I was recently encouraged by a small donation for the translation of Stephan Molneux, so I continued the editing, and now I am posting the final version of the fifth chapter, The Apocalypse Argument.
First, to get things started, the author analyzes the Apocalypse argument itself, which does not require much intellectual effort, but then the interesting part begins. If in the previous chapter the anarcho-capitalist skillfully explained why roads are not that important, now he sets a new bar and just as skillfully explains why anarchy is not that important. Truly, among none of the critics of ancap have I previously encountered a critique of ancap as convincing as that of the person who consistently preaches that very ancap, and this, if you think about it, is quite logical.
How Molneux will answer this critique himself, I do not yet know: the end of the chapter caught Scheherazade, and she ceased her permitted speeches. So send your donations for the translation of the next piece of text. There is no rough translation there, so I will be working from the source, but I have become quite adept, and this will not particularly slow me down now, so I will put your donations directly into my own pocket. Nothing can be done, coronacrisis, there is less money.
Provide a quota for girls? Let me say right away that this nonsense—claiming “we will establish a proper system where selection will be unbiased”—doesn’t work, because at the moment “this selection is also unbiased,” yet they still predominantly take guys, and it is difficult for a girl to get in.
liberal
It is a time of anarchy, capitalism, heat, and summer. A young woman submits an application to an educational institution where they teach effective ways of killing people and destroying material assets as part of organized groups and using various specialized equipment. In essence, this is as ordinary an event as if a girl were applying to an educational institution where they would tell her the history of how people effectively killed people as part of armed groups and so on—that is, a faculty of history.
What interests guide the institution when accepting her application? It expects to make a profit. What ways does it have to profit from educating students in the absence of state funding (due to the absence of the state)? There are two main ways. First, trading in knowledge—that is, educating for money anyone who is willing to pay. Second, trading in prestige—that is, implementing a strict selection process, providing the most effective knowledge and skills, and hoping that graduates will be maximally successful in life and then, out of gratitude, contribute to the endowment fund of their beloved university. The education itself might even be free, because the university here effectively acts as a venture capital fund.
If the military university in question makes money by selling knowledge, the girl has no problems. She pays—she receives what she bought. But if the university considers itself prestigious, then the girl has a chance of encountering disproportionately serious difficulties right at the admission stage.
Let’s start with the fact that historically, the army is a male brotherhood, and the entry of women into it often dealt a blow to the prestige of the army (historian Martin van Creveld talks about this interestingly in his book Transformation of War, I highly recommend it). We do not know to what extent patriarchal snobs will form the core of organized armed formations under ancap conditions, and how fundamental it will be for them that women not only do not enter the army, but do not even study military science. I find this unlikely, simply because trends have changed, inclusivity is in fashion, and work in the army looks less and less like a brutal slugfest and more and more like working in a delivery service or other logistics businesses.
Secondly, the army still places significant physical fitness requirements on soldiers, including those related to lifting heavy weights and other disciplines in which women are relatively weak simply by virtue of their constitution. Theoretically, this should not become an obstacle to university admission, as it should, at worst, only narrow the range of available specializations. However, if physical training turns out to be one of the admission criteria at the university, then our hypothetical applicant faces obvious, though surmountable, difficulties.
So your fears are quite justified; it is unlikely that it will be much easier for girls to become specialists in the military sphere under ancap. Then again, this sphere itself does not look particularly promising, so it’s not like anyone really wanted it that much.
In Chapter 52, A Positive Conception of Rights, David Friedman, using the conceptual framework introduced in the previous chapter, develops the idea of Schelling points and claiming strategies from a model microsociety of two people to a society of arbitrary complexity.
In fact, Friedman introduces more extensively and with more justification the very definition of rights that I regularly use in my texts: rights are claims that are tolerated. It is not surprising that we found such a parallelism in thinking: if it hadn’t existed, I would hardly have undertaken to translate his book after reading literally a couple of chapters.
I have reviewed the widely publicized draft of the new constitution from the Society. Future and its leader, Roman Yuneman. I am deeply disappointed.
