Тег: Safety

The Problem of Cartel Collusion in the Sphere of Protection under Ancap

Mancur Olson, in “The Logic of Collective Action,” proved that small groups with concentrated interests always win the coordination game against a diffuse majority due to the free-rider problem. Three CEOs will agree over dinner; a million customers never will, because each rationally waits for others to take the risk first.

What specific mechanism in ancap prevents a cartel agreement between two or three of the largest protection agencies to divide territories?

Konweni

This is a question that also concerned David Friedman. In the chapter “The Mechanics of Freedom,” concerning economies of scale, he reasons that in the law enforcement market, there seems to be a more pronounced positive economy of scale than he initially thought, which in turn increases the likelihood of a cartel agreement.

It seems to me that the cause of this excessive pessimism is the overestimation of the importance of direct armed protection in the security market. Literary descriptions of the security market under ancap are filled with some kind of universal protection agencies that are responsible for security in general across the most diverse aspects and scale easily. Of course, such an initial monopoly, already given in the problem statement, leads an honest analyst to conclude that such agencies will tend to grow significantly and enter into cartels, and their impact on people will be completely total, making the sale of such security services terribly dangerous for clients, as it is only one step away from total enslavement.

But where will these protection agencies come from? Who will be their clients, and what services will they buy from them?

Suppose I don’t live in peaceful Montenegro, where every house has a legal shotgun plus a couple of black guns left over from the war, but, say, in some place like Brazil. I have reasons to fear street attacks, car theft, and break-ins at my home. And then, a startup opens in the city that is ready to serve me, even if I wander into the favelas. What does such a startup need, within the technologies relevant at the time of writing this post? To reach an agreement with the company that owns the lamp posts to place cameras on them, as well as landing pads for drones with a charging function. Then, AI tracks suspicious actions, such as breaking into a house door or a car; a drone takes off from the nearest pole and demands a justification for the legality of the actions. In the case of an aggressive response, it applies measures of influence to the suspect, for example, firing a taser, after which it calls a live squad to process the detention. Similarly, in the case of an attack on a person: it flies in, demands they stop, reasons with those who ignore the instruction, waits for the squad, and returns to the nest. And then comes the court proceeding regarding how much to recover from the aggressor.

After working in this market for six months, the startup is surprised to find that its services are becoming less in demand because the city has become noticeably safer. And what, should they now start harassing me clandestinely so that I renew my subscription? No, of course not; they will simply make the subscription cheaper, and the drones that spend most of their time idle will be used, for example, for delivering pizza.

And what about peaceful Montenegro—do I not need protection agency services there at all? Of course I do. I need it so that when I break my leg while hiking in the mountains, brave rescuers in a helicopter fly to me and pull me out of that hole. Or pull me out of a car that flew off a cliff. Or find me in the sea when a storm carries me far from shore on a SUP board. Or get a cat down from a tree.

You realize that a Brazilian security startup won’t be able to enter the Montenegrin market because that market is completely different? Protection agencies are doomed to locality due to the local nature of threats, and are also doomed to a small size because the nature of threats also tends to change. It is harder for a large company to change, which means inefficiency, and inefficiency means saying goodbye to market share.

But surely there are functions for protection agencies that would be in demand globally? Of course there are, but these are specialized functions. For example, to find someone anywhere on planet Earth who owes me a vast amount of money and refuses to return it. Or a person who killed my mother and knows that I would like to burn him on her funeral pyre because she will need a servant there. Such agencies will not sell a subscription for service; they will have to take on rare one-off orders, as this market is too specific. It is impossible to build global dominance with the prospect of bending anyone to your will and subjecting them to your sinister market power based on this.

And what about the prospect of an external armed invasion? Shouldn’t private military companies be the backbone of any respectable social order if it wishes to call itself ancap? Shouldn’t such companies unite into a mega-cartel dictating its will to all of humanity? To the great regret of the adepts of this branch of human development, in peacetime, the peaceful average citizen is not inclined to finance the military. He doesn’t need war; he doesn’t buy it. An invasion army can only be equipped if you establish taxation on your territory. However, a militia for protection against an invasion army organizes itself in the presence of a free market—quickly, efficiently, and not too expensively, as shown by the experience of at least the Ukrainian war.

