Автор: Битарх

What to do with people who currently work for the state or receive aid from it?

Voluntarist

A significant portion of the population consists of so-called “budgetniki”—employees of government structures and corporations. According to various estimates, about 30% of the working-age population in Russia are budget employees. A very reasonable question may arise: what happens to them in the event of achieving a free society? After all, they are accustomed to working according to state standards, which often lag behind the requirements of the private sector. For example, the professionalism of government teachers or medics is very often inferior to that of private workers. If the state ceases to exist, these people will not be able to realize themselves in a private environment, as it is unlikely that anyone will need them given their relatively low qualifications, and thus their poor ability to attract clients and generate income for an organization. Moreover, undergoing additional qualification is a rather difficult task for people who have been working at the same pace for many years without any changes.

Will all budget employees find themselves on the street in an instant? But that would lead to a catastrophe, as they constitute too large a part of the population. Most likely, they would demand the return of the monopolistic and coercive power they are used to, because under it they at least had no problems with survival; the state provided them with funds even if they brought relatively little benefit to other people. According to Hirschleifer’s criteria, a stable free society requires that there be no people driven beyond the edge of survival, because having nothing to lose, they will do anything, including acts of violence; the more such people there are, the more violence there will be, potentially reaching scales that threaten the preservation of a non-violent social order.

Besides budget employees, we must also remember the people who receive assistance from the state without which they simply cannot survive. The disabled, pensioners, orphans—can they really be deprived of the benefits they receive for survival, thereby condemning them to a short, impoverished life on handouts or death altogether?

However, there are at least two solutions to this issue, which, of course, cannot cover absolutely all the problems of civil servants and social assistance recipients, but should handle the vast majority of them.

The first solution will arise on its own in the process of practicing agorism. The creation of alternative social institutions to the state while the state’s monopolistic power still exists is very important so that people are not left with nothing, but have the opportunity to switch at a pace convenient for them from state work to work in similar independent organizations. This mitigates the problem, as budget employees will not be put in a position where only immediate dismissal and the need to find an alternative right away await them. No, they will be able to seek alternatives while having the ability to continue their accustomed life for some time, without worrying about their own survival.

Also, in the process of practicing agorism, various interest-based communities will emerge, and budget employees can use them to organize mutual aid systems. This same answer applies to socially vulnerable layers of the population; they too can find a place in such systems.

If this answer seems unconvincing to you, then there is another option. Achieving a free society does not consist of eliminating the state as an organization; no, this process is aimed only at destroying its power structure, which allows it to impose a monopolistic order on everyone through the threat of violence, and at equalizing the Balance of Violence Potential among all subjects of society, so that no one can simply recreate power by force. This is also called the non-violent state scenario. In this way, we only achieve the appearance of alternatives to the state organization, which anyone wishing can use, but not its complete destruction.

Naturally, many people accustomed to the state will remain. Even without coercion, they will pay it for the services provided to them. Many people are simply used to state schools, clinics, and other institutions, so they will continue to use them even under conditions of freedom. This means budget employees will not lose their jobs. Likewise, the socially vulnerable layers of the population will not lose their social payments.

Of course, for a non-violent state to survive in conditions of freedom, it will have to become an efficient and competitive organization. It can be expected that the officials managing it will succeed, as they will now have the necessary market tools to evaluate the effectiveness of their activities, since it will make sense to compare income with expenses (currently such a comparison is pointless, as any expenses can be covered by taxation and the use of monopoly privileges). Moreover, they will have to work honestly, without deception, corruption, or theft; otherwise, the state-organization will go bankrupt, and they will find themselves on the street in poverty and debt. It is also quite expected that the leadership of the state, once it becomes a competitive organization, will quickly be replenished by people who know how to work in a market environment, as, again, this is also a very good way to avoid bankruptcy.

But even if the state does not become efficient in conditions of freedom, it will still be able to hold on for some time thanks to the people who are accustomed to it. An analogy can be drawn with the fear of progress. Some people fear that new technologies will lead to crowds of displaced workers who have become obsolete. However, it doesn’t work that way; if, for example, a sufficiently good autopilot is invented that can replace human taxi drivers, it will still take many years, if not decades, for its widespread implementation. The taxi driver profession will disappear gradually, allowing current taxi drivers to work out their careers; there simply won’t be a demand for new taxi drivers, and people currently choosing their professional path will simply look at other, more relevant options.

The same applies here. If the state, having become a private organization, gradually falls apart, then current budget employees and social assistance recipients will be able to live their lives as they planned; it is simply that new employees and needy people will seek work and receive help from alternative organizations. In the non-violent state scenario, that day when everything collapses in an instant is unlikely to occur.