As I already mentioned in the article about Constitution Day, only one thing matters to me in such documents: exactly what the state declaratively prohibits itself from doing in relation to its citizens. All those complex relationships between branches of government are something like a handbook on the mating habits of toads and vipers, which only makes sense to study from the perspective of navigating between them to minimize one’s own losses.
So here it is: Yuneman’s new constitution does not introduce a single new prohibition on the state squeezing the little people. The state is still prohibited from forcing citizens to testify against themselves, executing them, introducing taxes retroactively—and that’s basically it. Oh, well, except it additionally prohibits obstructing internet access, but implicitly, in the form of “a citizen has the right to hang out on the internet.”
Various citizens’ rights to peaceful assembly are still accompanied by the caveat “without weapons,” which means the state has the right to set boundaries and frisk participants of peaceful assemblies to ensure their constitutional right to assemble specifically without weapons. Voting rights are restricted for prisoners, which opens the door for political persecution to obstruct electoral procedures. Even universal military conscription—the authors of the draft constitution somehow managed to keep it, as if possessed by some demon—which is why Shaveddinov and company are waving to Yuneman from offstage.
Much attention in the project is given to the design of checks and balances between branches of government, while enormous presidential powers are still maintained. The explanation is simple: well, we want the ability to carry out rapid reforms, and for that, a concentration of power is needed. A strange archaism has been preserved whereby the president has the right to stay in power for two terms. Why specifically two? Simply because once upon a time, President Washington did not run for a third term after his second and wrote that enough is enough, and he wouldn’t recommend it to anyone. You’d think—if you want to fight the administrative resource and ensure the rotation of power—you’d make it exactly one presidential term, followed by a ban on holding any government positions. And that’s it; the presidency becomes the natural crown of a career, followed by a normal private life, without shitty personal pensions and other privileges. No, damn it, we want to go back to the nineties, when it was two by four.
The phrasing in the draft of the new constitution is just as disgusting as in the old one. Instead of Shulman’s crisp formula “do not enter—will kill,” the typical form of a constitutional article is something like “the state guarantees non-interference,” with a complete absence of instructions on sanctions for interfering.
The right to bear arms, so widely publicized by Yuneman, boils down to the right to acquire it in accordance with federal law (which can be as restrictive as desired) and the right to self-defense. There is no right to armed rebellion; on the contrary, the state is granted the right to squeeze any illegal armed formations, so a “well-regulated militia” in the spirit of the Second Amendment is out of the question for Russians. An inferior populace; they didn’t earn it.
By the way, about Russians. This unfortunate adjective sticks out of every second article in the draft constitution without carrying any meaning. Well, there is some formal entity called by such-and-such a word, so what. In this regard, Yuneman’s constitution resembles Putin’s amendments, where a lot of stylistic garbage is also inserted into the text of the existing document, but nothing changes in substance. There was a multinational people; now there are Russians and other indigenous peoples of Russia. Same difference, in short. However, for everyone who is not a nationalist, this is rather a plus.
We continue our series of sloppy translations of English-language articles on libertarianism from popular websites, simply to keep you up to date with the discourse.
Original publication: David S. d’Amato. Translation: André [remarks in square brackets throughout the text are his]
Libertarianism is, first and foremost, a philosophy of the Other, a philosophy emphasizing our obligation to refrain from dominating other people, and from imposing our vision of a good life on others.
In critiques of libertarianism, a common motif is the claim that libertarianism is nothing more than a celebration of selfishness and greed. According to this view, the libertarian ideal is a heartless miser on a golden toilet, gazing dispassionately down upon the poor. This view is most common among left-wing critics and is not least driven by Ayn Rand’s 1964 collection of essays, The Virtue of Selfishness, in which Rand advocated [regardless of what you think] selfishness. To begin with, it should be noted that Rand’s definition of “selfishness,” as she noted herself, “differs from the common usage.” Her argument is built on a very peculiar and counterintuitive definition of selfishness, differing from both everyday use and dictionaries; she was well aware of how controversial and provocative such a step was, which is precisely why she justifies selfishness. Despite this remark, placed in the very first lines of the preface, Rand still insists that she is simply applying the dictionary definition of selfishness: “concern for one’s own interests.” But Rand overlooks a very important component of the dictionary definition of “selfishness”—disregard and lack of respect for others. This point, as it turns out, is very important both in everyday life and in our discussion of the link between libertarianism and selfishness.
