The translation of the fourth part of The Network State has begun. As expected, after finishing with the “past present,” the author has moved on to discussing the future.
In Chapter 4.1, Possible Versions of the Future, Balaji Srinivasan begins by clarifying the factors that prevent him from making precise forecasts, then provides a brief description of the envisioned future scenario, and finally estimates where his idea of network states would fit into this scenario. In doing so, he uses the disgustingly clumsy term “re-centralized center.” My ability to adapt the text during translation is limited, so I can only state that the term is terrible and difficult to understand, but nothing comes to mind yet to replace it with. What does the author even mean? As far as I can judge based on an incomplete reading, the word “center” refers to the center of the triangle he drew in the third part of the book describing a tripolar world—suggesting that our salvation lies in not falling into the extremes that accumulate at the poles. And he has yet to explain “re-centralized.” Perhaps it means that every startup community must have its own leader, otherwise it won’t take off. I would be glad to be wrong.
In Chapter 4.2, Sociopolitical Axes, the author briefly notes that to assess the future, it is not enough to look at well-known and long-established trends; it is also worth looking at those that are only just forming. As examples of sociopolitical factors that could seriously affect the future, he provides three completely diverse examples: Indians (while everyone is looking at China, India is quietly closing the gap, and in the next decade should make its presence felt quite loudly, both as a state and as a diaspora, i.e., a Network, in the author’s terminology), the confrontation between the “un-prime” and the “trans-hum” (Klaus Schwab was listed as a transhumanist), and the identity stack (there are several interesting thoughts on where identities come from, as well as a non-obvious take that one identity will inevitably be the leading and defining one).
The chapters in the fourth part of the book are not very long, so I will try to post them in groups rather than one by one, to avoid cluttering the feed.
In connection with what has happened, I would like to express my own opinion. Of course, many are grieving and expressing their condolences. However, now would be the time to talk about what this story can teach us. The point is that opposing the established system—moreover, in many countries of the world—absolutely openly, playing by its own rules and resorting to standard and well-known practices, as the tragically deceased Alexei did, can be very dangerous and ultimately unproductive. But in the modern world, it is possible and necessary to resort to alternative approaches that, in principle, do not involve direct confrontation.
As a good example, I would point to how a certain anonymous individual (or group of anonymous individuals) under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto destroyed the “sacred” monopoly of stationary bandits (states) over money by creating Bitcoin. He was never reliably deanonymized, and his tool was designed so that even in the event of full deanonymization, or even the physical liquidation of the creator, it would not cease to exist and function, as it is decentralized. Meanwhile, the anonymous and state-uncontrollable payment methods and electronic currencies that existed before Bitcoin, such as E-gold and Liberty Reserve, were destroyed by the US government due to their centralized structure and the presence of specific, non-anonymous creators and managers, who ultimately received very long prison sentences.
Ideally, stationary bandits should not even be aware that someone is opposing them, and should not have the ability to track down those who are doing so. The methods of opposition should be extremely unconventional and non-traditional, most likely relying on modern technologies. Here, one could also mention current wars—with the popularization of modern drones, states have lost the ability to effectively destroy the production of high-tech weaponry when attacking someone. No matter how well-protected or hidden a large centralized military plant producing traditional weapons by traditional methods is, sooner or later it will be bombed. But with hundreds of small private enterprises producing thousands of drones a day and not united by any single management structure, absolutely nothing can be done. Such a modern, non-traditional approach to the production of high-tech weaponry is capable of providing protection even to those facing an enemy vastly superior in strength.
Exactly which methods can be proposed is for those who possess the necessary competence in a given field to decide. But we, within the framework of our project, can put forward one approach relying on science and modern technology. Understanding that the ability to commit intentional, planned, and targeted acts of violence without experiencing any internal repulsion or resistance is the result of an individual having a disorder—a dysfunction of the violence inhibition mechanism—makes clinical therapy of violent behavior possible using means that enhance the function of this mechanism. And in the event of a threat of violence from certain private individuals or representatives of some organized structure, it would be worth considering the creation of a combat version of such a biological solution. You can always find more details about the violence inhibitor concept in our materials.
