Автор: Битарх

Can violence be an evolutionary adaptation?

Voluntarist, Bitarch

The fact that there is still a certain percentage of individuals in the human population capable of committing violence, up to and including murder, easily and without any internal resistance, may lead some to think that this is quite normal and natural. Since such people exist, and humanity has existed for a long time, could violence simply be an evolutionary adaptation that for some reason proved necessary for the human population?

To answer this question, we turn to the works of ethologist Konrad Lorenz, who first discovered the presence of innate inhibitors of intraspecific aggression in many animal species. He also described the conditions under which these inhibitors arise. The most important of these are the presence of strong innate weaponry and the inability to avoid violence through flight. According to Lorenz’s observations, ravens possess a strong inhibitor against striking their conspecifics in the eyes with their sharp beaks. Such inhibitors are often observed in wolves as well—when one of them assumes a submissive posture or demonstrates vulnerable parts of the body, such as the throat or belly, it leads to the cessation of aggressive actions by the conspecific. At the same time, collared doves, whose beaks are not as sharp as those of ravens, although they usually do not kill each other in natural conditions, are capable of doing so during a conflict if they are deprived of the possibility of escape by being locked in a cage.

Speaking of humans, Lorenz did not believe that they possessed aggression inhibitors, as they lack strong innate weaponry. Furthermore, humans were not prepared for the emergence of artificial weapons, as scientific and technical progress acquired rapid momentum that biological evolution simply could not keep up with. In view of this, Lorenz expressed concerns about the possible destruction of humanity:

“The day will come when two hostile camps will find themselves face to face, facing the danger of mutual destruction. A day may come when all of humanity is split into two such camps. How will we behave in this case—like doves or like wolves? The fate of humanity will depend on how people answer this question. We must be vigilant!”

Of course, as other researchers later found, humans do possess a mechanism similar to the one Lorenz wrote about. Its emergence can be explained by gene-culture coevolution, where factors of culture and society influence selection in the human population even over short periods of time. And it is worth remembering that primitive artificial weaponry in the form of clubs, spears, and stones appeared in early hominids presumably as far back as 5 million years ago.

However, to a certain extent Lorenz was right, and in the course of biological evolution, intraspecific violence was not completely eradicated from the human population. It is also obvious that humans could not evolutionarily adapt to modern remote weaponry, such as artillery or the atomic bomb. Of course, based on the model of the violence inhibition mechanism in humans, conditioned reflexes should be developed during its operation, preventing any urges to initiate violence. But military evidence shows that while 98% of soldiers experience strong resistance to committing murder during direct contact, in the case of remote weaponry, which allows one not to observe or even know about the potential victims, such resistance weakens.

Based on all this, it can be boldly asserted that violence cannot be called an evolutionary adaptation for humans. Any adaptation must benefit the species by increasing its chances of survival, which cannot be said of violence. It is quite the opposite—due to rapid scientific and technical progress, humans have not had time to fully adapt to new environmental conditions, to the fact that they are the most armed species on the planet. This, in turn, based on the evolutionary model, should imply the existence of extremely strong and pronounced inhibitors of intraspecific aggression.

Preventive attack as a non-existent category

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Sometimes violent actions, ranging from their use as a method of resolving interpersonal conflicts to geopolitical relations, may be justified by resorting to the so-called concept of a preemptive strike. In this way, violence is equated with self-defense, since the victim of the attack is allegedly the aggressor themselves, intending to carry out an attack and certainly would have done so if a preemptive strike had not been delivered. In practice, this line of thinking can easily be seen in conflict situations where, for example, violence was used in response to purely verbal threats. It is even more evident in cases where some threat of a future attack was presented as a justified reason for starting wars.

