Тег: Violence

The difference between aggression and violence using the example of American football players and police officers

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Aggressive feelings and behavior are a natural part of human nature. But this naturalness of aggression is often, and absolutely erroneously, perceived as a capacity for its boundless manifestation, up to such violent actions as murder. And from such an incorrect interpretation of the nature of aggression, a conclusion is drawn about the impossibility of eradicating violence from human behavior, since without it a person would become a “willless vegetable,” incapable of many types of activity that require aggressiveness from them. But this absurd substitution of concepts can be easily refuted with one practical example—the statistics of domestic violence in the families of American football players and police officers.

If you believe that aggressiveness is a necessary component of many types of human activity and social communication, then you will agree that American football is a fairly aggressive sport, and a person cannot do without this component to participate in it. Why it is necessary for police officers, I think, does not even need to be explained. But there is one categorical difference between players and police officers. As American domestic violence statistics show, the level of violence in police families is up to 4 times higher than the national average. At the same time, in the families of players, it occurs almost 2 times less than the average.

Why is this so? While players simply need to achieve good sporting results, the immediate task of a police officer is to carry out violent attacks on other people, who themselves often committed no violence at all, but were merely accused of violating some state laws and “victimless crimes.” Obviously, the first profession may attract people who clearly demonstrate their aggressiveness but are still non-violent, and whose aggression is limited and under inhibiting control. The second profession will more often attract precisely violent people, since their official duties require violence.

Using the example of these two professions, we can clearly see the difference between functional aggression under inhibiting control and pathological violence that has spiraled out of control. The former is absolutely sufficient for a person to perform any activity, provided, of course, that it does not consist of committing violence itself. A person will not become some kind of “willless vegetable” if their aggressiveness is limited. Moreover, it is naturally limited in the vast majority of people, who could never intentionally cause serious harm to someone, let alone kill, feeling a strong repulsion toward such acts. Therefore, calling the capacity to commit violence an important trait for many types of human activity would simply be an absurd substitution of concepts.

The Question of Instincts and Reflexes in Human Aggression

Voluntarist, Bitarch

It has become a fairly established opinion that human beings possess no instinctive behavior. Sometimes, even the instincts of highly developed animals (especially primates) are subject to partial doubt. Priority is given to the crude satisfaction of immediate needs, while all other behavior, it is claimed, is purely social in nature. Based on this position, the idea that humans have innate predispositions regarding social behavior—for example, a tendency toward either violent or non-violent behavior—is also criticized. Thus, human behavior is seen as purely a product of upbringing and environment, unless it concerns certain pathologies already described by medicine. Or even if an individual does have some innate predispositions, they can be easily “overwritten” by upbringing.

To understand whether humans have instincts or not, it is necessary to define the concept of instinct itself, as well as another similar concept—the reflex. An instinct is defined as a set of complex hereditary and preset behavioral acts, whereas a reflex is a standard reaction to a stimulus. It is immediately apparent that the difference between an instinct and a reflex comes down to the complexity of the structure of these phenomena, without a clear boundary being drawn. This can lead to some confusion in the study of innate behavioral predispositions. However, while instincts are generally considered not to be present in humans, no one doubts the existence of reflexes.

Perhaps the most criticized is the maternal instinct. However, it is an indisputable fact that an attachment between mother and child usually does arise. Research clearly shows that during pregnancy and breastfeeding, oxytocin—a hormone that plays an important role in this process—is produced in the mother. However, researchers agree that this cannot be called an instinct.

At the same time, for some reason, the innate human fear of certain threats encountered during evolution is explicitly called an instinct. For example, research has shown that the fear of snakes and spiders is present in 6-month-old infants. In general, the concept of the threat superiority effect, which explains the human ability to react quickly to threats in the environment, suggests a protective reaction to both innate and experience-acquired stimuli, not just the latter.

Let us now turn to the topic of aggression. As ethologists claim, the restraint of intraspecific aggression in animals, expressed, among other things, through the ritualization of battles, is instinctive in nature. However, the model of the violence inhibition mechanism in humans calls the rejection reaction—which arises in a normally developing individual from childhood when observing distress signals (expressions of sadness, fear, pain) from victims of violence—merely an unconditioned reflex. It should also be noted that this mechanism is important in the development of empathy, and children as early as 2-3 days after birth show an empathic response by reacting to the crying of other children with reactive crying, which is more intense than their reaction to other irritating stimuli.