Don’t criticize the fight against violence, or how to argue with those who are against the fight against violence

Voluntarist, Bitarch

As you know, we promote certain methods of combating violence: the use of reputational and financial tools to exert non-violent but quite effective influence on criminals of various kinds; universal armament (a balance of violence potential) to ensure everyone has the ability to defend themselves during a direct attack; and gene therapy as a means of eradicating violent tendencies in people prone to them. These methods are often criticized. Most often, this criticism stems from a lack of understanding—the critic has merely learned of the existence of the idea, dislikes it, and without even bothering to study it in detail, immediately begins to criticize it. But even if you have sufficiently grounded criticism of these ideas, there is no need to try to actively destroy them. This will only make things worse, and I will now explain why.

I will begin by stating that none of these ideas are promoted on a compulsory basis. Reputational and financial tools do not involve violent influence at all. Self-defense is justified, as it is a necessary response of a victim to the direct initiation of violence against them. The main point is to never initiate violence yourself. Gene therapy against violence is also not promoted as a forcibly imposed measure—it should be used only as an additional tool for protection against violent offenders during a direct attack (moreover, it is more humane; putting a bullet in the forehead is certainly worse than injecting a drug that suppresses violent tendencies). Additionally, people prone to violence can be pressured via reputational and financial methods so that they begin to seek treatment for their violent nature. As you can see, we are not proposing that anything be imposed on people by force. Our methods are either entirely non-violent or are implemented within the framework of self-defense during a direct attack.

If someone does not like our methods, simply do not apply them to yourself. After all, from our side, they will not affect you in any way unless you commit violence against us. Develop and promote your own methods of fighting violence, if you have any. Collectively, we will achieve a better result if each of us fights violence in their own way, rather than trying to sink those who are on the same side. Of course, any ideas are worth discussing—this is necessary for their development. But if those fighting violence spend their time actively “destroying” one another instead of developing their ideas, it will only play into the hands of the violent and nothing will change in the end. And I think you do not want your own actions to help violent people and support the existence of a social system whose order is based on the threat of applying violent measures, do you?

After these words, it is hardly possible to reasonably criticize any methods of fighting violence that do not involve forced imposition. Of course, the critic themselves may not be against violence but may be a supporter of violent methods of implementation. Well, in that case, they should first admit that they are, in fact, a supporter of violence, or perhaps a violent person themselves, so as not to mislead anyone. After all, the following rule applies in any case: if you support violent methods, then you are a supporter of violence; if you initiate violence against someone, then you are a violent person. And if someone speaks out against violence but simultaneously supports violent methods, then that person clearly has an issue with logic—one cannot be simultaneously for and against violence. In such a case, one must either think carefully about this contradiction or stop deceiving others and finally admit the violent nature of their position.

Violence is irrational – rational incentives against it do not work

Voluntarist, Bitarch

In the modern world, surveillance using various digital means, especially surveillance cameras, is actively practiced. Most major cities in developed countries are already covered by them from top to bottom. This is promoted to the public as a method of fighting crime, including violent crime. If there are cameras everywhere, few people will dare to steal property or attack others due to the inevitability of punishment. But it is not that simple. Surveillance cameras do help in preventing non-violent crimes. But in the case of violence, they are useless.

An analysis of 41 studies on this topic shows that everything depends on the type of crime. Cameras are best at preventing car thefts and property theft. Accordingly, the greatest effectiveness of cameras is achieved specifically in parking lots (a 51% reduction in crime), while in city centers, the impact of cameras proved to be insignificant. But most importantly, no evidence was found that cameras have any influence whatsoever on the number of violent crimes.

This fact only confirms that violence is not a rational and conscious act; the tendency to commit violent acts depends on the “nature” of the specific person. One cannot stop violence, which is irrational in its essence, by resorting to rational stimuli and deterrence mechanisms. Neither surveillance nor the punishment following a violent crime can reduce the level of violence.

The tendency to commit acts of violence, or more precisely, the inability of a specific person to restrain their aggressiveness, can generally be explained by a weak version of the Lorenz mechanism that inhibits intraspecific violence. Given that it is observed in a wide range of very diverse species, its presence in humans would be unsurprising. The only difference is that there was no evolutionary pressure on humans to develop a strong version of it, so some people possess precisely the weak version.

