Libertarian Theory of War, Woven from Contradictions

Alex Rozov, a left-wing anarchist and author of the transutopia cycle, has read my “Libertarian Theory of War” and shared his impressions on his channel. I felt it necessary to add the word “left-wing” to his description so that the reader would better understand where he gets such a strange conception of ancap:

Ancap society is based on the non-aggression principle. Every member of society recognizes the established distribution of property and promises not to seize by force what is recognized as belonging to someone else.

It is quite characteristic for leftists to speak not of the ways of acquiring property, but of the distribution of property; not of methods (exchange), but of results (inequality), and so on. However, it would be a sin for me to be indignant about someone else’s inclination toward such holistic constructs, since I myself operate with the concept of collective speculative subjects, aka spirits, in my book.

I view war for resources within my classification as one of three causes of war, and I separately indicate that for libertarians, this type of war is marginal: although the forceful acquisition of resources may be legitimate (in the case of restitution), it is usually too expensive to make sense. Alex, however, interprets the text as if it were entirely about the seizure of resources, while everything else is apparently insignificant lyrical digressions—some kind of war for freedom, what are you even talking about. I don’t know if the entire pathos of the book completely passed him by, if this part of the reasoning is too banal for him and therefore does not require separate analysis, or if it is simply uncharacteristic for Alex to speak of ethics where it is not verified by economics. To some extent, the epigraph to the book is precisely my polemic with such a purely economic approach to conflicts.

Upon reaching section 2.3.3 (I hope he progressed further afterward), Alex saw a logical dead end: war is expensive, a temptation may arise to forcefully extract resources from uninvolved parties, and that is lawlessness, so that’s the end of your ancap. That is essentially where his analysis of the book ends.

Meanwhile, the text explicitly states that even if such requisitions are accompanied by promises to compensate everything, the person subjected to the requisitions still has the full right to resist this by any means, up to lethal ones. In other words, he may consider this the beginning of a war against him, where he is the defending party, and you can’t argue with him, damn it, because he is right; therefore, try to remain within the framework of voluntary transactions with outsiders even during wartime, and do not make new enemies for yourself. Perhaps I should have articulated this point more clearly. Perhaps Alex was simply looking for something to nitpick. If you think the text should be adjusted, please suggest options.

Decentralization of publications, homework

Yesterday, I felt a sudden urge to have my own personal relay for Nostr. My system administration skills are practically zero; even the ancapchan.info site was once built and configured for me without my involvement. But since then, LLMs have appeared, and it would have been a sin not to use them. So, I dug into Grok, and after a few hours of tinkering, the relay relay.ancapchan.info was up and running. This fully revealed the peculiarities of the protocol’s decentralization. For instance, broadcasting a test message only through my single relay turned out to be convenient via the Snort client, syncing relays is convenient via Amethyst on Android, and Nostria knows how to broadcast an arbitrary event as raw JSON, and so on.

The purpose of a personal relay is to store a full archive of my publications, private messages, and everything else, as well as the content of those I follow. This is a good step toward local autonomy, although still far from the ideal I described in the third “Notes on Decentralization”. I still have to figure out backups and content management, and then, perhaps, it will come to providing this relay for use by the local community. And if it proves to be in demand by the community, then it will be, again, a step toward centralization: someone bothers with their own server, and someone uses shared ones—why not.

At this rate, I’ll even properly connect a wallet to Nostr (currently it only works conveniently for receiving), set up a Lightning node, or even start “vibecoding” something…

Readers are also pleasing me with their examples of using neural networks. For instance, one of them opened a resource where they post AI-narrated books for free, including those on libertarianism/Austrian Economics. Of course, a certain amount of cringe remains in AI narration, but it is so much cheaper that it’s a sin not to use it. For those who find it easier to listen than to read, welcome: website, Telegram bot. By the way, the AI narrations of my two books are already there (I’ve already added direct download links to my book pages: Ancap, War).

Notes on Decentralization, Part 3. Publications.

