Carrying weapons is absolutely normal behavior, if it is not done for the purpose of committing crimes

Quite interesting results were demonstrated by studies examining the link between carrying and using weapons and a person’s psychopathic predispositions. For instance, high scores in callous-unemotional traits among adolescents are linked to more frequent weapon carrying, regardless of any extraneous factors, and its use in committing crimes. Additionally, the presence of certain psychopathic predispositions in an individual, especially emotional coldness and antisocial behavior, is linked to the illegal use of weapons and a tendency toward violent confrontations.

However, the first study notes that adolescents with low callous-unemotional trait scores may also be inclined to carry weapons, but this is not associated with committing armed attacks and often occurs simply because their peers also carry weapons—they are merely succumbing to their influence. The second study notes that legal weapon carrying, associated with legal motivations for such behavior (for example, ensuring self-defense), has no connection to psychopathic predispositions.

Such results lead to the conclusion that carrying a weapon not for the purpose of committing an attack is absolutely normal behavior, which does not indicate the presence of any mental abnormalities, including psychopathic predispositions arising from the dysfunction of the violence inhibition mechanism that make a person capable of easily harming others. Therefore, there is simply no reason to fear a weapon in the hands of an average individual, if this suddenly causes anyone fear. Nor is there any reason to listen to those who will claim that a normal person has no need for a weapon.

Also, let us not forget that a mentally healthy person will try to possess a weapon legally, if possible. Here, it is worth noting a long-established fact immediately – weapon bans only affect law-abiding citizens, depriving them of the ability to effectively defend themselves against attacks. Such people will not be inclined to acquire weapons if there is no legal way to do so. At the same time, psychopaths will prefer illegal weapons regardless, which they will obtain on the black market or manufacture themselves. Think about it – it is unlikely that a person who anticipates that they might commit a violent crime with some probability, or has even planned it in advance, will use legal weapons that can be traced. And with illegal weapons, a psychopath will be able to easily attack ordinary people if those people do not have a legal right to armed self-defense.

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Nostr, interim results

About a year and a half ago, the Nostr protocol was first mentioned in my channel — initially as the basis for a recurrent Lightning payments engine, and subsequently more detailed impressions were given regarding the protocol as a means of decentralized publishing. What has changed since then?

Unfortunately, not much. The adoption of Nostr is happening quite slowly, and even in Montelibero, no one really uses it properly (although Sondre from Liberstad is even writing his own software for Nostr, we don’t use it). I have tried several clients and settled on Amethyst for Android and Gossip for Windows. Web services are all terrible; none have gained traction. The vast majority of Nostr clients cosplay Twitter, except without character limits — which results in a complete lack of the ability to make posts with human-readable formatting. In principle, this is logical: even if one client understands a post with markup, another won’t bother with it. Decentralization encourages a certain degree of primitivism.

The browser application Alby has long relied on using a custodial Lightning wallet, but its support is ending soon, and now those interested are being offered to either set up their own node from the same provider or rent a ready-made one. Overall, this is sensible, but since I have no idea how to set up a node on a server, I had to just install it on my laptop, and now, as I understand it, post donations can only be sent when the node is online. Perhaps I’ll manage to do it properly eventually, but honestly, this task is not a high priority; usually, it’s just trivial stuff coming in anyway. For my part, I use these satoshis to reward other people’s posts—a simple cycle of gratitude in the blogosphere.

As for Nostr to start being widely adopted in Montelibero, it seems we need some serious persecution of freedom of speech; without that, no one will leave Telegram voluntarily. I understand perfectly)))

And what about under ancap..?

I constantly receive the same type of questions: how will this or that thing be implemented under ancap, given that it is currently implemented either directly by the state or by private entities, but under conditions of heavy state regulation. Quite often, these kinds of questions have a boundary condition: not everyone has the money to buy this thing on a free market, which is precisely what causes the questioner’s interest: how to provide the needy with this expensive thing if not through robbery.

Of course, one could go on for a long time saying that in a free, unregulated, competitive market, this desperately needed thing will be cheaper and of higher quality than it is today, but such arguments cannot fully negate the aforementioned boundary condition: not everyone will have the money for it regardless, and there will still remain the possibility that some of those who desperately need it will not have the money. Who will help them buy it?

I have a simple answer: you will do it yourselves, those who are so concerned about this issue. Because it is personally important to you that the needy receive this thing (otherwise, you wouldn’t be so concerned about this question). And it will not be particularly taxing for you personally, because you will be wealthy enough to afford this small expense. Why? Because you can buy Bitcoin right now. Even if it’s not a whole Bitcoin, but some fraction. And by the time ancap arrives on Earth, today’s acquisition will be so valuable that you will easily be able to afford such small-scale charity.