Understanding the irrational nature of violence, the fight against it must be based exclusively on an understanding of human biology and psychology. An obvious alternative to surveillance cameras is universal armament (a uniform balance of violence potential). Almost every aggressor has a self-preservation instinct, so knowing that a potential victim is highly likely to have a weapon, they will not attack. And if someone attacks anyway, the victim’s armament will not only allow them to deal with the violence specifically at the moment it is committed but will also exert that very evolutionary pressure to strengthen the innate inhibitor of violence, as in the case of some species that are heavily armed by nature and possess a strong version of it. Post-factum punishments, again, do not work. This includes even the adoption of the elimination of violent offenders after the fact, as this also requires people capable of violence outside the framework of self-defense (that is, initiating violence on their own part), which means this will not help reduce aggressiveness.

A more humane and effective option would be the development of gene therapy for violence, which would activate and strengthen that very Lorenz mechanism. In this case, pressure could be applied to violent offenders to stimulate them to take the corresponding drug. Alternatively, a dart could be fired at them during a direct attack, using this alongside non-lethal means of self-defense.

There aren’t actually that many rapists

Voluntarist

There aren’t that many violent people

Sometimes it seems that there are many people prone to violence all around us. Almost every day in the news, you can see how someone beat, maimed, or even killed someone else. Perhaps you often encounter various kinds of hooligans and “gopniks” on the streets. Therefore, it is difficult to even imagine how to fight violence if so many people commit it. However, this is a quite deceptive perception that does not correspond to reality. In fact, there are very, very few people prone to violence, and therefore, by applying certain strategies, the problem of violence is entirely solvable. Now we will perform a detailed calculation of the actual number of violent offenders to ensure that there really are not that many of them in society.

The peculiarity of acts of violence is that, in their visibility, they far outpace all other events. Millions of different events happen every day, but it is exactly a few cases of violence that end up on the front pages of news resources and on television broadcasts. Hundreds of thousands of people live beside you, leading their ordinary lives, and you don’t even notice them. On the other hand, you will easily notice a dozen hooligans whose behavior will naturally stand out strongly among everyone else. You see them; you don’t see the other people. That is the whole point. In reality, violent offenders and the acts of violence they commit are very, very few on the scale of society as a whole; it is simply that acts of violence are among the most noticeable deeds.

How does this assertion relate to real data? Let’s look at the statistics of violent crimes in Russia. Non-violent crimes do not interest us, as they are not related to the infliction of direct physical harm to a person or forced coercion. Material damage can be fully compensated, including obtaining compensation from the perpetrator himself by applying various reputational and financial sanctions, and moral harm can be avoided by not maintaining relationships with people who might inflict it (of course, there are situations where a person is forced to interact with someone against their will, but here everything again boils down to forced coercion itself). Only the infliction of physical harm and forced coercion are real problems. Furthermore, our topic is the determination of the number of violent offenders specifically, and not just dishonest and unscrupulous people.

In 2020, 2,044,221 crimes were registered in Russia. Of all crimes, 1.53% are murders (7,695), intentional infliction of severe physical harm (20,019), kidnapping (411), and rapes (3,535). Another 0.26% of crimes are robberies (5,280). Let’s also add 2.7% threats of murder or infliction of severe physical harm (55,223). Of course, this is not the infliction of physical harm itself, but we will consider these acts as failed attempts to commit violence by people prone to it. And finally, 1.66% of crimes consist of intentional infliction of moderate health damage (28,185) and battery (5,716). In total, about 6.1% of crimes are violent in nature [1].

We find that on average, 1,393 crimes were registered per 100 thousand people. Of these, 85 crimes are violent. Of course, far from all acts of violence are registered. This may include domestic violence, small fights, and many other cases. It would be quite reasonable to multiply this number by 4. I made this choice based on the results of a study by the Institute for Law Enforcement Problems at the European University, which discusses how many people actually report to law enforcement agencies and for how many reports a case is initiated. Unfortunately, the study does not have such a clear division of crimes by category as in the case of official crime statistics, so I will assume that about 25% of violent crimes fall into these statistics, based on the percentage of initiated cases for assault (55% of assault victims report to the authorities, and cases are initiated for 44% of reports) [2].

This gives us 340 acts of violence per year per 100 thousand people. The number may seem too small because some violent offenders commit violence frequently and regularly (for example, a bad parent may beat their child, or a bad husband may beat his wife every day). Therefore, for 1 act of violence, we will take all violent actions of one specific person toward another specific person, especially since the repeated commission of similar acts of violence by one person against another in official judicial proceedings will most likely be registered as one crime, and therefore will enter the statistics as only one crime. Out of 852,506 identified criminals, 492,107 (57.7%) had previously committed crimes. The statistics do not specify the number of previously committed crimes; most likely, in reality, 1 violent offender commits more than 2.36 acts of violence on average, but due to the lack of data, we will accept exactly 57.7% of acts of violence as those that do not increase the total number of violent offenders, but only indicate which of them committed violence again. Additionally, it is worth noting again that the vast majority of crimes you notice are non-violent in nature (most often they relate to the economic sphere), whereas we are considering exclusively the commission of acts of violence.