Libertarianism implies a fundamental modesty: we should not be so blinded by our ideals as to forcibly compel [hello GULAG and prison sentences for hate speech] others to follow them. Thus, it is important to understand that in some sense, the libertarian idea embodies a rejection of selfishness. One of the main concerns of libertarianism is that some people will use others as a means to achieve their own goals [when the forest is cut, chips fly], which entails selfishness of the most loathsome kind. Libertarians view everyone and every single person—including that guy on the left—as an important individual deserving of autonomy and dignity, possessing rights that must be protected from violent encroachments. Historically, libertarianism was a reaction to the blatant, irresponsible selfishness of the strong and the powerful. It is a fundamentally egalitarian viewpoint, according to which all people are equal in the sense that, completely regardless of our abilities, skin pigmentation, sex and gender [the same as sex, but if you say so, the Transformers will beat you up], language, and ethnicity, we all have the right to be free and pursue our own notions of a better life. This is simultaneously a radical idea and common sense, but it is not an idea that can be equated with “selfishness.” Put simply: “no one is free until we are all free.”
Selfishness is the arrogant belief that I know best and have the right to force everyone to live as I wish [church, ideologies, SJWs, the state]. Oscar Wilde perhaps expressed this better than anyone: “Selfishness is not living as one wishes to live, it is asking others to live as one wishes to live. Unselfishness is letting people live as they wish to live.” [trans. Oksana Kirichenko] The arrogance and complacency of the belief that I know better than others how they should live is a serious problem in itself, but added to it is the dangerous belief that I have the right, or even the duty, to use force to bring this belief to life. Obviously, this is wrong, but in politics, it is the norm. Libertarians are perceived as childishly minded egoists when they criticize, with undeniably logical ethical arguments, the unacceptability of such a state of affairs. We teach children that hitting and threatening others to get what one wants is unacceptable, but when it comes to the construction of all public institutions, this becomes not only acceptable behavior, but is presented as the best way of organizing society. Libertarians simply ask politely: “on what grounds, exactly, did you decide that among your rights there is a right to violate the rights of others?” Libertarians base their view on the conviction that we should treat others as free and equal, not as tools for achieving a desired end [whether it be ice cream or social justice]. This is sometimes called the law of equal liberty: people deserve—simply because they are human—to be free and do whatever they wish, as long as they do not violate the same liberty of others. People who support the idea that the state should create armed detachments to impose their understanding of the world and morality on people demonstrate an amazing overconfidence, believing their convictions to be the only correct ones. This overconfidence makes such people dangerous, prone to exceeding their authority and abusing power to achieve their ideals. And we are all prone to believing in the truth of our own ideals. As John Stuart Mill notes: “Very few people think it necessary to take any precaution against the possibility of their own views being mistaken, or admit the possibility that any opinion with which they are satisfied may be a case of error, which is itself a logical error.” Libertarians note the diversity of opinions and lifestyles; this position provides protection against the dominance of One Ideal, curbing its destructive potential.
The assumption that libertarians are selfish is an example of bad faith and self-deception, intellectual laziness, and an unfair way for a person to avoid the obligation to consider views on their merits. But while the critique of libertarianism as a philosophy grown out of selfishness is based on an unfair and inaccurate reading of libertarianism and its motives, we are not obliged to pay back in the same coin. Progressives, social democrats, socialists, and other pro-state creatures from the left side of the spectrum likely do not support the state solely to dominate and control those around them, even if this is an inevitable result of the expanding role of the state in our lives. Rather, they tend to mistakenly perceive the state as a virtuous social force aimed at protecting and supporting the most vulnerable and deprived. It would be one thing if they were fundamentally wrong only about what such a state is, how it behaves, and so on—but even the means to which this part of the left appeals do not yield the desired and expected empirical [visible, literally, physically tangible] results. On the contrary, they generate poverty and destitution, while libertarian principles of individual rights, genuine market competition, and private property ensure widespread prosperity and encourage generosity and social trust.
