Murray Rothbard and the End of Socialism

I was approached by the founder of the “Molinariy” project, for whom I had already translated one of the chapters of “Evenings on Saint-Lazare Street,” written, in fact, by Gustave de Molinari, the author of the key idea of anarcho-capitalism—namely, the private production of security in a free competitive market, similar to any other consumer services. Molinariy consists of a Telegram channel, which at the time of this publication has 70 subscribers, a Substack with a whopping six subscribers, and a YouTube channel with 1.13 thousand subscribers. This asymmetry is due to two factors. First, YouTube promotes channels through a suggestion system, while Substack and Telegram do so far less effectively. Second, the primary content of Molinariy is video content, while the auxiliary text channels are used to store additional materials and alternative formats for delivering the main content. Thus, we come to the essence of the request. I was asked to give my opinion on the Russian translation published in Molinariy of a 1989 lecture by Murray Rothbard regarding the global political agenda of that time, primarily the collapse of the socialist camp.

The video is posted on YouTube, while on Substack and in Telegram, a transcript of the speech and comments on it are provided.

Rothbard begins with a brief overview of the history of socialism: how it appeared in Europe in the 19th century, how and why it gradually gained popularity, how liberals toward the end of the 19th century felt a sense of doom because socialist ideas had completely seized the masses, and how in the 20th century socialism finally had the opportunity to be embodied in practice. He then notes a phase-shifted movement of ideas: people in the socialist bloc countries were fed up to their teeth with this collectivist system and dreamed of capitalism, while Western intellectuals managed to maintain an untouched admiration for socialism throughout the decades because they had not truly tasted it in practice.

It turns out that there is only one way to prompt people to abandon an externally attractive but false idea: let them try to implement it and wait until the idea is discredited. However, even in this case, the abandonment of the idea will most likely not occur until the first generation of its carriers physically dies out.

Here, a mischievous question occurs to me: could the same happen with ancap? Perhaps it will gradually win over minds, a certain critical percentage of politicians will be permeated by it, and then everyone will be more or less unanimous that it is finally time to let people realize this bright idea. And then, when the first generation of those who dismantle the state in favor of the free market begins to physically die out, the idea will lose its sincere carriers, and in the eyes of the next generation, it will already be discredited. And if at the end of the eighties of the last century, the rulers of the socialist camp countries bewilderedly asked such clever Western experts if there were any reliable ways to carefully abandon excessive state regulation and transition to a free market, then in a hundred years, will free participants of a spiraling libertarian society bewilderedly ask how to carefully find those who are ready to take responsibility for people and start managing them, rather than complaining, “Why on earth would I want to do that?”

Life, of course, has shown that the world is more complex than the picture Rothbard saw at the end of the eighties, but overall his view was quite correct. For instance, he correctly grasped that in American society at that time, people were tired of high government spending under Reagan, and soon under Clinton, the national debt began to decrease. But the momentum did not last long, and now it is growing at unprecedented rates. He identified the problem of “too big to fail” financial institutions, and this problem eventually triggered a global crisis. He correctly noted that China would have problems with a market economy if it were not accompanied by general liberalization. And indeed, thirty years later, China’s economy eventually faltered due to a lack of freedom and an excess of state regulation, but by then it had managed to become a superpower. Finally, Rothbard noted that now that the Cold War between superpowers has ended, this would not be a reason for the US to demilitarize; instead, the government would frantically seek any excuse to fight with anyone or anything.

Rothbard also harshly criticized the Libertarian Party, which practically failed to notice that liberalism had won over socialism and in no way took advantage of the fruits of this victory, focusing instead on its own internal administrative squabbles. In fact, this criticism applies to any libertarian party in any country at any time: libertarians are especially vulnerable to the bureaucratization of their institutions. This applies not only to parties but also to scientific institutes or projects like Mont Pelerin. The thing is, a volunteer comes to an organization for a result, while long-term institutions work for the sake of the process. As a result, enthusiasts burn out and leave, leaving behind those for whom routine is comfortable, and work results are measured by the number of meetings.

