What to do if we have ancap and suddenly there’s an epidemic?

Many liberally minded citizens criticize the Russian authorities for failing to take proper sanitary measures against the coronavirus. They claim that at that rare moment when a firm hand of authority was actually needed, it did not appear; instead, the authorities carelessly and unprofessionally let the situation run its course, introducing some local restrictions and leaving measures up to the regions, etc., causing the epidemic to spread to terrifying proportions. Meanwhile, under ancap, the adoption of any restrictive, mandatory measures is fundamentally impossible! How should this be handled?

Minarchist

Using the current bedlam as an example, we can see very clearly: states are incapable of dealing with a pandemic because while one man’s war is another’s windfall—for politicians, the more global the mess, the more convenient the opportunity to profit from government procurement, and the more convenient the opportunity to restrict the freedom of citizens. If people themselves are whining for a firm hand, how can anyone resist the urge to shove that firm hand deeper into the citizen’s pocket?

Let’s compare this with ancap, where states are absent, all ultimate responsibility for one’s own health lies with the people, and if you don’t take care of yourself, you have only yourself to blame.

Some would have been entirely voluntarily insured against infectious diseases and accidents; some, having heirs, would have also insured their lives. If ancap has existed on the planet for a long time, then such insured individuals would make up some stable, significant percentage. But since such a misfortune has occurred that quite a few people are beginning to be infected by a previously unknown virus, this will generate additional demand for health insurance, and the prices for such insurance will spike.

Different insurance companies may act using different means. Some simply pay for treatment under policies within the limits of the insurance premium. Others realize that if nothing is done, all reserves will be spent on paying insurance claims, and to avoid bankruptcy—they should incentivize clients not to get infected. They begin offering payment for every day of self-isolation, plus remote supply of everything necessary (especially to high-risk groups). A third group of companies invests in the development of a treatment protocol. A fourth—in the development of vaccines.

But insurance companies are not the only players in the market. Pharma companies, even without insurance, understand that they can make a lot of money now, and they also begin seeking remedies for the new plague, or increasing the production of existing and well-working ones (more accurately, those in demand on the market, which in general is not the same thing).

In short, entrepreneurial initiative, unrestrained by government shackles, revitalizes sectors of the economy related to health care. What happens to other sectors? And what could possibly happen to them? Who will forbid tourists from flying to a quiet, pleasant place for a vacation? They get insured so as not to wander in an unfamiliar place in confusion about where and how to get treatment if something happens—and they fly. Who will forbid restaurants from operating? No one will forbid them. True, people themselves may enter with caution—which means they need to launch advertising about how safe the establishment is: here is a hand sanitizer, here are tables on an open terrace, here are waiters in masks.

And so on. What will be the result? Simply that throughout the world, the pandemic will proceed roughly as it did in Sweden, perhaps just a little bit better.

And, of course, no one will be able to prevent an investigation into where the virus came from. And if it turns out to be the work of some private laboratory, those guys will go bankrupt from lawsuits. Naturally, payments will not go to everyone, but only to those who managed to sue first—well, no one stopped them from searching, it’s only fair. As for other laboratories, realizing that they will now all be suspected, they will be forced to introduce very advanced standards of openness, otherwise, they won’t be able to work peacefully. And what is there to hide, if intellectual property is not valued under ancap? This means one must work not for the sake of rapid patenting, but for the sake of rapid implementation, in conditions where everyone sees each other and everyone adopts what they can from each other. This is a perfectly fair race, and it is strange to think that they would somehow stop participating in it due to the absence of patents.

– Vaša ancap-kafa
– Hvala vam puno

(translated from Montenegrin: What, an epidemic, really? Then I’ll have another cup.)

Coronavirus as a challenge to the idea of the nation-state

The apology for the nation-state is primarily based on the idea that it is the best way to solve problems on a national scale. The problem is that there are fewer and fewer tasks for which this specific level of resolution is the most appropriate.

The coronavirus epidemic clearly demonstrated that the task of fighting epidemics cannot be solved at this level. Not a single country managed to resist the spread of the virus into its territory through quarantine measures. Not a single country proved capable of preparing enough equipped hospital beds to provide necessary aid to the sick. Conversely, there are countless examples where the measures taken by states only fueled the spread of the epidemic. I will provide just a few.

The very first case is, of course, the sanctions against the Chinese doctor who first tried to convey information about the start of the epidemic. This is exactly how the motivation system built inevitably by state bureaucracy works. A second example is the conduct of electoral events by states in the midst of the epidemic. Iran experienced a powerful surge in morbidity after parliamentary elections were held there on February 21. On April 22, something similar, though far less rational, awaits Russia. Against this backdrop, the banning of rallies in Russia looks quite inconsistent. A third example is the mass deportation of infected and suspected individuals from the countries where they were located back to their countries of permanent residence, often transiting through third countries, and not always with the observance of proper safety measures.

