Dating apps – the market crash we were so afraid of?

It is clear that incentives in commercial dating apps do not always align with the expectations of clients and society as a whole (to quickly find a spouse and never use the app again). They have to keep the business afloat somehow. What else is there to hope for if not some government uncle, a state-approved dating site, and standing in an electronic queue for a “wife voucher”? Perhaps philanthropy, as a stopgap for awkward moments in a market economy—that Musk will create a less mindless dating app for us that will get family formation and birth rates back on their feet?

Saddam Hussein’s rotating aluminum pipes

Let’s go through the problem you’ve outlined. People want to meet, and the market monetizes the fulfillment of this desire. People want to meet for different purposes and in different manners, so the market is naturally segmented.

Online dating services theoretically allow a user to quickly obtain information about people with complementary needs and to meet more purposefully. After going through enough options, a spherical client in a vacuum finds a suitable partner, after which they move to communicating via less specialized tools, leaving the dating service. This is unprofitable for the service creators; they are interested in the client returning again and again, and, of course, purchasing a premium subscription. As long as dating apps have not gone out of style, this model works quite well; people really do return. Furthermore, since the market is already quite saturated, the success of dating apps cannot be linked to simply attracting new clients; it is precisely that the use of these apps has managed to become a lifestyle for a fairly broad segment of people. I am not one of them, so I do not claim to provide a deep analysis—I am simply noting their existence.

Of course, there are those who have not succeeded in using dating apps. The reasons can vary. The most banal is that the process of meeting itself can be perceived by some people as a source of intense stress. They are not opposed to finding a partner in life, and would even settle for a fading interest after a year, after which they would need to find a new one, but they will do this as rarely as possible, and are certainly not ready for a queue of candidates from which they must choose, say, one and reject the rest. And they are even less ready for a series of rejections or being ignored. If every failed encounter becomes a reason for serious distress, then an app capable of providing dozens of such experiences a day turns out to be a hellish invention that drives a person into the depths of depression and from which one should stay far away.

Of course, psychological difficulties are not the only reason for not using fast-dating services. A person may have certain preferences regarding a prospective partner and the method of meeting them that simply do not fit into the typical application scenario of an app.

So, does it turn out that there are tons of people in the world who wish to meet, but this desire cannot be monetized through specialized mass-market apps? Yes. There are tons of people who happily buy fast food, and tons of people who do not consider this option at all because for them it is: too shabby, too expensive, too unhealthy, too anything else—in short, it doesn’t fit. But these bastards eat something! Yes, and these bastards meet somewhere, even if they don’t have a Pure account.

But the author of the question is not concerned with getting everyone hooked on fast-dating. On the contrary, they likely believe that fast-dating kills marriages, childbirth, and the replenishment of the taxpayer ranks. I find this concern baseless. Mises once wrote that it is foolish to blame an entrepreneur for producing guns instead of butter; this only means that investments in guns are more profitable. However, he will gladly switch to butter when the conjuncture changes, so it is foolish to blame him for starting wars just to sell more guns—that is the prerogative of politicians, who are, of course, always happy to blame entrepreneurs for their own ignoble dealings. And while many may wish to dispute this thesis regarding guns, claiming that dating app creators are to blame for the decline in birth rates is a bit too much. At the very least, the dates don’t match; the second demographic transition began much earlier. So this is merely a symptom: people want fast encounters—here is a service for fast encounters. People have always wanted fast encounters; they just used to pick each other up in bars or even hit on each other in the streets, and now apps have not only greatly simplified their lives but also saved a lot of people from random harassment.

OK, but people also need strong, exclusive relationships, not just fast and disposable ones, so where is the app for finding them? Why is this need not being monetized?

Fine, let me imagine how I would monetize the need for people to establish strong family relationships in the IT sphere if I had access to serious capital. I would create a service that provides a person with a personal AI advisor, which can be configured to support a certain type of relationship. To start, you simply communicate with it, send it your favorite books and movies, discuss them, tell it what you value in relationships and what you cannot stand—and this in itself is a consumer benefit, allowing one to better realize their needs and learn how to communicate them. But the assistant also communicates with other clients. At some point, it might ask, “Are you acquainted with so-and-so? Great guy, and it seems he might suit you.” You ask the assistant questions about the proposed candidate, the assistant asks questions about you, and at some point the AI confidant reports: “You know, when he read about you, he became interested, and it seems he’s not opposed to meeting. Maybe we should start a three-way chat?”

And now, you are communicating directly, but the confidant is invisibly with you, and you can still privately discuss the details of your communication with it. Then you meet, grow closer, and at some point decide to join your destinies. And here you receive an offer: why remain in the general database, wouldn’t it be better to take care of privacy? And you rent a personal server where your confidant moves with all the knowledge about you. It continues to care for the well-being of your marriage, and you continue to pay for the service. At this stage, the company no longer receives your data and limits itself to model updates and technical support.

Such a monetization model is anything but fast food. For lovers of fast dating, all this is too troublesome, expensive, and excessive. Therefore, there is no danger that you will be pushed toward people looking for a one-time hookup; on the contrary, only virtuous husband candidates. Right at this stage, one could hit their forehead and shout: “Aha, I have an excellent candidate to implement all this magnificence,” and push him toward Dobroum. But I am a libertarian, not some conservative, so let’s think further.

It may very well turn out that you prefer open relationships, or even polyamorous ones. At this point, we lose Dobroum as a potential founder of our startup, as well as the possibility of government grants. Nevertheless, I see no reason why an AI confidant could not serve cute polyamorous kittens, same-sex couples, and all others: as long as they have a need for long-term, stable, ecological relationships based on love and trust in each other, this need can be monetized using the proposed tool. But, of course, the more exotic the kitten, the harder it will be for them to find that very partner or group of partners. However, as the service grows, simply by the theory of probability, options will appear for them as well.

