A very common mistake in the study of phenomena such as wars and genocides is the incorrect correlation between the number of those who actually committed killings and other forms of violence and the number of victims who suffered from that violence. Some may even think that the number of killers is roughly equal to the number of killed, which would mean that wars and genocides with millions of victims prove the capacity for brutal violence even in the average person. But to think this way would be a grave error.
One can recall that according to some military researchers, such as Dave Grossman, 98% of soldiers on the front line experience strong resistance to committing murder, and only 2% lack such resistance. The deaths of up to 2 million inhabitants of Cambodia under the Pol Pot regime were the fault of only 55-70 thousand Khmer Rouge (averaging about 30-40 killings per killer). And one researcher of the Rwandan genocide claims that there is nothing impossible about even 25 thousand people killing hundreds of thousands, if not a million people in 100 days—for this, one killer would have to commit on average only one killing every 2.5 days (or 40 killings in total).
In peaceful everyday life, as a rule, there are 2.5 violent crimes per one violent criminal. Less than 0.1% of people commit more than a dozen violent crimes. But what level can such “recidivism” reach in the case of wars, genocides, or repressions, when killing becomes something acceptable, permitted, or even required?
Let’s look at some well-known extreme cases. You have probably heard of the following figures at least once: — the Croatian war criminal Petar Brzica, who personally killed up to 1,360 Serbs in one night (according to the most conservative estimates, 670 killings were committed); — the NKVD officer Vasily Mikhailovich Blokhìn, who personally shot between 10,000 and 20,000 people throughout his service.
In the case of wars, genocides, and repressions, one killer can indeed personally commit hundreds and thousands of killings. In principle, such figures can be expected from any person who is capable of easily committing murder without experiencing any resistance or disgust. Does a killer have any incentive to stop and kill less when they have been given an unlimited right to do so? It would be absurd to expect such a thing from a killer; rather, he will kill until the very end, and if the opportunity arises, he will personally kill hundreds and thousands of people.
Based on what we know about genocides, in practice, one average killer in a state of “violent omnipotence” is most likely to manage to commit several dozen killings. Of course, this still indicates that the actual killers in any situation are a tiny minority of people, meaning that the number of victims of mass killings significantly exceeds the number of killers themselves. Wars, genocides, and repressions never work on the principle of “one day a million people took to the streets and killed another million people.” If a million people were indeed killed somewhere, it means that only several tens of thousands of killers took to the streets with violent intentions.
A rather interesting pattern can be traced in a great many genocides. They were preceded by the introduction of regulations and bans on civilian weaponry. Often, such bans directly preceded the genocides. Very convenient for government thugs and other bandits, isn’t it? To strip the common people of their weapons, and then calmly and almost without any resistance exterminate the undesirable part of the population.
To advocate for gun laws and against the natural human right to defend one’s own life means supporting the exclusive armament of a minority of perpetrators. After all, bans only work against peaceful and law-abiding citizens, who would never in their lives use a weapon to commit an attack, but only for the purpose of self-defense. Meanwhile, government agents and lawless bandits will keep their weapons regardless. Is this really what opponents of the freedom of armament and self-defense desire—that governments hold totalitarian power over people, and bandits have complete freedom to commit violence without facing resistance from their victims?
Recalling the genocide of the Tutsi ethnic group in Rwanda, it might seem to us that nearly the entire Hutu people, egged on by supporters of the idea of exterminating the Tutsis, simply turned into killers. Or we might recall how horrific Pol Pot’s regime was, when up to a quarter of Cambodia’s population perished. Do this and other similar examples of mass genocides show us that humans have no natural restraints against killing other people, and that with enough conviction, almost anyone could easily do it?
In assessing phenomena such as war or genocide, it is certainly not worth relying on subjective feelings. It would be much better to conduct detailed calculations. Based on the most widely accepted research, between 500 thousand and 662 thousand Tutsis died as a result of the genocide in Rwanda, with some estimates reaching 800 thousand deaths. But how many Hutus took part in the genocide? One study estimates the number of killers at 50 thousand people [1]. Another study estimates the number of genocide participants (those who attempted murder, committed murders, rapes, torture, and other forms of serious violence) at between 175 thousand and 210 thousand people [2]. At the start of the genocide, the population of Rwanda was over 7 million people.
