Murray Rothbard and the End of Socialism

I was approached by the founder of the “Molinariy” project, for whom I had already translated one of the chapters of “Evenings on Saint-Lazare Street,” written, in fact, by Gustave de Molinari, the author of the key idea of anarcho-capitalism—namely, the private production of security in a free competitive market, similar to any other consumer services. Molinariy consists of a Telegram channel, which at the time of this publication has 70 subscribers, a Substack with a whopping six subscribers, and a YouTube channel with 1.13 thousand subscribers. This asymmetry is due to two factors. First, YouTube promotes channels through a suggestion system, while Substack and Telegram do so far less effectively. Second, the primary content of Molinariy is video content, while the auxiliary text channels are used to store additional materials and alternative formats for delivering the main content. Thus, we come to the essence of the request. I was asked to give my opinion on the Russian translation published in Molinariy of a 1989 lecture by Murray Rothbard regarding the global political agenda of that time, primarily the collapse of the socialist camp.

The video is posted on YouTube, while on Substack and in Telegram, a transcript of the speech and comments on it are provided.

Rothbard begins with a brief overview of the history of socialism: how it appeared in Europe in the 19th century, how and why it gradually gained popularity, how liberals toward the end of the 19th century felt a sense of doom because socialist ideas had completely seized the masses, and how in the 20th century socialism finally had the opportunity to be embodied in practice. He then notes a phase-shifted movement of ideas: people in the socialist bloc countries were fed up to their teeth with this collectivist system and dreamed of capitalism, while Western intellectuals managed to maintain an untouched admiration for socialism throughout the decades because they had not truly tasted it in practice.

It turns out that there is only one way to prompt people to abandon an externally attractive but false idea: let them try to implement it and wait until the idea is discredited. However, even in this case, the abandonment of the idea will most likely not occur until the first generation of its carriers physically dies out.

Here, a mischievous question occurs to me: could the same happen with ancap? Perhaps it will gradually win over minds, a certain critical percentage of politicians will be permeated by it, and then everyone will be more or less unanimous that it is finally time to let people realize this bright idea. And then, when the first generation of those who dismantle the state in favor of the free market begins to physically die out, the idea will lose its sincere carriers, and in the eyes of the next generation, it will already be discredited. And if at the end of the eighties of the last century, the rulers of the socialist camp countries bewilderedly asked such clever Western experts if there were any reliable ways to carefully abandon excessive state regulation and transition to a free market, then in a hundred years, will free participants of a spiraling libertarian society bewilderedly ask how to carefully find those who are ready to take responsibility for people and start managing them, rather than complaining, “Why on earth would I want to do that?”

Life, of course, has shown that the world is more complex than the picture Rothbard saw at the end of the eighties, but overall his view was quite correct. For instance, he correctly grasped that in American society at that time, people were tired of high government spending under Reagan, and soon under Clinton, the national debt began to decrease. But the momentum did not last long, and now it is growing at unprecedented rates. He identified the problem of “too big to fail” financial institutions, and this problem eventually triggered a global crisis. He correctly noted that China would have problems with a market economy if it were not accompanied by general liberalization. And indeed, thirty years later, China’s economy eventually faltered due to a lack of freedom and an excess of state regulation, but by then it had managed to become a superpower. Finally, Rothbard noted that now that the Cold War between superpowers has ended, this would not be a reason for the US to demilitarize; instead, the government would frantically seek any excuse to fight with anyone or anything.

Rothbard also harshly criticized the Libertarian Party, which practically failed to notice that liberalism had won over socialism and in no way took advantage of the fruits of this victory, focusing instead on its own internal administrative squabbles. In fact, this criticism applies to any libertarian party in any country at any time: libertarians are especially vulnerable to the bureaucratization of their institutions. This applies not only to parties but also to scientific institutes or projects like Mont Pelerin. The thing is, a volunteer comes to an organization for a result, while long-term institutions work for the sake of the process. As a result, enthusiasts burn out and leave, leaving behind those for whom routine is comfortable, and work results are measured by the number of meetings.

And finally, I want to leave hanging the key prediction Rothbard made in his lecture: that the 21st century would be the century of freedom. Of course, compared to the 20th century, in very many aspects and in very many countries, people have become noticeably freer. But regulators have not been idle, and many freedoms that people enjoyed at the beginning of the 21st century are now unthinkable in its second quarter. However, I want to note an interesting pattern here: modern enslavement is not total. It exists only where the state maintains its monopoly. For example, it has turned air travel into a sophisticated mockery. But in the field of money transfers, people endure the mockery only where the transaction must be shown to the state. But if it needs to be hidden, everything is done in two clicks. And so in many industries. People are learning and getting used to bypassing government desires, and they seem to stop longing for a boot over them. Perhaps freedom really is arriving? I want to believe it.

What are the different variants of anarcho-capitalism? I only know about the Rothbardian and Friedmanite variants (I am not including Hoppe, as it is essentially a development of Rothbard’s ideas in one specific direction).

Dmitry

I don’t think there is a clear typology anywhere, but the question is interesting; let’s reason through it.

The Rothbardian version: it is derived from natural rights, and therefore presupposes a certain unified ethical-legal system described in “The Ethics of Liberty,” or derived in some other way on the same methodological basis (for example, Molliqneux expresses his views in this same vein in his Practical Anarchy). Consequently, questions arise regarding it: who will force everyone to be guided by a single legal system?

