Praxeology is indeed simply a set of deductive inferences from the axiom of action: “humans set goals and choose means to achieve them.” To the extent that real people satisfy this axiom, praxeology works for them. Similarly, for example, Euclidean geometry is a set of deductive inferences from five axioms, and to the extent that real physical space and the objects within it correspond to these ideal geometric shapes, this geometry will work for them. Replace the axioms—and you get, for example, Riemannian geometry, which will differ from Euclidean geometry and be better suited for describing real objects in a space with different properties.
Similarly, if we replace the axiom of action, for example, with “man is an instrument for the realization of divine will,” then we would have to derive a different praxeology for it, and to the extent that real people satisfy this new axiom, the praxeology we derived will work for them. Although, of course, given such starting data, a researcher would find it far more interesting to study theology rather than praxeology.
We can conventionally say that the leftists (more precisely, proponents of social engineering) build their praxeology on something like “human action is a phenomenon of the influence of the forces of the material world upon them, obeying the objective laws of physics and biology.” Deductive inferences from this axiom form the set of approaches that the left apply to people. And this also works in some way.
Thus, praxeology indeed does not rely on empiricism. It is verified by empiricism. I hope this clarified things.
Conspiracy theory is an explanation of facts of observed reality by the hidden, purposeful activity of certain subjects or organizations. It is common to ridicule it, especially if a particular conspiracy theory provides truly absurd explanations.
Praxeology asserts that acting subjects can only be individuals, and if so, it can be assumed that any social phenomena must be caused by either overt or covert purposeful activity of specific people. However, this assertion is supplemented by the claim of the existence of spontaneous orders, which are the unintended consequences of the activities of an indefinite number of persons. Therefore, not wishing to delve too deeply into the subtleties of the theory, we state that social phenomena can be based on both the unintended consequences of the actions of a wide circle of actors and the intended consequences of the actions of a narrow circle. Moreover, in the latter case, these actions and their goals may be consciously hidden from the general public. In other words, conspiracy explanations can be truthful.
In my observation, older people are more prone to conspiracy explanations. I can assume that this is an interpretation of their life experience, since in their years they usually manage to participate in many successful and unsuccessful conspiracies themselves, and to observe the uncovered conspiracies of others. And in general, it is difficult to deny the very existence of constantly conceived and implemented conspiracies, since every government budget has a secret part, and every self-respecting enterprise has a slush fund, as its management is in a conspiracy against the government to reduce taxes or bypass regulations.
In order to avoid constantly shrugging and stating that everything is possible and we will never be told the truth, I would like to have a criterion that, when applied, would allow one to decide for oneself in which case a conspiracy explanation is quite probable and in which it is improbable. To formulate such a criterion, I will use the praxeological concept of the planning horizon (or timepreference, that is, the inverse of the planning horizon, but it is not as convenient for me to use and sounds clunky in Russian).
To evaluate a conspiratorial design, simply estimate what planning horizon is required for its implementation. Then compare it with the planning horizon usually demonstrated by the presumed actors in the conspiracy hypothesis under consideration. If the required horizon is much longer than the one usually demonstrated, this is a strong argument for considering the conspiracy hypothesis untenable.
One more clarification is needed here. If the presumed actor, guided by their short-term goals, unintentionally supports what appears from the outside to be a single long-term design, then the conspiracy hypothesis, while actually incorrect, proves to be effective—the actor was guessed correctly, the direction of activity was guessed correctly, and the fact that not the entire design was planned in advance—who cares, the main thing is in whose interests everything is being done. Here, for additional verification, I can recommend checking whether there were numerous cases where the actor’s actions contradicted the goal assumed by the conspiracy hypothesis. If this is observed, we are most likely dealing with a tactician, and there is no need to invent a strategic design that they are supposedly following.
At this point Scheherazade ceases her permitted speech, as further information does not correspond to your security clearance.
Libertarianism is based on natural rights; why is Svetov against them?
анонимный вопрос
In a recent video by Mikhail Svetov, which your question is about, much seemed strange to me. Since that is the case, I will first go through the entire video and then move on to the topic of the question, so as not to make two posts about one video.
To begin with, Svetov uses a definition of anarchy as a Hobbesian war of all against all. I don’t remember if Hobbes used the exact word anarchy; I recall the term state of nature more. However, in our video on the deterrence doctrine, I tried to show that a war of all against all is not the natural state of society, meaning that Hobbesian (and Svetovian) rhetoric is based on a dubious foundation.
Svetov also uses the word rights as a synonym for the word privileges, thereby limiting himself to so-called positive rights. This is indicated by his phrase “fear people who want to grant you rights.” Libertarian discourse, however, usually concerns negative rights, which are freedoms. One is not “granted” such rights, because their realization does not require the actions of others; non-interference is entirely sufficient.
In attacking liberals, Svetov implies progressives of the American type, given that he uses headlines about minority quotas and affirmative action as illustrations. In Europe, they more often call themselves social democrats, and it is unclear to me why Svetov separates them from socialists at all, saying that from one side we are pressed by a socialist boot and from the other by a liberal one, while in fact he is speaking of the same socialist boot.
Another interesting point: Svetov opposes morality and conscience, claiming that evil liberals removed conscience from man and replaced it with morality. However, Svetov does not define what conscience is and where it comes from, if not from the experience of interacting with other people and the memory of their moral evaluations. Or does he want to say that conscience is the voice of God? Well, in that case, it is unclear what he has against natural rights, understood as divine decrees.
Another phrase that Svetov uses in his video: “where there is no law, there is no crime.” Yes, that is correct; crime is a term from positive law, which is a system of commands. There is a command, someone violates the command, they have committed a crime. In private law, there are no crimes; there is property damage, breach of contractual obligations, and so on, and the person who suffered the damage is free to oppose this and demand compensation—or not oppose it and not demand it.
Thus, I would say that Svetov’s video is simply a juggling of terms. We define anarchy in a way that no anarchist defines it, after which we prove as simply as two plus two that anarchy is bad, and even that the state is anarchy. Everything is logical, but we get nothing but confusion in the end.
Now let’s return to the question of whether libertarianism grows out of natural law. Historically, yes, but today that is not important because human thought has not stood still. We can derive libertarian principles deductively based on the laws of logic: here is an apodictically true statement that a person belongs to themselves; now we show that any attempt to refute this statement implicitly relies on the very premise we are trying to refute. Those whose brains haven’t melted have grasped the Tao and discovered natural law. Or we can examine human interactions and show which behavioral strategies prove more advantageous and therefore survive through natural selection. This utilitarian approach gives us the same libertarian principles, but in this case, the laws of logic do not stick out as if they were god-given and people were merely objects under them. Therefore, such an approach is less irritating to people like the hypothetical Mikhail Svetov with their obsession with ethics, but more so to connoisseurs of mathematical rigor.
Personally, I first became acquainted with Rothbard and the Hoppean derivation of the principle of self-ownership, and then with Hayek and the Friedmanite utilitarian justification of property, and I suggest not arguing over whom to love more—father or mother. Both praxeology and spontaneous orders are two equally useful methodological principles; let us use both, depending on the situation, rather than imitating Svetov, who is so right-wing that he tries to bite off libertarianism’s left leg.