What does this mean? According to the highest estimate, only 2.5-3% of the population of Rwanda, or 3-3.5% of the Hutu population itself, committed violence during the Tutsi genocide. According to the lowest estimate, the killers constituted less than 1% of the population. This is considering the fact that movements advocating for the extermination of the Tutsis called upon the Hutus to commit murders by all possible means and through all information channels. And the killings themselves were indeed mass in nature.
There should be no doubt that such a percentage of people could organize a genocide. It is unlikely that a person who is urged to kill, who feels no repulsion toward committing murder, and whose potential victims have no serious means of defense, would stop after only one or two episodes. Rather, one should expect that he would kill everyone who crossed his path. Small groups of such killers could wipe out thousands of people at once, especially if they were armed. The study that estimates the number of killers in the Rwandan genocide at 50 thousand people asserts that there is nothing impossible about even 25 thousand people being able to exterminate hundreds of thousands, if not a million people, in 100 days.
Another well-known example of genocide is the extermination of 1.5 to 2 million Cambodians by the “Khmer Rouge” from 1975 to 1979 under Pol Pot’s regime. The forces of the Khmer Rouge by 1975 can be estimated at 55 to 70 thousand people [3][4]. The population of Cambodia at the beginning of the genocide was about 7.8 million people. Based on these numbers, it is obvious that less than 1% of the population was responsible for the death of 20-25% of Cambodia’s population at that time.
Genocides cannot tell us that the majority of people are ready to carry out the extermination of groups or even entire peoples who do not share their views. The direct killers and other perpetrators of violence in genocides are an overwhelming minority of the total population. Therefore, they cannot serve as evidence of human violence; rather, the opposite is true—they only confirm that, for the most part, humans are non-violent.
Sources:
Jones, B. D. (2001). Peacemaking in Rwanda: the dynamics of failure;
Straus, S. (2004). How many perpetrators were there in the Rwandan genocide? An estimate. Journal of Genocide Research, 6(1), March, 85–98;
Carney, T. (1989). The Unexpected Victory. In Karl D. Jackson, ed., Cambodia 1975–1978: Rendezvous With Death. Princeton University Press, pp. 13–35;
The Crime of Cambodia: Shawcross on Kissinger’s Memoirs New York Magazine, 5 November 1979.
Extremely interesting and important results were demonstrated by experiments on the use of anti-aggressive agents in mice and rats. It turned out that some of them are capable of reducing the manifestation of attacking aggression on their part, while not affecting defensive aggression and other non-aggressive forms of behavior and social communication. To be more specific, we are talking about agonists that activate serotonin 5-HT1A/1B receptors.
These results align with the theory that many species possess innate inhibitors of aggressive behavior, which prevent causing harm and killing members of their own species. In the case of humans, a model of the violence inhibition mechanism (VIM) was even developed, which also explains the development of empathy. Based on this theory, violence in intraspecific relationships should be viewed as a pathological rather than a natural form of behavior. Especially since even in many territorial, social, and armed species, the level of lethal violence still does not exceed 1%, and according to various evidence, only no more than 2% of people do not experience strong resistance to committing murder.
We also see that defensive aggression, unlike attacking aggression, is indeed a natural form of behavior, and the work of the violence inhibitor does not stop it in the presence of an immediate threat to life in the environment. This was well demonstrated by the administration of the 5-HT1A agonist alnespirone to rats. It had an extremely selective effect; the strong reduction in aggressiveness did not prevent the rats from resorting to defensive behavior when encountering an aggressive peer.
