some of the most democratic states in the world can easily turn literally into authoritarian regimes with strong government power, suppression of the opposition, and the imprisonment of “undesirable” people. We are talking about Australia and Canada, which rank in the top ten countries in democracy ratings. In the fight against the pandemic, the government of the former decided to resort to total bans on leaving the home and movement of citizens, surveillance of them, and the imprisonment of violators. In the latter, the government responded to truckers’ protests against coronavirus restrictions by blocking bank accounts, suppressing the activities of the opposition, introducing a state of emergency, and arresting some of the protesters. Or let us recall France, which is also a fairly democratic country, yet its police do not hesitate to beat people without masks with batons, and almost any anti-government actions end with a harsh dispersal of protesters by security forces.

Democracy can very easily turn into an authoritarian and repressive regime. And this should not be surprising—what else can be expected from governments that, while perhaps quite democratic and liberal in their goals, still rely on the instrument of force to implement those goals? When a certain body in society has the right to use force to compel people and the ability to effectively exercise that right, it is only a matter of time and the existence of a pretext before force transforms from a simple tool for upholding the law into a tool for carrying out repressions and strengthening power.

Therefore, it is important to understand that the only possible path to achieving a free and non-violent society is the eradication of coercive instruments of management, and the mere replacement of an authoritarian regime with a democracy will yield nothing in the long run. Adhering to democratic and liberal values is absolutely meaningless and useless if, alongside them, the impermissibility of violence is not actively supported, both in private relationships between people and in the implementation of measures by any associations or public governing bodies.