Discussion on whether to pay for security

A subscriber sent me the text of their article with a suggestion to refine and publish it. This seemed like a bad idea to me, as I find AI-generated creations uncomfortable to read, and editing them is not enjoyable at all. So I simply posted the article on Teletype so that those interested could read it, and I will reflect on the topic addressed in it.

Briefly, the article explains why someone in need of security should not buy this security, but should ensure it for themselves. As justifications, fairly standard protectionist arguments are provided, stating that the division of labor is not always a benefit because the provider of necessary services will inevitably want to dominate the market, which in the case of security services will inevitably place the consumer of these services under the complete control of the provider.

Firstly, it seems to me not entirely correct to suggest that the reader act on the assumption as if there are currently no enforcers claiming a monopoly, but rather a free market, and one only needs to try not to spoil the current blissful ancap. In fact, we already have a situation of forced collection of arbitrary sums from everyone the state can reach under fraudulent pretexts, including the argument that the state supposedly provides protection. In other words, the article essentially suggests to people who have already fallen into the crocodile’s teeth to be more careful and not walk around Africa.

Secondly, the same arguments used against the division of labor in the sphere of security can be transferred unchanged to other spheres. Wouldn’t a food supplier want to be a monopoly supplier, with complete power over your death by starvation? Let’s engage in subsistence farming to avoid this terrible danger.

In fact, in the case of state security, we have not an excessive, but an insufficient division of labor. The state tends to involve itself in any aspect of security that occurs to a bureaucrat drafting new regulations. Meanwhile, it is precisely the practice of turning to various narrow specialists for every specific issue that counteracts the potential forced merger of these specialists into a single center for providing everything. As soon as the state gets a market competitor in any sphere, the state’s position in it becomes more shaky. Of course, many initially prefer the option already paid for by taxes and therefore requiring no additional expense, rather than paying a private provider for a higher-quality solution. However, private solutions still gradually carve out their way, first in the premium segment, and then in the mass market.

Therefore, I will instead formulate the opposite call: pay for security. Buy all goods and services that are sold to you cheaper and/or of higher quality than if you were to tinker with it yourself. And only if the market choice does not satisfy you, does it make sense to combine efforts with partners and produce the missing product yourself.

I have my own libertarian boxing club; can I publish our article about fighting corporations with you?

Daniil

From what I understand, the main point of the club is as follows: weapons are, of course, cool, but they are rarely managed to be used for self-defense, and safely—even more rarely. Meanwhile, for a libertarian, it is not only useful to know how to defend oneself in a wide variety of situations, but this skill, when applied, also advertises libertarian ideology in its own right.

The proposed article describes how, within the framework of private security production, the world does not revolve solely around private security companies—since this field is very strictly regulated by the state, and therefore such companies, firstly, provide their services at a disproportionately high cost, and secondly, the spectrum of services does not cover all types of demand.

Instead of private security companies, the revival of such a soft and humane means of reasoning with unfriendly counterparties as hiring a team of trained musclemen with powerful fists is proposed. Of course, in most cases, this cannot be seen as an alternative to hiring a professional security firm, but for organizing some libertarian events, such heavy artillery as professional security firms is not required. Yes, actually, hiring trained fighters to guard a hall is either excessive (usually, admonishment and the threat of calling the police are sufficient) or insufficient (if the aggressor is the police themselves).

On the other hand, it’s stylish. After all, a press wall provides no direct benefit either; one can take photos against a bare wall—but people still order them to be printed. Thus, proper ancap security should not be neglected for roughly the same reasons.

The article ends with a call to join the club (which presumably wants to mutate over time into such a fighting corporation) and to subscribe to the channel People of Good Will. I went to take a look at the channel, and there is a curious Code of the Person of Good Will. The Code is imbued with the values of republicanism, which Rodion Belkovich talks about so convincingly, and generally paints a rather attractive image. So read it; it is beneficial for the soul.

What is the difference between libertarianism (classlib) and modern “European Union” liberalism, and how do Ancap-chan and Bitarch view the latter, being ancaps and voluntarists?

Do you believe that social justice, democracy, general welfare, developed feminism, LGBT rights, juvenile justice, tolerance, reliable protection of human rights, liberty, equality, and fraternity are good or bad, and why?

Teanol (the question is accompanied by a donation of 0.00008010 BTC)

In classical liberalism, the state is considered an evil necessary for the protection of private property rights. In libertarianism, it is not considered necessary for this function; however, as long as it limits itself to this, its existence may be considered justified. In a conditional EU-style liberalism, the state is viewed as a tool for reconciling the interests of various strata of society, one that is more convenient than free market tools.