There is one negative aspect to Navalny’s death: a good man has died. But there could never have been a happy ending in his fairy tale.
Otherwise, alas, things have rather improved.
The Russian regime has lost the potential opportunity to use a well-known political prisoner as bargaining material or a tool for blackmail.
The Russian opposition has an additional reason to abandon the idea of peaceful protest. Some of its representatives, acting by inertia, will go out into the streets of Russian cities to publicly express their grief, face persecution, and leave the RF.
I have an additional reason to increase my efforts in writing a book on the theory of war.
Other political regimes may throw a bit more fuel onto the fire of war with the RF (it would be good if without new mindless sanctions against those Russians who are easier to reach, but here life rather forces one to be a pessimist).
The translation of the third part of Balaji Srinivasan’s book The Network State has been posted. Unlike the second part, it is quite short and is dedicated to describing the current tripolar world:
The author argues that the world today is ruled by three ideas: the American liberal agenda, brutal and pragmatic Chinese communism, and the idea of personal sovereignty, which has found its maximum expression in Bitcoin. Additionally, he touches upon the tripolar configuration of the first half of the 20th century in the context of analyzing the primary strength of each of the current poles.
In general, while the second part dealt primarily with the past, in the third part the author has moved to the present, and further on, presumably, he will deal with the future.
When discussing what weapons could be extremely lethal yet very cheap and accessible for creation by almost any group of people or even a single individual, viruses likely come to mind. Given the rapid development and decreasing cost of biotechnologies, there is a threat of “basement laboratories” that can be easily opened and moved from place to place. However, the list of lethal and accessible weaponry does not end there. As noted in Alexander Rozov’s “LiveJournal,” AI-powered drones could become such weapons.
To provide context, it is first worth quoting a comment from user alekseymeeres, to which Rozov was responding: Light drones have changed the battlefield. Today, this is a flying sniper that terrorizes everyone—people and even armored vehicles. The cost of a kamikaze drone is 1,000 dollars (approximately), which is practically one enemy soldier. A million dollars is a thousand enemy soldiers. A billion dollars is a million enemy soldiers. Even by WWII prices, this is dirt cheap.
Further, based on technological patterns, Rozov makes predictions that: – light drones costing 100 dollars and produced at 100,000 units per day will appear, which is entirely realistic; – drones for destroying drones will appear as the only possible defensive measure against drone attacks; however, manual control of them will be impossible due to such a complex target, making them autonomous, which will also make them resistant to signal jamming; – the decision-making barrier will disappear; humans will no longer make decisions about whether to launch an attack or in which direction to conduct it if the drones are already in the air.
But what is more important to us is not how drones will be used by states in wars. We are concerned with the consequences for society as a whole: – due to the simplicity and low cost of the technology, it cannot remain a secret; any extremist or mafia group with any political or economic goals will be able to use it; – no civilian object in the world will ever be safe again; – the boundary between peace and war will disappear.
Most likely, many will be able to create drones at home simply by following instructions from the internet; it will not be much harder than making a children’s electric toy. Ensuring autonomous control resistant to EW suppression is also not a problem at the current level of AI development. And any person with a dysfunction of the violence-inhibiting mechanism and psychopathic predispositions will easily use such drones to commit violence. Moreover, tracking and punishing the perpetrator will be extremely difficult, unless they decide to openly release a swarm of drones in broad daylight, which would encourage an even greater number of psychopathic individuals to commit violence. What the drones are equipped with is also unimportant, even without access to explosives or their components. For example, they could carry flammable substances, and if the target of the attack is just one person, a swarm of drones might be able to beat them down by brute force. In such a world, there would be no possibility to engage in full productive activity, to develop, or even just to live peacefully. Perpetrators will establish total terror for both each other and ordinary peaceful people.