As a result, we find that 144 violent offenders are discovered per year per 100 thousand people, which is 0.144% of the total population, or 1 person out of 695. A very insignificant number, right? Some might say that in their place of residence there are clearly more violent offenders, however, the statistics we are considering concern all of Russia at once, where crime is distributed very unevenly. For example, if we consider severe violent crimes (including robbery), which make up 1.79% of all registered crimes in the general statistics, in Moscow they account for only 1.13% [3]. The total number of crimes registered in Moscow is 146,559, which is 7.2% of all crimes, which is also a more positive result than for Russia as a whole, since Moscow accounts for about 8.6% of the population.

From these calculations, of course, it is impossible to draw exact conclusions about how many violent offenders we have in society at a specific moment, i.e., at what level their number remains. However, as we have seen, the growth of violent offenders is minuscule, and it should be noted that there is also a decrease in violent offenders; they are no more invulnerable or long-lived than other people. Quite the opposite—violent offenders live less on average, as they more often expose themselves to risk due to active participation in violent clashes, whereas other people will not initiate them and will try to avoid them. The absolute number of violent offenders will, of course, grow with population growth, but their percentage ratio to the total population, all other things being equal, will not change.

Note that this result, revealing one violent criminal per 695 people per year, is the worst possible scenario, since we made a series of assumptions in the worst direction: all threats of murder and infliction of severe physical harm were taken as unsuccessful attempts to commit violence; the number of registered violent crimes was multiplied by 4 because many people do not report to law enforcement agencies or they do not initiate a case upon report; we assumed that 1 violent offender commits 2.36 acts of violence on average, but this would be true only for a single recidivism (whereas many violent offenders have multiple). There are all grounds to assume that the real number of violent offenders is many times smaller. However, it is not possible for us to find it, so we calculated the worst possible value, below which it certainly cannot be.

Another important point to mention is that we considered only cases of inflicting fairly serious physical harm. The least brutal of violent crimes that can be found in official statistics is battery. Of course, there are many more people capable of violence that is very weak compared to battery, for example, hitting someone with a fist once or intentionally pushing. This is the kind of violence you notice most often, which is why it may seem to you, again, that there are many violent people. Of course, this violence is also a problem, but far from such a large one, considering the following factors:

1) such violence is not enough to maintain a violent hierarchy of dominance in society (one form of which in human society is the state), nor can it seriously threaten people in general;

2) it is very easy to control through upbringing, condemnation, as well as the threat of ostracism and other reputational methods;

3) it is easy to defend against using simple means of self-defense, such as pepper sprays;

4) its danger is not that great, so there is no need for a priority struggle against it; it is sufficient only to concentrate efforts on fighting violence exhibited by a small percentage of brutal violent offenders, and weak violence can be dealt with later.

From everything we have now considered, a simple conclusion can be drawn—real violent offenders are not that many; they make up a very tiny percentage of the population. This means that the deterrence, and in perspective the complete eradication of violence, is a completely achievable goal, which clearly does not face the problem that there are too many violent offenders and therefore we cannot deal with all of them.

Sources:

1. State of crime in the Russian Federation for January – December 2020: https://мвд.рф/reports/item/22678184/

2. Crime and victimization in Russia: https://enforce.spb.ru/images/analytical_review/irl_rcvs_memo_29.10.pdf

3. Departmental statistics for January – December 2020: https://epp.genproc.gov.ru/web/proc_77/activity/statistics/result?item=58390629

Maintaining strategic parity for “pacifist” countries

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Between different jurisdictions, there has always been the question of maintaining strategic parity—that is, an equality of chances of emerging victorious in the event of a military conflict. Without this, it is impossible to either deter a potential aggressive attack or repel it should it occur. But what strategic parity can there be in the case of an excessive difference in power potential? And the problem here consists not only in the quantitative and qualitative difference in weaponry, but also in the difference in violent tendencies among people. However, a solution exists even for absolutely pacifist societies, which we will now discuss.