Libertarianism, in essence, is the clearest, most direct, and best path to those goals of the left that are worthwhile: ensuring that as many people as possible around the world have access to basic necessities, and opening the way to economic opportunities and security for the poorest strata of society. From a technical standpoint, those whose stated goals of government policy include the growth of the state, the restriction of free trade (both domestically and internationally), and the increase of the tax and regulatory burden are the primary enemies of the poor and oppressed; they actively hinder the mechanisms that create and distribute material values. Thus, as Jason Brennan notes in “Libertarianism: What Everyone Needs to Know,” when libertarians criticize, for example, the welfare state, it is not because of their “heartless indifference to the plight of the poor,” but “because they are convinced that the welfare state does more harm than good to the poor.” Political dialogue often (in fact, almost always) misses or confuses goals and means, assuming that political and social institutions designed to help the poor work as they should by design, rather than as they actually do.
It must be acknowledged that libertarianism mainly speaks (or, at least, should speak) about means, placing violations of the legitimate sphere of individual autonomy outside the bounds of acceptable behavior—completely regardless of the goals the individual pursues [one cannot drive people into paradise with a stick]. “I have often said,” writes Gandhi, “that if we attend to the means, the end will take care of itself.” Gandhi said this while arguing that non-violence is a practical path to national independence, but libertarians are guided by a broader and more principled interpretation of this idea. Following Gandhi, libertarians recognize that “we do not know our goal,” that the goal must be limited by the use of correct means and therefore “is defined not by our definitions, but by our actions.” Libertarians strive to treat other people appropriately—respectfully and decently—and we think that this constitutes a far better political program than the various forms of authoritarianism that have left so many scars in human history. Those who see in libertarianism only a reflection or rationalization of selfishness do not understand either its history or the philosophical positions that characterize it. Libertarians argue that there is nothing wrong with caring for oneself and pursuing one’s interests, but that our actions are limited by social reciprocity, the recognition of Others, and their inherent human value.
Yesterday, I read the tragic news that US President Donald Trump had his Twitch disabled, and Stefan Molyneux, whom I translate, had his YouTube disabled. After all, what a mess this creates—our opponents will say—here you are, wanting to rid us of the state, after which power will pass to mega-corporations; state censorship can at least be defeated democratically, but what can be opposed against the whims of a corporation owner? You say that the market and the institution of reputation will work against this, but the owners of media platforms don’t give a damn about their reputation in the eyes of their ideological enemies, and they only get more money because they fight those they position as a global evil.
Furthermore, they continue, you say that private discrimination will lead to the emergence of alternative platforms that will serve those who were discriminated against by others. But Twitter banned people for Nazi views, and indeed, an independent platform called Gab was created in opposition to it, where anyone could speak without any censorship, and what happened? It is being disconnected from payment systems. How do you like this triumph of ostracism and private discrimination, gentlemen ancaps?
At the same time, it is hard not to notice that this case differs greatly from the corporate wars depicted in caricatures of ancap. For instance, in the most famous parodic description of anarcho-capitalism, the subject is a war between mega-corporations McDonald’s and Burger King for market share—serious business sharks seeking only money.
In our world, however, the enmity of corporations toward customers is not about money, or at least not directly about money—but about ideology. What introduces such a strange correction? It is not hard to guess—it is the state.
In a free market, you get the maximum number of customers when you start satisfying them better than your competitor, but in a state, you have an additional powerful option—to ban the competitor. However, in a democracy, you cannot simply declare that this company should be given a tax break because it feeds the ruling party, and that one should be banned because it feeds the opposition. Instead, you can declare that the competitors are evil incarnate, literally Hitler, and a hundred other epithets—and therefore they deserve shame, condemnation, censorship, and ostracism. The state distorts market incentives. Always. From the towers of high theory, this may look like harmless private discrimination, but from the ground, it is perfectly clear that we are dealing with good old political struggle.