Thus, the market will once again make the world more beautiful.

Hardening of character or a lifelong trauma?

There is a traditional opinion: a boy needs to “harden” his character to grow into a full-fledged man and be ready for life. Following this position, or simply using it as a justification for violence, some abusive fathers deliberately harm their sons. Victims encounter this form of violence at a very early age, which makes it important to examine.

At the core of such an approach is the belief that a boy must grow up to be tough, insensitive, aggressive, and dominant, and that any manifestations of vulnerability, emotionality, and softness allegedly make him weak and unable to survive in society. However, a recent article published on the Psychology Today website correctly notes how such “upbringing” actually only causes serious damage to the child’s mental and emotional development.

The methods used for such “hardening” include physical “punishments,” psychological pressure, humiliation, and intimidation. A child may be forced to participate in aggressive or painful activities, or encouraged to fight or engage in excessively harsh sports such as boxing, martial arts, and even American football. Simultaneously, he is required to suppress his emotions—especially fear, sadness, and affection. The boy is taught not to cry, not to complain, and not to show weakness, forming an internal belief that sensitivity is something shameful. These practices may be accompanied by direct instructions on what a “real man” should be.

It is important to understand: such actions cannot be justified by “good intentions,” partly because in practice they are often used by the abuser purely for personal interests, as a method of control and dominance over family members. A son may be used as a tool—for example, to strengthen the father’s power, exert pressure on the mother, or pass on the same beliefs and behavioral models to the next generation, making violence an inherent trait of the family. Abusive fathers also tend to destroy the bond between the son and mother, which is crucial for psychological development and a sense of security.

The consequences of such actions for the child’s emotional development are very profound. The constant suppression of feelings leads to the child stopping the recognition of his own emotions and the emotions of other people. His capacity for empathy decreases, and difficulties with self-regulation and the expression of experiences arise. In the future, this may manifest as emotional detachment, an inability to build close relationships, and outbursts of uncontrollable aggression.

Ultimately, the boy may begin to identify with the aggressor and adopt his model of behavior. He is deprived of the ability to build healthy relationships, becomes cruel himself, and passes this cruelty on to future generations, forming a closed cycle of violence and traumatic experience. Alternatively, he may suppress himself, leading to anxiety, depression, and low self-esteem. Often, both outcomes blend to some extent. This only decreases, rather than increases, the child’s social adaptability.

Beyond psychological harm, such treatment can lead to physical consequences—injuries, chronic stress, and related health problems. And even if the child is not a direct victim of physical violence, the mere observation of aggression in the family already has a destructive effect on his psyche and health.

Therefore, only one conclusion can be drawn: “hardening” through violence has nothing to do with care or upbringing. It is a form of abuse of power by a domestic tyrant, which destroys the child’s personality and even exacerbates the problem of violence at the societal level. Such practices are simply incompatible with a free, non-violent society, and they must be completely replaced by models of upbringing based on respect, empathy, and the development of emotional resilience not through the suppression of feelings.

Voluntarist, Bitarch

On the Left-Right Deviation

@SperryUNIVAC

The idea for this text has been floating around in my head for quite a while, because I really dislike it when words lose any semblance of meaning and turn into simple labels, like the Blues and the Greens at the Constantinople Hippodrome. What is the difference between them? Well… uh… some are blue because they root for the Blues, and others are green because they root for the Greens, makes sense, right? Patsaks and chatlans, as is well known, are not nationalities, not professions, not races, and not religions; they are simply patsaks and chatlans. In the same way, over the last hundred years or so, the meaning of the words “politically right” and “politically left” has undergone total and absolute erosion. It’s not even that the radical right and radical left essentially do the same thing (shedding rivers of blood / calling for them to be shed), as the famous horseshoe theory teaches us. It’s not even that anyone at all is called “left,” right down to the insane regime of the ayatollahs who hanged communists and gays with crane trucks, while the entire Western LGBTQA+++ agenda is convulsing in paroxysms of passion for HAMAS, ISIS, and other Islamic cannibals. The point is that these words have literally, completely, and entirely lost their original meaning (and quite some time ago), yet they have failed to acquire a new one.

Back in 1945, the famous “Nazi Pope” Pius XII (theoretically an ultra-right Catholic conservative), together with Juan Perón (theoretically a left-wing progressive reformer), were together saving Nazis (who are generally considered ultra-right by the public for some reason, though in fact they are further left than Stalin) from Stalin (theoretically an ultra-leftist, at least that is how the West sold him in horror stories about the “red menace” to capitalism). Since then, the question has not become clearer; on the contrary, it has only become more confused, because liberation theology appeared (a left-wing Latin American version of essentially right-wing Catholicism), the People’s Mujahideen (a left-wing Iranian version of essentially right-wing Islam, successfully wiped out by the insane Shiites), and there are left-libertarians (which in itself seems like an oxymoron).

Putin is supported by the same left-wing American woke establishment that supports HAMAS (despite the fact that half of this establishment are neither left nor right, but rainbow-colored, and in Russia you get imprisoned for that, but for them Putin is still the Great Left Leader because he is against the damned America), yet their embodied vox populi — the US Democratic Party — for some reason fought Russia far more fiercely than the supposedly right-wing Trump (simultaneously, moreover, championing transgender transitions for children from age five, unlimited migration, and 56 gender pronouns). Again, if old-school right-wingers, including libertarian icons like Cecil Rhodes, Rockefeller, or Carnegie, looked at all this, they would have unleashed their Gatling guns.