As some researchers believe, avoiding irreparable harm in the future will only be possible either through a complete renunciation of freedom and the introduction of a totalitarian system of round-the-clock surveillance of every person, or through “moral bio-enhancement.” To implement the second scenario, it would be sufficient to develop and distribute a therapy that restores the full functioning of the violence-inhibiting mechanism in psychopathic individuals. Only this way can the threat they create in the violent pursuit of their goals be reliably eliminated. Furthermore, even politicians, who will not soon have the technical capability to monitor what every single citizen does behind closed doors, should consider the idea of moral bio-enhancement, as they too will not be safe.
In Stefan Molynieu’s “Practical Anarchy,” which I have never fully translated, there is a chapter Stateless Prisons, where as an alternative to the loathsome state penitentiary system, an equally loathsome non-state one is proposed, based on what resembles cancel culture in the US, the social credit system in China, or, for instance, the “foreign agent” label in the RF. The idea is to make an undesirable person an outcast with whom everyone is afraid to deal to avoid secondary sanctions. The mechanism is described using the example of retribution for something sufficiently loathsome to the vast majority of readers (sexual violence), but there is no reason to believe that the exact same mechanism cannot be used to punish anyone for anything: it is enough to incite moral panic around certain actions, and suddenly the very mechanisms that yesterday cancelled rapists are today cancelling smokers. Or those leaving an excessively large carbon footprint. Or those infringing on intellectual property. Or formally the same rapists, but with an expanded interpretation of rape, extending even to initially voluntary sex with post-coital disagreement.
What I love about moral philosophers is that they adore pushing ideas to the point of absurdity with the utmost seriousness, thereby teaching others precision in phrasing, provided these others do not wish to resemble holy fools.
So let us talk about the institution of reputation more carefully.
Anya caused damage to Borya. Borya is a peaceful man; he wants restitution for the damage, but he does not wish to extract it by force. Additionally, he is offended, no longer wishes to have dealings with Anya, and generally does not want to see her in his social circle. Unless, of course, she apologizes, first making amends for her guilt.
Anya considers Borya an asshole who fully deserved all the damage received. She also does not wish to deal with him and simply rides off into the sunset.
Anya has no incentives to compensate for the damage. What is needed for her to have some? One of two things. Either Borya must spend significant resources on damaging Anya’s reputation, or these resources must be spent by someone else, in which case Borya only needs to send a low-cost control signal that triggers a chain reaction of cancelling.
How do you organize a system that allows for the cheap cancelling of people under conditions of decentralized law? Only through mass hysteria, which sharply lowers the threshold of arousal in people, after which they decide to abruptly sever relations with a person previously unfamiliar to them. Admit it, it’s convenient: you say a person is, say, a pedophile—and that’s it, no one will shake their hand. But who will verify this claim? No one can. Verification is a costly process. Adding it to the scheme kills all the profit from the idea of cancelling.
Fine, “no one can” is too strong a statement. One could add certain moral authorities to the scheme who verify the labels being applied. Borya called Anya a fraud—that is just noise. Guru Vasya called Anya a fraud—Anya becomes an untouchable. Borya’s only task is to grease Vasya’s palm. In other words, this scheme is also easily corrupted.
Of course, I am not suggesting the abolition of the institution of reputation. I am suggesting that one should not expect that under ancap it will be possible to cancel people without extremely destructive consequences for ancap itself. Yes, you can release information about Anya’s actions into the network, accompanied by reliable confirmations. Those intending to enter into a serious deal with Anya may come across this information and adjust their initial opinion of her reliability as a counterparty, after which, for example, they may demand payment upfront. But that is the maximum you can hope for. She will still be sold bread at the store, no matter how angry Stefan Molynieu is about it.
It’s not Anya, it’s Gina. Ancap Borya wants to cancel Anya the way Disney cancelled Gina. No fucking way he’ll succeed.
As I have already mentioned, writing news reviews for the entire Montelibero project is currently pointless—no one is capable of fully grasping the state of affairs across the project; it has become too large and complex. Therefore, I will pick certain characteristic themes and provide sketches on them so that a rough impression can be formed about how and what is being done in our community.