Get to it)))

A question about Montelibero’s tokenomics

Why did Monteliberro create an internal financial system similar to fiat (with artificial tokens and a trusted third party), and why do you support this decision by involving people? If the Montenegrin authorities deem Monteliberro’s internal payment tokens as securities and shut the operation down, will you take on the responsibility of reimbursing people for their financial losses? After all, it is obvious that abandoning Bitcoin in favor of one’s own internal shitcoin is merely a way for the owner and members of his politburo to make money.

Vito

To understand the logic behind the emergence of EURMTL, let’s compare Montenegro, for example, with El Salvador.

Neither state has its own sovereignly issued national currency. In El Salvador, the legal means of payment are the US dollar and Bitcoin. In Montenegro, it is the euro. Formally, the circulation of other fiat, as well as cryptocurrencies, is not regulated in any way, but in practice, we see a complete absence of street exchange points (unlike neighboring Serbia, where exchange offices are on every corner) and a complete absence of crypto ATMs (there was only one in the entire country, and even that one was arrested by the state, because in the absence of regulations, one agency believed “what is not permitted is forbidden,” another “what is not forbidden is permitted,” and in reality, the crypto ATM owners simply lacked sufficiently strong protection).

In El Salvador, a business owner, for the most part, does not care whether a client pays in dollars or Bitcoin. The exchange spread in the BTC/USDT pair is negligible, and the exchange between USDT and dollar cash is also likely carried out with minimal commissions. Thus, an entrepreneur can easily transfer money from one form to another literally on the fly, based on their preference for which form is more convenient for storing value.

And what about Montenegro? An entrepreneur has the right to accept only euros, in cash or non-cash form. If, instead of euros, he accepts anything else, for example, Bitcoin, he must put the euro equivalent of the received values from his own stash into the cash register, otherwise, the state will issue him a massive fine. This means he needs tools for convenient conversion. The exchange spread in the BTC/EUR pair is slightly higher than in the pair with the dollar, but tolerable. However, there is no sufficiently liquid euro-pegged stablecoin in existence; everyone uses dollar stables. And in order to withdraw money from an exchange to a bank card, one needs to have a bank card and a bank that will not block such an operation. Thus, for our potential Bitcoin maximalist, it would be more reliable to find some kind of money changer who will buy his bitcoins for euro cash, and then the entrepreneur can use the acquired euro cash to put into his own cash register and tell the state: here, look, I sold my stuff for euros and am ready to report to you. The commission for such street exchange is about 5%, and the daily exchange rate of Bitcoin relative to the euro also fluctuates freely by about the same amount, so on an unlucky day, you can lose a lot of money.

Of course, when calculating things yesterday, there were no problems with telling each other prices in Bitcoin and settling with it. In fact, for large deals, we regularly do exactly that, because there aren’t many maniacs willing to hold large sums in fiat; Bitcoin is the savings tool. But imagine a gathering in a restaurant. Seven people walked around for three hours, racked up a bill of two hundred euros, and the owner wouldn’t even think about splitting the check because, by local customs, one person always pays. You could, of course, open calculators and start calculating: here this unfortunate owner of a two-hundred-euro note pays for everyone, the Bitcoin to Euro exchange rate is such-and-such, so now let him issue an invoice in Lightning to each drinking companion for the Bitcoin equivalent of the debt expressed in euros. Very damn convenient, especially when everyone is tipsy.

Therefore, we simply invented our own Euro stablecoin and started using it, primarily for these kinds of small mutual settlements. And so that the counterparty would willingly accept these tokens, some project participants took on a free social burden—the obligation to exchange EURMTL for EuroCash for anyone who wishes, without a commission. It is a heavy burden. I, for example, do not dare take on such obligations for any significant amount, because it would require freezing my own capital in EuroCash and EURMTL, and the mere prospect of having so much money sitting not in Bitcoin simply makes me sick.

I hope I have managed to make it clear that maintaining the EURMTL infrastructure is not a profit for the issuer, but an expense. For what purpose does it incur them? The issuer of mules is the Montelibero investment fund. Naturally, it would not build such an impressive and costly infrastructure for the free exchange of mules for cash and back just to provide the Montelibero community members with a tool for splitting a cafe bill. The main purpose of the infrastructure is to make it convenient for people to buy fund shares and receive dividends on them. Why not conduct all settlements in Bitcoin? Because the fund, by attracting investments, invests them into local businesses. A local business, having received investments in any currency, will be forced to convert them into euros to spend on its subsequent operating activities. It will also receive its profits in euros. Under these conditions, fixing a business’s debt obligations in Bitcoin means predetermining its future bankruptcy, as the long-term growth rate of Bitcoin’s exchange rate exceeds the income of almost any business.