Of course, there are no preemptive strikes as a separate category of aggression, and certainly not as a form of self-defense. A certain “preemptiveness” in this case is exactly the same kind of justification as any other possible justification for violence; it in no way makes a specific instance of its use something else, qualitatively different from other cases. Certainly, if there were immediate threats of violence or a real attempt to attack, then responsive force measures can be called self-defense. But if there was no such thing, then we are dealing precisely with a violent attack, and everything else is simply speculation, invented to justify one’s violence to others.

The problem of the stationary bandit’s tyranny cannot be solved with violence

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Some people believe that a stationary bandit can be defeated exclusively by initiating violence against them. From them, one may hear calls for a violent revolution. To some, such an idea may even seem reasonable; however, look at this matter from another perspective. To carry out a violent attack, it is necessary to gather a group of people capable of it, for such a task cannot be accomplished by complete pacifists or those ready to use weapons only for self-defense. Such people will emerge, naturally supported by interest groups who are also not opposed to violence as a tool for achieving goals. These people will attack the government, maiming and killing everyone who gets in their way along the way, and seize power for themselves. What happens next?

Nothing will change! One set of violent oppressors in power will be removed, and other violent oppressors will take their place. Of course, it is quite likely that the new regime will be more liberal, as in such an unstable position, it will not risk immediately resorting to the methods of its predecessors. But the stationary bandit himself will not go anywhere; he will still try to build a monopoly on power through violence. Gradually, the new faces in power will also strive for increasingly harsh orders. This is how it has always been and always will be with monopoly political power. Or does someone really expect that people for whom using violence was previously the norm will suddenly become peaceful and kind pacifists after seizing power? It would be great naivety to believe so!

It sounds as if we are supporting the state. However, these are merely practical considerations. Since we want to achieve a free, non-violent society, it is more advantageous for activists ready for radical action to focus on balancing the potential for violence by ensuring universal armament, which will deprive the stationary bandit of the ability to effectively apply force. Or better yet, think in general about the methods of eradicating violence from society, which we constantly talk about. Non-violence and freedom cannot be achieved through the seizure of political power and a mere change of faces at the helm of the stationary bandit!

Goals and provocations are not the direct cause of violence

Voluntarist, Bitarch

It is often believed that the question of violence boils down exclusively to the goals that incite it, or to provoking factors. Based on this opinion, violence will be committed almost every time if it is beneficial for a specific person and carries no risks. Likewise, in the absence of risks, violence will almost always be committed in the event of a provoking stimulus. And the only thing that stops any person from committing violence is precisely such rationally assessed risks, for example, the threat of punishment following the violence, armed self-defense by the victim of a violent attack, or others.

Such a view of the issue of violence, of course, does not correspond to reality. Otherwise, the entire world would consist of evil and violent, or at least simply indifferent to violence, people. But the behavior of any person is largely shaped by a vast spectrum of feelings. Aggressive feelings are no exception; they are quite natural for a human being. However, based on the concept of the violence inhibition mechanism, every normally developing individual experiences, from a very early age, a feeling of repulsion toward committing violent acts against other people. This same mechanism plays an important role in the development of empathy, which is also characteristic of the vast majority of people.

It is also worth remembering that regardless of social circumstances, the vast majority of people never commit violence. Even in Latin American countries, all violent crime originates from a small minority of people. The driving force behind all wars, repressions, and genocides was a small minority of people. Therefore, can it really be believed that every person will indeed commit violence whenever it is rationally beneficial for them?

Regardless of the circumstances, the vast majority of people have never committed and will never commit violence, at least in its most serious forms (causing significant physical harm or murder). Violence is not formed solely by goals and provocations. These, of course, can incite violence, but only in those people who were already capable of such things because they felt no repulsion toward violence.

People are enslaved by violence, not by technology

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Luddite and anti-progressive positions that oppose scientific and technological progress, while quite unpopular, still exist, creating a myth about the enslavement of people by technology. These positions blame technology specifically for the fact that people are rapidly losing their freedom and happy lives. For example, with its help, governments gain more power and the ability to manipulate people, meaning that scientific and technological progress, starting from the moment of the industrialization of society, is an evil that must be eradicated. Of course, many would consider such argumentation extremely absurd without further explanation, but let us nevertheless look at what is wrong with it.