The most characteristic feature of the community, as I have written repeatedly, is its developed tokenomics. I dare claim that no other community in the world yet has anything similar. At the time I wrote my first reviews on this topic, the tokenomics still maintained a fairly significant centralization: there was the MTL fund with its own token (which brings modest monthly dividends and is slowly growing in price), there were many tokens issued by the fund to represent its own assets, and there were a couple or three independent tokens, for example, mine. Now, those wishing to diversify their investments have far more opportunities. (True, this is expressed, in particular, by the fact that I managed to place my previous loan of 500 euros in full, while the current one was not fully filled—about 320 tokens were bought. This only means that I need to offer a higher interest rate.)
It is evident that brisk sales followed immediately after the post about the loan placement, but the interested buyers quickly ran out
For example, a person has a dream. He is a programmer, but he also wants to be a DJ. What did he do? He issued DJAndy tokens, and now those wishing to finance his dream can do so. There is an offer with a more detailed description of the terms; it shows that this is essentially a short-term loan with deferred payment, but beyond that, the tokens can be used to pay for his DJ services at a good discount. Who in the traditional financial sphere would invest in someone else’s whims under such conditions? Yet, several people were found, although the total volume of purchased tokens is still noticeably less than the requested amount. The factor of social connectivity proves to be decisive.
In general, of course, the social aspect under ancap is a whole other story. The first Montelibero fund was created for commercial and infrastructure projects and does not engage in charity. Thus, for charitable tasks, a separate fund was created by other people. And what is the result? The fund’s capital is growing, yet there is no queue of suffering people knocking on its doors. People find it beneath them to simply ask for money for living expenses; therefore, the fund’s charity manifests in the fact that it satisfies requests for interest-free loans or sponsors some inexpensive campaigns to promote the Montelibero project.
But even simple interest-free loans already seem like too generous charity to people. For instance, in January, a private kindergarten took a short interest-free loan of 500 euros from the charitable fund to cover a cash gap, and by February, it had already issued its own short-term bonds for 1,000 euros to expand the business—and sold them all in literally two days.
Of course, the mere fact of belonging to the community does not mean that everyone will compete to offer you money on the most favorable terms. On the contrary, newcomers have to make do with short-term loans, while old and venerable companies already have the opportunity to attract long-term money. For example, one of the two whales of our tokenomics, the MTL-City developer, created its own investment platform Tokenopolis, where it offers investments in the construction of specific objects, the purchase of company shares, or three-year bonds. The site is somewhat raw, and if a potential investor knows how to buy tokens through Stellar’s native tools, I recommend using them for now, though it is also possible through Tokenopolis, albeit with some difficulty, and I think they will fix the bugs over time. A secondary market for this family of tokens (as with most others) does not exist—there are simply too few of us for that yet. Thus, after buying a particular investment token, the buyer must be prepared to hold it until the maturity date if it is a bond, and if it is a share, it is completely unclear for how long. Nevertheless, investors can be found.
The second whale of our tokenomics, the diversified holding GPA, also moved from a loan attraction model to the sale of shares. Presumably, they should bring some dividends once a quarter, plus grow in price. However, dividends are not yet being paid, and as long as the entire primary placement is not sold out, one cannot count on a price increase either. But even for such an offer, investors are found, which clearly demonstrates the price of reputation.
As far as I can judge, we have not yet picked all the low-hanging fruit, and Montelibero’s tokenomics is expected to see decent growth in the coming year. Meanwhile, other startup communities will catch up. For example, similar mechanisms for investing in local businesses have already begun to be implemented by the Norwegian Liberstad.
The most promising area of work for increasing the overall volume of tokenomics is the creation of convenient interfaces for third-party investors—through fiat banking instruments or at least through Bitcoin. So far, Tokenopolis has begun to move in this direction, but I hope a more universal platform appears, earning from the integration of Montelibero’s local tokenomics into the world of big finance. Work on this is already underway; perhaps in the foreseeable future, I will be able to tell you what this turned into.
Recently, I came across an interesting criticism of ancap. The gist is: you believe that the market will solve everything, and that monopolies shouldn’t be touched because they are inefficient and always eventually collapse. So why are you picking on the monopoly on violence? It will collapse on its own too. Either admit that monopolies aren’t collapsed by the market themselves, or that violence is a special, separate type of service that should only be managed by the state.