Various genetic evidence demonstrates that certain variants of the 5-HT1A/1B receptor genes, as well as three other genes associated with the 5-HT system—TPH2, MAO A (also known as the “warrior gene”), and SERT—lead to increased aggressiveness in animals and humans. For example, in one study, impulsive and aggressive alcoholics were found to have differences in the 5-HT1B gene compared to healthy people and non-aggressive alcoholics. This study covered two different groups of people: Finns and a Native American tribe. Mutations in the MAO A gene have long been known as a cause of abnormal manifestations of aggression in men.
According to the violence inhibition mechanism model, the direct result of its dysfunction is calloused-unemotional (CU) traits in children and psychopathy in adults. Changes in the function of 5-HT1B receptors in certain parts of the brain were found in people with aggressive traits and psychopathic traits. A difference in the 5-HT1B gene genotype was present in children with calloused-unemotional traits.
It should be noted that dozens of genes and a large number of systems influence aggressiveness. However, the violence inhibitor remains a specific mechanism expressed by a limited number of receptors and genes. Firstly, this is simply important for inhibiting aggression most effectively. Secondly, other forms of pharmacological intervention, such as the use of antipsychotics (like haloperidol), beta-blockers, drugs affecting GABA neurotransmitters, and 5-HT2 receptor agonists and antagonists (many psychedelics belong to the former), result only in a non-selective reduction of aggressiveness, suppressing defensive aggression and other forms of behavior, and causing side effects.
Understanding the nature of the violence inhibitor and its limitation to a small number of receptors and genes can not only tell us a lot about violence itself, but also help in creating a solution aimed against it as a pathological form of behavior inherent in a minority of people. And the essence of such a solution is simple: returning to them the inhibiting control over aggression that is natural for the majority, through the use of appropriate pharmacological or even gene-therapeutic drugs.
Libertarian Band has released a video on the ethological approach to defining the concepts of aggression, violence, and self-defense. Ethology, as a science that studies animal behavior and serves as a link between biological and sociological sciences in the study of human behavior, is a fairly precise tool for solving this problem. The ethological approach can provide us with clear answers regarding what should be considered aggression and violence, as well as where the boundaries of self-defense lie.
I recommend everyone watch this video and share it with others, so that there will be less confusion in the future during conversations about aggression, violence, and self-defense.
During the invasion of Russian troops into the territory of Ukraine, an incident occurred that could have ended with extremely catastrophic consequences. We are talking about the events at the Zaporizhzhia NPP – the largest power plant in Europe. The details of this event are not so important; the main point here is that military actions were taking place around the nuclear power plant itself. Perhaps the probability of a catastrophe was extremely low, but it was still not zero. And had it happened, tens of millions of lives would have been at risk, as it would have been much worse than the well-known nuclear catastrophe at the Chernobyl NPP. Also, information has now emerged about biolaboratories located on the territory of Ukraine. The WHO recommended that Ukraine destroy dangerous pathogens to prevent their possible leakage.
Should this not demonstrate what the problem is with violence as a method of solving problems and achieving goals, and why we need to fight against it? War or any other violent conflict can lead to a catastrophe if it hits a nuclear plant, a warehouse with dangerous chemicals, or a biolaboratory with samples of deadly viruses, especially those of artificial origin, which were kept for strictly controlled experiments and for which it is unknown what to do if they suddenly break out.
As we can see, it is not even necessary to intentionally use nuclear, chemical, biological, or any other weapon of mass destruction to achieve exactly this mass destruction. In the modern world with a heap of dangerous technologies and means used at various enterprises and facilities, it can become merely an accidental result of even a small armed clash, not to mention a conflict as large-scale as the one currently taking place between Russia and Ukraine. Therefore, violence and war are extremely unacceptable; it is necessary to fight against all manifestations of violence immediately and everywhere, throughout the world. Those who are not in the territory of the conflicting countries likely believe they are completely safe. But this is absolutely not the case, for in the modern world, no one is safe as long as any violent conflicts remain possible.
Now we can clearly observe where violence as a method for solving problems and achieving goals leads. Regardless of who holds what views regarding the conflict in Donbas, the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, the relations between Ukraine and Russia, the state of affairs in both countries, or who is right and who is wrong, in all possible positions, the attempt to achieve something by violent—in this case, military—means can be called both the root cause and an aggravating factor of the existing problems.