The point is that technologies themselves do not lead to any enslavement of humans. This is primarily caused by violence as a method of solving problems and achieving certain goals, including when used by those same governments. All of them rely on the threat of applying certain “legitimate” and “legal” force measures against any ordinary person if they do not follow a specific order. Technologies in this case only make such a threat more effective in its execution and help strengthen the power of already existing governments.

But think about it—even with the simplest tool, such as a hammer, it is much easier to intimidate, subdue, or even maim a person than with bare fists. However, a hammer is created to drive nails, and the problem lies within the person who is capable of committing violence using any available tools, not in the hammer itself. The exact same situation applies to weapons—the problem is not with the weapon, but with the tiny percentage of people willing to use it to commit violent attacks.

It is the problem of violence and the fact that some people strive for the forceful subjugation of others that needs a solution. As soon as this problem is solved and violent hierarchies of dominance disappear from society, technologies will cease to contribute to the enslavement of people in any way. It is necessary to fight violence and the tiny percentage of violent offenders in society, not technologies, which, by the way, are the only thing that could save people from endless hunger, disease, child mortality, and other terrible phenomena of the past, and will also allow humanity to survive and continue its existence in the long term.

The difference between aggression and violence using the example of American football players and police officers

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Aggressive feelings and behavior are a natural part of human nature. But this naturalness of aggression is often, and absolutely erroneously, perceived as a capacity for its boundless manifestation, up to such violent actions as murder. And from such an incorrect interpretation of the nature of aggression, a conclusion is drawn about the impossibility of eradicating violence from human behavior, since without it a person would become a “willless vegetable,” incapable of many types of activity that require aggressiveness from them. But this absurd substitution of concepts can be easily refuted with one practical example—the statistics of domestic violence in the families of American football players and police officers.

If you believe that aggressiveness is a necessary component of many types of human activity and social communication, then you will agree that American football is a fairly aggressive sport, and a person cannot do without this component to participate in it. Why it is necessary for police officers, I think, does not even need to be explained. But there is one categorical difference between players and police officers. As American domestic violence statistics show, the level of violence in police families is up to 4 times higher than the national average. At the same time, in the families of players, it occurs almost 2 times less than the average.

Why is this so? While players simply need to achieve good sporting results, the immediate task of a police officer is to carry out violent attacks on other people, who themselves often committed no violence at all, but were merely accused of violating some state laws and “victimless crimes.” Obviously, the first profession may attract people who clearly demonstrate their aggressiveness but are still non-violent, and whose aggression is limited and under inhibiting control. The second profession will more often attract precisely violent people, since their official duties require violence.

Using the example of these two professions, we can clearly see the difference between functional aggression under inhibiting control and pathological violence that has spiraled out of control. The former is absolutely sufficient for a person to perform any activity, provided, of course, that it does not consist of committing violence itself. A person will not become some kind of “willless vegetable” if their aggressiveness is limited. Moreover, it is naturally limited in the vast majority of people, who could never intentionally cause serious harm to someone, let alone kill, feeling a strong repulsion toward such acts. Therefore, calling the capacity to commit violence an important trait for many types of human activity would simply be an absurd substitution of concepts.

The Question of Instincts and Reflexes in Human Aggression

Voluntarist, Bitarch

It has become a fairly established opinion that human beings possess no instinctive behavior. Sometimes, even the instincts of highly developed animals (especially primates) are subject to partial doubt. Priority is given to the crude satisfaction of immediate needs, while all other behavior, it is claimed, is purely social in nature. Based on this position, the idea that humans have innate predispositions regarding social behavior—for example, a tendency toward either violent or non-violent behavior—is also criticized. Thus, human behavior is seen as purely a product of upbringing and environment, unless it concerns certain pathologies already described by medicine. Or even if an individual does have some innate predispositions, they can be easily “overwritten” by upbringing.