The nation-state is not only unable to fight epidemics, but it also hinders solving this task at both a lower and a higher level. At a lower level, it suppresses private medicine. Market demand allows for a more flexible approach to providing people with vital necessities. But the state, for example, begins to fight price markups on masks and thermometers, and thereby deprives manufacturers of incentives to invest sufficient funds into expanding production. At a higher level, the state obstructs the work of international organizations by insisting on the priority of national regulations over their recommendations.

One can also recall examples where, in the context of epidemics, the national level of management comes into conflict with the regional level. For instance, a story from 2011 recently surfaced about how the federal government in Germany insisted that the states purchase a huge amount of swine flu vaccine, and two years later, most of what was purchased had expired and had to be burned. In Russia, a significant share of healthcare spending also falls on the regional level, but it is all subject to federal regulations. Thus, any emergency will inevitably cause conflicts because some people steer, while others pay and bear the responsibility.

Thus, it can be assumed that in the coming years, the nation-state will be attacked from literally all sides, as epidemics are only one example of its inefficiency. There will be attempts to dilute its sovereignty, on one hand, in favor of global bureaucracies like the EU and other political blocs; on the other, in favor of local self-government; thirdly, in favor of international non-governmental organizations; and fourthly, in favor of TNCs. And we agorists will surely find a way to profit from these murky waters as well.

Carthage must be destroyed.

Italy fights the epidemic

Ancap vs. Coronavirus

I was asked to comment on the Dobroum project video about coronavirus. Here is a summary of the content:

Coronavirus highlighted the downsides of the state reaction to epidemics. The first reaction: classify information as secret, suppress leaks. But once the information leaks, clearly excessive measures begin. Officials act strictly according to instructions from above, and the closer the attention to the problem, the fewer people are willing to take responsibility for decisions. Instead of a sensible quarantine, a “security theater” occurs, while maintaining the appearance that everything is under control.

The second part briefly shows how the market solves such issues. Let me reflect on this topic as well.

There is a non-state society that did not emerge yesterday; the transition processes have already died down, and the main institutions associated with ancap are in place. That is, there is decentralized law, a free market, and a developed industry for rights enforcement and insurance. And in this society, an epidemic arises.

Where did it come from? Let’s assume the worst: as with coronavirus, it is either someone’s leaked development or a surge of the local biosphere—all exacerbated by high population density and a relatively low average standard of living by ancap standards.

It doesn’t matter whether the first sick person was insured or not. When they collapse on the street, they will get to a hospital quickly enough. Something unusual happened, and something unusual in a free market is always a signal for entrepreneurs. To interpret the signal correctly, it must be processed. Where is the best place to figure out exactly what happened? In a hospital. Therefore, the sick person will be delivered there.

If they were insured, the insurance company will pay a tip to whoever brought the helpless client to the place of care. The sooner treatment begins, the cheaper it is on average. This means there is an economic incentive to reward the delivery for treatment, regardless of who provides it.

If they were not insured, then again, it is important for all insurance companies to know whether this is an epidemic or a single isolated incident, like food poisoning. After all, if an epidemic is contained quickly, it results in giant savings on insurance payouts; thus, every company has an incentive to pay—whether collectively or independently—for the hospital delivery of anyone who potentially poses an infection risk. And then, of course, to pay for the examination.

Once information about the virus is obtained, it certainly won’t be hushed up, because all stakeholders are driven by the desire to minimize their losses. Therefore, it would likely be possible to organize a compact and sufficiently effective quarantine at a fairly early stage, and the epidemic would fail to develop.

But fine, let’s assume the incubation period is quite long, and the virus is easily transmitted during this period; thus, by the end of the incubation period, there are already many infected, and containing the epidemic failed. Can insurance companies build a hospital in ten days, like the Chinese authorities? Unlikely. It is far more likely that they would rent entire hotels for their clients: one for quarantine, one as a hospital. Sequencing the virus and finding a vaccine formula would be at least as fast as in our reality, because modern private high-tech laboratories handle this no worse than the state. Setting up production and supply would be even faster, as there would be fewer approvals.

Regarding the possibilities of organizing a quarantine under ancap, I have already answered in relation to epizootics. In our case, similar mechanisms would operate.

As a result, I believe that in the worst-case scenario, an epidemic under ancap would affect roughly the same number of people as under a state, but the market would likely slump less, because in the absence of a state, there would be no one to crush it out of panic with sudden regulations. And in any case, it is hard to imagine that humanity, in the absence of “benevolent” state intervention, would find itself helpless against some epidemic.

Here he is, the beauty, in ancap colors