In short, using the adjectives “left” and “right” at present is completely, utterly, absolutely meaningless. They convey exactly zero information because they don’t even work as political labels: we hear “right-wing” and don’t understand if he is for Volodya Pu, or for Khamenei, or for Andrew Jackson (the founder of the Democratic Party, by the way), or for Trump, or perhaps for Hitler or Netanyahu. As we can see, the only thing all these characters have in common is their membership in Homo sapiens.

Of course, a devout libertarian will exclaim that we have long been aware of these problems, and we have long had a solution for them! It is our beloved Political Compass by David Nolan, a libertarian himself and therefore possessing typical libertarian cognitive biases. Firstly, he naturally placed himself in the most prestigious square of “right-wing individualists,” tossing everything tasty in there — personal freedom and freedom of entrepreneurship. Secondly, like all libertarians, he is obsessed with economics, because libertarianism was born as an opposition to Marxism, a movement designed to lash capitalism from a scientific and ethical standpoint, relying specifically on economics. Consequently, to lash communism as effectively as Marx hit capitalism, libertarians were forced to concentrate on the exact same thing. Bob Black, I recall, in one of his scandalous essays called this labor fetishism: the very idea that for both capitalists and communists, the message has not changed in 150 years; they are still obsessed with only one thing — who owns the labor.

Accordingly, Nolan could not have excluded the problem of labor from his diagram simply by definition, otherwise he would not have been a capitalist; however, the result turned out to be extremely unsatisfactory. Why is that? Because both extreme idealist an-caps and genuine state sharks of capitalism, whom libertarians pray to, ended up in his favorite corner: all these Rockefellers, Morgans, gold cufflinks with a dollar sign, etc., etc., who not only spat on the personal freedom of their workers (Ford went as far as prying into everything: who they sleep with and how, whether they go to church, play cards, or swear), but also relied on the state, lived in a touching synergy with it, and had no desire at all to abolish it (like Theodore Vail, the father of the AT&T communications monopoly, which was made possible only thanks to the state).

And here is where the funniest part comes out: formally, according to Nolan, there is simply nowhere to put them! There is not a single cell for cynical bastards who spat on any ideologies (and the American robber barons were as much libertarians as Stalin was) and simply sought power. Well, Rockefeller, let’s say, considered himself a good WASP, was a Baptist fanatic, went to church every Sunday (and many hyper-capitalists of that era did too), but this is the common legacy of Calvinism: if you are rich, you are blessed, so become rich and disregard everything else. The nightmarish Dutch V.O.C., the first transnational corporation in history, slaughtered more people in Indonesia than Pol Pot did in Cambodia, and its Heren XVII (Seventeen Lords, an omnipotent board of directors that had its own private army and fleet, minted its own currency, and declared war on states) were good Calvinists and people who deeply believed in the righteousness of their actions; nevertheless, they acted quite rationally, selfishly, and cold-bloodedly, suffering from no excess of idealism; their only true god was profit.

Accordingly, I propose to finally send these labels to the dustbin of history and not use them for anything other than what they were historically intended for, i.e., describing the sessions of the National Assembly of the Great French Revolution. Attempts to fix the Nolan scheme by adding extra dimensions can also be considered unsuccessful, as the scheme becomes cluttered, and it doesn’t become any clearer where our left and right are. What can replace it that is closer to reality? Two new, simpler, and more logical axes. Horizontally, we will plot Idealism (faith in dogma, utopia, a higher goal) against Cynicism/Realpolitik/Social Darwinism (pragmatism, cold calculation, survival, profit). Vertically, we will take the Will to Power (control, suppression, hierarchy) against a generalized Drive for Freedom (decentralization and personal autonomy). This is a broad and integral criterion, because a person might, for example, advocate for freedom of religion but oppose the freedom to use drugs; in such a case, we would not recognize them as being high enough on this scale. This thesis was most simply formulated once by the famous anarchist mathematician Verbitsky: “If you want freedom, demand freedom for Nazis, pedophiles, homosexuals, everyone. Because people are divided into supporters of freedom and opponents. Those who do not love freedom do not need freedom anyway. And those who love freedom have earned it.”

This compass finally stitches up the holes in political science that we mentioned above, because it evaluates politicians not by their slogans (“for the workers” or “for capital”), but by their psychotype, motivation, and actual method of action.

Let’s see what this gives us in practice. Into the quadrant of powerful cynics and pragmatists of total control, Joseph Stalin and John Rockefeller will fly in like they belong there and settle side-by-side (as well as all the robber barons, from Armour, Morgan, and Gould to Ford, Carnegie, Vail, and Thomas Watson), along with Cecil Rhodes, Mussolini, and Saddam Hussein. All of them wanted only power for power’s sake, stability, and personal triumph. Utopias do not interest them; they use them only as a screen for the masses. The main thing is the efficiency of the system and total control over resources. Benchmarks and regulars of this sector are also the Venetian Signoria, the father of Realpolitik Otto von Bismarck, both ruling parties of the USA, and Latin American dictators almost across the board — from Perón and Batista to Pinochet. Thatcher, Indira Gandhi, Nasser, and Marshal Tito also fit here. Many figures of the Third Reich who did not suffer from fanaticism will also end up here, such as the completely honest epicurean, sybarite, corrupt official, cynic, and drug addict Göring (“I decide for myself who is a Jew to me”) and the technocrat Speer (“just let me build something already”), as well as Dönitz, Guderian, and other commanders.