The Internet began when people started publishing data in electronic form: that is, not just storing it for themselves, but providing access to it via remote connection. To ensure this, a minimum set of components is required: 1) a data storage device; 2) a communication channel to which the storage device is connected; 3) a protocol for providing remote access to this data. There can be many different types of devices, channels, and protocols, as long as they can somehow interface with each other. This looks quite promising in terms of ensuring decentralized data exchange, doesn’t it? Of course. But there is also a vast open field here for deepening centralization.

It is cheaper to produce identical devices. Identical communication channels are cheaper to maintain. The use of a single protocol is an invaluable asset. But the main thing is the functional separation that occurs between different system components when, for example, it turns out that storing data is cheaper on a large stationary server with a thick, uninterrupted communication channel, while accessing it is more convenient from inexpensive personal clients. And just like that, a platform economy begins, in which those who need to store and consume data become completely dependent on the rules established by the storage and publishing platform.

Naturally, throughout history, this state of affairs has greatly irritated both data producers and consumers, who would prefer to retain control. However, the question is how to have this control without spending too much money, ensuring everything works fast and doesn’t require mega-skills from every user. The struggle for the user, accompanied by the involvement of the state as a conflict regulator and the state’s own initiatives to ensure the interests of politicians, is all well-documented and generally well-known. The struggle for digital autonomy is also well-documented and quite known. One could provide an overview of the dynamic equilibrium between centralization and decentralization processes at the time of writing this text, but I want to approach this from a different angle. Specifically: how do I personally see the ideal functioning of the Internet given the current level of technology?

Current snapshot of the technological level

  1. Data storage. Without investing in specialized devices, the average user easily secures volumes on the order of hundreds of gigabytes on a phone and several terabytes on bulkier personal devices.
  2. Communication channels. A more or less settled user can relatively easily afford a 24/7 unlimited channel with speeds ranging from units to tens of megabytes per second. An actively traveling user, without additional investment, may occasionally be offline, have traffic limits, and a more modest channel width.
  3. Clouds. For a price comparable to the cost of personal internet access, a user can rent cloud capacity for data storage and processing that slightly exceeds the power of their personal devices.
  4. Money. Thanks to cryptocurrencies, a user can technically pay for any services over the network directly to their providers in arbitrarily small fractions with an arbitrarily high frequency.

Now I will daydream

I produce only a few gigabytes of data per month, mostly crappy photos. With crappy videos, let’s say it would be tens of gigabytes (the highest subjective value for me, of course, is text, which is a mere few hundred kilobytes, and with all the chatter in chats, let’s say a few megabytes). I want to have unconditional access to all this content from any of my devices, as well as the ability to share access to individual pieces of content with both a limited and an unlimited circle of people. To achieve this, I need my texts to be fully synchronized between several of my personal devices and cloud storage, while photos and videos gradually settle into cheaper and higher-capacity storage, unobtrusively leaving, say, the phone—but with the ability to easily return any archived data back to local access.

Beyond this, I consume other people’s content. Here we are talking about hundreds of gigabytes per month. I need the ability to selectively save any data into personal storage. Ideally, while preserving metadata about where and when this content was obtained by me. It would also be good to substitute locally saved content when surfing the same network resource again to avoid re-downloading—and if the content on the network has updated, to have the ability to replace my version with a fresh one or save an archived version.

I also value a convenient way to donate directly for someone else’s content and receive donations for my own. For this, I need the ability to attach payment detail metadata to an arbitrary object.

So, effectively, I need an operating system for working online that would link locally stored materials with the network addresses where they should be available, provide flexible data synchronization between storage systems, allow for configuring access rights, contain tools for viewing and editing data, as well as a toolkit for managing money. Naturally, all of this must be sufficiently protected from unauthorized access.

It turns out that in order to provide me with the most decentralized workflow on the web, a quite comprehensive centralized solution is required. It could, of course, consist of modules from different providers, but these modules need to work together seamlessly, so centralization practically invites itself here.

And what do we have today?