We know that it is primarily the correct functioning of such a mechanism—which causes a feeling of rejection toward violence, plays an important role in the development of empathy, and leads to the development of a number of important conditioned reflexes—that makes a person non-violent, and only after that comes upbringing. Is such behavior instinctive, or is it simply a reflex? It is impossible to say for sure until a clear boundary is drawn between these concepts. However, if researchers nonetheless call the innate fear of threat, which influences the regulation of aggressive behavior, instinctive, then why can the violence inhibition mechanism not also be called instinctive? Especially since in many people it is so strongly expressed that it absolutely prevents the commission of violence, at least in its serious forms.

Myths about violence

Libertarian Band has released a video on the very important topic of myths about violence, which we have raised more than once. Were killings truly the norm for prehistoric humans? What percentage of soldiers feel no resistance to committing murder and act as the driving force of wars? How many people are actually responsible for the millions of victims of genocides? Where lies the falsehood in experiments demonstrating human violence? You will find the answers to these and other similar questions by watching the video “Myths About Violence”.

How weapons restrictions and bans produce an effect opposite to the expected one

Voluntarist, Bitarch

When certain political forces or communities advocate for strict regulation, or even a ban on weapons for private individuals, they invariably expect an increase in societal security and a reduction in crime, including violent crime. The logic behind such expectations is as follows: a person without a weapon cannot cause as much harm as a person with a weapon; therefore, the freedom to arm oneself represents a threat to society.

Of course, such logic is fundamentally flawed. It is simply impossible to completely get rid of weapons. In any scenario, they will remain in the hands of government agents, such as the army and police. Likewise, they will most often remain at the disposal of bandits—they are bandits, after all, which means they will not follow a law banning weapons. If they are left without “legal” ways to obtain weapons, “illegal” methods and the black market will be used. For example, statistics from the United States show that 80% of armed criminals obtain their weapons illegally.

We see that regardless of any laws, at least two types of agents will absolutely always have weapons. However, ordinary people—law-abiding citizens—will now guaranteedly not have them. And the absurdity of such a state of affairs consists not only in the fact that the vast majority of people need weapons only for self-defense and would never use them to carry out attacks. It also consists in the fact that people are thus effectively deprived of all possible rights and freedoms at once. What can unarmed people possibly oppose against armed bandits, whether stationary (states and governments) or nomadic (private bandits and rapists)? What will they do if someone, utilizing their enormous potential for violence, decides to attack them—they who have essentially no power at all?

And indeed, this has always happened in human history. Genocides began precisely with the deprivation of the freedom to arm oneself. Before the Turkish genocide of the Armenians, a proclamation was issued regarding the seizure of weapons from the latter. The Soviet government, even before the end of the civil war, introduced the mandatory surrender of weapons to the government and severe punishments for disobedience. The German Nazis also introduced bans on arming. The same situation occurred during the genocides in Cambodia and Rwanda, as well as in many other genocides.

As for private violence, let us take the same United States as an example, where 94% of all mass shootings occur precisely in so-called “gun-free zones.” According to the logic of opponents of the freedom to arm, this is simply impossible, as weapons are banned there. I will also note that it is very easy to explain why the mass shooting rate is so high in places with a ban on weapons, whereas in places where weapons are permitted, they almost never occur. Why would they happen there, if any bandit attempting to arrange such a thing would instantly receive armed self-defense from their potential victims in response?

I would like to ask the opponents of the freedom to arm—what will you do if your government, deciding to purge people it finds undesirable, turns its weapons against you? What will you do if a bandit with a pistol, or even just a knife, attacks you? What do you suggest all ordinary and peaceful people do in such situations? Obviously, no adequate answers to these questions can be given without referring to armed self-defense.

To speak out against the freedom to arm and against the natural human right to self-defense is to give a small percentage of bandits and rapists full coercive power over the entire society. An attempt to achieve greater security ultimately results in less security, if not its complete absence, because security cannot exist where some people possess a relatively infinite potential for violence, while others have neither the right nor the means to defend themselves. Private banditry and government genocides are the unsurprising result of such aspirations.

Using the concept of the implicit contract against statisticians

Voluntarist, Bitarch

You are likely familiar with the argument that the mere use of some benefit supposedly implies agreement with the rules established for it, even if such agreement was not explicitly confirmed. For example, being in a certain territory automatically obligates a person to follow its rules. If they disagree with the rules, they should not visit this territory; otherwise, they can absolutely reasonably expect the punishment established for committing such a violation. This works similarly with any use of material goods and interaction with other people. And some, referring to copyright, may even claim that such a rule applies even to intangible benefits. For example, by simply using a certain program, you automatically agree to follow the rules established by its developer and copyright law itself (“clickwrap”).