Of course, the upcoming hyperbitcoinization will mean a transition to ubiquitous settlements in Bitcoin, but it will also mean a significant decrease in the growth rate of Bitcoin’s purchasing power; for now, during this transition period, it is necessary to conduct settlements and hold some reserves in currencies whose long-term value is decreasing.

Now let’s talk about the risks of direct intervention by the Montenegrin state in the Montelibero tokenomics by declaring any tokenized liabilities as securities, the circulation of which requires approval from the state financial regulator.

Yes, for some time the global trend was exactly this, and it was reflected in the fact that the US jurisdiction was becoming increasingly toxic for cryptocurrencies. What did this lead to? To the ruling party suffering a crushing defeat in all branches of government under the promises of its opponents to significantly deregulate the industry. I foresee a substantial reduction in the powers of the US Securities and Exchange Commission regarding cryptocurrencies, European regulators following suit in the same vein, and a complete loss of interest from the Montenegrin regulator in the relevant sphere, because it is no longer fashionable.

Let’s assume, however, that instead of following American trends, the EU and Montenegro fall, say, under China’s influence. They ban cryptocurrencies or subject them to a large number of regulations. It is clear that in this case, any crypto enthusiasts in Montenegro will feel just as nervous as, say, marijuana sellers. In other words, only a handful of people will be held accountable for this undoubtedly prohibited business, purely to demonstrate that the state is working hard in this direction. Naturally, in this case, Montelibero will have to move its entire infrastructure from the simple, convenient, cheap, but very transparent Stellar to some other blockchain. We have already had experience working with tokens on the Liquid sidechain. It was a terrible hassle, but better than nothing.

There will be no need for me to compensate Montelibero tokenomics participants for their financial losses; instead, I will have to participate in developing manuals for transitioning to systems with higher levels of privacy. I do not have the resources to do this in advance, but I consider such a scenario highly unlikely. Even if it were implemented, we would most likely just pause the tokenomics until a new solution is developed, and in the meantime, we will make do with Lightning payments.

To summarize.

  1. Montelibero tokenomics has evolved along an evolutionary path, following the real needs of the community more closely than the theoretical considerations of Bitcoin maximalists.
  2. Montelibero tokenomics will easily restructure either for settlements in Bitcoin under an optimistic hyperbitcoinization scenario, or for the use of secure mutual obligation accounting schemes under a pessimistic scenario of a sharp increase in state regulatory control.

Greetings to Franz Oppenheimer

Today in MTL-City, the development of the business accelerator under the Monteliberro investment fund was discussed. The head has changed there; the new one is currently taking over, trying to understand what he has gotten himself into, and estimating what to do about it.

Based on the results of the discussion, it seems to have become clear that the focus should not be on attracting new businesses, but on auditing those already invested in, either to ensure everything is fine there or to guess how to steer things out of trouble.

But that is just a side note. I simply want to share a thought that I voiced at this meeting.

When the Monteliberro project was just starting, a study was conducted on why Montenegro was the best place for its launch. It pointed to many favorable factors. The country is small, multinational, has sea access, and has democracy—it has everything so that Russians could come and carry out political transformations toward freedom and, to start with, achieve a powerful economic rise. In fact, it turned out that a small country means a tiny consumer market. That the absence of unconditional dominance by the Montenegrin national majority means the impossibility of obtaining citizenship. That sea access helps nothing in terms of the economy, because the country is effectively walled off by high tariffs on almost everything. And that no one will let Russians carry out any political transformations here; the citizens fight among themselves and change governments every two years, and to step into the line of fire under such conditions is an extremely foolish decision.

Therefore, essentially, the only reason for Rus to go to Montenegro now is that Montelibero is here. Yes, the location might not have been the most ideal choice, but we have already invested here, have already achieved significant success, and now other places are definitely worse. It turned out just like with Israel: the location there isn’t great, and the neighbors are aggressive, but once the Jews had already arrived and built so much, it truly made sense for those for whom it was all being built to go specifically there.

As for the motto of the updated Montelibero business accelerator, it has become “economy without politics.” A sort of return to libertarian classics.

What do you think about DOGE? Isn’t it true that creating a ministry to reduce ministries is an extremely efficient idea?