There are separate services for organizing local data storage and for organizing cloud storage. There are services for synchronizing local folders with cloud ones. There are tools for various network activities: publishing photos, videos, texts, tracks, exchanging messages, money, plans, task lists, and a ton of other types of data. There is the ability to rent servers and host websites on them. There is the ability to rent a domain name. In short, there is a huge, flourishing variety of tools for working on the web, the development of which is quite decentralized. And none of this gives me the possibility of full control over my data.

Such is the paradox.

Libertarian Theory of War. Epigraph.

David Friedman’s laurels wouldn’t leave me alone, and I wanted to add a bit of pathos to the book. So, spending an evening, I finally provided the book with an epigraph. Now an audiobook can be recorded, if there are any volunteers.

People strive to live in peace with themselves.
People strive to live in peace with others.
What then punishes us with war?
The spirits of war — what lurks behind them?

To build cunning, secret plans,
To amass strength, to stock up on weapons,
To practice the art of deception…
Is this necessary? Who needs this?

Is the master an offspring of hell?
Have you not grown accustomed to slavery over the years?
To rise and strike? Or perhaps, there is no need?
Do it. Thus demand the Spirits of freedom.

Mechanics of “Freedom”

I don’t quite understand publishing books on paper, unless they are books for small children that can be physically chewed on or, at a slightly older age, creatively doodled in. Even if a person leads a sedentary life in their own home, storing paper books at home is a luxury, as it requires acquiring such a strange vintage interior item as a bookshelf (if there are few books in the house, a small shelf in the toilet would be more suitable). And if a person rents housing, is forced to move from time to time, and doesn’t even know in which country they will be in six months, then for them the expression “paper book” is definitely something for the rich. Therefore, paper books migrate to public spaces, and they can more often be seen in some time-cafes next to board games. The few paper books that for some reason ended up with me in recent years quickly migrated to one of these spaces, and now in the apartments I rent there lies a single comic in Serbian about Corto Maltese, which wandered in from a comics festival.

Nevertheless, paper books, this deeply niche product, are still not only being bought but even produced in new editions. For example, my acquaintances were engaged in this back in Russia, founding the “Svoboda” publishing house, then continued in Montenegro, and now in Germany. However, they are still oriented towards the Russian market and are sold mainly on Ozon. I doubt that my own books will be published in this way because they are extremely small in volume, which means that the share of postage costs in the expenses of obtaining the finished product will be disproportionately high. However, if I happen to write another work, then three books under one cover would already have a chance.

On the other hand, “Svoboda” published my translation of Friedman’s “Mechanics of Freedom,” and there are even a couple of dozen reviews on the Ozon website. You can perfectly well read the translation absolutely free in electronic form, but if you enjoy owning a hefty souvenir brick, then you are welcome. As I understand it, the links I will provide here contain a mention that they were received specifically from me. I think this is for analytics, so that the publishers understand how effective advertising in this way is. I have no idea myself; we’ll see.

What’s there on libertarianism, besides Friedman?

2. Alya Zanoza. A Guide to Rational Egoism. Well, I’ve started with my trump card, of course. You are probably familiar with Alya from her YouTube channel, which will likely be soon renamed to “Serbian Political Stove.” The text of the book is not in the public domain, so buying a two-hundred-page brick is not only a souvenir but also an extremely perverse way to get acquainted with the content of Alya’s creativity. If the author throws the text my way, maybe I’ll even post a review.

3. Linda and Morris Tannehill. The Market for Liberty. This is another exclusive, previously unpublished in Russian. Friedman and the Tannehills almost certainly actively cross-pollinated each other’s ideas (judging by the nearly identical publication years and references in Friedman, since I am not directly familiar with the Tannehills’ work). For instance, the famous idea of private security agencies, which are intended to replace the most toxic function of the state, was launched to the masses in the 20th century specifically by the Tannehills.