The market by itself does not defeat the state, only in combination with an ideology that asserts the values of individual freedom. Otherwise, it leads a subjugated existence, being over-regulated by those in power and subjected to arbitrary interventions under the guise of morality, behind which political reasons often stand.
Therefore, the recipe remains the same: defending the values of freedom, promoting them, and constantly searching for new bypasses that are, in principle, not subject to external dictate. And after mega-corporations protected by the state, corporations under ancap will seem to you like innocent lambs.
And we’ll all feel great when Money comes marching home…
Under a state, practically no one ever jams signals from radio stations or telephone towers, because the perpetrator would be found instantly (this is a very simple task) and then forcibly compelled to pay fines, compensation, etc. (it is difficult to deny that this is fair).
Under ancap, however, such actions by this perpetrator would essentially not violate the NAP, would not infringe on someone else’s property, etc., which means, logically, they would not face punishment. But that is surely unfair.
Anonymous question (accompanied by a donation in the amount of 0.00047976 BTC)
As it happens, I have already answered a very similar question in great detail regarding how property rights to radio frequency bands are established under ancap, so first, please read that answer, and we will continue the discussion.
Having analyzed the principle of using radio frequency bands, I stated that in an economic sense, this is a scarce resource, and therefore it can be converted into property. Moreover, as you yourself note, the violation of property rights (unauthorized use of a reserved band) is quite easily recorded. In an ancap environment—that is, a developed market decentralized legal order—such disputes are easily taken to court. The grounds for filing a lawsuit are obvious: communication collisions lead to quite measurable losses, all logs are kept, so the damage can be calculated with very high precision.
Under the dominance of the state, it happens frequently that, for example, security forces jam communications in a certain area, and usually, these are states of a sufficiently authoritarian nature that they wouldn’t even bother with the issue of compensation for damages. Nevertheless, even under a state, there are precedents for the judicial protection of the right to use radio waves. For instance, a year ago, by a court decision in Sudan, the plaintiff’s access to mobile internet was restored, after the military junta had previously disconnected the entire country. Thus, if it is sometimes possible to restore property rights even under conditions of weak protection, then under ancap, where much more attention is paid to such things, similar problems would be extremely rare.
Lawyer Abdelazim Hassan guarantees: the right to use radio waves is respected even in Africa, let alone under ancap
An interesting study by biologist Konrad Lorenz shows how natural “armament” in animals leads to the emergence of morality against aggressive violence. Similarly, restoring the balance of violence potential (BVP) in human society will lead to the adoption of the non-aggression principle (NAP).
There are many species whose armament is so devastating and whose methods of application are so lightning-fast that a real combat clash between rivals would end with the death of one of them, or even both. Take, for example, venomous insects and snakes. Therefore, it is not surprising that natural selection develops a prohibition against using weapons in intra-species clashes for such species. Ethologists, following Lorenz, call this system of instinctive prohibitions that limit animal behavior “natural morality.” It is stronger the more powerfully the animal is armed by nature. During a territorial clash, venomous snakes exaggerate their size by stretching out to see who can stand taller, swaying, and pushing each other, but they never bite, nor do they even demonstrate their weapons. Some species even threaten each other with their heads turned away. It is no wonder that not only ordinary people but also many zoologists mistook the tournament battles of snakes for mating dances.
Well-armed animals can threaten each other for a long time, and when one of them grows tired, it abruptly changes posture, exposing its most vulnerable spot to the opponent for a decisive combat strike. The moral prohibition acts on the winner like an electric shock: all their angry fervor evaporates, they turn away from the opponent and hide their weapon. Similarly, a proud boy, feeling that he will lose a fight, suddenly puts his hands behind his back, lifts his face to the victor and shouts: “Go on, hit me!” Unlike a wolf or a snake, a human may actually strike in response.
