A human chooses. Absolutely any human activity boils down to the fact that a person sets goals for themselves and chooses the means to achieve them. The discussion of any human activity comes down to what goals a person sets, what means they choose, what alternatives they had, what they achieved, and what they could have achieved. If a person did not make a choice, there would be no point in discussing them, let alone condemning them. The instinctive behavior of an animal or the sequence of actions of a computer program are not subjects of moral evaluation of the animal or the program—only of the people behind those actions, if they are discovered.
As long as a person makes their choice without interacting with other people, everything is simple: they carry out purposeful activity with varying degrees of success—why should we care? But when interaction begins, the choice of one person affects the interests of another. A person sets a goal, and as a means, chooses not their own actions, but the actions of other people. For this, they need these other people to set goals for themselves, the means of fulfillment for which is the very action required of them. For example, my goal is to get a cup of coffee; for this, I need the coffee shop employee to set a goal to get my money, and choose serving me a cup of coffee as the means to obtain it.
If, instead of serving me coffee, the coffee shop employee points to a “men only” sign and refuses to take my money, it means our interaction has gone wrong, and the standard means of obtaining coffee available in my arsenal of means does not work here. I could try other means, such as persuasion, a scandal, or violence, but most likely I will prefer to choose a different goal. Either way, I will experience some frustration, and to reduce the irritation, I may choose various means, from slamming the door harder to writing an angry post on Facebook about what these men allow themselves.
Humans have a huge, powerful brain for solving complex problems of modeling surrounding reality and planning within those constructed models. Humans solve such resource-intensive tasks in order to bring the surrounding world into alignment with the constructed models, so they no longer have to solve tasks of this type but can use a ready-made solution. The predictability of the surrounding world allows a person to set more complex goals and use more complex means to achieve them. Therefore, in interacting with other people, humans strive to develop certain protocols that make human behavior predictable and, consequently, subject to planning. A “men only” sign in a coffee shop shatters this predictability. Encountering this discrimination, I will for some time expect to see signs in other establishments regarding other restrictions affecting me, so the action of even a single act of discrimination can lead to a significant deterioration in the quality of life. Especially if it is discrimination expressed in a phrase like “girl, with a look like that you should be selling seeds, not hanging out in clubs,” spoken by a club security guard.
Thus, when performing everyday interactions with other people, a person would prefer to be surrounded by soulless automatons, or at least that people behave according to simple, unified protocols. But at the same time, one must not forget that humans have a powerful brain designed to solve complex problems, and in their absence, boredom appears. To get rid of boredom, following simple unified protocols is not enough for a human; creative tasks are needed, and one way to ensure them is interaction with other people beyond standard banalities. And so, one coffee shop customer, out of boredom, starts a scandal over a trifle, while another, also out of boredom, starts flirting with the barista. At the same time, it is not clear in advance which of these entertainments the barista will perceive with greater willingness.
Ultimately, human life in society boils down to the constant maintenance of an individual balance between the strive for predictability (that is, safety) and the flight from boredom. Wishes for other people will constantly vary from the demand for the most impersonal automatic service to the hope for an interesting and unpredictable individual interaction. Thus, every person expects a complete absence of discrimination from some people and at some moments, while from others they hope to receive individual attention, that is, positive discrimination, when out of all possible options the counterparty chose to interact in the desired key specifically with them. These principles work for absolutely any human community with absolutely any orders. No person can live in a society where discrimination is completely absent, and no person would want to live in a society where the right to discriminate is absolute, knowing no exceptions and backed by the unlimited use of force.
Nevertheless, everyone would prefer to live in a world where their own personal right to private discrimination was indisputable, and the right of everyone else was limited by some clear mechanisms of appeal. As a result, in a society left to its own devices, without external regulations, certain frameworks will be established in which discrimination is permissible, more or less general for all. What will these frameworks be?
Here the well-known pyramid of values comes to our aid. The more vitally necessary the counterparty assumes your need to be, the less likely it is that you will be discriminated against by them, and your need will remain unsatisfied, even if the counterparty sees no serious benefit for themselves from your interaction. Conversely, if your need looks like foolish, meaningless whim to the counterparty, they will quite easily decide to avoid cooperation, unless, of course, it is vitally necessary for them as well.
Example. Herman Sterligov, widely known for his private discrimination, not only banned faggots from entering his stores but also ordered a piece of bread to be cut for free and to pour, I don’t remember, I think kvass—for anyone who asks for Christ’s sake. That is, he clearly indicated that his private discrimination recedes before truly serious cases. Perhaps I remembered the facts incorrectly, and according to his orders, faggots are not entitled to bread even for Christ’s sake, but even in this case, the direction of Sterligov’s thought illustrates the natural criterion for the development of norms of private discrimination that I propose.
In general, it is clear why the criterion will be exactly this. After all, a human possesses the notorious powerful brain, perfectly tuned for modeling imaginary situations. Seeing a person in extreme need coming with a request, an individual easily puts themselves in that situation, thinks something like “if I were in their place, in case of refusal, I might even kill” (or, more likely, models possible moral condemnation from neighbors)—and decides to abandon the idea of discriminating against a person who is even very unpleasant to them.
Private discrimination in itself does not encroach on another’s self-ownership, does not violate the NAP, is not a breach of contract—in short, from whatever angle you look at it, it does not contradict libertarian principles. Private discrimination cannot be a subject of legal regulation in minarchism, where the court deals only with issues of protecting private property, interpretation of contracts, and similar things. Similarly, there is no place for the legal regulation of private discrimination within ancap—either a certain norm regarding obligations for a non-discriminatory service regime is in the contract, or it is not a subject of judicial proceedings. Only panarchy stands out, especially in the “cockroach” version, where one can end up under an insurance umbrella involuntarily, and that umbrella may, on its own initiative, regulate some aspects of private discrimination. Moreover, classical voluntary panarchy may include socialist jurisdictions where a person is guaranteed a number of positive rights, in other words, protection from some types of discrimination. But panarchy is more likely a probable transitional stage on the way to ancap rather than a specifically desired libertarian society. It allows free competition of management systems, destroying territorial monopoly, and that is already not bad.
Mostly, of course, private discrimination in a libertarian society is regulated by means of moral and reputational pressure—in other words, the threat of reciprocal and compensatory private discrimination. Everything is logical: aggressive violence is regulated by the threat of reciprocal and compensatory violence, and with discrimination, the exactly same mechanism applies.