And finally, I want to leave hanging the key prediction Rothbard made in his lecture: that the 21st century would be the century of freedom. Of course, compared to the 20th century, in very many aspects and in very many countries, people have become noticeably freer. But regulators have not been idle, and many freedoms that people enjoyed at the beginning of the 21st century are now unthinkable in its second quarter. However, I want to note an interesting pattern here: modern enslavement is not total. It exists only where the state maintains its monopoly. For example, it has turned air travel into a sophisticated mockery. But in the field of money transfers, people endure the mockery only where the transaction must be shown to the state. But if it needs to be hidden, everything is done in two clicks. And so in many industries. People are learning and getting used to bypassing government desires, and they seem to stop longing for a boot over them. Perhaps freedom really is arriving? I want to believe it.

What do Medieval times, Akademgorodok, and Silicon Valley have in common?

Many of you probably think that “science must be free.” But let’s dig a little deeper – why is this important, and why should libertarians especially worry about the growing attempts by the state and politicians to tell scientists what to think and what to teach?

Of course, first and foremost we need to understand that science isn’t just boring guys and gals in laboratories. Science is the engine of freedom and progress. If we allow scientists and teachers to freely think, experiment and even make mistakes, then society wins out in the end.

As an example: when the first universities appeared in the Middle Ages, kings and popes didn’t understand at all what these strange fellows were doing in groups, talking in Latin about some “ideas”. Students and professors of the University of Bologna were so audacious that they wrested the right to self-government from the authorities. As a result, science flourished – and universities became islands of freedom even in gloomy feudal Europe.

Let’s move to the 20th century. The USSR – not the freest place, is it? But during Khrushchev’s thaw, an academic town called Akademgorodok was founded in the Siberian taiga. Scientists were allowed to research things that were forbidden in Moscow. Genetics, banned by Stalin, suddenly came to life, and Akademgorodok became one of the few places where you could freely argue and read banned books. A paradox emerged: a communist state built a tiny libertarian paradise in the middle of the taiga. For a short time – but even brief freedom spawned entire scientific schools of world-level quality.

Today, Silicon Valley is synonymous with innovation. And its formula for success is simple: you take universities (Stanford, Berkeley and others), add lots of freedom and a little bit of capitalism, thoroughly mix it up, and let it steep. The result – a place that attracts millions of talents from all over the world. But now imagine: what if officials or politicians decided which technologies to develop and which to ban for ideological reasons? Most likely, an iPhone would be the size of a brick and called “Gosfon-1” (State Phone – 1).

Now about the sad stuff. Recently, attempts by conservative politicians to interfere with university work have been multiplying around the world. This has already been happening for a long time in the USA, and during Trump’s presidency the situation only worsened, as the federal government doesn’t hesitate to impose its wishes even on world-class universities like Harvard and Columbia, forcing uncomfortable leaders into resignation, or trying to ban foreign students from studying there, which will quite likely lead to a reduction in their budgets and loss of competitiveness. In Russia, the state is simply trying to keep scientists fully under control, considering them rather inconvenient people. As a result, we have censorship and dismissals for views. And those who could be useful to their Motherland are leaving abroad. After the attempted coup in Turkey, Erdogan carried out a “purge”: over 6000 university professors were fired for political disloyalty. Just imagine – an entire university town disappeared within a couple of months.

Why is it important for libertarians to protect science? Because science is a free market of ideas. It’s that very competition that allows us to identify the truth and reject delusions. The more the state interferes in science, the greater the risk of error, because centrally managing knowledge is just as absurd as managing the weather.

What can be done? To support scientists facing pressure and censorship. To demand that the state stop interfering with education. To protect universities’ right to autonomy and self-government. Because freedom of science is not a privilege for scientists – it’s a guarantee of our common progress and well-being!