What is the convenience of the modern liberal state compared to the classical liberal one? Primarily, it is that being personally responsible for one’s own life is a rather frightening level of responsibility for many people. In the market, you must independently decide which property objects to insure, where, and under what conditions; how much and when to save for unforeseen circumstances or for an entirely predictable old age; which neighbors’ claims to satisfy and which to actively oppose, and if you oppose them, whether to do so independently or in a coalition. This is somewhat complicated; it’s better to spend one’s finite intellectual resources on skills that bring in money, and delegate all the aforementioned tasks, as far as possible, to those who are more savvy in these matters.

In a complex world where narrow specialists interact, a vast number of standardized solutions will inevitably be used, and a significantly smaller number of custom ones. The state is a standardized solution for any issues where it is not entirely clear who to offload them onto. And since such issues are constantly proliferating, the functionality of the state—even one consisting of entirely well-meaning liberal bureaucrats completely devoid of corrupt interests—will inevitably expand.

But as the state grows, its inefficiency inevitably grows as well. A Swiss Army knife with a couple hundred blades looks great in a store window, and you really want to buy this shiny toy, but in everyday life, the vast majority find it more convenient to have one very simple knife for most standard tasks, plus a couple of highly specialized ones that are used rarely, but when others are extremely inconvenient. A durable jumpsuit with a bunch of pockets looks exquisitely designed, but in a relaxed setting, a person throws on shorts and a t-shirt. It seems like you’d want to be able to call 911 and solve absolutely any problem, but in practice, this means you’ll get tired of fighting an automated answering machine, selecting menu items, and in the end, you’ll still be directed to the wrong specialist.

One would think that the more aggressive the environment, the tougher and more reliable the institutions should be. Therefore, on a small yacht in the middle of the sea, a single chain of command and clear functional duties for each crew member are quite appropriate, while on a beach, it’s enough that those wishing to play volleyball don’t trip over those sunbathing; otherwise, let complete anarchy reign and no one will care about anyone else. But the state cannot do that. It grew out of military needs, and it’s like a guy who returned from the front, suffers from PTSD, and is extremely outraged that people on the beach aren’t buttoned up to the top, aren’t marching in formation, and aren’t saluting. If you let him establish his order, everyone will have a hard time, even without unofficial hazing. And it’s no better when the state looks like a safety engineer. Fence off the volleyball court! Divide swimming zones by gender and age! Everyone put on life jackets! Organize the delivery of ice cream and lemonade! But the ice cream must be warm so that no one catches a cold, and the lemonade sugar-free, regardless of the fact that the ice cream has sugar. And then the state will see some kind of COVID, and the whole beach will go down the drain because everyone must stay home and wash their hands.

For Bitarkha, it is important that no one attacks anyone. Because one person will attack with fists, and another will sneeze on the first, and the whole world will die from a virus. So that no one dares to attack anyone, it is desirable that everyone be armed, and those who are not stopped by the sight of a weapon in others’ hands should be stopped some other way. It could be a bullet at the moment of attack, but it’s more humane to make them change their mind, perhaps, say, medicinally. Fortunately, Bitarkha only needs people to observe the NAP; otherwise, he would be indistinguishable from an adept of the COVID-fighting state. In order to live in a safe society, he is willing to pay well.

It is important to me that both I and the people around me are wealthy and free. For this, people must not be robbed or restricted, and they must not be extorted for all sorts of useless nonsense. For this, robbing and restricting must be dangerous, unprofitable, and unprestigious. And I, as a civilized and benevolent person, would of course prefer that people be stopped from robbing and regulating for reasons of lack of prestige, or at the very least, lack of profitability. If I have to ensure a threat to them as well, that will stress me out.

I apologize for the lack of a direct list, such as “I feel this way about social justice, that way about democracy,” and so on.

By the way, about urbanism…

Using a password manager

One of the most important measures of information hygiene is using a password manager. Recently, I referenced a video by Svetov dedicated to information security, and there he recommended a very specific password manager – KeePass. I agree with him on this matter. However, it has long been known that simply naming a tool is not enough for people; they still won’t start using it until you explain in detail how everything is done. So, I decided to prepare a short manual.

I would be happy to receive your useful instructions on various aspects of life online. I have created a section for such guides on the website and will continue to update it.