Into the most terrifying quadrant — the powerful idealists and butchers of utopia — will go Pol Pot, Ayatollah Khomeini, Robespierre, Savonarola, the leadership of ISIS, Calvin, and similar figures. These are people obsessed with a great idea (building communism, a Caliphate, the Kingdom of God), for the sake of which they are ready to burn millions of people. Power for them is a tool for reshaping humanity. Many traditionally left-wingers also fall here, from Karl Marx to Castro, Ho Chi Minh, and Che Guevara. With some stretching, Napoleon Bonaparte will settle here too (though closer to the border with cynicism). He sincerely believed in Reason, Progress, and the Code, and believed he was building an orderly, secular, advanced world, rid of medieval chaos. For the sake of this beautiful legal empire, he put millions of people in the ground and subordinated all of Europe. Mao is the true titan of this quadrant. Unlike Stalin, who was a pragmatic manager, Mao was a fanatical ideologue. He was not concerned with the stability of the state or the economy; he believed in the utopia of the new communist man until the very end. Enver Hoxha and Ceausescu are of a much smaller caliber, but they also reside here. On the border with the Free Idealists, the Fabians and utopian socialists like Bernard Shaw, Herbert Wells, and other Saint-Simonians will settle. Almost all of them believed that society should be rigidly and totally controlled by the state, and managed by an expert elite of scientist-officials. Many of them (including Shaw) openly admired Stalin and Mussolini for their abilities as “efficient managers.” We will also find Hitler here, although his utopia was pure madness (like many other utopias), along with his main priests — Himmler and Goebbels.

Into the quadrant of Free Idealists and romantics of autonomy will go people such as Diogenes of Sinope, early Christians before they became a state church, Mahatma Gandhi, Leo Tolstoy, the hippies of the 1960s. They believe in a beautiful, just future or in absolute morality, but categorically reject the apparatus of violence, the state, and coercion, and want people to come to freedom voluntarily. Many sincere libertarians with their NAP also fall here. They all idealize human nature and believe that if oppression (state, taxes, army) is removed, people will organize themselves into beautiful, peaceful communities. Due to the lack of will to power, this quadrant is historically defenseless — its representatives are usually the first to be put to the knife by Powerful Idealists or subordinated by Powerful Cynics. Mikhail Bakunin fiercely hated the state in any form and fell out with Marx, brilliantly predicting that if the Marxists came to power, they would build the most terrible tyranny in history. But Bakunin was an idealist: he believed that one only needs to light the fuse of a general revolt for people to unite on their own into free federations without any coercion, so he also falls here. Nestled next to him are Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the anarchist prince Peter Kropotkin, perhaps the most noble and pure free idealist. He sincerely believed that without a state, people would live in absolute harmony, sharing everything necessary according to the principle of anarcho-communism.

The most adequate, from my point of view, is the last quadrant, the Free Cynics and pragmatists of freedom. They passionately want freedom for themselves and their group, but they have no illusions about humanity. They do not believe in the brotherhood of man or a bright future. They understand that the world is cruel and selfish, and they build freedom on the basis of pure pragmatism. This includes the more militant wing of libertarians, cypherpunks and crypto-anarchists, Father Makhno, the pirates of the 17th-century Caribbean, and the authors of the US Constitution. They do not try to build a utopia, but try to carve out a piece of freedom for themselves in this bleak world. This also includes outstanding practitioners of anarchy, such as Ross Ulbricht and even, in part, Ayn Rand. She is often mistakenly placed with the conservatives, but she despised them. Rand is a free cynic in the purest sense. No “brotherhood of man,” no altruism and self-sacrifice (in this, she saw the very root of fascism and communism). Society, according to Rand, should consist of tough, independent egoists who interact exclusively through a free market and capitalist exchange, where no one owes anyone anything.

As usual, for a theory to be working, it must explain the shortcomings of the previous one, and the new compass well covers all the shortcomings of the old one. It instantly explains why modern woke activists find a common language so easily with ISIS and Iran, when on the traditional compass they are at opposite poles. Simply because both have a sacred dogma and a colossal will to power; psychologically, they are blood brothers. Stalin and Rockefeller are completely identical here — they are simply two managers managing human cattle, while Pol Pot and Khomeini are two mad prophets who decided that they have the right to remake this cattle. Marx and Bakunin were comrades in the First International, but Marx moved into the upper quadrant of Powerful Idealists, while Bakunin, conversely, moved into the lower one — Free Idealists, and they became mortal enemies. Rockefeller and Ayn Rand are considered icons of capitalism. But Rockefeller (a Powerful Cynic) destroyed the free market, creating a monopoly with the help of state regulation and bribes, while Rand (a Free Cynic) considered such monopolists to be traitors to capitalism and parasites on the body of free creators.

Citizen Vigilante

In the following text, I assume that everyone has already seen the movie and formed their own opinion, and if not, it doesn’t matter much whether you watch it before or after reading this text.

Reviews often call the film a piece of propaganda, a pamphlet, or a political manifesto. That is not the case. What we have here is an instructional film. It does not criticize the current state of affairs. It provides instructions on how to act and what is needed for that. Here are the narratives that need to be transmitted: if you are a vigilante; if you saw a news story about a vigilante; if you are a TV presenter talking about a vigilante; if you are a witness being questioned by the police about a vigilante. No wide field of opinions is given — only clear, correct answers; the viewer must not be confused, they need clear instructions. The key message is: look, I’m showing you how it’s done. Later, you will do it yourself. This is the only take that is repeated several times in the film, including right at the curtain call.