The Friedmanite version is based on the economic analysis of law, specifically on the basis of the Chicago School of Economics, which implies the possibility of engaging in interpersonal utility comparisons to a certain extent. Accordingly, in the Friedmanite version of anarcho-capitalism, different legal systems are traded on the market, capturing those segments where they prove to be the most efficient.

Nevertheless, both versions of social organization imply, as a kind of successor to the key state function of enforcing its own decisions, certain law enforcement agencies, as in the case of Friedman and the Tannahills, or strictly non-violent dispute resolution agencies, as with Molliqneux, which nevertheless possess truly totalitarian regulatory power—in short, some “larvae” of the state, about which one must somehow explain what reasons will prevent these larvae from growing into full-fledged states.

Following Vladimir Zolotorev, I adhere to a praxeological approach to the analysis of law and, quite independently of him, predict that in an anarchic society with developed market relations, the effect of the division of labor will push cumbersome monsters—those attempting to gather completely diverse functions, which are currently appropriated by the state, under one roof—out of the market. There are no grounds to believe that the services of detectives, forensic experts, or blockchain analysts must necessarily be provided by the same firms that offer security services, debt collection, resolve economic disputes, maintain cadasters, insure life and property, or issue certificates stating that a person knows how to drive a car or, for instance, shoot a pistol.

The practice of living in the libertarian community of MonteLibero further strengthens me in my originally purely theoretical views that people do not need detailed, written-out legal institutions all that much. On the contrary, in an anarchic society, people tend to resolve conflicts on the spot, forming situational coalitions if necessary. The need for complex specialized services in the field of legal protection arises quite rarely; therefore, in a free market, this need will likely be met by relatively small companies that nevertheless have a wide geographical reach—otherwise, a sufficient client base cannot be gathered.

Returning to the question, we see that different descriptions of ancap mainly boil down to how conflicts will be resolved in such a society—because regarding issues such as the functioning of a free market, libertarian theorists have no particular disagreements. Accordingly, if some previously undeveloped idea occurs to you about how law could otherwise function—congratulations, you will add another version of ancap to the collection of existing ones.

Apology for Agorism

One often reads that agorism not only fails to help abolish the state but actually directly harms the libertarian movement. The main argument against agorism boils down to the claim that the black market in no way contributes to the disappearance of the state. On the contrary, by reducing the share of legally employed people, the growing black market increases the tax burden on the white market, as well as the number and severity of various inspections. Thus, the competitiveness of the state’s economy declines, people become impoverished, and the poor are prone to socialist views. Therefore, it is respect for the law and civilized political activity that allow for gradual movement toward freedom, while all forms of rebellion only give the state excuses to tighten the screws.

To everyone deeply interested in this issue, I would recommend reading Konkin’s “New Libertarian Manifesto”, as well as the discussion between Konkin and Rothbard regarding this manifesto. And for symmetry, it is worth looking at Rothbard’s “For a New Liberty”, which serves as the manifesto of the Libertarian Party of the USA—although the latter work is significantly more voluminous than the first two.

Both sides presented various interesting arguments in their discussion, which took place in the early eighties of the last century. However, nearly forty years have passed since then, and we can see what has changed in the USA.

The Libertarian Party continues to slowly increase its electoral support, received nearly 5% of the voters’ votes in the 2016 presidential election, and has a few small electoral victories. However, the trend of the USA turning into a socialist state has not been broken; there is incredible monetary emission and an increase in national debt, and the powers of intelligence services are expanding—in short, the state is advancing in full force.

Meanwhile, agorists have invented Bitcoin, are operating full-throttle in the darknet, printing weapons on 3D printers, and mastering biohacking. At the intersection with panarchists, they are launching Bitnation.

And finally, there is the phenomenon of New Hampshire, where agorists and supporters of political methods combined their efforts, even if without much concern for coordinating their actions. Political activists there are actively elected to legislative bodies and engage in deregulation. Meanwhile, agorists organize direct action campaigns to demonstratively violate idiotic laws—and this also sparks public campaigns for their repeal. It is precisely the simultaneous action on two fronts that led to New Hampshire becoming the freest of all fifty states.

A similar tactic is used by the Georgian Girchi party. On one hand, it is a political party; it participates in elections and is ostensibly a legal subject of politics. On the other hand, it is a gang of hardcore agorists who openly grew marijuana right in their central office and then publicly sold joints in the square in the presence of the police. This led to the legalization of marijuana in Georgia. Now they have organized a brothel in their central office—everything points to the fact that sex work will soon be legalized in the country as well. Thus, we see that coordinated actions of politicians and agorists yield an even more effective result than if they worked separately.

Meanwhile, agorism by itself simply slowly delegitimizes the state and increases the share of people who have, more or less, slipped from under its short-sighted eye. And the political process by itself helps broader masses learn the word “libertarianism.” Both are very useful, but neither compares in effect to the joint application of these two recipes—agorism and minarchism. And we have barely seen the implementation of panarchist developments, with their functional contractual jurisdictions. I suspect that an offensive on three fronts at once would be even more effective.

In Russia over the last year, the positions of the Libertarian Party have strengthened quite significantly. I would like the agorists not to lag behind; otherwise, it will be like in Ukraine, whereas I would prefer it to be like in Georgia. The Russian Libertarian Party has its own Rothbard—Mikhail Svetov. All that is left is to find its own Konkin.

the father of world agorism