Indeed, what can we expect in a world where governments and states declare themselves “monopolists” of the right to “legally” use violence to achieve certain goals. And now, the Russian government has simply exercised this “right to violence.” As any other government that relies on force instruments will do, if it seems profitable enough.
Some may justify what is happening by saying that it is a response to the violence of the Ukrainian government toward the residents of Donbas who are unwilling to submit to it. But even if that is the case—can any force measures be justified in this instance other than purely defensive ones? Can an invasion of peaceful cities with accompanying human casualties be justified? No, and again no! And if someone thinks otherwise, if someone considers the death of people to be an adequate and acceptable price for achieving some geopolitical goals, then their opinion can only be called the position of a rapist and a psychopath who does not care about human life. And I have said more than once that a position allowing for forceful coercion, the infliction of harm, and the killing of people simply has no right to exist.
Of course, actual rapists and psychopaths make up only a tiny percentage of society; far more people simply hold such a position due to their own stupidity and lack of understanding. It was a tiny percentage of people who were responsible for violent attacks throughout all of human history, while the vast majority of people never needed this—they have their own families, concerns, and goals, and in general, they simply feel an instinctive aversion to violence and would never be able to commit a murder with their own hands.
Understanding all this, we must first and foremost fight against violence as an approach to achieving any goals, against the existence of any force structures in society that may have an advantage in their potential for violence relative to ordinary people, and most importantly—against rapists for whom committing a murder costs nothing, and with such a position, they successfully advance either into force structures or government bodies. After all, as long as someone has the opportunity to freely commit violence, they will do so in pursuit of their goals at the first convenient opportunity. And if someone holds violent views and possesses power over certain force structures staffed by violent people, then even war ceases to be something surprising and unexpected.
Fight against violence and war. And stay with us to learn more about how we can deal with the problem of violence and achieve a free, non-violent society.
It is a fairly common assertion that the level of lethal violence (deaths of people at the hands of other people) in prehistoric times was extremely high and could normally reach as much as 50%. This means that half of the “savages” became victims of murder rather than dying of natural causes or other reasons. Such a claim is used, among other things, to refute the argument that humans possess natural inhibitors of aggression, calling the aversion to violence and non-violent relationships purely sociocultural inventions that have nothing to do with what humans are by nature.
Indeed, archaeological evidence demonstrates cases of an extremely high level of lethal violence. Moreover, even in some primitive societies today, a significant portion of people still die from murder. However, the argument that murder is a natural and widespread phenomenon for humans is greatly exaggerated and based on individual, limited examples rather than general statistics. For instance, a study examining 600 human populations shows that throughout the history of Homo sapiens, the level of lethal violence was only 2%, and this includes cases of war and genocide [1]. Some studies also state that theories about the universality of war in human history lack empirical support, and data on high levels of prehistoric violence (for example, those presented in the work “War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage”) may be unjustifiably inflated [2][3].
Relying on the sample provided by the study of 600 human populations, as well as data from several other studies, let us analyze the level of lethal violence in different eras and in different human societies in more detail to confirm its rather low prevalence throughout human history.
The Old World
During the Paleolithic period in the Old World, the level of lethal violence was 3.97%. In archaeological excavations relating to this period, generally, few human remains were found, at best only a few dozen. However, excavations of the Natufian culture from the Epipaleolithic period in the territory of modern Israel draw attention. Of 400 human remains dating from 11,000 to 15,000 years ago, only 5 indicated a violent nature of death.
This example is taken from a study of prehistoric wars in Europe and the Near East [4]. The claim that wars were the cause of death for 15% of prehistoric people is called absurd in it. It also states that humans have no evolutionary predisposition to attack people from other social groups, and excavations related to the European Paleolithic show no evidence of wars, only extremely rare cases of cannibalism. Of course, this same study mentions the possibility of humans easily entering violent conflicts, based on the fact that wars did eventually arise later. But as we will see further, participation in violent conflicts never became something inherent to the majority of people.