A successful vigilante needs: to have combat skills, a stable source of income, the ability to articulate their position, neatness and attention to detail, to demonstrate professional integrity, and not to leave the regime with hostages in the form of family members, sticking to superficial connections; always offer simple executors on the opponent’s side to retreat, and shoot only in case of refusal. Outsiders need: to express a clear public demand, saying, “it’s cool that there are such people, we need them very much in such-and-such a country.” Journalists need: to hammer the public and the establishment with the question, “should our system protect victims of violence or criminals? And if it handles criminals poorly, then why hinder those who handle them better? Or are you in favor of more crime?” Witnesses need: while demonstrating a willingness to cooperate, to sabotage police actions to capture the vigilante.

A separate important feedback mechanism is shown, which is necessary for the vigilante to remain within the framework of the public demand, without replacing it with personal notions of morality. The main character always asks the victim if they are satisfied with the procedures of restoring justice already carried out. And only when the victim states that they are not satisfied do they give the vigilante sanction to act. However, a vigilante can, of course, search for injustice directly perceived through the senses in order to correct it immediately. To do this, he simply needs not to move around the city in a Batmobile, but to occasionally use public transport, walk, drop by bars, and so on. In short, not to be detached from life.

With that, I will end the general conclusions and move on to various sweet details.

The film takes place in a kind of averaged Europe, but from the visuals, it is obvious that it is Croatia. It is clear why. First, Croatia is almost devoid of the shortcomings that the main character fights against: it is an almost mono-ethnic and quite racist society, without a painful law-abidance drilled into its citizens. In short, Uwe Boll is using the sacred right of a Soviet citizen to shout on Red Square that Reagan is an idiot. Second, the target audience of the film is not Americans at all, and for them, all European countries look more or less the same. Third, those who are slightly familiar with regional specifics can get an extra laugh out of this.

For example, it is precisely in light of Croatian specifics that the episode in the brothel acquires additional meaning. The girl is unaware of why mold is appearing on the walls, which means that this is her first winter on the Adriatic. Obviously, in her native Ukraine, this problem does not exist. And for us, this is a clear signal: the author shows that not all migrants are equally harmful; there are useful, hardworking ones, ready to perceive local cultural values, and they need the local specifics to be explained delicately and to be paid honestly for honest work.

There are probably other cool moments, but I will leave you to discover them on your own. The main thing I wanted to say was said at the very beginning. Before you is an instruction. Take note and apply it creatively.

How bats solved the free-rider problem without taxes and prisons

Every time you start a conversation with someone about a voluntary society, you inevitably encounter the trump card of any statist: “But what about the free-rider problem? If people aren’t forced to pay under threat of a club or prison, everyone will just enjoy the benefits, and no one will chip in! Everyone will want to be a free-loader, and society will collapse!” It sounds logical. Yet, an interesting thing happens: in nature, the free-ride problem was solved millions of years ago, and completely voluntarily, without a single tax inspector or ministry of coercion.
 
Let’s look at an unexpected example—vampire bats. Life for these creatures is certainly not a walk in the park. They feed exclusively on blood, and night hunting for large animals is a highly unpredictable business. About a third of the colony returns home empty-handed every night. This is where the harsh mathematics of survival comes into play: if a bat does not eat for three consecutive nights, it dies of hunger. Individually, this species would simply have been wiped off the face of the earth. This means they needed an insurance system. And they created one.
 
When a lucky, well-fed bat returns to the cave, it regurgitates part of the obtained blood to feed a hungry neighbor. From the outside, this might look like a socialist’s dream—from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs. But there is no need to rush to rejoice for the leftists, because we are talking not about a common pot, but about a system of decentralized mutual aid built on reputation.
 
And here we return to the argument of the fans of the “strong hand.” What stops some cunning bat from simply sitting in the cave, squeaking pitifully, collecting tribute from neighbors, but never sharing its own prey? How will that end for it?
 
Bats are far from stupid. They have a disproportionately large neocortex, an excellent memory, and they recognize each other without fail by voice. They practice strictly targeted cooperation. Bats do not dump resources into an abstract fund; they invest in specific social ties. They remember who shared with them and who withheld their prey.
 
If a bat only takes but does not give, its social rating drops to zero. Neighbors simply stop feeling sympathy toward it. The next night when it is unsuccessful and begs for food, its yesterday’s “friends” will simply turn their backs to the wall. Through its dishonest behavior, this bat will kick the bucket without any coercion, bat courts, or prisons!
 
Now for the most interesting part. How does this mechanism work at the level of neurobiology? Evolutionary selection was not tasked with inventing this form of cooperation from scratch. There was already a powerful, perfectly tuned chemical circuit—maternal bonding (the mother’s attachment to the child), which forces an adult individual to spend colossal resources on a helpless offspring and derive pleasure from it. Selection simply took and extended this mechanism to non-related individuals.
 
When a bat shares blood with a neighbor or grooms its fur, its brain is flooded with the same cocktail of oxytocin and dopamine as a mother’s during contact with a child. Oxytocin forms deep attachment and trust, and dopamine reinforces this feeling with powerful pleasure from the very fact of mutual aid.
 
This is why bats, like you and me, help each other not out of cold calculation, but on emotions, which also serve as a biological detector of cheating. If a partner plays a one-way game, oxytocin simply stops being produced in your brain in their presence. The attachment breaks, and you no longer want to help them.
 
Of course, you might say now: “But we aren’t bats; we have millions of people in our society!” And you would be absolutely right, because our brain has a biological limit on the number of social ties it can maintain. However, today we have the tools (institutions and technologies) to scale this natural mechanism to all of humanity. Though, that is a completely different story, which we can discuss in future publications.

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Prediction markets

Just as I started to be glad that I can now post long-form content directly into Telegram, Sperry released a mega-long post that definitely won’t fit anywhere. I even initially thought about posting it on my own website in chapters rather than on a single page, but in the end, I decided not to overcomplicate things.

