Belarus 4

This is my fourth text about Belarus (others can be found via the hashtag ), and this time it was prompted by watching a conversation between Mikhail Svetov, Roman Popkov, and Elena Borovskaya, as well as Roman’s post summarizing the stream on his channel.

Roman Popkov’s account of the current state of Belarusian civil society was very informative and explained why things are going the way they are, but right now I want to talk about something else.

During the conversation, Roman reproached “Moskals” for their excessively technological mindset. Ponasenkov took the brunt of it with his Die erste Kolonne marschiert, die zweite Kolonne marschiert, but Svetov, who agreed with Ponasenkov, also got hit. I, for one, although I live separated from Moscow by a considerable distance and the Ural range, am still one of those very same “Moskals,” and therefore I also have a purely technological approach to this political science problem: how to ensure the transit from an illegitimate dictatorship to a transitional government, constitutional reform, and a new legitimate government. And I see exactly two options.

Option one. Do you want it to be like in Ukraine?

If the dictator previously had enough strength to weed out combat organizations (hello to Roman Popkov and his NBP) by the root, then now, with constant street protests occurring, it is quite easy to disguise combat coordination training as episodic spontaneous coordination. Tens of thousands of people daily search for the most effective ways to exhaust the opponent’s resources, get to know each other, find out what everyone is capable of, and if the degree of anger continues to rise, then at some point the hundreds of corpses mentioned by Roman will stop seeming like a serious restriction on the path to overthrowing the dictatorship.

Of course, they don’t charge head-on toward administrative buildings, but, as we saw in Ukraine, they seize military warehouses and armories in police stations. After that, a transition to the hot phase of street fighting is inevitable, even if no one is injured during the seizure of weapons. And street fighting will inevitably end with the overthrow of the dictator.

Option two. What is the name of the President of Switzerland?

What follows is a fantasy story; do not take it as a forecast.

Tikhanovskaya arrives for Biden’s inauguration. This is an excellent pretext to discuss exactly how to overthrow Lukashenko. The invasion option is dismissed, and a cheaper one is proposed. Lukashenko is placed on an international wanted list, and a serious reward by Belarusian standards is set for his capture, dead or alive—say, a conventional hundred million dollars. Simultaneously, a second very important person enters the fray; his name is Guy Parmelin. He is the Vice President of the Swiss Confederation, who by the time of Biden’s inauguration will be the new president (hello to Mikhail Svetov and his constant rhetorical question about the name of the President of Switzerland). Switzerland is a neutral country with a very stable political system. Only it can give Lukashenko a guarantee of lifelong political asylum (Russia or the USA cannot).

That’s it; now we start the clock and watch to see what happens first: one of Lukashenko’s guards presents his head and demands the reward—or Lukashenko seeks guarantees from Mr. Parmelin and leaves the country immediately after they are confirmed.