The Neolithic, Mesolithic, and Bronze Age were also not characterized by a high level of lethal violence (3.59%, 3.39%, and 2.33%, respectively). However, the cases of the Iron Age and the Middle Ages require more detailed study, where the level of lethal violence, as claimed in the study of human populations, was 5.82% and 12.08%, respectively.
From the considered sample of Iron Age populations, cases of an extremely high level of lethal violence relate to Britain during the rule of the Roman Empire. For instance, one of the archaeological excavations in London, while demonstrating a large number of men killed by violence, explained this as “headhunting” by the Roman army and/or defeats in gladiatorial combat [5]. And the most “violent” Celtic excavations (though containing the remains of at most a few dozen people) relate to the Maiden Castle fortress.
On the other hand, all other major excavations, both in Britain and in other places such as Spain, Italy, the Near East, and North Africa, show an extremely low level of lethal violence. Many such pieces of evidence relating to the territory of modern Syria showed no cases of murder. The study providing them, covering 25 archaeological Mesopotamian excavations, shows that only 28 out of 1278 (i.e., 2.2%) of the examined remains have traces of healed cranial traumas related to violence. Based on evidence of bloody military conflicts and some level of violence in daily life in this territory, researchers expected to find a much larger number of traumas of this nature [6].
Such a difference between “violent” and “non-violent” Iron Age excavations may suggest that the emergence of organized armies was precisely the cause of the increase in the overall level of lethal violence in this period. But this says nothing about the violent nature of humans in general, since the professional soldiers who attack and kill other people are an overwhelming minority in society. And if we exclude from the sample only the London excavations relating to the actions of soldiers and gladiators of the Roman Empire, we get a lethal violence level of only 2.9%.
Similar results are shown by evidence from the Middle Ages, because in the case of the sample of archaeological excavations we are considering, the statistics of lethal violence are significantly increased by literally two battles: the Battle of Visby and the Battle of Aljubarrota. By excluding only these from the sample, we get a lethal violence level of only 3.3% (and this is without excluding other battles that left behind fewer remains).
Extremely interesting evidence is provided by more modern records of death and its causes for residents of London between 1629 and 1659, as well as in 1665. In the first case, out of 263,440 records, only 470 related to violent death (i.e., 0.18% of all deaths), and in the second, out of 97,306 records, only 30 (i.e., 0.03%) [7][8]. On average, although this is dozens of times higher than the modern global murder rate (and a hundred times higher than the murder rate in modern Britain), we clearly see that murderers in those times (as in any other times) constituted only an overwhelming minority of the population.
The New World
The level of lethal violence in the New World was 3.19% in the Archaic period, 3.52% in the Formative period, 5.28% in the Classic period, and 9.94% in the Post-Classic period.
The Archaic and Formative periods do not demonstrate a high level of lethal violence. A slightly higher level is observed in the Classic period, however, I would like to highlight the largest excavations from Central California. Among 2,182 remains, only 11 (i.e., 0.5%) had traces of violent death. Similar excavations from Central California, but relating to the Post-Classic period, also showed an extremely low level of lethal violence (less than 0.3%).
The level of lethal violence in Mexican California, based on evidence from colonial missions sent there, was 10%, which is much higher than the indicators for Central California. However, it should be noted that almost half of the cases relate to actions of a military nature [9]. Furthermore, the total number of registered deaths was dozens of times smaller than the sample provided by Central Californian archaeological excavations.
Among the extremely violent examples, the Crow Creek massacre should be highlighted, in which an entire Indian settlement was destroyed at once by attackers whose identity is not reliably known. Once again, we can see that lethal violence statistics increase precisely due to violent attacks of a military nature by specific groups of people.