4. Hans-Hermann Hoppe. The Theory of Socialism and Capitalism. This is no longer an exclusive of “Svoboda” publishing, but a reprint of an edition by the Novosibirsk Hyde Park Library. Judging by the annotations, the most valuable part of the book is not the discussions on socialism and capitalism at all, but Hoppe’s argumentative ethics, upon which he presumably builds all further constructions.

5. Ayn Rand. Capitalism: An Apologia. This is a noticeably less popular author, judging by the number of reviews on Ozon. This is a collection of various articles in which Ayn Rand applies the tools of her developed objectivism to discuss different political concepts. Maybe in my old age I’ll also put together a collection of appendices to different aspects of reality for my own theories…

6. David Bergland. Libertarianism in One Lesson. Somehow it happened that I knew about this book with the basics of libertarianism, but didn’t get around to reading it in my time, immediately rushing to gnaw through Rothbard. As a result, I have no idea how good this direct competitor to my Ancap is for carriers of Russian culture. If anyone has compared them, please share your opinion.

Perhaps in the foreseeable future I will make more detailed reviews of these books, as well as new releases from the publisher, should any appear.

Philosophy of the Poor

Sperry UNIVAC

His Majesty Trump continues to rebuild his palace, and the scandal surrounding the complete demolition of the White House East Wing and the construction of a ballroom in its place—with dimensions befitting a tsar’s ego—continues to flare up. The issue is not only that an architectural monument in a protected zone of Washington has been destroyed and some monstrosity will be built in its place, but also that the budget, initially planned at $200 million, has grown threefold to nearly $600 million, as happens with any good developer (and Trump is certainly a good one). For many people, these sound like insane figures, but I was unexpectedly drawn to another piece of news. The unlucky Boeing company (where engineers who talk about the mess in aircraft assembly have a habit of mysteriously dying, and the aircraft themselves have a habit of falling apart) has suddenly made the breakthrough of the century and rolled out an unparalleled refueling drone (yes, really!) the MQ-25A. It is small and carries about 7 tons over 900 km. 

What is the point of it, since there are the ancient, monstrous tankers like the Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker (from as far back as 1957) and the McDonnell Douglas KC-10 Extender (1981)? The point is that they cannot operate from aircraft carriers—they are too huge—and deck aviation sometimes needs to refuel. As a result, for many years, the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet—a quite versatile machine—has been used for this purpose. Specifically, it can carry external tanks and a refueling system instead of weapons, and refuel F/A-18s in strike configurations during flight. In short, the new drone is intended to relieve the unfortunate fighters of this grunt work, and so the delighted USMC and US Navy bought 76 units immediately, without bargaining or even looking! So, what is the connection to the previous news? The fact that the cost of one such refueler is… roughly 3-4 times more expensive than an F/A-18 (depending on the version and configuration) and amounts to $200 million. 

With the cost of this contract, one could not only rebuild the East Wing, but tear down half of Washington and rebuild it as Trump Towers. Meanwhile, the reconstruction of the White House has already entered the annals of corruption scandals, and there are attempts to stop it partly because of reasonable suspicions of embezzlement and kickbacks. In other words, either the tsar-developer was too modest and took too small a kickback, or Boeing has completely lost its bearings and charged some unreal prices. Think about it: a flying jerrycan for 7 tons costs more than the legendary F-22—the first and only true 5th-generation aircraft in the world, whose overpricing sparked many debates in its time—as much as the long-suffering F-35, the most embezzled project in the history of weaponry, and for the price of five such drones, one could buy a B-2 stealth bomber.

To understand what is happening here, we need to look back at history. American megacorporations see ancap in their nightmares because their best and only friend throughout time has been the state. No American technological (as opposed to resource-based, like Standard Oil, U.S. Steel, or the Chicago meat kings like Armour) corporation could have been born, become a monopolist, or earned billions if not for the state. IBM was founded as TMC to sell tabulators for analyzing the government census; AT&T grew because Theodore Vail went straight to the government and offered the deal of the century: you give us a complete monopoly on telephones across the country, and we provide the telephone infrastructure—and no other way. William Seward Burroughs (grandfather of the beloved beatnik drug-addict William Seward Burroughs III) invented a perfect button calculator and founded AAC, which later became the Burroughs computer corporation, but he only began making millions when the 16th Amendment was ratified in 1913, giving states the right to collect income taxes. Taxes were calculated by hand, and errors were severely punished, so Burroughs’ calculators began selling like hotcakes. Later, Burroughs would become one of the three (along with Sperry Corporation and IBM) main US military contractors; their computers were installed in nuclear missiles and submarines, and their mainframes were purchased by the Federal Reserve.