Freedom and Security

In the video about coronavirus and the state, I pointed out that the main danger of the epidemic is not in the deaths, nor even in the fact that the state, under the guise of security, is encroaching on freedoms—but in the fact that this encroachment will be welcomed, and after the epidemic ends, many of the introduced restrictions will remain.

And indeed. Mikhail Svetov likes a post stating that in Miami, not a single murder occurred during seven weeks of isolation. Mikhail Pozharsky writes an article about what cannibals the Swedish socialists are for starving their elderly with COVID. And literally almost everyone snorts with disapproval at anyone who admits they are not following the ban on walks or other excursions from home unless for an urgent need.

Yes, if everyone is locked in their homes, there will be fewer killings in the streets. There will be more killings at home. If people are not allowed to go to work, they will not die of pneumonia. They will die of hunger. Any restrictions introduced by the state to save lives have a price, which is expressed not only in money, but in those same lives.

I sincerely hope that the Swedes hold their ground and ultimately do not trade freedom for security. And I also sincerely hope that when all this is over and we count the excess mortality among the Swedes and their neighbors, it turns out that by choosing freedom, the Swedes won not only money, but also lives, and the praised security provided by the state actually meant not only the destruction of the economy but even more deaths. If this turns out to be the lesson for humanity, I will be happy. But even if it turns out that freedom means an increased risk of death, it is still no reason to abandon it. Otherwise, what is the point of it all?

Risky behavior

Continuation of the discussion on the coronavirus. Beginning, continuation.

Bitarch’s Column

My recent article about the idea of bypassing house arrest (“self-isolation”) for healthy people while observing all possible safety measures sparked a huge wave of criticism. I’ll be honest — I have never received so much hate directed at me. Nor so much support. Subscribers were split roughly in half: about 60% on my side and 40% against, but they proved to be extremely uncompromising in their positions! In reality, this exposed a very important problem that I had been planning to write about for a long time. The disputes regarding the permissibility of quarantine measures provided a good opportunity for this.

We are talking about the assessment of any risky behavior that does not directly cause harm to anyone, but has some probability of unintentionally causing harm to third parties. This is far from just forced “self-isolation” against the spread of coronavirus (do you not notice the oxymoron here?!), but also driving a car at high speed, under the influence of alcohol and drugs, the use of certain psychotropic substances, the construction of certain facilities (gas stations, explosives warehouses, chemical and nuclear waste sites) near residential buildings, placing a level 4 biosafety laboratory in an apartment of a residential building, launching pyrotechnics near houses, and much more. If a stationary bandit imposes a ban on any such action, he creates a victimless crime.

Any person calling themselves a libertarian, even a minarchist, cannot support punishment for a victimless crime; otherwise, they have no right to call themselves a libertarian. Some say that, for example, complying with a ban by a stationary bandit against leaving one’s home is normal, as I could potentially be infectious without even knowing it, and consequently, I initiate aggressive violence against the people around me. But if we follow such logic, then even an openly gay person, walking down the street holding hands with their partner, initiates violence against religious conservatives who might have a heart attack with some probability. This can lead to absurdity, which is why libertarian philosophy clearly answers this question: no victim — no crime!

Nevertheless, the problem of risky behavior does not disappear. For some people, the values of freedom, progress, and economic development are more important, while for others, safety and risk minimization are paramount. There are scientific studies proving that the predisposition toward certain values is partially determined by genetics. People from these two categories will never be able to reach an agreement. This is, in principle, an insoluble problem.

All that remains is to seek ways of peaceful separation:

1) Freedom of association and private discrimination;

2) For more conservative people, territorial communities/jurisdictions (TCJs) will likely be suitable, while for those more tolerant of risk and diversity — extraterritorial contractual jurisdictions (ECJs).

In any case, I recommend moving from the habitual authoritarian two-step style of thinking “Crime — Punishment” to a three-step “Action – Counteraction – Agreements for the future.” Only when it becomes natural for you to think in terms of the equality of subjects will you be able to start feeling out your own approach to the problem of balancing freedom and security.

How will new and underdeveloped capitalists emerge under conditions of anarcho-capitalism?

