Social orders are often built on the assumption that potential punishments for their violation should deter a significant portion of individuals who would otherwise boldly commit any crime. To some extent, this is indeed true; however, the degree to which a person is susceptible to the threat of punishment also depends on what kind of personality they have.
As was recently found, individuals with psychopathic predispositions demonstrate reduced sensitivity to pain, which affects their ability to learn from painful consequences. In one experiment, while performing a task in which participants could receive either a reward or an electric shock, possessing more pronounced psychopathic traits led to a poorer ability to learn from painful experience. Due to the more rapid development of pain tolerance, participants with high psychopathy scores quickly returned to their initial expectations and did not change their behavior.
Earlier studies show that if psychopathic individuals are asked to learn how to navigate a maze using various levers, while simultaneously avoiding those that cause painful shocks, they handle only the first task well. And in the case of a gambling experiment, in which two decks contained cards leading to high wins but also high losses, making long-term winning impossible, while the other two decks led to small wins but also small losses, making long-term winning possible, psychopathic individuals were poor at learning not to choose cards from the first two decks, whereas ordinary participants had no such problem. Apparently, they easily concentrate on faster and larger gains, ignoring the accompanying risks. Additionally, one MRI study showed that the brains of violent offenders with high psychopathy scores process punishment stimuli in an atypical way, which may lead to an inadequate assessment of benefits and punishments.
There is also a suggestion that psychopaths may actually derive pleasure from experiencing fear and deliberately place themselves in situations that induce it. This is supported by one study in which individuals with higher psychopathy scores, and especially its primary factor (traits such as lack of empathy and superficial charm), expressed more pleasure from watching videos with content aimed at inducing fear than participants with lower scores. Furthermore, researchers of corporate psychopathy studying information security in the banking sector note that fear of immediate or direct punishment is unable to prevent unethical behavior on the part of psychopathic people. Therefore, they, among others, propose conducting screening for psychopathic predispositions before hiring anyone.
It can be observed that individuals with psychopathic predispositions tend to inadequately assess the benefits and negative consequences of their behavior, and threatening them with punishment is often simply pointless. Therefore, in their case, instead of punishment, it is certainly worth considering a therapeutic approach that corrects the dysfunction of the violence inhibition mechanism, because of which they possess high psychopathy scores.
In the distant past, it was absolutely normal to use physical punishments, such as whipping or beating with a stick, even for minor offenses. Theft, insults, or leading a lifestyle that did not conform to accepted norms could even lead a person to the death penalty. Over time, punishments became less violent, and the death penalty remained only for the most brutal crimes. But even this is not the limit; in many countries, the death penalty has been banned, and in some (for example, Norway), even imprisonment has become an extremely mild form of punishment, where a person is only deprived of their liberty, but is provided with access to all the benefits necessary to lead a full life.
Reflecting on the topic of why punishments are becoming more humane, one can come to various conclusions. However, a very good explanation is provided by an article on the function and regulation of aggression by psychologist Seymour Feshbach, written back in 1964. It describes the concept of empathic inhibition, the presence of which deters a person from causing harm to others. This concept can be called an early prototype of the later proposed theory of the violence inhibition mechanism, which examines the psychology of violence in more detail and depth.
As Feshbach claims, a physical attack brings psychological discomfort to the person. This, among other things, becomes a major problem and barrier in the application of physical punishments. Other forms of punishment, which do not require the direct infliction of pain and harm, are far less uncomfortable for those executing them and cause them fewer negative psychological consequences.
An example can be drawn from what the landowner A. S. Zeleny wrote about corporal punishment in 1857: “One of the most unpleasant and heavy duties of our patriarchal landlord management (and for me—yes, probably not for me alone—the most unpleasant and heavy) is the necessity of subjecting our people to corporal punishment (birching) from time to time… corporal punishment has something repulsive about it… life becomes somehow coarsened; everything feels awkward in the soul… although one realizes that the act of punishment committed is only the fulfillment of a duty and that this evil is for now necessary.”
Of course, one can always find a degenerate who feels nothing wrong at all about causing harm to other people. Moreover, a system of imprisonment instead of physical punishments requires orders of magnitude more funds for its maintenance and places a heavy burden on society as a whole. At first glance, beating a petty criminal with a stick and executing a major criminal is a far more profitable strategy than imprisoning them. But when the issue is the widespread application of punishments for crimes, it is unlikely that enough degenerates could be found to effectively apply physical punishments to everyone who has committed even the slightest offense.
The violence inhibition inherent in humans makes direct physical punishments involving pain and harm an extremely limited and non-scalable tool. Therefore, instead of these, more indirect punishments are used, in which there is no need to engage in the direct infliction of pain, even if they are more costly from an economic point of view. Of course, established bandits may still set their most degenerate agents upon particularly unacceptable prisoners, for example for political reasons, and punish them brutally, up to the organization of staged “suicides.” But this does not concern the vast majority of criminals in most places of detention. And this once again confirms the concept of the violence inhibitor.