The flowering of Detroit automotive baroque coincided strikingly with the start of the construction of the US federal interstate highway system; without the first SAGE air defense system, there would be no modern air traffic control or even online ticket booking; ARPANET was created in the US Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency at the taxpayers’ expense and developed for a long time on Uncle Sam’s money; in fact, even the transistor and the entire Silicon Valley are products of state (and exclusively military) investments. Only when HP, Xerox, Motorola, Fairchild Semiconductor (which, by the way, was part of a huge holding including, for example, Fairchild Aircraft, which produced missiles and fighters for the state) and others had been sufficiently fed by the state, did the time come for all the various AMDs, Apples, and other Intels (who were also knee-deep in military projects). Even the food megacorporation General Mills earned most of its money not from children’s cereal, but from smokeless powder components, army rations, and even nuclear bombs and guidance systems. 

The father of supercomputers, Seymour Cray, worked for the state his entire life. All his companies—CDC, Cray Research, and CCC—produced exclusively military equipment: machines for the CIA, NSA, and federal nuclear laboratories (and also for the state weather service). There is nothing to say about corporations like Lockheed, Northrop Corporation, and Boeing—they were, are, and will be primarily military state companies, earning most of their money from defense contracts. It is not for nothing that when the Cold War ended, American industrialists nearly committed suicide in despair, as the Niagara Falls of megabucks from the Pentagon literally dried up to a thin stream in a couple of years. At that moment, almost all companies of the golden age went bankrupt: everyone from Cray to McDonnell was forced to merge, consolidate, and absorb one another just to survive. Of the entire US aviation industry, only two companies survived: Lockheed and Boeing (and Northrop turned into a single-purpose state company: for 30 years they have built, maintained, and modernized a single aircraft—the B-2 bomber, and recently created its new version, the B-21, which is what they live on). In general, even Google and Elon Musk are knee-deep in military contracts (Tesla itself was deeply unprofitable even with incredible state subsidies).

This is precisely what explains the monstrously inflated, unreal budgets (which, in today’s money, are more expensive than the Manhattan Project and the flight to the Moon) that Lockheed and Boeing spent on developing their most scandalous projects. The life cycle of the F-35 until the end of its operation (i.e., the 2050s) is estimated at a couple of trillion—a fine way for a corporation to live off the backs of taxpayers. At the same time, Lockheed is involved in another no less scandalous embezzlement—the “naval F-35” project—the so-called Littoral Combat Ships, Freedom-class LCS (yes, they build ships too), which turned out to be almost even more expensive. Ironically, since the end of the Cold War, Pentagon budgets have been attempted to be cut at every Congressional session, yet for some reason, during the relatively meager 1990s–2000s for megacorporations, they still managed to suck about 5–6 trillion bucks in total from the state. Who else can pay so much, without bargaining, for such useless nonsense? 

So, as we see, Boeing is moving well within the tradition: now the Pentagon will have a flying jerrycan that costs more than the most advanced fighter on the planet. It would seem that beating the embezzlement record set by Lockheed was impossible, but the old school has once again shown a masterclass. Once, a philosopher expressed a paradoxical thought: Marxism is the philosophy of the privileged classes; to the workers and peasants, it is abhorrent. Similarly, one could propose a no less paradoxical postulate: libertarianism is the philosophy of the poor and underprivileged; to the capitalists, it is abhorrent.

I finished her off!

That’s it, Libertarian Theory of War is finished and even immediately formatted into epub – download it as a single file and read in comfort.