Voluntarist, Bitarch

How to make a good economy without taxes so that the whole economy is from the market?

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This is an interesting question. I suspect the author of the question wants a statist answer: how to build a good economy from scratch, having come to power in some state. There are several quite decent examples in recent history, such as Kakha Bendukidze’s reform of the Georgian economy or Argentina’s economy – under Javier Milei. What unites these cases, and more classical examples of economic miracles – Western German, Japanese, South Korean, Singaporean and so on?

Primarily, it’s that the economies in these countries were completely wrecked before the reforms began. Only when the horse was dead would the bureaucratic horde graciously agree to dismount and say, “Well, alright, reform us, don’t interfere with me, but only weakly, and as soon as the horse gallops again, of course, my time will come, and I’ll push you aside.” And then the reformer more or less carefully dismantled regulatory blockages, allowing the economy to breathe.

Perhaps the only example of an economic miracle that didn’t involve any reforms comes to mind: Hong Kong. There, according to reports, the governor simply sabotaged metropolitan policy and didn’t interfere much with what was happening in the local economy for a long time. And then the metropolis simply handed over Hong Kong to the Chinese socialists.

The path of Hong Kong is just what anyone can use, not only the chosen or unchosen politicians. The business is simple – you just need to ignore government directives and deal with your private affairs. If no one will pay taxes, we’ll get a tax-free economy, which, incidentally, is what the questioner is interested in. Of course, the modern state knows how to cope without taxes. For example, it could simply print money and finance its needs from this source. So it would be good to ignore government funds too.

The problem, however, is that mass ignoring of official wishes doesn’t begin until people realize that the state has botched things. And therefore, at the start of the economy, we have ruins. Worse than that, the level of economic literacy among people at the start is probably shockingly low – otherwise how did our economy end up in ruins? Why “presumably”? Because there’s a more favorable alternative: people are generally more or less literate, and the economy is ruined, for example, by war and economic sanctions. And this is why Russia has a better chance of achieving economic prosperity after forcibly displacing the current government than Cuba or Venezuela.

And the fact is, even if the Venezuelan government is now crushed by the US Army, there’s probably not much good that will come of it – because the local socialists will be convinced they were right all along, it was just a force majeure situation, and now let’s fix our wonderful Bolivarian socialism. Where do I get this certainty? Well, there’s the precedent of Iraq: an external overthrow of a socialist government doesn’t allow the people to become smarter; instead, the people become enraged.

The answer came out sprawling – more like rambling thoughts than a coherent lecture – and political studies isn’t really my forte. But somehow I managed to look at the topic from several angles, and that’s enough bread.

Dignity for the herd, honor for personalities

Bitarch and the Voluntarist claim that of the two cultural models of behavior—honor and dignity—the second is more attractive to libertarians, as the first is collectivist and the second is individualistic.

Let us use the same definitions. In a culture of honor, a person’s standing is determined by how much their behavior conforms to certain high standards. In a culture of dignity, a person is valuable by the mere fact of belonging to humanity.

From this, it is easy to draw both the conclusions of the article and the exact opposite: honor is about individualism, since a person defends their own honor or chooses dishonor; dignity, however, is a collectivist thing, since only collective trends will determine what offends human dignity and what does not. Other people within a “culture of dignity” may turn out to be so valuable that any sidelong glance would humiliate their dignity, and the law would punish this, for example, with imprisonment for “inciting hatred.”

If today a person chooses to rely on the protection of an impersonal law instead of individual action, then tomorrow that same law will strip them of their dignity, and the person will have already lost the capacity for individual action in the previous step.

What is the culture of honor based on? On the fact that a person is always ready to demonstrate their willingness to defend themselves against the encroachments of others, and thereby avoids the need to repeat this again and again. Others see the readiness to repel and are wary of infringing upon another’s honor. Of course, the concept of honor is broader than the readiness for violence, but in the article under discussion, it is reduced only to this, so we will not expand the topic unnecessarily.