Statists—supporters of coercive state power—often resort to such an argument. With its help, they can justify any obligations arising from various state laws as a kind of implicit consent to the norms they establish. Very often they claim that the mere presence of a person within the territory of the state already obligates them to complete submission to all state laws. Well, then they should not be surprised that this argument can be turned against them.

The main tool of the statist in imposing the arbitrariness of the stationary bandit (“legislation”) is coercion through the threat of violence. After all, would a statist be able to force you personally to do or not do something without threatening violence? Of course, it can be initiated only against a specific person who, based on the concept of the implicit contract, has nothing preventing them from simply setting their own terms for interaction.

I warn that if someone wants to commit violence against me, then by interacting with me in such a way, they will enter into an agreement consenting to an euthanasia procedure as part of my self-defense. Having been warned and acquainted with my rule, the choice now lies with the person wishing to commit violence. Deciding to do so, they thereby implicitly sign the contract established by me and accept the conditions specified therein.

Understanding this, the statist is left with only two possible options for how to further regard the concept of the implicit contract. They can either continue to adhere to it, thereby recognizing the right of other people to unlimited self-defense against any attempts to commit violence against them, or throw out this untenable and unfounded concept from the list of their arguments in defense of violent power.

The problem of violence cannot be solved partially; it can only be dealt with completely

Voluntarist, Bitarch

When violence is divided into categories such as unacceptable, acceptable, or even necessary, a gross error is made in this division. It consists of the assumption that it is possible to fight only unacceptable violence without affecting other categories. The initiation of violence is supposedly useful in certain situations, and therefore this “useful” violence should be preserved.

However, dividing violence into different categories based on the indicator of acceptability and unacceptability is simply an absurd undertaking. Violence is indivisible; there are no people capable of committing one type of violent attack while being incapable of committing another. A person is either capable or incapable of committing a violent attack in general. You will be able to easily convince yourself of the truth of this statement after a brief explanation of the very nature of violent behavior and one interesting fact.

Violence is not a purely rational act to which a person resorts whenever it is profitable and does not carry serious risks. The manifestation of violence does not depend exclusively on social checks and balances. Regardless of the incentives, most people have never committed and will never commit an act of violence, at least not in its serious forms, such as causing significant physical harm to another person or murder. Throughout human history and in all circumstances, such as wars and genocides, fewer than 2% of people have committed such actions.

As a rule, humans possess natural deterrents to aggression—a violence inhibitor that causes a feeling of repulsion when attempting to commit an act of violence. This mechanism also plays an important role in the development of empathy, which is also inherent in most people. The ability of the average person to cause real physical harm to others is limited only to self-defense in the presence of an immediate threat to life.

Now it is worth mentioning one very important and interesting fact. As domestic violence statistics in the US show, it occurs up to 4 times more often in police families than on average in all American families. And these are only the cases that police officers reported themselves in anonymous surveys; surely many of them did not even admit to their violence in that way.

By preserving even one category of violence, it is inevitable that all other categories are also preserved. For a society to have police, soldiers, and even more so some kind of special services and “executioners” who carry out orders to eliminate someone, it is absolutely necessary for there to be a certain percentage of people in society who are capable of violence in general. Otherwise, there would simply be no place to get such employees. But if such a state of affairs is maintained, then private violent crime will never disappear. And the employees themselves will be a source of private violence. By day, someone is a highly successful employee, always ready to carry out any violent detention on command, and in the evening he returns home and beats his wife and children. Judging by the statistics, this is exactly what should be expected from a person who, in general, does not feel as strong a repulsion toward committing violence as other people do.

An attempt to merely limit, rather than eradicate, violence from people capable of committing it simply will not work. One can effectively fight only against all violence and all violent offenders at once. Violence cannot be divided into categories of acceptability and unacceptability (and even more so necessity), otherwise this problem will not go away, and that small percentage of people capable of committing it at any moment and in any form will continue to remain in society.

Violence attracts too much attention

Voluntarist, Bitarch

It is often claimed that the commission of brutal violence by humans, up to and including murder, is natural, based on supposed endless observation of human society. Not a day in history has passed without murders or some form of armed conflict, and this continues in the modern world. This implies that humans are extremely cruel and violent.