Imagine Scandinavia, where although violence has not been completely eradicated, certain social factors have clearly reinforced low violent tendencies in the vast majority of the population over time. Even among state security agents, violent tendencies there are relatively low; at the very least, they are not even close to the violent tendencies of similar agents from other countries, such as Russia. If we assume that a military conflict arises between the Scandinavian states and Russia, the latter would be able to seize them almost without a fight. Even weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons or a class 4 pathogenic virus, would not help if they suddenly came into the possession of the Scandinavians, for because of their pacifism, they would hardly dare to actually use them. And given a similarly pacifist army and the lack of a balance of violence potential (general armament of the population), for security forces highly prone to violence—those who previously toured actively in Donbas and Syria—it would be no problem at all to march across the entire territory of Scandinavia and easily deal with any possible resistance in their path.

This same problem can be transferred to a potential free stateless society in which different contractual jurisdictions exist. Imagine that in such a society there is a jurisdiction of pacifists, in which violence is completely eradicated, and any offenses are punished by non-violent methods (ostracism or financial sanctions). But alongside this, there exists a violent jurisdiction, in which all problems are solved by brute force and cruel physical punishments (such a jurisdiction might be created, for example, by some conservatives). Obviously, there is no strategic parity here either; the order of the second society will lead to the reinforcement of violent tendencies in its participants, whereas in the case of the first society, these tendencies will be maximally suppressed (reinforcing a strong version of Lorenz’s violence-inhibiting mechanism). I think it is easy to understand who would win in the event of a direct military conflict.

An excellent solution to the problem of maintaining strategic parity on the part of more pacifist jurisdictions and societies is the creation of gene therapy against violence. It could be implemented in the form of a drug delivered to attacking agents via a fired dart. In an extreme case, implementation as a pandemic virus is possible (we do not approve of this option). Of course, the latter faces many risks, including the fact that bystanders would be affected, some of whom might die (even with the highest quality vaccination, not everyone tolerates it). However, such a “non-violence virus” is not a traditional weapon of mass destruction in terms of the physical destruction of the attackers; it is intended only for the forced eradication of violence in the aggressor’s army and is therefore the best possible solution within the framework of the classical MAD doctrine (Mutual Assured Destruction) that can be imagined if there is no chance of stopping the aggressor through immediate resistance.

Both darts with the drug and a pandemic “non-violence virus” (personally, I do not approve of this option, but the opinions of others regarding the admissibility of such a “weapon” may differ) could be used even by fierce pacifists, given that such a “weapon” does not initiate violence in the biological sense, and even a person with a strong version of the Lorenz mechanism would be able to apply it. They would allow for the deterrence of potential aggressors, as they would fear losing their violent tendencies as a result of attacking pacifists. But if someone still decides to attack, then we will arrive at the following scenarios:

1) Security agents sent to the front by the aggressor will come under fire from darts with gene therapy. And these darts will reach their target far more often than bullets do now, because soldiers, for the most part, are not rapists or violent criminals; they most often try to simulate activity at the front, avoid shooting, and if they do shoot, it is not at people on the other side of the front, but into the air, again, merely to create the illusion of performing some activity. There are quite few actual violent criminals in war, and this is confirmed by research, which you can find here. But anyone can fire a dart. And if the darts accurately hit the soldiers on the other side of the front, including those actually prone to violence, then the aggressor will soon find themselves completely without people capable of pushing the war further.

2) It is impossible to stop the attack; even darts with gene therapy are not enough to deter the overwhelming forces of the aggressor. In such a case, a pandemic “non-violence virus” is deployed across the front. After this, a few weeks may be enough for the aggressor’s forces to be completely disorganized and the soldiers to turn into pacifists incapable of attack. The war ends quite quickly.

Do you see now what an effective means of deterrence and ending war gene therapy against violence is? In principle, this is the only possible salvation for peaceful and non-violent societies from attack by violent aggressors. Moreover, compared to the weapons of mass destruction that are currently suggested as means of deterring aggressive attacks, this solution is extremely humane.

By the way, this solution is an excellent answer to the question of how a free society can protect itself from aggression by surrounding states in the event of a local rather than global achievement. It is also very useful in the very process of achieving a free society—the same darts with gene therapy can be successfully launched at security agents who beat and arrest peaceful protesters. Ensuring a balance of violence potential (general armament of the population) to achieve a state of affairs where any aggressor can be eliminated upon immediate attack can be a quite difficult task, but it is not necessary to provide everyone with darts with gene therapy—a small number of activists ready to fire them upon seeing another security officer in case of need will suffice (this is especially effective if security officers are deanonymized, as is currently done in Belarus; then they can be caught even in everyday life). And activists will be able to do this even while being less violent people than the security officers, or even absolute pacifists, because, again, this is not a means of inflicting physical harm or killing another person, but merely a means of depriving them of their violent tendencies.