After analyzing many species, Lorenz reached a conclusion of stunning simplicity more than 50 years ago: a strong animal has strong morality, while a weak one has weak morality. In terms of its natural history, a human is a very poorly armed animal; unlike monkeys, humans cannot even bite properly. Therefore, humans initially have weak instinctive prohibitions and weak natural morality. An unarmed man cannot cause significant damage to another in a clash: one will tire of hitting, and the other can always run away. Innate prohibitions in humans correspond to this. But subsequently, humans began to create and improve weapons and became the most armed species on Earth. Morality, however, has hardly changed.
Shareholder Viktor Rafaelevich “Ethological Excursions to the Forbidden Gardens of the Humanities”
Ancap is a free, unregulated market. That is, any decisions within ancap are made voluntarily and for mutual benefit. Now let’s look at who cares about demographics under ancap.
First, there are producers of goods and services. They are interested in increasing demand, and specifically, in increasing demand for children’s goods. Children are a very capacity-rich market because they need special nutrition, they quickly outgrow clothes, quickly change their preferences in toys, their safe outings require specially designed spaces, they need to be educated, treated, and so on. So I will receive various tempting offers, from “Today in our store we have a tasting of baby food, be sure to try it and see that your child would be satisfied” to “Planning a tour? Special group discounts for families with children!” I will be shown movies and clips on the internet praising the joys of motherhood. In general, I will constantly feel that with a child, I will be a welcome member of society.
Second, there is me. If I know that my relationship with my child concerns only the two of us, then I will have no fears that I will be deprived of parental rights over some nonsense that bothers neither me nor the child. If I know that people will be happy to sell me any technically possible product or service, from ectogenesis to caring for the child while I feel the urge to take a break from them—then I will have no fears that I will be alone in the face of many accidents, because specialists will help me deal with all the unpleasant chores. So, in essence, the only things separating me from having a child will be money and desire.
But at the same time, if I am too lazy to earn good money, too carefree to save anything or use contraception during sex, and too squeamish to care for an infant—then at least I will know that parental rights to a newborn can be profitably sold to those who, for some reason, have problems having their own child. So it will be completely unnecessary for me to have an abortion, especially if the process of carrying the child is easy enough and doesn’t stress me too much.
From this, it can be concluded that under ancap, the birth rate will be higher than in miserable countries with powerful juvenile justice and a heap of regulations related to children. But lower than in traditionalist cesspools where a woman is property, and if her purpose is to give birth, then go, fulfill your purpose and don’t complain. In short, there will be as many children as those who decided to raise a child need, and whether reproduction ends up expanded or the human population declines in certain periods—I have no idea, it’s not my business.
By the way, here is another category of consumers ready to raise children
With some delay, I saw an article by Anton Epikhin on the RLN.Today channel, in which he discusses the idea of absolute NAP voiced by Bitarch. These thoughts seemed very interesting to me, as they appear more practical and illustrate that the same goal, if pursued as a tactical one, requires certain methods, whereas if pursued as a strategic one, it sometimes requires the exact opposite.
From the position of prioritizing a radical interpretation of the primacy and absolutization of the NAP, for example, a contract army is clearly better than a conscripted one, and the complete absence of an army is even better than its presence.
However, if the NAP is understood as a project-based direction of movement rather than a religious dogma, it becomes obvious that the existence of a national army ensures collective sovereignty for society. Therefore, it is better that it exists than not, and the presence of mass military conscription, unlike a compact conscript army, distributes power within society by involving broad layers of the population in the defensive function, preventing the repressive apparatus from being concentrated solely in the hands of the government.
Therefore, the optimal defense system for moving toward the NAP would be a ubiquitous, albeit currently compulsory, militia-volunteer force, rather than a purely “professional army,” or even more so, the elimination of the state’s repressive apparatus as such, as this would only guarantee the establishment of someone else’s repressive apparatus that is not subordinate to the local community. Gradually, once they become an accepted norm, the practices of local militias united into a nationwide defense system can become purely voluntary; however, for the NAP, the physical presence of such a militia is more important here than the voluntariness itself.