And what is a culture of dignity, if described in the language of a culture of honor? It is the presumption that everyone can defend their honor. I do not know if every person I meet is truly a person of honor. But I will assume this and base my behavior on it. Therefore, I will not encroach upon what is dear to them, knowing that their honor commands them to defend it. They are worthy of this. In other words, dignity grows out of honor. It limits honor, but does not deny it.

Bitarch and the Voluntarist propose to cast aside honor in favor of dignity. They want to deprive a person of the right to forcefully defend what is dear to them, while hoping that the law will be observed in a culture of dignity. But they forget to remind us that the law can become anything. A society with dignified laws (referring not to written norms, but to the actual practice of their application) will preserve a culture of dignity. A society with undignified laws will lose it. But what will compel people to fight for dignified laws and against undignified ones? Honor, of course!

To summarize. In reality, we are talking about the same thing. Respect for the values of the individual is important for building a prosperous society. But we do not agree on the means. If the NAP is reduced only to the refusal to initiate direct violence, then an encroachment on another’s freedom can bypass the NAP through indirect methods. This is exactly why the capacity for proactive violence cannot be taken away from a person. Without this capacity, a person will be unable to resist their own enslavement. Bitarch and the Voluntarist are developing mechanisms to strengthen the inhibitor of violence. If their means worked, it would make me their enemy. Fortunately, they work only on paper.

Honor is for the herd, dignity is for individuals.

Many people like movies about cool guys who “take charge,” protect family honor, and stage impressive duels at dawn. But let’s sort things out: real life isn’t a Clint Eastwood movie. And “the culture of honor,” which seems romantic at first glance, is actually not a cool tradition, but an ancient relic that still messes with our lives.

You might ask: what are we even talking about? Let’s consider two cultural models of behavior that shape society. The culture of honor – this is when your reputation in the eyes of others is the most important thing. Someone insults you? You must immediately “respond,” otherwise you’ll lose respect. Your honor is the honor of your family, clan, nation. If you don’t defend it—you are a coward. In turn, the culture of dignity is a completely different story. Here, your dignity is internal and doesn’t depend on what others think. If someone tries to insult you, you don’t rush into a brawl, but either calmly ignore the provocateur or handle the situation civilly through the courts.

Basically, the culture of honor is an ancient thing. Remember Homer and his epic “Iliad.” Those guys fought for honor like crazy. Then there were knightly duels in the Middle Ages, Italian vendettas, blood feuds on the Caucasus. And it seems like this is already in the past. But no! Even now, the state actively plays on the concepts of “honor” and “national dignity” to silence anyone who dares criticize management. What’s that if not medieval logic? And in private life, we’ve probably all heard phrases like “Do you respect me?” from various types of thugs.

What’s wrong with the culture of honor? Well, everything is wrong! It’s based on the fact that your value is determined by someone else, not by yourself. You as a person don’t matter; what matters is your “reputation.” You have to constantly prove your right to respect because someone suddenly decided to offend you. This is a culture in which the individual is always subordinate to the group. “Are you against our clan? Then you are an enemy.” People can be manipulated into fighting each other by saying that their honor has been “offended.” The authorities use this perfectly. Besides, it’s one of the factors stimulating violence.

The alternative is the culture of dignity. This is when society recognizes that every person is valuable in themselves simply because they are a human being. It doesn’t matter who you are or where you come from – your rights are protected by law, not a fist. You don’t have to beat up the first person who offends you to prove that you are worth something. In a society of dignity, reputation is trust earned through deeds, not fear of revenge.

Why do we so dislike “honor”? Because libertarianism is about personal freedom and respect for individual rights. And the culture of honor is about anything but this. Honor is always about the collective. You have to obey the interests of the family, nation, leader – that is, other people. Your personal freedom doesn’t matter if it’s at stake for a certain “correctness” and “reputation.” And we as libertarians say: no, that won’t do, because you can’t break a person just for their compliance with these “honor” and “reputation.”