As we can see, for the sake of maintaining strategic parity on the part of pacifist societies and for the sake of ensuring an effective struggle of peaceful protesters against the security agents of the state, it is very advantageous to develop gene therapy against violence. What is very important for us is that this is advantageous even to many modern governments, for example, in Scandinavia, and it is quite likely that they will want to help us. This would be the best and most humane solution to these problems that could possibly be imagined.

Authoritarian Conservatism and Cognitive Abilities

Voluntarist, Bitarch

A rather interesting study was conducted by Gordon Hodson and Michael A. Busseri from Brock University regarding the explanation of adherence to prejudices and support for authoritarian-conservative ideology based on a person’s cognitive abilities. This work analyzed two large representative datasets from the United Kingdom: the 1958 National Child Development Study (NCDS) and the 1970 British Cohort Study (BCS). Both datasets contain data on the cognitive abilities of the participants, as well as their attitudes toward racism and social conservatism. Cognitive abilities were assessed using standardized measures when NCDS participants were 11 years old and BCS participants were 10 years old; attitudes toward social conservatism and racism were assessed at ages 33 and 30, respectively. In total, 15,874 people participated in these studies.

As a result of forming statistical models, it was found that a lower level of general intelligence in childhood predicts a greater tendency toward racist prejudices in adulthood and, furthermore, adherence to social conservatism largely mediates this effect. This model is particularly convincing because in both the NCDS and BCS, the measurement of childhood intelligence preceded the assessment of adult prejudices by at least two decades. Moreover, all predictive effects were independent of socioeconomic status and education.

A secondary analysis was also conducted based on a dataset from a 2010 American study by Kayler, in which 254 students participated. It was confirmed that a low level of abstract thinking predicts anti-homosexual prejudices. This relationship is partially mediated by both support for right-wing authoritarianism and a low level of intergroup contact. The results of this analysis align with the results of the analysis of the NCDS and BCS datasets: the hypothesis about the influence of cognitive abilities on adherence to prejudices was confirmed by sample data from another country. This means that the tendency toward prejudice and authoritarian conservatism can be confidently explained by a person’s low cognitive abilities.

Another study was conducted by Satoshi Kanazawa from the London School of Economics and Political Science. He uses the “savannah principle,” according to which human behavior, remaining to some extent adapted to the ancestral environment of early Homo in the savannah, can lead to problems in a modern (industrial or post-industrial) environment. In a 2010 article, Kanazawa proposed the savannah-IQ interaction hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that smarter people are more likely to acquire and maintain evolutionarily novel values and preferences than less smart people. He used data from a national longitudinal study of adolescent health. A sample of 15,197 adolescents from 80 high schools and 52 middle schools in the USA was taken (their first survey was conducted in 1994-1995, the last in 2001-2002). Data from the General Social Surveys (GSS) were also taken as a sample of adult US citizens, with 1,500 people for each annual survey and 3,000 for each biennial survey. The results of the study confirmed that people with higher IQs are more likely to be liberals than conservatives.

Incidentally, some might object that this study is merely a fabrication by a liberal scientist; however, Satoshi Kanazawa was once even suspended from writing articles for claims regarding the difference in intelligence levels between different races, and the London School of Economics banned him from publishing in non-peer-reviewed publications for 12 months, so he can hardly be accused of being linked to the current social-liberal movements of the West.

“Masquerade” against violence

Voluntarist, Bitarch

One of the primary methods of fighting violence can be described as achieving a balance of violence potential—that is, the general armament of the population, where every person is able to quickly and effectively eliminate a violent offender during a direct attack. However, some people may doubt the possibility of implementing such a scenario due to economic inequality in society or the simple unwillingness of some people to own weapons. But there is one interesting method through which the number of violent offenders in society can be significantly reduced, even with the help of a small group of armed activists. It will create the exact same natural selection pressure to strengthen the violence-inhibiting Lorenz mechanism in the population as in the case of general armament, but will require far fewer resources to implement.

Of course, I am not proposing preemptive violence, because for its implementation, our activists themselves would have to be violent offenders capable of initiating violence against other people. To rely on a group of armed violent offenders for one’s own security, even if they currently claim to be on your side, would be great foolishness. Activists must be people capable only of self-defense. Furthermore, it should be understood that we cannot know for certain whether a specific person is prone to violence until they find themselves in circumstances that provoke its initiation. Only if they were unable to restrain themselves and exhibited violence can it be said that they are prone to it. In this regard, preemptive violence would ultimately lead to casualties among ordinary and peaceful people, which we absolutely cannot allow.