The question of the violent nature of some modern tribes
Claims about the extremely violent nature of prehistoric humans very often rely on an analogy with the high violence of some modern hunter-gatherer tribes, especially the Hiwi and Ache of South America, with 55% and 30% lethal violence, respectively. However, such an argument would be fundamentally incorrect, because if these tribes are compared with other similar tribes, the latter turn out to be far less violent [10]. There are also cases of entirely non-violent tribes, a well-known example being the Paliyan people of South India. In general, one cannot determine how inherent violence is to humans based on individual cases of extremely violent isolated tribes. Nor can one lightheartedly draw conclusions about the level of lethal violence in tribes of the past—an error made by some researchers [2].
Conclusions
From the statistics of 600 human populations and other evidence we have examined, we can conclude that lethal violence was not an excessively widespread phenomenon in human history. Also, as mentioned at the very beginning, theories about the universality of war in human history lack empirical support, and data on high levels of prehistoric violence may be unjustifiably inflated. In general, cases of populations with an extremely high level of lethal violence can easily be categorized as statistical outliers.
And most importantly—mass killings are most often associated with violent attacks by organized armies. Therefore, the bulk of all lethal violence is merely the result of the actions of a small percentage of people initiating attacks of a military nature. Against the backdrop of an extremely non-violent daily life throughout human history, this only proves that many people who entered battles and became victims of military attacks died from lethal violence, not that many people in general did. For was participation in battles the norm for the majority of people? Except for isolated cases—no.
Sources
1. Gómez, J. M., Verdú, M., González-Megías, A., & Méndez, M. (2016). The phylogenetic roots of human lethal violence. Nature, 538(7624), 233–237. doi:10.1038/nature19758;
2. Haas, J. & Piscitelli, M. (2013). The Prehistory of Warfare: Misled by Ethnography. Pp. 168-190 In: DP Fry ed. War peace and human nature: the convergence of evolutionary and cultural views. Oxford Univ. Press.;
3. Ferguson, R. B. (1997). War before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage. American Anthropologist, 99(2), 424-425;
4. Ferguson, R. B. (2013). The prehistory of war and peace in Europe and the Near East. Pp. 191-240 In: DP Fry ed. War peace and human nature: the convergence of evolutionary and cultural views. Oxford Univ. Press.;
5. Redfern, R. & Bonney, H. (2014). Headhunting and amphitheatre combat in Roman London England: new evidence from the Walbrook Valley. Journal of Archaeology Science 43: 214-226;
6. Sołtysiak, A. (2015). Antemortem Cranial Trauma in Ancient Mesopotamia. International Journal of Osteoarchaeology, 27(1), 119–128. doi:10.1002/oa.2478;
8. Champion, J. (1993). Epidemics and the Built Environment in 1665. Champion. Centre for Metropolitan Hist. Working Papers Ser 1 35-52;
9. Hackel, S. W. (2012). From Ahogado to Zorrillo: external causes of mortality in the California missions. The History of the Family 17: 77-104;
10. Gurven, M., & Kaplan, H. (2007). Longevity Among Hunter- Gatherers: A Cross-Cultural Examination. Population and Development Review, 33(2), 321–365. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2007.00171.x.
The fundamental difference between the idea of a free society and any statist ideology is not which specific model of social organization their proponents strive for, but the methods they use to realize these aspirations. If the difference consisted only of end goals, there would be no fundamental difference at all. Indeed, any model of socio-economic organization and system of relationships between subjects can be implemented in a free society based on the principle of non-violence, voluntary agreements, and within the framework of free associations. In contrast, political ideologies always propose one specific social model that must be mandatorily implemented for all people, including through violent coercion.
When people encounter an idea of social organization that is unfamiliar to them, they almost always start asking questions such as “how will such-and-such a problem be solved within the framework of this idea.” Such an approach to understanding ideas is not surprising, as most of them offer a specific and single solution for everyone. People are used to the idea that a universal goal must be chosen, mandatory for everyone under threat of violence. However, if one tries to explain the ideas of freedom within these boundaries, it will likely fail—the listener will evaluate your answer based on their own preferences and conceptions of possible solutions, which may not coincide with your positions at all. Obviously, in their eyes, this will make the ideas of freedom appear unattractive, or even completely untenable.