To understand whether humans have instincts or not, it is necessary to define the concept of instinct itself, as well as another similar concept—the reflex. An instinct is defined as a set of complex hereditary and preset behavioral acts, whereas a reflex is a standard reaction to a stimulus. It is immediately apparent that the difference between an instinct and a reflex comes down to the complexity of the structure of these phenomena, without a clear boundary being drawn. This can lead to some confusion in the study of innate behavioral predispositions. However, while instincts are generally considered not to be present in humans, no one doubts the existence of reflexes.

Perhaps the most criticized is the maternal instinct. However, it is an indisputable fact that an attachment between mother and child usually does arise. Research clearly shows that during pregnancy and breastfeeding, oxytocin—a hormone that plays an important role in this process—is produced in the mother. However, researchers agree that this cannot be called an instinct.

At the same time, for some reason, the innate human fear of certain threats encountered during evolution is explicitly called an instinct. For example, research has shown that the fear of snakes and spiders is present in 6-month-old infants. In general, the concept of the threat superiority effect, which explains the human ability to react quickly to threats in the environment, suggests a protective reaction to both innate and experience-acquired stimuli, not just the latter.

Let us now turn to the topic of aggression. As ethologists claim, the restraint of intraspecific aggression in animals, expressed, among other things, through the ritualization of battles, is instinctive in nature. However, the model of the violence inhibition mechanism in humans calls the rejection reaction—which arises in a normally developing individual from childhood when observing distress signals (expressions of sadness, fear, pain) from victims of violence—merely an unconditioned reflex. It should also be noted that this mechanism is important in the development of empathy, and children as early as 2-3 days after birth show an empathic response by reacting to the crying of other children with reactive crying, which is more intense than their reaction to other irritating stimuli.

We know that it is primarily the correct functioning of such a mechanism—which causes a feeling of rejection toward violence, plays an important role in the development of empathy, and leads to the development of a number of important conditioned reflexes—that makes a person non-violent, and only after that comes upbringing. Is such behavior instinctive, or is it simply a reflex? It is impossible to say for sure until a clear boundary is drawn between these concepts. However, if researchers nonetheless call the innate fear of threat, which influences the regulation of aggressive behavior, instinctive, then why can the violence inhibition mechanism not also be called instinctive? Especially since in many people it is so strongly expressed that it absolutely prevents the commission of violence, at least in its serious forms.

Myths about violence

Libertarian Band has released a video on the very important topic of myths about violence, which we have raised more than once. Were killings truly the norm for prehistoric humans? What percentage of soldiers feel no resistance to committing murder and act as the driving force of wars? How many people are actually responsible for the millions of victims of genocides? Where lies the falsehood in experiments demonstrating human violence? You will find the answers to these and other similar questions by watching the video “Myths About Violence”.

How weapons restrictions and bans produce an effect opposite to the expected one

Voluntarist, Bitarch

When certain political forces or communities advocate for strict regulation, or even a ban on weapons for private individuals, they invariably expect an increase in societal security and a reduction in crime, including violent crime. The logic behind such expectations is as follows: a person without a weapon cannot cause as much harm as a person with a weapon; therefore, the freedom to arm oneself represents a threat to society.

Of course, such logic is fundamentally flawed. It is simply impossible to completely get rid of weapons. In any scenario, they will remain in the hands of government agents, such as the army and police. Likewise, they will most often remain at the disposal of bandits—they are bandits, after all, which means they will not follow a law banning weapons. If they are left without “legal” ways to obtain weapons, “illegal” methods and the black market will be used. For example, statistics from the United States show that 80% of armed criminals obtain their weapons illegally.