We all know well how the history of punishments for offenses has evolved. In the distant past, the death penalty was an acceptable, if not mandatory, measure in the event of violations of various social orders. Usually, this concerned religious norms and traditional life principles. Burning, hanging, or stoning could occur for some kind of “witchcraft,” for treason, for non-traditional sexual relations, for theft, or even simply for words that contradicted the dominant opinion in society. And this was considered absolutely normal; violence bothered few people—on the contrary, crowds of onlookers often gathered to watch such a spectacle.
Over time, the scope of the application of the death penalty has steadily shrunk. This punishment was abolished for non-violent crimes; it remained only as a supreme measure against particularly distinguished brutal rapists. But even this did not last long; in most developed countries, this measure was soon completely abandoned and replaced by imprisonment. And punishments for non-violent crimes became even more lenient.
But even this cannot be called a desirable state of affairs. Of course, many are still at the very beginning of the path of humanism, and in some countries, one can still be stoned for treason, theft, or an improper lifestyle. But at the same time, some societies have already surpassed everyone else in the development of humanism. A good example is Norway, where even the most hardened rapist, Anders Breivik, was placed, effectively, in luxury quarters with all amenities. Of course, he was deprived of his liberty—this is still a coercive measure—but the punishment ends there; besides the loss of liberty, nothing bad awaits the prisoner. In general, the Norwegian law enforcement system is one of the most humane in the world; several prisons are closed annually due to a lack of prisoners, and those who do end up in incarceration have many benefits and considerable freedom (including movement) within the prison institution. To some, it may seem extremely surprising that prisoners can freely, solely of their own will, go to the football field, the library, or the kitchen, and in the latter, kitchen knives may even be at their disposal. But for some societies, this is already a reality.
Now I want to make a small note regarding why we should be humane at all. This may seem completely unfair in the case of certain categories of criminals. But the answer is quite simple and obvious: to carry out violent punishments, we need people prone to violence. If no one can pull the trigger at the sight of an unarmed person, then a death sentence cannot be carried out. However, if someone is capable of doing this, nothing will stop them from killing not only to execute the “supreme measure,” but also to punish insignificant and non-violent offenses, or even to pursue personal goals or satisfy their violent nature.
By making violence a normal phenomenon, even as a measure of punishment, we contribute to the negative selection of the species Homo sapiens in favor of people more prone to violence. Without this, there would be no executioners, who are necessary for a legal system based on force. But an executioner can always become a rapist, and by fostering executioners, we cannot help but foster rapists in general. And it will be impossible to restrain this phenomenon. If a person is not prone to initiating violence, they will not commit it regardless of what views they hold. If a person has such inclinations, then with a change in views, only the circle of victims of their violence will change, but in general, there will always be victims. They will also always initiate violence in situations that provoke it, for example, in conflicts, quarrels, when raising children, and in many other cases. Violence in society will only increase, and the problems of violence will worsen.
In some societies, executioners have almost disappeared; there are only people capable of limiting the freedom of others by force, and even then, not fully. But this is not the end of the development of humanism, because according to the scenario we described, by fostering even such minimal agents of force, we will quite possibly get people who, while perhaps not as dangerous, are still capable of initiating violence. This, among other things, will be enough to maintain a violent hierarchy of dominance in society (the current state system). Likewise, the development of scientific and technical progress will be impossible due to the probability of catastrophic consequences for all mankind if (or rather, when) dangerous technologies fall into the hands of a person prone to violence. Therefore, we need to take one more step in the development of humanism.
This step is the complete renunciation of the initiation of violence, including for the execution of punishments. The only scenario in which violence may be permissible is defense against a direct attack. This is defensive violence; people capable only of such violence pose no problem, as they cannot initiate violent actions themselves for any reason whatsoever, including the fact that they cannot create and maintain a violent hierarchy of dominance, as it requires precisely the initiation of violence in the form of forcing people into submission. Such a behavioral model is evolutionarily optimal for all highly armed species in nature, one of which is Homo sapiens thanks to the ability to manufacture weapons. In all other cases, non-forceful measures of pressure and punishment must be used against criminals and violators of order. These can be various reputational and financial instruments.
This step is a natural continuation of the process of making society more humane, which has already lasted for many centuries and has currently led us from the permissibility of widespread killing to punishments that, while still forceful, are quite lenient and involve only the restriction of freedom without depriving one of the benefits necessary for leading a normal life. This step is needed to further suppress, and in perspective, eradicate violence as a phenomenon as a whole. This is the next stage in the evolution of man and human society. Let us contribute to this process, rather than hindering it and sliding back into violent barbarism!