The scariest part is that he isn’t joking when he calls this a short essay; I also had the chance to hear several historical anecdotes that didn’t make it into the text, and if he wanted to, it could have been significantly longer. I can’t do that!

So: Prediction Markets. A brief essay on libertarianism, rationalism, ludomania, and mathematics. It turned out to be a very interesting mix. For me personally, the essay is useful primarily because it allows me to distinguish more confidently between the spheres of the predictable—and therefore the plannable—and the unpredictable, i.e., that to which one should merely adapt.

The Art of Leaving People Alone: How Libertarianism Was Invented in Ancient China

What if the concept of the free market, spontaneous order, and the minimal state wasn’t devised by Mises, Hayek, or Rothbard, but by guys in robes sipping tea in the mountains of China 2,500 years ago? Does such a claim surprise you? Then today we will talk about Wu Wei—the ancient philosophy of “non-action,” which, of course, does not mean lying on the couch with a beer, but refers to how the Universe (and the economy) works.

What is Wu Wei and what does it have to do with the free market? “Wu Wei” literally translates as “non-action,” but this is a terrible translation that makes Daoists look like slackers. It would be much more accurate to translate it as “action without violence” or “non-interference.” Imagine a surfer. He doesn’t try to beat the ocean with his fists to force the wave to go where he wants (which is how any government behaves). The surfer catches the wave and uses its natural power. He acts, but does not contradict the nature of things. In libertarianism, we call this “spontaneous order.” People, interacting voluntarily, create highly complex systems themselves: languages, money, markets. And a bureaucrat’s attempt to step in with his wrench and standards only breaks the mechanism. The Daoists understood this even before paper was invented.

Let’s transport ourselves to Ancient China (the Warring States period). Complete chaos, kings slaughtering each other over territories. Against this backdrop, the Confucians appear—ancient etatists of a sort. They walk around with tablets saying: “We need more laws! More officials! More subordination and taxes!”. And then Lao Tzu comes along and drops the “base,” which exactly mirrors modern libertarians: “The more prohibitions and restrictions there are in the world, the poorer the people become. The more laws and decrees are issued, the more thieves and robbers appear.”

Lao Tzu argued that the best ruler is one who rules so unobtrusively that the people forget he even exists. The ideal policy according to Wu Wei is to lower taxes, remove prohibitions, and leave people alone. Let them plant rice, trade, and make agreements on their own.

Some might say: “Sounds great in theory, but did it work in practice?” It worked, and brilliantly! Let’s recall recent history: Mao Zedong, wanting to take everything under his control, ordered the destruction of sparrows. A typical example of anti-Wu Wei (“I am smarter than a complex system”). The result: locusts devoured the harvest, and tens of millions of people died of hunger.

Now let’s rewind 2,000 years. The Han Empire (2nd century BC). After the brutal tyranny of the previous Qin dynasty (which tried to control every sneeze and predictably collapsed), Emperors Wen and Jing came to power. They were convinced fans of Daoism. And what did they do?

– Reduced agricultural taxes first to 3%, and then abolished them entirely for 12 years!
– Deregulated the economy, allowing peasants to freely mint coins, extract salt, and smelt iron.
– Abolished repressions for criticizing the authorities and abolished corporal punishment.
– Stopped waging senseless wars and reached agreements with neighbors.
 
The state simply stepped aside. What did this lead to? The economy exploded with growth. The standard of living soared, granaries were overflowing with grain, and the population grew rapidly wealthy. This period is still considered the Golden Age of China. No state plans—just give people freedom, and they will build everything themselves.

By relying on Wu Wei, we can learn two things:

1) Macro-level: Do not believe in saviors. Any political program that promises to “make everything good for everyone” through new prohibitions and regulations is doomed to fail. The system is too complex. The market will always find a way, just as water finds a crack in the asphalt.

2) Micro-level: Agorism and the black market. Do not waste energy on head-on collisions with the leviathan. Water does not fight the stone; it flows around it. Use crypto. Build parallel institutions. Find loopholes. Mind your own business without attracting the attention of the “sovereign’s eye.” Be like water.

The state is heavy, rigid, and fragile. While freedom is fluid, flexible, and unstoppable. And in the long run, water always wears away the stone!

Voluntarist, Bitarch

“Don’t like it—get out!”, “Say thank you that they let you in at all!”, “Be more modest as a guest, otherwise it’s suitcase, station, [country of origin]!”

Have you heard this before? If you have ever moved to another country and had the misfortune of criticizing the local taxes, bureaucracy, or healthcare out loud, you have likely faced a similar storm of indignation in response. Moreover, this is said by local “patriots” and even other immigrants, who apparently suffer from a severe form of Stockholm syndrome.
 
For some reason, in the minds of authoritarian etatists, the state is a kind of sacred deity. A strict but fair father who, out of great mercy, “took in” the poor orphan immigrant. Consequently, the orphan must fall prostrate, kiss the ground, and keep quiet. Only we understand that this is all nonsense that does not fit into common sense.
 
Imagine that you checked into an expensive hotel. You paid for the room a month in advance and left a deposit. You enter, and the faucet is leaking, the Wi-Fi only works on the balcony, and cockroaches are running down the hallway. You go down to the reception to express your dissatisfaction. And suddenly some guy in the lobby screams at you: “How dare you complain?! If you don’t like the hotel, go sleep on a heating pipe! Be grateful that you were even given keys!” Sounds like the rambling of a madman? But it is exactly the same as the phrase “if you don’t like it, leave.”
 
It is also necessary to understand that immigration is by no means “charity.” Modern legal immigration is a harsh, pragmatic, and very expensive procedure. The state is effectively selling you access to “its” infrastructure. And it certainly does not lose a single cent in the process.
 