I still have some grievances regarding the cover: Rothbard’s portrait resemblance to his spirit in the image leaves much to be desired, and the neural network stubbornly insisted on depicting me in exactly that image, despite the reference I provided. Nevertheless, I generally like the result, so I’ll leave it as is. But if anyone decides to try and improve it, I’m all for it; post your versions in the comments.

I also believe that finishing the book is a good occasion to remind readers of the link for donations to the author: https://ancapchan.info/donate/

Libertarian Theory of War, section 3.3.4 on war between states has been completed

So, the book on libertarian theory of war has finally touched upon war itself just before the finale. A couple of paradoxical conclusions and several banal ones have been made, and recommendations have been formulated on what libertarians should do in all this mess—in short, I am rather satisfied with the new section.

Now all that’s left is to smoothly summarize the entire text, and then the book can be assembled into a single epub, illustrated, and presented to the general public in some way.

And just as the finish line is very close, one misplaced question has started to irritate me. Actually, I love juicy and atmospheric details in books. But I made both of mine—on ancap and on the theory of war—as dry and concise as possible. Compressing ideas into a minimal volume was sometimes damn difficult, and now I wonder: was it even necessary to bother with that? Perhaps it would have made sense to generously pour out a stream of consciousness, adding various historical anecdotes and lyrical digressions? Maybe that would have been swallowed much more easily?

Liberland

From April 11 to 13, I was with a group of Montelibero residents at the eleventh birthday of Liberland. The party took place near Apatin, the closest Serbian Danube town to Liberland. There, Liberland had purchased land and built a tourist complex The ARC — a very cozy eco-village.

By the way, the Liberland website has a list of Diaspora villages, where, in addition to Liberland itself and Arc Village, Montelibero is featured, along with some community in Mexico unknown to me, and several settlements from a single developer, ECI Development. It seems to me that colleagues from Green Zyland should connect with Liberland so that their Georgian and Antiguan Green Zyland settlements eventually appear on their map as well.

On the first day, there was an excessively dense speaking program; by the end, my head was swollen from English, and instead of normal networking, I shied away from all English speakers just to get a little break from them, but we had some good chats with all the Russians present. There was no single theme for the presentations; it seems President Edlička simply gathered everyone he could reach, and if someone had something to say, he pulled them onto the stage. So it turned out quite eclectic, and there were relatively few talks about Liberland itself, except for an overview report on what successes it has achieved over 11 years.

On the second day, they organized a trip along the Danube to show us Liberland itself.

As the excursion approached the shores of Liberland, a Croatian police boat was spotted both above and below it, and a patrol car accompanied us along the Croatian shore. Croatia jealously guards the inviolability of foreign land. The plot of the conflict is described on the wiki, so I won’t retell it. Nevertheless, a settler named Martin waved to us from the shore of the smaller of the two islands that make up Liberland. It was mentioned that he intends to build a beach cafe there, although I don’t rule out that this was said as a joke.

What can be said about Liberland in general? The project is firmly on its feet 11 years after its founding. Despite the fact that quarterly congress elections regularly take place in this pseudo-state, the executive power does not plan to be re-elected until the official establishment of the state, which fully aligns with what Balaji Srinivasan writes in his “The Network State” — namely, that without a single founder figure, nothing will work; only under the leadership of a benevolent dictator are liberty-loving voluntarists capable of moving anywhere. The project is not struggling; it lives and celebrates without excessive luxury, but quite lavishly, and its establishment consists of fairly wealthy entrepreneurs.

A business approach is also evident in the treatment of participants. Tickets for events are paid, including simply purchasing the opportunity to watch a broadcast. Electronic residency is paid. Citizenship costs a quite significant $10k, which is, of course, cheaper than from the “big brothers,” but then again, the power of a Liberland passport is currently near zero. In short, it is a very interesting venture project that can exist in a state of limbo for quite a long time, but as soon as it receives actual diplomatic recognition, the project’s shares will skyrocket, since there is certainly no overabundance of libertarian jurisdictions with open entry in the world right now.