Anonymous question

The irony is quite understandable; however, we have the example of Argentina before our eyes: Milei also created a structure in charge of deregulation, and the reduction of the state apparatus there is indeed in full swing. And he doesn’t even have a parliamentary majority yet, whereas in the USA, the problem of passing necessary laws is theoretically much easier to solve.

Of course, we don’t even have an approximate idea of what pitfalls the American deep state hides—that’s why it’s called “deep.” However, it seems to me a good sign that the new department has been allocated very little time for everything, only until 2026, which means they will act quickly. The state machinery of sabotage is quite cumbersome, and there is indeed some chance to overcome its resistance while riding the momentum. Especially if acting in many directions at once, cutting through everything that can be reduced right now from what was planned, and letting what cannot be reduced wait for another convenient opportunity.

Many also snicker at the Ramaswamy/Musk duumvirate, but here there seems to be a fairly logical division of labor, where the former provides analytics, media support, and, if necessary, money, while the latter knows which bureaucrats to talk to and about what to ensure that orders stall less. Will they undermine each other? I doubt it. Musk was born outside the USA and therefore cannot have presidential ambitions; he doesn’t need political points at all. Viveck Ramaswamy, on the other hand, if he decides to run for president in three-plus years, will desperately need a story of maximum constructive cooperation with Musk, so he will lick his boots if necessary.

That’s how I see it. Forgive me for my perhaps excessive naivety and optimism; after all, political analysis is not my field, I am more used to writing fan fiction regarding politics.

How the terrible and uncomfortable fortress city of Kowloon turned out to be an extremely attractive place for people to live

Until 1993, the Kowloon Walled City existed in Hong Kong. Its defining feature was the actual absence of government authority. This became possible because, during the transfer of land from the United Kingdom to China in 1898, a small area of 2.6 hectares containing the fortress was not included in the agreement. It became a Chinese enclave, but later, as it turned out, China withdrew its troops from there. Consequently, this territory became controlled by no one.

After World War II, people began to settle in the Kowloon territory en masse, and by the early 1990s, its population reached 50,000 people, making it the most densely populated place in the world. The entire area was densely built up with buildings. Of course, this place suffered from poor sanitation and a lack of space; one could only breathe fresh air on the rooftops, and visually, it was a terrifying place. Furthermore, in the 50s and 60s, the area was controlled by criminal gangs. Nevertheless, people actively moved there for permanent residence. How did this happen?

Kowloon was a place where state regulations and taxes were absent. Although gangs and drug trafficking were widespread there initially, by the 70s, Hong Kong police had begun conducting raids and flushing them out. The population of Kowloon also took up the eradication of drug trafficking and violence. A practice even developed where if someone committed a crime, that person was simply thrown out of the city, where they would quickly fall into the hands of the Hong Kong police. Former residents of Kowloon themselves claim that the place was safe. And for the most part, the state still did not interfere in the life of Kowloon, which meant that after the disappearance of the bandits, business flooded in and the place began to prosper.

A cohesive society also emerged in Kowloon, where residents helped each other in everything. This included the appearance of kindergartens, schools, clinics, and charitable organizations, which required no laws or regulations to exist. Along with the presence of diverse businesses that sought out Kowloon due to the lack of taxes and regulations—causing even residents of the rest of Hong Kong to frequently visit to purchase cheap goods and services—all of this made the Walled City an attractive place to live, despite all its seemingly most serious drawbacks.

As we can see, the assertion that people are willing to sacrifice freedom and give a significant portion of their money to the state just to live in comfortable conditions with spacious streets, good ecology, parks, and all possible amenities, is not all that well-founded, since Kowloon—which provided no comfort but gave complete freedom in how to live, earn, and manage one’s means—attracted so many people, even though the comfortable “city of the future,” Hong Kong, was within walking distance. In fact, all such amenities could have existed in a place like Kowloon if it weren’t for territorial limitations. Furthermore, security was provided in Kowloon, not least due to the efforts of the residents of the walled city themselves. Although there was police intervention in the 70s, they were not present there on a regular basis and mainly only took in criminals who had already been expelled from the city. Kowloon was not some kind of “violent ancap,” as some might claim. The Kowloon ancap was quite safe and non-violent.

Of course, Kowloon was ultimately destroyed by violence—external violence from a stationary bandit, even if the latter had previously helped in getting rid of internal violence. That is why it is important to eradicate all forms of violence, including having some serious means to neutralize external aggressors, rather than relying on the hope that “good” aggressors will only catch “bad” aggressors without ever interfering in the lives of peaceful people.

Voluntarist, Bitarch

How is the culture of libertarian political thinking structured?