What I am proposing is specifically a method of “provoking” violent offenders to reveal their violent nature. To make it clear what I am talking about, I will refer to one example of the practical implementation of this strategy. We are talking about the eradication of banditry in post-war Odessa, or the so-called “Masquerade” operation, organized by Marshal Zhukov himself. Of course, this operation was carried out by government decree, but in this case, that is not so important, since it still consists of using only self-defense, and therefore can be adopted by those fighting against aggressive violence. When well-dressed men, sometimes accompanied by equally fashionable ladies, began to appear on the streets of Odessa under the cover of night and in dark alleys, bandits simply could not restrain themselves from attacking. However, the victims of the attacks were actually disguised and armed officers of the Soviet militia, and upon being attacked, they shot to kill.

I think you already understand the essence of this strategy. Armed activists simply need to provoke people prone to violence into attacking. And I am not even talking about some kind of intrusive provocations (although a normal person would not respond to those with violence either); provocations on the level of the aforementioned walks through dark alleys are sufficient, and many, many variations of these can be devised. For example, walking through a predominantly conservative neighborhood in LGBT attire. When some bandit or violent offender decides to carry out an attack, all that needs to be done is to defend oneself using weapons—an absolutely normal action in the case of any violent attack.

Some may dislike such an approach for its cruelty, but it is unlikely that anything can be found in it that would make it not worth applying. It does not propose the initiation of aggressive violence, only self-defense against violent attacks, which is an absolutely normal and justified action. It cannot lead to casualties among ordinary and peaceful people, because such people simply will not attack the activists under cover; this will be done exclusively by bandits and violent offenders. And there is nothing wrong with provocations of this kind. In the scenario we have already examined, we would not justify the violent offender and blame the victim of the attack if the event took place not in broad daylight in a crowded place, but somewhere at night in a dark alley, would we? Every person has the right to walk where they want and in whatever they want; the problem lies exclusively with the violent offender who is unable to follow the simple rule “one can offend, but one cannot be offended”! If someone is unable to restrain their violence and attacks people, then they fully deserve a response in the form of armed self-defense.

Why there is no absolutely-universal armament (balance of violence potential) in the USA

Voluntarist, Bitarch

The idea of leveling the balance of violence potential (BVP) so that every person could deter and repel attacks from various types of violent offenders and maniacs, as well as to ensure the impossibility of recreating a violent hierarchy of dominance in the form of a state imposing its monopoly on violence, is often criticized by pointing to the example of the USA as a society with universal armament. Since there is a state in the USA and acts of violence are very frequent there, it is argued that this demonstrates the failure of this idea. But is there actually a uniform BVP in the USA?

Of course not. A Pew Research Center survey shows that only 30% of Americans own a weapon, and another 11% live with someone who does. Among gun owners, 72% possess handheld firearms, such as a pistol. Of these, 11% carry a weapon constantly, 26% from time to time, and 57% only rarely. Summarizing these statistics, we find that among all Americans, only 2.4% of people carry a weapon constantly, another 5.4% from time to time, and 12.3% rarely.

It should be added that the distribution of armament in the USA is very uneven. First, different states and counties have different gun laws. While in Maine and Louisiana you can acquire a weapon with ease, in New York, California, or Massachusetts, you would have to struggle significantly to do so. Second, recently, representatives of minorities have been obtaining concealed carry permits much more frequently than the white population of the country. For example, over the last 10 years in North Carolina, the number of permits issued to Black people has grown twice as much compared to whites.

Overall, 7.3% of Americans have a permit for the concealed carry of weapons. Of course, considering that in 16 states it is sufficient to legally own a weapon to have the right to carry it concealed, and assuming that some people own and carry weapons illegally, the number of owners and carriers still should not be that much higher, given that according to 60% of Americans, gun laws need to be made even stricter.

As we can see, there is no absolutely universal armament in the USA, meaning no uniform balance of violence potential. And the armament that does exist is distributed very unevenly. For this reason, the example of the USA cannot tell us anything about how universal armament affects society.

If it seems to you that Lorenz’s violence-inhibiting mechanism is not working, then it really only seems that way to you

Voluntarist, Bitarch

As a critique of Lorenz’s theory, I am often sent images where an enraged bear or lion inflicts fatal injuries on another member of its species. But how can this be, since they are heavily armed species, and Lorenz’s mechanism, which inhibits intraspecific violence, is weakly expressed in them? Does this not mean that in reality, violence does not threaten the survival of any species, and the Lorenz mechanism is merely a fiction? Let us examine this question much more deeply than those who make such claims have done.