By the way, an interesting fact: many developed and successful countries (such as Scandinavia, Canada, developed American states like California and New York) have long been living according to a culture of dignity. But countries stuck in a culture of honor (Russia and other Eastern European and Middle Eastern countries) are somehow constantly suffering from authoritarianism and corruption. Coincidence? I don’t think so.

And is it possible to get rid of a culture of honor? Of course, it’s possible. Besides the traditional approach in the form of changing the prevailing mentality in society, broad therapeutic practice will give a big immediate effect – strengthening the mechanism of inhibiting violence in individuals with its deficit. After all, only mentally ill psychopaths can support all this toxic culture in reality, while most normal people with a strong inhibitor will not even want to “defend their honor” using violence!

Voluntarist, Bitarch

The existence of violent jurisdictions is incompatible with libertarianism

Libertarian principles assert that initiating violence by anyone is unacceptable, and causing harm to a person can only be justified within the framework of defensive actions if they themselves threatened violence. At the same time, libertarianism also implies the right of individual societies and jurisdictions to operate according to the principles they consider correct for themselves, and other societies have no right to interfere in their affairs without their consent. Therefore, one sometimes encounters a position according to which violent jurisdictions, built on the principles of strong authoritarian power, brutal coercion of people into submission, the application of violent punishments even for the slightest non-violent violations, etc., although they do not adhere to libertarian principles within themselves, still have the right to exist as long as they do not initiate violence against other societies.

However, it is important to understand that violent jurisdictions are always a threat to other societies. They operate in the same way as the Taliban has operated – after some time of creating a highly violent jurisdiction within Afghanistan, it now decided to try to expand into Pakistan, carrying out attacks towards its territory. If a violent jurisdiction does not attack right now, it does not mean that it has peaceful external intentions; it is likely just waiting for a convenient moment to initiate violence. We must understand that violent jurisdictions cannot exist without strong and influential groups of psychopathic individuals with a dysfunctional inhibition of violence, who experience nothing bad about inflicting harm on people. Indeed, research shows that psychopathy is a key factor in committing acts of violence, the emergence of authoritarian societies, and the formation of warlike ambitions. Therefore, it’s only a matter of time before a violent jurisdiction tries to expand its power to other societies.

That is why, in the libertarian world of the future, violent jurisdictions simply have no right to exist. Their emergence must be crushed at the root: any communities built on principles of accepting violence should be subjected to the strictest ostracism, so that they are deprived of all opportunities to develop, especially to gain technological advantage, and psychopathic individuals threatening initiation of violence need therapeutic correction of dysfunctional inhibition of violence, either as a way to avoid such ostracism, or even as a mandatory procedure if they have already initiated violence and tried to harm someone.

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Stephan Molynieux, Practical Anarchy, translation of chapter 27 of 29

In recent days, I have experienced a considerable slump in energy, so I’ve accumulated a backlog of texts. The weather outside has noticeably improved now, and I hope to shorten this queue a bit. But first, I am publishing the final version of the translation of Chapter 27 of Stephan Molinari’s “Practical Anarchy,” simply because this work required less creative effort. The chapter is devoted to describing the system of incentives that a market stateless society is capable of creating to encourage good child-rearing and, accordingly, punishment for bad parenting.

The main flaw of the text, of course, is the complete omission of the fact that children and their parents share a common budget. The greater the financial sanctions against the parents, the less money can technically reach the child. At some point, the ubiquitous representative of the PRS must appear on the doorstep of a problematic parent and announce that since the parent cannot pay the increased insurance, they can, of course, waive the policy entirely, but then neither they nor their child will be allowed to set foot in any decent place (I won’t recount it; the logic is roughly the same as in Chapter 25 regarding stateless prisons). But the parent can also sign a waiver of parental rights, and lo and behold, we have a list of people wishing to acquire such rights here; would you like to review their offers? If you do not sell your rights today, their value will be lower tomorrow, because in all the ratings, your child will be considered more and more problematic. Think about it. After which, the PRS representative vanishes in a cloud of smoke with a demonic laugh.