You pay for this access long before your foot touches the new land. You pay visa fees, document translations, agent services, language tests, and medical examinations. You go through a rigorous administrative filter that checks your health, education, lack of criminal records, and ability to bring in money. The state power of the country lets you in not because it is kind. It is simply because you are a ready-made, trained taxpayer at someone else’s expense with minimal risks for the system.
 
Does this end upon arrival? Not at all. At that moment, an invisible counter starts. Your life in the new country has a specific price—the cost of one hour of life. Calculate your rent, utilities, insurance, groceries, gasoline, taxes, and divide by 30 days, then by 24 hours. You will get the amount you owe this system simply for the right to breathe its air. Even when you sleep or are sick, your counter ticks. You continuously pour money into the local economy as a customer of banks, supermarkets, insurance companies, and landlords, who, by the way, pay exorbitant taxes. Even if you personally do not work “on the books,” these taxes are already included in the price of goods and services.
 
So why on earth should a client, who regularly pays the “subscription fee” (in the form of huge taxes and the cost of living), not have the right to say that the service is, to put it mildly, mediocre? State lovers adore the proverb “Don’t look a gift horse in the mouth.” Only the horse was never a gift; it was bought at a double rate. And we have every right to be outraged if the horse is defective.
 
Citizenship, by the way, also changes nothing fundamentally. A passport is not the end of the game or an indulgence from levies, but simply “premium access” within the framework of the same contract. Once the counter is started, no one will ever turn it off.
 
Therefore, to the words of a defender of the stationary bandit saying “pack your bags,” you can boldly ask—are you saying this to the investors who invested their capital, their brains, and their time in this country? People have every right to demand quality service, be outraged by high taxes, and criticize unfair laws. In any language and in any part of the globe, regardless of their origin and the color of their passport!

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Graeber, Mises, and Evolution

@SperryUNIVAC, whom I infinitely respect for his frantic work ethic and very broad range of interests, besides various commissioned books and military-technical analysis, also runs a small channel (slightly larger than mine) purely for the soul — about coins. I don’t understand much and am not particularly interested in how many ounces of silver were in which thaler, but when he posted a powerful cycle of texts called “What is Money,” I could not help but give it my close attention.

Mainly, the text is a retelling of Graeber’s book “Debt: The First 5,000 Years,” but in some places, the accents are set differently.

Part 1 — in which the author immediately describes the economy as a zero-sum game, but at least acknowledges that not everyone adheres to this ancient belief. Also, the concept of debt appears on the scene as a moral obligation, which is the basis of all economic magic.

Part 2 — in which it is pointed out that the strong can easily impose debt conditions on the weak that have nothing to do with justice. In general, the idea of debt is based on violence. If there is no possibility to forcibly reclaim what was lent, there is no institution of loans. But if this violence is abused, the moral obligation to pay debts weakens.

Part 3 — here the author continues to retell how wretched these debts of yours are, but for the first time disagrees with Graeber and refuses to unequivocally condemn the concept of debt-money itself. He suggests that since the concept of debt led to the emergence of the state, it must have brought some benefit to human communities under its yoke, regardless of how individual people suffered from it.

Part 4 — here the author, following Graeber, mocks Adam Smith and explains that money did not emerge from direct barter, but first took the form of debt receipts for homogeneous goods convenient for storage, such as grain or livestock, while coins made of precious metals appeared much later and were state-issued.

Part 5 — it describes three types of economic relations according to Graeber: communism (within small groups), exchange (for one-off transactions with strangers), and hierarchy (where debt cannot be repaid, leading to dependency). Communists try to prevent hierarchy, but once they increase in number, the transition is almost inevitable. Markets, meanwhile, are created by states so that people sell their goods for a pittance for the sake of paying taxes (this thesis is designed to cause “butthurt” for all supporters of the strict opposition between state and market).

Part 6 — here the author describes how, besides credit-commodity money, symbolic money has also been in circulation since antiquity, used to assess damage to property, life, and honor; the clash of these monetary systems led to the symbolic money system losing. Roughly speaking, life and honor became commodities. The author also persistently calls Irish bards “skalds,” but those are trifles.

Part 7 — describes how the appearance of iron democratized war, mass violence destroyed systems of credit trade, which led to the invention of coins; it is convenient to pay mercenaries with coins, and so that they could spend them, empires required taxes to be paid in coins. The result was the launch of the main engine of all ancient empires: army–slaves–coins. These changes led to revolutions in consciousness, which is why antiquity is now known to us as the time of the birth of almost all great doctrines.

Epilogue — the pace accelerates sharply, and in one post, it covers the entire history from the end of antiquity to the end of cash. Until the next leap in military technology, which led to gunpowder empires, Europe relied again on commodity-credit money, then regained a taste for coins, but soon smoothly transitioned back to credit receipts—first for precious metals, and then to pure fiat, which subsequently rapidly transitioned into cashless form so that the money circulation could, first, keep up with the pace of monetary operations, and second, with the ambitions of states to control the economy. The word “blockchain” was mentioned, but the word “bitcoin” was not, because it does not fit into Graeber’s concepts.


It is foolish to dispute the anthropological material on which Graeber bases his monetary theory. Therefore, it would be far more logical for supporters of the Austrian School of Economics to agree with the erroneousness of Mises’s regression theorem (that today’s demand for money is derived from yesterday’s, and so on back to a commodity with consumer value, which became the first money), especially since the foundation of economic theory does not crumble from this admission. Money has various functions — unit of account, store of value, means of transfer of value, and so on. There is nothing surprising in the fact that at different times, different peoples practiced different ways of implementing these functions. Later, in the course of history, convergence occurred, and now we call various implementations of these functions “money” under one umbrella.