In this argument, the second premise—the pressure of natural selection to strengthen the Lorenz mechanism—is always overlooked. This is the impossibility of escaping in the event of an attack, or the inherent inability of certain species to avoid situations that lead to violence. In the case of solitary species, such as bears or jaguars, it is very easy to see where an escape occurs—they basically do not contact other members of their species outside of the mating season or the process of raising offspring. Of course, the presence of an intraspecific violence inhibitor is not that necessary for them, as they very rarely find themselves in a situation that makes the commission of violence possible.

As for lions, one should look at their social life. In natural conditions, male lions, upon reaching a certain age, leave their natal pride in search of a new one or to create their own. There are usually no more than three adult males in one pride. The low concentration of violence-prone individuals within specific social units also reduces the risks of violence, and they become far less threatening; thus, no evolutionary pressure arises to develop a strong version of the Lorenz mechanism. If you show me a lion tearing another apart, then that is exactly the case where the concentration of violence-prone individuals became too high. In artificial parks or enclosures, dozens of adult male lions are often in one society, so the probability of a fatal fight increases significantly.

In addition to this premise, I would also like to recall the argument that animals are sometimes prone to killing and eating the offspring of others, or even their own, in case of food shortages or under stress. Obviously, the activation of the Lorenz mechanism could not have developed here because juvenile individuals do not yet have developed weaponry; therefore, an adult individual committing an act of violence against them does not risk dying and thus never fails to pass on its weak version of the violence-inhibiting mechanism. When there are insufficient resources to support its own offspring, a mother’s decision to kill them in no way affects the survival of the species as a whole. And the inhibition of killing the offspring of others is sufficiently handled by the innate weaponry of their own mothers.

One could try to provide many examples of why the Lorenz mechanism does not work, but if you dig deeper, there will always be an explanation that fits the premises necessary for its development. Simply try to analyze each such case in more detail, and you will see it for yourself.

State violence threatens corporations

Bitarch, Voluntarist

We have already previously considered the topic of why it is profitable for corporations to fight against violence. In order to produce new products and generate profit from their sales, it is extremely important for them to develop and implement new technologies. However, if violence as a general phenomenon continues to exist, further scientific and technical progress will simply become impossible. New technologies also provide new opportunities for committing acts of violence, including catastrophic ones. Imagine if a smartphone battery became energy-dense enough to cause a large explosion, or if home computers became powerful enough to allow any random person to create and test viruses using artificial intelligence for simulation, which could then be recreated in real life using a DNA/RNA synthesizer that has also become more advanced and accessible. For corporations, this is a collapse; they must participate in solving the problem of violence to preserve and increase their own income. You can find more details on this argument in the material “Corporations Against Violence”.

But one must consider not only the risks of individual acts of violence. If dangerous technologies available to the general masses have not yet been released on the market—meaning corporations have nothing to worry about in that regard for now—then violence on the part of the state threatens them directly already. Recall what recently happened to Jack Ma, the founder of Alibaba Group. Due to critical remarks regarding state economic regulation, the Chinese authorities began to pressure him in every way and destroy him as a businessman. In general, China has taken up the harsh subordination of all large technological corporations on its territory.

Such a scenario could happen to any billionaire and any corporation. Well-known figures such as Elon Musk, Bill Gates, or Jeff Bezos possess enormous funds and influence in society. But the state can nullify all of this at any moment by applying certain sanctions supported by security forces, who are always ready to forcibly compel obedience if the orders of a stationary bandit are not followed. Using China as an example, we clearly see that rulers like “Comrade Xi” do not care at all about the funds and influence of corporations and their owners; for the sake of their own desires, authoritarians will take all of this by brute force.

It would be correct to note that specific governments may not be interested in using force against corporations. But what guarantees eternal power to those specific people in government? Nothing! Sooner or later, power always changes. And if the current government is peaceful enough not to threaten corporations, the next government—regardless of whether it was elected democratically or seized power in an armed coup (although this scenario is more dangerous, as it most often brings deranged dictators to power)—could well declare so-called “nationalization” for corporations and subject the corporation owners to harsh repression. Moreover, such changes can occur even within a single administration—after all, nothing can guarantee its commitment to the same interests over a long period of time.

For these reasons, it is quite profitable for corporations to invest in the fight against violence, and they will do so if initiatives to combat violence become noticeable enough to attract their attention. It is far better to invest a few percent of their profit in balancing the potential for violence or, for technology companies, to participate in the development of gene therapy against violence, rather than constantly risk being destroyed by violence.