Is there any answer to this argument?
Querens
Monopoly in conditions of free market entry is a rather conventional concept; everyone tries to establish their own arbitrary criterion for what percentage of the market should be considered a monopoly. Again, the boundaries of the market are also taken from thin air. For instance, on the scale of Montenegro, if you try hard enough, you can see a monopoly on violence held by the Montenegrin state. But on a planetary scale, you can’t see one even with superpowers.
Therefore, it seems more convenient to me to speak not of monopolies, but of the optimal size of an organization. In given conditions, there is always a certain size of organization (determined by the technologies it uses and those used by others, population density and characteristics, landscape, history, and a host of other factors), beyond which the organization is forced to spend disproportionately large resources to maintain its own structure and activity; conversely, if the organization is smaller than the optimal size, growth proves beneficial because the organization’s activity brings a greater effect with relatively lower resource expenditures.
A hairdressing business has its own optimal size, as does a business producing microchips or airliners. Similarly, in these specific conditions, the business of organizing coercion will have its own optimal size. God is on the side of the larger battalions, but the technology of assembling large battalions is a very non-trivial thing.
The Neolithic agricultural revolution made it possible to coerce the inhabitants of fertile lands to grow grain, deliver it to state granaries, and then assemble into large battalions that could eat this grain on the march and crush small barbarian tribes by sheer mass, turning them into slaves or subjects who became new farmers. But on barren lands where grain does not grow, the state did not take root, and various highlanders are still considered less civilized—that is, less shaped for state needs (this was a brief summary of James C. Scott’s book “The Art of Not Being Governed“).
Nowadays, the financial system plays the role of grain. Whoever’s economy allows for the extraction of more resources for state needs can afford more expensive military toys, as well as fashionable soft-power tools—and that party secures that very monopoly on violence in a more complete volume and over a larger area.
Libertarians are a modern remake of those same barbarians described by James Scott, who sought to retreat to areas where grain doesn’t grow and where the hand of the state—in the form of censors, tax collectors, recruiters, and other unpleasant types—hardly reaches. Only now, instead of potatoes and other yams, they grow their bitcoins, which are useless for state needs, cook up their tokenomics, which are useless for the state, corrupt the tax collectors, refuse to work in the army or police, remain indifferent to patriotic slogans, but are keenly interested in all sorts of technological innovations useful to them, even if for some reason they are being banned.
Now, I will answer the question itself. Monopolies (including the monopoly on violence) do not collapse on their own; they are helped by the invisible hand of the market. But this hand consists of many elementary actions of all those for whom this monopoly is an inconvenience. And the invisible boot of the state consists of many elementary actions of those who profit from the monopoly on violence. The only thing that large battalions handle very poorly is guerrilla warfare, plus sabotage. This is a complex technology of decentralized resistance, and that is exactly what we are developing.
See the monopolist of violence? Can you hit them in the eye?
I have repeatedly had to answer questions about how courts would work under ancap, and we even once made a video on the subject. Nevertheless, questions continue to come in. This is understandable; the future is always in question. I believe the best way to resolve this issue is to demonstrate it in practice. Therefore, I am opening my own ancap court.
The main principles I intend to adhere to:
The goal of the court is to resolve the conflict. Not to match a transgression with a registry of punishments, but to ensure that the decision helps the parties reconcile.
All parties participate in the process voluntarily, agreeing in advance to execute the court’s decision.
I reserve the right to refuse to conduct the proceedings and issue a decision at any moment, consequently refusing payment.
The amount of my remuneration is announced in advance; the judicial process cannot begin before the parties agree to its payment.
Judicial remuneration, deposits, and similar payments will be transferred to a separate Stellar account with a “2 out of 3” multi-signature. Thus, (a) parties will be able to withdraw their money in any proportion at any time by mutual agreement, thereby ending the court amicably; (b) I will be able to receive remuneration if at least one of the parties is satisfied with the decision; (c) the transfer of the claimed amount to the plaintiff or the return of the deposit to the defendant will not require the goodwill of the opposing party.