Assuming that an organized crime group (OCG) could appear, engaging in banditry and robbery. As an example, I can provide such a situation: a citizen (territorially, since there is no state as such) decided to grow and sell vegetables and fruits, but in the absence of large starting capital, all his funds go only towards cultivation and care; he cannot afford security, as a result, an OCG with taped-over license plates and masks could drive up to him, and… I can only imagine such a situation: this citizen will sell his goods and services at a special market, where he will pay (tribute/taxes) for its protection. So the question is: how is it possible for a small business to grow under ancap conditions, given that criminal groups will arise that will rob and kill, and who will be interested in catching them?

анонимный вопрос

All growth in human well-being is based on the division of labor and its capitalization. The division of labor increases productivity because each participant in the system of division of labor does what they are more efficient at and does not do what they are less efficient at. The capitalization of labor is, in essence, the same division of labor, but not only among the immediate participants of the production process, but also across time and space. That is, it is not simply “Vasya digs holes, Masha plants seedlings,” but “a factory once produced a shovel somewhere, Vasya bought it, and now he digs holes faster — and Masha plants the seedlings.” A bunch of people participated in the division of labor, this labor is encapsulated in a conventional shovel, and as a result of such a division of labor, productivity in planting increased.

The flip side of the division of labor is that it is not always possible to organize it so that everyone does what they are best at and does not do what they are worst at. A bad manager (and a good locksmith) may end up being the boss of a bad locksmith (and a good manager) simply because of the way things historically unfolded — the career ladder, personal connections, and so on. The larger the business, the greater the probability of such inefficient sections appearing in it, reducing overall productivity. Also, since within one company the relationships between its employees are not market-based, the division of labor and the division of profit in it can differ greatly. These factors are amplified when scaling a business.

Small business is a form of organization with a low level of division of labor and/or a low level of its capitalization. It is effective only in those areas where the negative effect of scale is higher than the positive one. But no one knows in advance and cannot calculate all these effects — market knowledge is dispersed in nature and is acquired only in the course of activity. Therefore, new small enterprises will always be formed and old large ones will collapse.

And now, after a long theoretical preamble, let’s talk about solving the specific problem of protection for small business.

The capitalization of the business is low, so the entrepreneur grows and sells the product himself. Theoretically, he could protect himself from encroachments as well. For example, it is quite conceivable that a person sells the product he grows exclusively to friends and acquaintances, and as a result, simply remains invisible to a potential external aggressor. Trust is also a form of capitalization. A person invests effort into gaining connections, and then uses those connections to safely obtain profit.

Another possibility of using trust to ensure security is associations of small producers. Each invests relatively little in self-defense means (knowingly insufficient for independent protection against a typical gang), but at the moment of attack, combines their efforts with other members of the association and puts up a confident fight. The cry “they’re beating our people!” has been tested by centuries of practice and works splendidly.

A third possibility is also related to an association of producers, but the division of labor is added to it. A village hires seven samurai. No single peasant alone would be able to hire even one.

You described the fourth possibility yourself: producers purchase a safe sale service from the fairground owner.

The fifth possibility is to specialize only in production and sell the grown produce immediately to a wholesaler, who will come, buy, and take the goods away themselves. This is currently actively practiced by small agricultural producers in Russia, but not out of a good life, and often such a buyer is able to ensure a local monopsony, that is, a buyer’s monopoly. In other words, here is the obvious threshold that the division of labor in agricultural production hits: every producer is interested in selling the products personally to the final consumer, without losing money on intermediaries.

Under ancap, several systemic factors that hinder an agricultural producer from contacting the end consumer are abolished. First, in the absence of taxation, costs for accounting and record-keeping in retail sales are sharply reduced. Second, in the absence of urban planning regulation, the possibility of organizing trade in the city is sharply simplified — in essence, it is regulated only by consumer preferences (the consumer themselves, and not an external regulator for them, makes the choice between the cheapness of the product and the quality of service). Third, entrepreneurial initiative to ensure one’s own security is also not restricted by such a systemic factor as the state.

Of course, without a state, entry into the market for small-time bandits will also be simplified. In the example of the much-discussed Somalia, we see that entrepreneurs there have to invest quite a lot in their security, and yet its level remains low. Therefore, not only the relative size of investments in security is important, but also the level of capitalization in this sphere. Institutions that increase trust in society, a developed and diversified labor market providing potential bandits with plenty of opportunities for honest earnings, the purely technological cheapening of security — all these are measures that make the “war of all against all” scenario under ancap less likely.

Work can be done on this already now; there is no need to ask the state for permission.

The specificity of the force market: it is very difficult to understand whether a bandit or a guard is before us. Most likely, both.