Since I plan to relocate to Serbia within the year, I will inevitably continue to interact with Liberland. We’ll see what the prospects are for attaching one business or another to it.

I continue to perceive Liberland without excessive seriousness, yet with respect.

What is Wrong With the War, Part 2

Now I will add my own thoughts on the two designated topics: the degeneration of strategy and the disappearance of the willingness to make sacrifices.

What historically constitutes a successful offensive strategy? A sudden start to the war, rapid achievement of predetermined goals, and the political consolidation of success. The greatest strategist of all time and nations is Genghis Khan. A successful defensive strategy: disrupting the attacker’s plans, dealing a convincing defeat, inciting the attacker’s other neighbors against their defenseless rear, and, again, politically consolidating the success.

A failed offensive strategy is either a crushing defeat at the operational level or, having exhausted the potential of surprise, becoming embroiled in a war of attrition. A failed defensive strategy is allowing the enemy to decapitate one’s centralized management structure or failing to avoid the demoralization of the defense forces.

When a clear division emerged in the world between the club of great powers and all other countries, it quickly became apparent that offensive strategies among great powers toward one another had ceased to work: even a clearly defeated party was unwilling to accept defeat, and other great powers were even less willing to accept the defeat of a great power. As a result, for a long time, this manifested as purely colonial wars, where European offensive strategies generally worked perfectly.

But after the Second World War, a general democratization of world politics began. Countries gained formal equality, a dogma on the inviolability of borders was adopted at the interstate level, and new large interstate alliances were formed—and as a result, the era of territorial conquests, and with it the era of corresponding strategies, ended. Now, as a surrogate for conquest strategy, the strategy of supporting political instability in the target country and bringing to power a group that would subsequently declare its country an ally of the supporting state prevailed. Aggressive war became a task for special forces, and a successful army became de facto a conglomerate of tools for various special operations. The only exception remained Israel, which emerged after the Second World War through war with all its neighbors and has continued to successfully expand its territory at their expense for decades—until it receives diplomatic recognition from a particular neighbor, which allows it to fix a piece of the border.

Thus, the only successful strategy for territorial seizure became the long-term nibbling of a neighbor’s land—provided that it is possible to ignore the pressure of the global community to return to the pre-war status quo until such a return becomes unthinkable. In principle, this is exactly the strategy that Putin is currently implementing.

As for defensive strategies, they developed largely in mirror image to offensive ones. Will the enemy destabilize your political regime? A successful defensive strategy consists of completely purging the domestic political field of any seeds of opposition. Will the enemy ignore the global community? Then the global community must scream in your favor so loudly that it cannot be ignored, and primarily, the opposition in the aggressor country and its key allies should handle this. Does the enemy lean toward special operations and is not ready for a war of attrition? Then one must develop immunity to decapitation strikes and prepare to engage in partisan warfare.

It should be added that all these strategies leave no room for benefit for the people of the country whose government implements either an offensive or defensive strategy. For people who do not derive direct benefit from political maneuvering, any war is inherently loss-making. Therefore, it does not matter much whether it is a hipster accustomed to high earnings and a wide variety of smoothies, or some tire repairman accustomed to moderate earnings and a wide variety of beer—they will not become the political support for any pro-war clique. Hence the tendency of aggressive governments toward the lumpenization of their subjects, in order to strip them of sybaritic habits and make the state their only hope for survival.

Summary: both Sonya and Sperry, while generally correctly identifying the trends, exaggerate them somewhat. Strategies have not completely degenerated, although they have changed significantly following the change in the nature of wars—and it is generally possible to compel people to go to war in the interests of the government, but the entire political regime must work meticulously toward this. From this comes my main conclusion: states have not yet exhausted themselves as a systemic factor of external aggression, but they can achieve this only at the cost of a sharp increase in internal aggression, which is incompatible with long-term economic growth. Those forces within states that are interested in economic growth will restrain pro-war sentiments in governments.