The regression theorem was needed as a justification that the state is unable to create purchasing power for money. Well, let’s discard this doubtful take: it is capable, and very much so. Take a group of ten people, give an eleventh person nine tokens and suggest they distribute them among this ten as they please, while warning them that in a month, whoever among the ten cannot produce a token will be killed. The tokens will have astonishing purchasing power. The distributor of the tokens will receive a huge amount of benefits. And in a month, they will present you with ten tokens, at least one of which will be counterfeit, because people want to live.

It is not so important who created the first money and when. It is not so important who and by what means attempts to endow current money with purchasing power. For a libertarian, the only thing that matters is exactly how people will organize their interaction in the absence of coercion. If they want, they will provide services to each other without a strict fixation of debt. If they want, they will use commodity receipts or tokens backed by a basket of goods. If they want, they will turn to items made of rare materials or to digital rare assets, such as bitcoin. Or they will use different methods for different situations and different counterparties, as has been the case in history.

In conclusion, I will touch upon an important assertion by Sperry that, from the perspective of survival and prosperity of large human associations, the emergence of the state and the improvement of means of state control over the activities of subjects turned out to be very useful. This conviction has a right to exist, however, there are a couple of remarks.

Firstly, after the appearance of Dawkins’ works, the subject of biological evolution is not the species, the population, or the individual — but the gene. Similarly, the subject of cultural evolution is not humanity, not the community, and not the human — but the meme. The fact that memes about the moral obligation to repay debts and the necessity of hierarchies are successfully passed from generation to generation does not necessarily condition the prosperity of human communities in which these memes are widespread.

Secondly, even if we assume that evolution primarily ensures an increase in the adaptability of a population to current conditions, this in no way guarantees that a useful trait that once appeared through evolution will retain its utility in new conditions. Since the appearance of the first states, the conditions of human interaction have changed significantly, and today the existence of a state that controls the daily lives of people and preaches some debt of every subject to it no longer looks so unconditionally useful for the community. With equal success, it can be viewed as a kind of atavism destined to be displaced by other forms of human organization.

“How to survive in this almost forced technological progress and live in well-being?”

Questions like these are increasingly coming from our subscribers. It sounds as if terminators are already marching outside the window, and Skynet is about to cut off our hot water for non-payment. Many seriously fear that neural networks and robots will leave us without work and means of subsistence, and if the market is allowed to remain free, then evil corporations will throw us out into the cold. But there is no need to worry so much—this threat is greatly exaggerated. And the fear of “technological unemployment” is perhaps the most persistent myth in human history.
 
Do you know that mean joke? “We thought that in the future, robots would carry heavy loads and mop floors, and people would paint pictures and compose music. In the end, AI draws and writes poetry, and we continue to mop floors.” This is the essence of the so-called Moravec’s paradox. What seems complex to us (higher mathematics, playing chess, writing code) is a piece of cake for a computer. But what is elementary for us (walking through a room cluttered with junk without tripping) is an impossible task for AI.
 
Any physical work requiring fine motor skills and the ability to act in the chaos of a non-standard environment will be automated last. Electricians, plumbers, auto mechanics, builders, painters, roofers, welders—they can all sleep perfectly soundly! No robot, not even the most advanced one from Boston Dynamics, will be able to climb under the hood of your old car, feel for the right bolt, and understand why it’s “making a strange knocking sound on turns” in the coming decades. Replacing a plumber in a Khrushchev-era apartment with its unique, historically formed pipe geometry is a task for super-civilizations, not for ChatGPT.
 
“But surely someone will be replaced!” you might say. Of course. But let’s look at a history textbook. In the 19th century, English weavers (Luddites) smashed steam looms in a panic. They were convinced that machines would deprive them of their bread. What actually happened? Fabric became many times cheaper. People were able to buy an entire wardrobe instead of one shirt every five years. Demand skyrocketed, and the industry required far more laborers: tailors, logistics specialists, salespeople, and mechanics to maintain those very looms appeared.
 
Or remember the beginning of the 20th century. About 80-90% of the population toiled in the fields. Then came the tractor. It seemed like a catastrophe! Millions of peasants would be left without work! But no, they went to build factories, produce cars, and open restaurants and barbershops.
 
And remember the panic of the 1970s when the first ATMs appeared? Bank tellers thought it was their funeral. But ATMs made opening new branches so much cheaper that banks began to grow like mushrooms after rain. In the end, the demand for bank employees only grew—from simple “bill dispensers,” they turned into consultants and managers.
 
We often fear what we cannot imagine. Try explaining to an 18th-century peasant who a “targetologist,” “SMM manager,” “cyber-athlete,” or “prompt engineer” is. He would simply tap his temple with his finger. In the same way, we currently cannot even imagine the professions that will appear in 10-15 years.
 
People think: “If the state doesn’t protect my rights and regulate AI, I’m doomed.” In reality, it’s exactly the opposite. When technology closes a door in one place, enterprising people immediately cut ten new windows. If officials start introducing quotas, bans on the use of AI, or robot taxes, they will simply freeze the economy. Enterprises will become uncompetitive, goods will become expensive, and you and I will become poor.
 
A deregulated market allows capital and resources to flow instantly into new, as yet undiscovered niches. Will AI take over the routine? Great! This means that the production of goods and services will become incredibly cheap and your real income will grow. We will work fewer hours but live in greater abundance, spending time on creativity, service, interpersonal communication, and those very new professions that will be born out of entrepreneurial freedom.

Voluntarist, Bitarch