If the parties agree for the process to be public, its progress will be covered by me in my channel.
I do not like it when those who call themselves libertarians simply mechanically replace the word “state” with the word “jurisdiction” and, in essence, try to simply cosplay the state. Jurisdiction is not a territory, not vassalage, and not an office with a sign. It is simply jurisdiction. For libertarians, it is voluntary jurisdiction that follows a request for help in resolving a conflict.
A court is far from the only tool for conflict resolution, and the need for it arises quite rarely. But, at the very least, I want to restore the good name of this institution, so that a court is not used as a threat, but that appealing to a court is perceived as appealing to a doctor or an accountant: yes, one can manage without it, but if the task is entrusted to someone with experience in it, the result will be faster and more reliable.
My main target audience is the participants of the Montellibero movement, but there are no problems with resolving conflicts among the external audience; they may simply need to put in effort to master the basics of tokenomics.
For now, I am accepting requests simply via Telegram DM (@ancapsan), but over time, I may add some additional interface.
Do you remember a sports car like the DeLorean, which was also used as a time machine in the “Back to the Future” trilogy? The story of its creator, John DeLorean, is quite instructive. As soon as he started producing cars, he was charged with drug trafficking. Later, he was able to prove that the story had been framed by the FBI, but his entire fortune went toward paying lawyers. One can also recall many stories where someone spent a decade or two in prison, after which it turned out they were innocent. Of course, in such cases, monetary compensation may be provided. But how can you compensate for the loss of a significant part of one’s life, often the “best” part, when a person is still young, most productive, and capable of easily starting a family or building a career?
Even after proving your correctness in state courts, you can lose a lot. In far from all cases will you be entitled to even monetary compensation, and if you do achieve it, it will still not cover the loss of part of your life or the lost profit from funds that you had to spend on proceedings rather than investing. A stationary bandit, by making a mistake, can easily destroy your life.
Of course, there is an argument that this is the price that must be paid for security, and the system is permitted to sacrifice the lives of a few if it is capable of saving many. But does the person putting forward such an argument understand that the mistakes of state authorities are paid for from their own pocket? The state does not have its own money, after all. Would he pay compensation to a falsely accused person himself if it were not taken from his pocket through cleverly designed and rather hidden tax collections? Hardly; most likely, he would say that the person who made the mistake should deal with it, without reaching into his pocket as an outsider. And would he support such a system if he himself ended up among those few victims? Most likely, such a situation would anger him.
Also, conversations about the position of the permissibility of making sacrifices for the “greater good” prompt us to remember who generally possesses such a mindset. Research in which participants had to solve moral dilemmas demonstrated that psychopathic predispositions are linked to a willingness to make a sacrifice. For example, this was well shown through a modified trolley problem, in which one must decide whether it is permissible to approach one fat person and push them under the trolley to stop it and save five other people tied to the tracks. The choice in favor of making a sacrifice was linked to an increased level of all psychopathy indicators. And, it should be noted, psychopathic individuals in their responses to various dilemmas were willing to sacrifice the well-being of other people, but not willing to sacrifice their own well-being (they, of course, would not throw themselves under the trolley).
Now it is worth asking: how does the immoral and cruel choice to throw an innocent person under the trolley to save other people, which only psychopathic individuals might decide upon, differ from the choice of a stationary bandit to impose such costs of legal proceedings on a person and apply punishments that can completely destroy their life when there is a probability of their innocence? If we are going to allow the second, then it follows that the first is also permissible. But most of us are peaceful and non-psychopathic individuals who, by their own hands and decisions, would not be able to sacrifice a person. So perhaps it is not worth supporting a system that does this? And, again, you yourself would not want to suddenly find yourself in the place of the victim.
And if someone does not mind becoming a victim for the good of others, they would like to be pointed to something regarding our main theme. In such a case, they, for example, have no right to argue from the position of the inadmissibility of mandatory therapy to strengthen the violence inhibitor in individuals with its dysfunction, justifying this by the possible error of its application to the “innocent.” Is that not so?