Of course, modeling possible solutions is important, and the resulting answer can still serve as a convincing argument; however, it cannot be anything more than a supplement to the main argumentation. And the main argumentation itself must show people what was mentioned in the previous paragraph—that a specific and mandatory solution does not exist!
But how, then, will a particular problem be solved? Very simply—in the way the person themselves wants, based on their own preferences and views. In whatever way each person approaches the solution to their problems, that is how they will be solved. As for questions and problems common to many people, they will be solved based on how people agree to solve them. Each person can unite in associations with other people to create their own social order, which extends to the members of that association.
Therefore, it is necessary to ask the listener how they themselves would solve a particular problem if the ability to make the decision were in their own hands, and if the implementation extended to those who have corresponding agreements with them or participate in the same association. Their answer to your question will also be an answer to their own question. Only in this way can the idea of a free society be explained most accurately and attractively. Only then can it be conveyed that it consists of a method—freedom of activity, agreement, and association, as well as non-violent coexistence—while the goals themselves can be completely different.
Of course, this will not sound convincing to those who unconditionally believe that the realization of their personal aspirations, or the aspirations of some association sharing their views, requires the violent coercion of other people to accept their ideals. In such a situation, it is likely necessary to use arguments demonstrating the negative externalities of violence and discrediting it as a phenomenon as a whole. But if even this does not sound convincing, then all that remains is to end the conversation. After all, explaining something to people who have strong violent convictions (or even tendencies toward committing violence) is simply pointless; they can only be pressured by condemnation, ostracism, and various sanctions, and one should prepare to defend oneself from them, for they will seek to force you into submission by power at the first opportunity.
In their ideas, proponents of coercive state power refer to so-called permissible (or even allegedly necessary) or “legitimate” violence, the commission of which should be a monopoly of a single agent (the state) in society. However, as a rule, no clear definition is given as to exactly what violence can be considered permissible, necessary, or legitimate, and in whose hands it should be. Everything comes down to goals: whatever goals a particular etatist adheres to—within those frameworks, violence is justified for them, and the “monopoly” on violence should belong to them and/or those who share their specific views. This is not changed even by an adherence to democracy, since a democrat would want the monopoly on violence to belong specifically to the proponents of democracy; they simply do not consider it important what their views on other issues may be.
For this reason, there can be no talk of any specific legitimacy of violence. For instance, an authoritarian conservative must understand that, in the opinion of an authoritarian communist, his place is two meters underground, and vice versa. Every proponent of violence has their own understanding of its legitimacy, which cannot be agreed upon.
A monopoly on violence cannot exist at all as a model implemented in practice. A stationary bandit’s “monopoly” on violence is lost as soon as other people, even within the same state, take power into their own hands. There are no eternal governments; sooner or later, there is either a change in power or a change in the views of some members of the current power (who, of course, eliminate from political life their very own colleagues of yesterday who held the previous views). And with the help of violence in new hands, and violence whose legitimacy is now justified differently, the achievements of those who previously considered violence legitimate only within the framework of their own views and monopolistically belonging only to their own hands are destroyed.
Moreover, the monopoly on violence is quite often violated by those who commit it in a private capacity. As long as there are people in society capable of committing violence under certain circumstances, statements about possessing a monopoly right to it will be an exaggeration. After all, “illegitimate” perpetrators of violence may even attempt to stage a coup. Would proponents of monarchy or democracy consider the Bolsheviks’ understanding of the applicability of violence to be legitimate? No. But in practice, that would change nothing.
In reality, the state can possess only a “comparative advantage in the application of violence,” which is what Max Weber wrote in his definition of the state itself. But this formulation was misunderstood by many or simply misreported, which led to the concept of a “monopoly on violence,” which does not exist in reality. And possessing only a comparative advantage in violence, rather than a fictitious monopoly over it, the statist cannot in any way guarantee that violence will work in their favor—someday this tool will be taken from them and used with full force against them, their supporters, and their ideas. And this once again speaks to why the tool of free activity and voluntary agreement is better compared to the tool of force.