But such claims are based on a purely subjective perception of events occurring in the world. For example, 69% of Americans believe that domestic violence is widespread among American football players. This belief is fueled by media scandals surrounding players who actually commit such acts. However, if one relies on statistics rather than subjective perceptions, it turns out that domestic violence occurs nearly twice as rarely in the families of players than in American families on average. At the same time, in police families, it occurs up to 4 times more often than average. But American media are unlikely to talk about bad cops unless the case is either extremely scandalous or somehow beneficial to the government. Moreover, police officers are covered up in their violence. For instance, reports of domestic violence are often not considered at all if the accused is a police officer.

This is precisely how myths about violence are formed. Incomplete data can also be misleading. When the conversation turns to a certain number of dead in some genocide or war, it is often assumed that there were approximately as many killers. But this proves to be absolutely wrong if we look at cases where the number of killers was actually known. For example, the genocide of up to 2 million people in Cambodia was orchestrated by only 55-70 thousand Khmer Rouge.

Relative to all people, violence is committed by a very small percentage of them. Only subjective assessments, based on incomplete data or common misconceptions, may suggest otherwise. If you observe violence every day, it absolutely does not mean that violence is committed by a large number of people. It is simply that a minority commits it quite frequently, and violence itself attracts too much attention compared to other events.

What every supporter of the security forces must understand

Voluntarist, Bitarch

The existence of compulsory coercive power in society is most often justified by the need to solve certain tasks using violent methods. At the same time, it is assumed that people will still possess some freedoms and rights to a significant extent. I am sure that the etatists themselves—supporters of coercive power—want to have freedoms and rights, and want to be treated as individuals and be taken into account. It is unlikely that anyone, even among representatives of rigid etatist views, would want to turn into a willless slave or state property, whose entire life is strictly controlled without being given any freedoms.

Of course, etatists make a great mistake in counting on the fact that coercive power will treat them with respect, will take them into account, and will somehow limit itself. The coronavirus pandemic clearly showed how the world’s top-ranked democracies, such as Australia and Canada, can almost instantaneously turn into authoritarian regimes, and authoritarian China can turn into a brutal dictatorship where people are treated precisely as state property, livestock, and expendable material. History also contains many cases where governments, even those quite democratic and liberal in their orders, deliberately neglected the freedoms and rights of people, or even persecuted and killed ordinary citizens.

Any etatist, even one adhering to the concept of a minimal coercive state, must renounce the recognition of any freedoms and rights for themselves in order to be consistent in their position. At any moment, any coercive power can do whatever it wants with a person. It cannot be limited solely to the performance of some specific tasks. If it has at its disposal agents capable of committing murder to fulfill one specific task, it means they can do so for any purpose whatsoever. A stationary bandit only needs a pretext or a reason to give the corresponding order. Does anyone disagree that this is exactly how it works?

Continuing to hold etatist views, a person must admit that within the framework of their preferred system, they will be treated as state property, livestock, and expendable material. Coercive power can neglect any person, or even deliberately sacrifice them. It may, of course, stand up for the protection of ordinary people, but only in cases when it is profitable to do so. And if it suddenly becomes profitable to neglect or sacrifice people, that is exactly what will happen.

Even direct democracy will not save them, where in theory the majority can still “dispose of” the minority, and in practice, this can be done unilaterally by a very small number of executors of the democratic will. For example, this will be done by some coercive structures, whose direct employees and managers will, of course, never be the majority. Nothing will prevent such a body from committing any act of violence, unless the citizens themselves are massively armed and ready to defend against encroachments on their lives.

If someone considers themselves an individual, wishes to possess freedoms, rights, and choice, then they categorically should not adhere to even minimal etatist views. Otherwise, their position will be absolutely inconsistent.

Why is there a significantly higher percentage of violent people in law enforcement agencies

than in society as a whole, and what this says about current social systems

Voluntarist, Bitarch

American statistics on domestic violence in police families show us interesting things. As it turns out, up to 40% of police officers in the USA practice violence against their loved ones. The level of violence in police families is up to 4 times higher than that in American society as a whole. It is worth noting that this is the result of several anonymous surveys of the officers themselves. Their families rarely complain about violence or seek help, as they do not expect it from the colleagues of their abusers. And officers are indeed rarely brought to actual charges of domestic violence—while 92% of reports are generally investigated, in the case of officers, this figure is only 42%. This means that the level of domestic violence in police families may actually be much higher than 40%. Also, among representatives of all professions in general, police officers turned out to be the most prone to domestic violence.

Of course, this is only American statistics, but there is no reason not to assume that employees of security forces will be significantly more violent than the rest of the population in all countries. And there is no need to be surprised by this. Obviously, it is more violent people—those who do not feel strong resistance or aversion to committing violence, and who have weaker empathy—who will be more inclined to choose a profession where the initiation of violence is a professional duty.