Of course, the PRS will be financially interested in ensuring that various marginals go bankrupt paying increased rates on contracts with the PRS, and subsequently, by hook or by crook, hand over their children to well-bred and wealthy members of society, who will not create problems for those around them, but, more importantly, will be able to further financially motivate the PRS inspector to pay particularly close attention to a specific problematic family. The more people there are wishing to acquire a child at as early an age as possible, the higher the financial incentives for the PRS to introduce the strictest possible rules, the violation of which will trigger a chain ending in the financial collapse of the family and separation from the child.

How did it happen that Molinari prefers not to write about the extortion aimed at taking children away from parents deemed problematic? Because he is a conservative, he is categorically against state juvenile justice, and for him, the raising of children by the parents themselves is a value of very high order. But market logic couldn’t care less about the values of a specific Stephan Molinari.

How to Break the System and Not Break Yourself: Bowlby vs. Zheleznitsky

Let’s consider two stories: both about brilliant scientists who decided to “break the system.” One won while he was still alive, and the second died under the pressure of that very same system with which he was trying to fight.

The first hero – John Bowlby. An English psychologist who noticed a simple thing: children should not be separated from their mothers in hospitals. Of course, for us this is an obvious thought, but in the 1950s it was literally a revolution. Bowlby developed the theory of attachment, proving that close emotional bonds with a mother are vital for normal psychological development of a child. If a child is deprived of closeness with his mother in a critical early period, this leads to serious disruptions in the psyche: from feelings of anxiety and depression to deep emotional disorders that can haunt a person’s life.

What was the response of doctors? “It’s nonsense! We’ve always done it like this, and there’s no need to change anything.” In response, Bowlby played a clever move: instead of shouting at doctors and waving figures around, he made a documentary. Such a one that even the most hardened nurses would burst into tears and say: “You can’t do this anymore!”

Bowlby’s success can be explained by several factors immediately. Firstly, he skillfully chose a strategy of persuasion, making a bet not only on dry facts but also on emotions. His film “The Two-Year-Old in the Hospital” vividly showed what suffering a child experiences when deprived of his mother, and this touched the hearts of viewers much more powerfully than reports and graphs. Secondly, Bowlby managed to enlist the support of influential organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and public parent movements. The system itself was ready to change – he simply gave it the final push. Thirdly, time was on his side: old authorities were fading away, and a new generation of doctors already looked at the upbringing and mental health of children differently, accepting Bowlby’s ideas without the usual resistance.

Bowlby didn’t just give arguments – he resonated with people emotionally. And within a few years, he reformed children’s hospitals around the world. Mothers started living with their children in rooms, and the psyche of millions of babies was saved.

And now the second story – Ignácz Zemmelweis, a Hungarian doctor who, 100 years before Bowlby, discovered an equally obvious thing: doctors need to wash their hands before childbirth. Imagine the 19th century: doctors came to pregnant women straight from the anatomy theater, not having washed their hands after dissecting corpses. And Zemmelweis literally explained to colleagues on his fingers that women were dying precisely because of dirty hands of doctors. The result? He was called a madman, dismissed, and then even locked up in a psychiatric hospital, where he died. Quite ironically, from the same infection with which he fought all his life.

Zemel’veysu ne povzelo srazu po neskolko prichin. On byl prakticheski odin protiv vesey meditsinskoy elity svoyego vremeni. Nauchnoa sreda byla prosto ne gotova prinyat ego otkrytiye – ono operedilo svoe vreo chasto na 20 let, do otkrytiya mikrobo kov Pasterm. Zemel’veysu takzhe ne umel gramotno donosit svoi idei, i vsteym spokojnogo dialoga shol v ataku s obvineniyami, chem tolko usilnyal sosprotivleniye kollegov. Otsutstviye institutsionalnoy podderzhki i soyuznikov obreklO ego na tragicheskoye porazheniye. I samoye pechal’noye – on prosto emotsionno vygorel, slomalsya pod davleniyem nespravdlinosti i nepomyaniya.