We see that regardless of any laws, at least two types of agents will absolutely always have weapons. However, ordinary people—law-abiding citizens—will now guaranteedly not have them. And the absurdity of such a state of affairs consists not only in the fact that the vast majority of people need weapons only for self-defense and would never use them to carry out attacks. It also consists in the fact that people are thus effectively deprived of all possible rights and freedoms at once. What can unarmed people possibly oppose against armed bandits, whether stationary (states and governments) or nomadic (private bandits and rapists)? What will they do if someone, utilizing their enormous potential for violence, decides to attack them—they who have essentially no power at all?

And indeed, this has always happened in human history. Genocides began precisely with the deprivation of the freedom to arm oneself. Before the Turkish genocide of the Armenians, a proclamation was issued regarding the seizure of weapons from the latter. The Soviet government, even before the end of the civil war, introduced the mandatory surrender of weapons to the government and severe punishments for disobedience. The German Nazis also introduced bans on arming. The same situation occurred during the genocides in Cambodia and Rwanda, as well as in many other genocides.

As for private violence, let us take the same United States as an example, where 94% of all mass shootings occur precisely in so-called “gun-free zones.” According to the logic of opponents of the freedom to arm, this is simply impossible, as weapons are banned there. I will also note that it is very easy to explain why the mass shooting rate is so high in places with a ban on weapons, whereas in places where weapons are permitted, they almost never occur. Why would they happen there, if any bandit attempting to arrange such a thing would instantly receive armed self-defense from their potential victims in response?

I would like to ask the opponents of the freedom to arm—what will you do if your government, deciding to purge people it finds undesirable, turns its weapons against you? What will you do if a bandit with a pistol, or even just a knife, attacks you? What do you suggest all ordinary and peaceful people do in such situations? Obviously, no adequate answers to these questions can be given without referring to armed self-defense.

To speak out against the freedom to arm and against the natural human right to self-defense is to give a small percentage of bandits and rapists full coercive power over the entire society. An attempt to achieve greater security ultimately results in less security, if not its complete absence, because security cannot exist where some people possess a relatively infinite potential for violence, while others have neither the right nor the means to defend themselves. Private banditry and government genocides are the unsurprising result of such aspirations.

Using the concept of the implicit contract against statisticians

Voluntarist, Bitarch

You are likely familiar with the argument that the mere use of some benefit supposedly implies agreement with the rules established for it, even if such agreement was not explicitly confirmed. For example, being in a certain territory automatically obligates a person to follow its rules. If they disagree with the rules, they should not visit this territory; otherwise, they can absolutely reasonably expect the punishment established for committing such a violation. This works similarly with any use of material goods and interaction with other people. And some, referring to copyright, may even claim that such a rule applies even to intangible benefits. For example, by simply using a certain program, you automatically agree to follow the rules established by its developer and copyright law itself (“clickwrap”).

Statists—supporters of coercive state power—often resort to such an argument. With its help, they can justify any obligations arising from various state laws as a kind of implicit consent to the norms they establish. Very often they claim that the mere presence of a person within the territory of the state already obligates them to complete submission to all state laws. Well, then they should not be surprised that this argument can be turned against them.

The main tool of the statist in imposing the arbitrariness of the stationary bandit (“legislation”) is coercion through the threat of violence. After all, would a statist be able to force you personally to do or not do something without threatening violence? Of course, it can be initiated only against a specific person who, based on the concept of the implicit contract, has nothing preventing them from simply setting their own terms for interaction.

I warn that if someone wants to commit violence against me, then by interacting with me in such a way, they will enter into an agreement consenting to an euthanasia procedure as part of my self-defense. Having been warned and acquainted with my rule, the choice now lies with the person wishing to commit violence. Deciding to do so, they thereby implicitly sign the contract established by me and accept the conditions specified therein.

Understanding this, the statist is left with only two possible options for how to further regard the concept of the implicit contract. They can either continue to adhere to it, thereby recognizing the right of other people to unlimited self-defense against any attempts to commit violence against them, or throw out this untenable and unfounded concept from the list of their arguments in defense of violent power.