What does this mean for society? In effect, existing systems of social management and law enforcement worldwide, based on the “legitimate monopoly” of a certain body (the state) in the application of violence, become tools in the hands of violent people. A small percentage of abusers gains power over everyone else—normal people, who for the most part never commit violence. And obviously, these abusers will use coercive power in their own interests, not limiting themselves to certain norms and laws, or interpreting and rewriting them to suit themselves. Nor will they certainly renounce violence in their private lives, considering it generally a normal tool for achieving certain goals, or even resorting to it to relieve stress and aggressiveness, taking it out on the people around them.

It is important to understand that the issue is why some people commit violence. They may, of course, be provoked or prompted by certain events and goals, but more importantly—they simply do not feel sufficient resistance and aversion to violence, including having weaker empathy compared to other people. This is precisely how violence in human society can be explained, if we refer to the concept of the violence inhibition mechanism, which asserts that every normally developing individual possesses innate restraints against aggression toward other people, the presence of which is also important for the development of empathy.

Can we expect people capable of easily committing violence due to a lack of such restraints to limit its use only as a tool for maintaining the law and some kind of justice? No, of course not; for them, violence is the norm, they feel nothing negative toward it, and they will resort to it whenever they deem it necessary. That is why any social system, the enforcement of whose order requires violent reinforcement, can hardly be called just or working for the benefit of the ordinary person—such systems only provide advantages to abusers and strengthen their power over normal people.

Rozov, Bitarch, violence and Montelibero

Alex Rozov (an author of near-libertarian trans-utopias whom I rate quite highly) examined in his LiveJournal a set of concepts promoted by Bitarh and Voluntarist regarding the possibilities for radically reducing violence in human society.

Post 1. What percentage of aggressive sociopaths are there in the human population—and what would happen if they were neutralized?

The author believes that a one-time removal of aggressive individuals from the human population would likely be insufficient, and to consolidate success, a “culturocide” is also necessary—that is, the abolition from culture of patterns that encourage and heroize aggressive violence.

Post 2. Violence inhibitor according to Voluntarist: the hypothesis of sectoral betrization as a style of a positive society

The author analyzes a series of articles on the violence inhibitor, noting that its appearance in humans is entirely evolutionarily grounded (the currently mainstream hypothesis of human self-domestication in scientific discourse), and also attempts to answer the question of to what extent it would be advisable to strengthen it (betrization is a term introduced by Stanisław Lem, referring precisely to the procedure of sharply increasing the violence inhibitor). The answer is discouraging: no single-step action will lead to the desired result, as society is regulated by mechanisms that are too complex. The author believes that the simple ability to defend oneself against immediate violence (which is ensured by the fact that the inhibitor’s action is temporarily weakened in a moment of immediate danger) does not provide sufficient feedback to bring society to the desired non-violent state; the readiness to retaliate stealthily is also important.

Thus, the difference in approaches is clearly highlighted. While Bitarh and Voluntarist, in exploring a mechanism that regulates human reactions, further speculate based on a fantastic premise about forcibly strengthening this mechanism in certain individuals, Alex Rozov considers natural human communities and the mechanisms that could lead them to the desired result (a society of free, prosperous individuals who highly value cooperation and development). His fantastic premises mostly lie in the technical sphere (technologies of war, information exchange, and organization) or boil down to the idea that the right people should gather in sufficient concentration and number.

Nevertheless, all three are convinced that removing individuals prone to aggressive violence from a community produces a powerful positive effect. I will note for myself that not all lustration is the same, and if a community is cleansed in such a way that those removed become its enemies, it could lead to serious problems in the future.

In Montelibero, we see so far that selecting people for the community who share the principle of non-aggression leads to a high level of cooperation. The removal of those with whom it is uncomfortable in the community currently happens through fairly soft rejection. I would prefer not to test how capable such a community would be to resist external aggression if the occasion arose, but so far, based on the general mood, it is not apparent that the chances of successfully repelling aggression are significantly higher or lower than those of any other cohesive community.

In other words, for now, we are managing with Rozov’s methods. Bitarh’s methods might be in demand for correcting the external background, but they are technically unavailable today. Rozov’s methods for the interaction of a free society with the outside world (creating a decentralized environment for conducting special operations to expand the space of freedom) are currently available to us to a minimal extent, at the level of maneuvering between state regulations.

That’s how things stand.

opasan pas – Montenegrin localization of the libertarian snake