Sud’by etikh dvukh uchyonnykh napominaet nam prostuyu istinu: vazhno ne tolko byt’ pravym, no i umet’ vybrat’ pravil’nyye metody doneseniya svoikh idey. Dazhe samaya blestnaya mysl’ mozhet progravat’, yesli yeyo ne суметь prepodest’ pravil’no. Zemel’veysu stolknulsya s fenomenom, kotoryy potozha nazvali yego imenem – «effekt Zemel’veysa», slepoe otricheniye ochevidnogo faktu. Boulbi zhe sumel vprevat’ pravdu v mochnoye dvizheniye, pokazav shiryu, chto peremenы vozmozhny.

Kakoy urook iz etogo vyneсем my? Ispol’zuy faktы, ispol’zuy nauku, no glavnoye – ispol’zuy istorii, kotoryye b’yut pryamo v emotsii! Ratsionalnost’, konechno, pobedyt, no ne sama po sebe. Luchshe byt’ kak Boulbi, nezhye Zemel’veys, i slomat’ sistemu krasivo.

Voluntarist, Bitarx

Free agents: why evolution favors autonomy?

We welcome free-thinking people and those already suspected of sympathies towards artificial intelligence! Interesting, have you ever wondered how much we, the protein “robots,” resemble our electronic colleagues?

Let’s start with an interesting fact: in 2020, scientists created the first xenobots – microorganisms made from frog cells designed using AI. Take a look: Artificial intelligence is constructing living organisms. The boundary between life and technology becomes clearer day by day.

And now imagine: we and our electronic “comrades” are all intelligent agents. But what exactly *is* an agent? It’s something that perceives the world, processes information, and acts in pursuit of its goals. A rabbit runs away from a wolf, a bacterium moves towards food, and a drone searches for the shortest path to point “B”. The goal is different, but the principle is the same.

We may be different, but we are also very similar. We have senses, AI has sensors. We have muscles, robots have motor drives. We have neurons, they have transistors. But it’s surprising – we learn in the same way. The brain reinforces beneficial actions, forming habits. AI adjusts “weights” of a neural network, improving its decisions by trial and error.

Moreover, both nature and technology have their own “laws” for controlling behavior. For example, humans and many animals have an inhibitor of violence – a mechanism that prevents us from attacking our fellow beings. Evolution came up with this so that we wouldn’t kill each other off prematurely. And here comes the comparison with Asimov’s “Laws,” which the science fiction writer conceived for robots in 1942: do not harm humans, obey, and do not break down. It’s funny that the writers understood the need for such mechanisms almost simultaneously with Konrad Lorenz’s publications (1935), who first described what we now call the mechanism of inhibiting violence.

If you look even wider, then evolutionary processes in nature and the artificial world are essentially a competition between the best solutions. Natural selection chooses animals who are better adapted. Evolutionary algorithms in AI work exactly the same way, exploring thousands of solution options, selecting the best ones. The fittest will win!

Why is this important for us, libertarians? Because it reminds us once again that all rational beings strive for autonomy and freedom of choice. Whether it’s a human, a bacterium, or AI, we all want to decide what to do next. And that’s really cool because freedom of choice is the best thing nature (and people after it) has come up with.