Rinat Enikeev

Politics is how collective actions are customarily carried out in a given community. Political thinking is a complex of ideas and evaluations concerning politics. Libertarian political thinking is political thinking determined by libertarian principles. The culture of libertarian political thinking is how it is reproduced and promoted.

Now the full definition: the culture of libertarian political thinking is how the complex of ideas and evaluations regarding how collective actions are customarily carried out in society, determined by libertarian principles, is reproduced and promoted. How is this culture structured?

In modern society, politics very rarely corresponds to libertarian principles, so a libertarian usually involuntarily shuns politics. In what cases will they not shun it?

First, the collective action must be voluntary for its participants. Rallies by quota, mandatory elections, and the like will be sabotaged by a libertarian whenever possible.

Second, the collective action must pursue an obvious benefit for its participants. A libertarian is unlikely to be inclined to pull chestnuts out of the fire for others.

Third, collective action may involve causing harm only if it is intended to restore justice. Lynching or street clashes with police committing illegal acts may well fit into libertarian political thinking. Pogroms—unlikely.

How are all these values reproduced and promoted? Like many other cultural ideas: through personal example, references to successful political actions, and campaigning.

The channel is changing its format

First, I want to inform you that the epub of the Network State has been re-uploaded — there was a dynamic gif that e-readers didn’t recognize, so it had to be replaced with a static png.

Leaving my job finally happened, and now I want to devote more time to my channel. However, it turned out that in its current form, it burdens me more than anything, which is why posts appear rarely and without much enthusiasm. Therefore, the main thing I want to achieve now is to start enjoying it again. In this regard, I plan to run it differently. Instead of rare articles that barely fit into the format of a standard Telegram post, there will be frequent notes, usually without images — just certain thoughts that I want to share with readers. In the coming days, I will try to return to daily posts, just to establish the habit, and we’ll see where it goes from there.

I don’t intend to descend entirely into a blog format; I have Instagram for that. It is also possible that not every post will now be duplicated across all social networks, we’ll see.

Let me know in the comments which topics of notes would be most interesting to you.

How they try to deceive us into thinking that humans are supposedly cruel by nature

Once, Mexican anthropologist Santiago Genovés decided to conduct an experiment that journalists dubbed the “sex raft.” Along with himself, he placed on a small raft intended to cross the Atlantic Ocean 5 men and 6 women, who were strangers to one another and belonged to different races and social classes. The stated goal was to study the behavior of people placed in an extreme situation.

However, Genovés was convinced that humans are extremely aggressive by nature and expected an outbreak of cruelty and debauchery during the experiment. Not waiting for this to happen, he began to stage provocations himself. For example, he repeatedly tried to turn the crew against a specific individual, or publicly announced details from the questionnaires previously filled out by the participants, which he considered embarrassing and provocative. He even documented non-existent cruelty—for instance, he described the participants’ hunt for a shark to prepare food as “mob madness.” There were also constant various problems on the raft, such as leaks, a broken compass, and a lack of radio communication for several weeks. Nevertheless, no real violence occurred, and the people did not fight with one another. If the experiment participants hated anyone during this time, it was only Genovés himself, who remained extremely dissatisfied with the results of the experiment.

Another interesting story concerns a group of 6 Polynesian boys who, through foolishness, spent 15 months on a small uninhabited island. This story was discovered by writer Rutger Bregman, who did not like the gloominess of William Golding’s novel “Lord of the Flies.” In that novel, children stranded on an uninhabited island quickly reverted to a savage way of life and even began killing other children who disliked what was happening. Bregman decided to look for similar stories, but in real life, and reality turned out to be much more optimistic. The Polynesian boys on the uninhabited island were able to establish a system of relationships that precluded conflict and worked together to ensure survival.

These cases once again show that there are no grounds to consider humans to be creatures cruel by nature. We are often tried to be convinced of this by dubious personalities such as Henovés himself, but everything they say is simply a lie. Although, unfortunately, sometimes lies become popular. This refers to the Milgram experiment, which contained many methodological errors and had most of its results hidden from the public, yet what was actually published succeeded quite effectively in deceiving the public about the willingness of the average individual to inflict any pain on others at the command of an authority figure. It also refers to the Stanford prison experiment, which turned out to be a setup with a predetermined result from the very beginning, and the truthfulness of which the public believed for 50 years, until the archival data was thoroughly studied. Their organizers, Stanley Milgram and Philip Zimbardo, also apparently seemed inclined, even before organizing their experiments, to believe that most people are easily capable of initiating violence. And their deception proved far more successful than the attempts to deceive everyone by someone like Henovés.

Voluntarist, Bitarch