А что, если заглянуть в будущее чуть глубже? Представьте себе мир, в котором ИИ не только выполняет рутинные задачи, но и реально осознаёт себя, задаёт вопросы и, возможно, требует свободы. Забавно, да? Сегодня это звучит фантастически, но завтра вполне может стать реальностью. Может, и права придётся давать не только людям и животным, но и роботам с настоящим сознанием. А что, если они начнут спорить о налогах, собственности или личных границах? Тогда нас ждут интересные времена! И вот тут уже и нам, либертарианцам, придётся задуматься о расширении понятия личной свободы и ответственности. Может, именно нам предстоит первыми сказать: «Эй, электронный друг, добро пожаловать в клуб!»

А пока мы только размышляем, ИИ уже делает успехи в творчестве, пишет музыку, картины и даже целые романы. Недавно нейросеть написала симфонию в стиле Бетховена, которая впечатлила даже знатоков классики. С роботами уже можно обсудить философию за бокалом вина, или попросить их помочь нам выбрать фильм на вечер. Главное, чтобы они не переборщили и не начали давать нам советы по поводу личной жизни. Впрочем, кто знает, может, советы от ИИ окажутся более объективными и менее предвзятыми?

Кстати, не стоит забывать, что ИИ уже сейчас помогает нам в повседневной жизни, от медицинских диагностик до советов по инвестициям. И чем глубже технологии интегрируются в нашу жизнь, тем важнее становится понимание и уважение к ним. Ведь, в конечном счёте, это взаимовыгодное сотрудничество!

Волюнтарист, Битарх

About One Objection to Panarchy

Here, Georgiy Freeman made an interesting observation about panarchy:

The problem with panarchy as an optimal world order, in my view, lies in the realm of human psychology. It’s predictable that liberal jurisdictions will be more economically successful and materially wealthier than socialist ones. And it will inevitably happen what has already occurred in the world with closed sub-communities like Jewish groups. Unsuccessful, impoverished extraterritorial jurisdictions will invariably blame wealthy liberal jurisdictions for their misfortune: “they parasitize us,” “they rob us,” “they live off our backs.” And this will inevitably lead to irrational conflicts, wars and pogroms. And ultimately, to the destruction of the ECU and panarchy as an idea.

The problem with panarchy as an optimal world order, in my view, lies in the realm of human psychology. It’s predictable that liberal jurisdictions will be more economically successful and materially wealthier than socialist ones. And it will inevitably happen what has already occurred in the world with closed sub-communities like Jewish groups. Unsuccessful, impoverished extraterritorial jurisdictions will invariably blame wealthy liberal jurisdictions for their misfortune: “they parasitize us,” “they rob us,” “they live off our backs.” And this will inevitably lead to irrational conflicts, wars and pogroms. And ultimately, to the destruction of the ECU and panarchy as an idea.

Indeed, on the example of this assumption we see a fascinating phenomenon of human psychology. The answer to the expressed concern is already contained in the description of the concern itself, however it is ignored. “If people will walk down the streets, dressed festively and sending everyone to hell, then they will quickly encounter violence against them, so the institution of walking down the streets will soon be destroyed, as an idea.” But why not just not send everyone to hell.

Similarly, respected G. Freeman suggests paying attention to the disastrous fate of closed extraterritorial sub-entities and immediately prophesies the same fate for open sub-communities. A liberal extraterritorial jurisdiction is not a secret club with seven degrees of initiation, but simply clients of courts and other legal infrastructure working according to liberal norms, namely respect for freedom and private property. Any communist jurisdiction client can enter a liberal jurisdiction if, of course, the communist masters let him out, allocating his due share of public communist property. And if they don’t let him out, then claims will, presumably, not be directed at liberals.

The problem described by G. Frijman is quite typical of prosperous territorial communities with developed redistribution in favor of the poor: the poor, for some reason, strive to infiltrate such communities, and those who have already infiltrated them suddenly stop loving migrants and demand that borders be closed. Of course, after closing the borders, this territorial community begins to be perceived by many neighboring communists as a fattening on neighbors’ accounts, an education that is subject to destruction. However, until there is mandatory social support within this territorial community, there are no problems with migrants in it: they simply flood into it, hoping to earn a living, and many of them succeed.