Тег: Violence

The problem of violence cannot be solved partially; it can only be dealt with completely

Voluntarist, Bitarch

When violence is divided into categories such as unacceptable, acceptable, or even necessary, a gross error is made in this division. It consists of the assumption that it is possible to fight only unacceptable violence without affecting other categories. The initiation of violence is supposedly useful in certain situations, and therefore this “useful” violence should be preserved.

However, dividing violence into different categories based on the indicator of acceptability and unacceptability is simply an absurd undertaking. Violence is indivisible; there are no people capable of committing one type of violent attack while being incapable of committing another. A person is either capable or incapable of committing a violent attack in general. You will be able to easily convince yourself of the truth of this statement after a brief explanation of the very nature of violent behavior and one interesting fact.

Violence is not a purely rational act to which a person resorts whenever it is profitable and does not carry serious risks. The manifestation of violence does not depend exclusively on social checks and balances. Regardless of the incentives, most people have never committed and will never commit an act of violence, at least not in its serious forms, such as causing significant physical harm to another person or murder. Throughout human history and in all circumstances, such as wars and genocides, fewer than 2% of people have committed such actions.

As a rule, humans possess natural deterrents to aggression—a violence inhibitor that causes a feeling of repulsion when attempting to commit an act of violence. This mechanism also plays an important role in the development of empathy, which is also inherent in most people. The ability of the average person to cause real physical harm to others is limited only to self-defense in the presence of an immediate threat to life.

Now it is worth mentioning one very important and interesting fact. As domestic violence statistics in the US show, it occurs up to 4 times more often in police families than on average in all American families. And these are only the cases that police officers reported themselves in anonymous surveys; surely many of them did not even admit to their violence in that way.

By preserving even one category of violence, it is inevitable that all other categories are also preserved. For a society to have police, soldiers, and even more so some kind of special services and “executioners” who carry out orders to eliminate someone, it is absolutely necessary for there to be a certain percentage of people in society who are capable of violence in general. Otherwise, there would simply be no place to get such employees. But if such a state of affairs is maintained, then private violent crime will never disappear. And the employees themselves will be a source of private violence. By day, someone is a highly successful employee, always ready to carry out any violent detention on command, and in the evening he returns home and beats his wife and children. Judging by the statistics, this is exactly what should be expected from a person who, in general, does not feel as strong a repulsion toward committing violence as other people do.

An attempt to merely limit, rather than eradicate, violence from people capable of committing it simply will not work. One can effectively fight only against all violence and all violent offenders at once. Violence cannot be divided into categories of acceptability and unacceptability (and even more so necessity), otherwise this problem will not go away, and that small percentage of people capable of committing it at any moment and in any form will continue to remain in society.

Violence attracts too much attention

Voluntarist, Bitarch

It is often claimed that the commission of brutal violence by humans, up to and including murder, is natural, based on supposed endless observation of human society. Not a day in history has passed without murders or some form of armed conflict, and this continues in the modern world. This implies that humans are extremely cruel and violent.

But such claims are based on a purely subjective perception of events occurring in the world. For example, 69% of Americans believe that domestic violence is widespread among American football players. This belief is fueled by media scandals surrounding players who actually commit such acts. However, if one relies on statistics rather than subjective perceptions, it turns out that domestic violence occurs nearly twice as rarely in the families of players than in American families on average. At the same time, in police families, it occurs up to 4 times more often than average. But American media are unlikely to talk about bad cops unless the case is either extremely scandalous or somehow beneficial to the government. Moreover, police officers are covered up in their violence. For instance, reports of domestic violence are often not considered at all if the accused is a police officer.

This is precisely how myths about violence are formed. Incomplete data can also be misleading. When the conversation turns to a certain number of dead in some genocide or war, it is often assumed that there were approximately as many killers. But this proves to be absolutely wrong if we look at cases where the number of killers was actually known. For example, the genocide of up to 2 million people in Cambodia was orchestrated by only 55-70 thousand Khmer Rouge.

Relative to all people, violence is committed by a very small percentage of them. Only subjective assessments, based on incomplete data or common misconceptions, may suggest otherwise. If you observe violence every day, it absolutely does not mean that violence is committed by a large number of people. It is simply that a minority commits it quite frequently, and violence itself attracts too much attention compared to other events.

What every supporter of the security forces must understand

Voluntarist, Bitarch

The existence of compulsory coercive power in society is most often justified by the need to solve certain tasks using violent methods. At the same time, it is assumed that people will still possess some freedoms and rights to a significant extent. I am sure that the etatists themselves—supporters of coercive power—want to have freedoms and rights, and want to be treated as individuals and be taken into account. It is unlikely that anyone, even among representatives of rigid etatist views, would want to turn into a willless slave or state property, whose entire life is strictly controlled without being given any freedoms.

Of course, etatists make a great mistake in counting on the fact that coercive power will treat them with respect, will take them into account, and will somehow limit itself. The coronavirus pandemic clearly showed how the world’s top-ranked democracies, such as Australia and Canada, can almost instantaneously turn into authoritarian regimes, and authoritarian China can turn into a brutal dictatorship where people are treated precisely as state property, livestock, and expendable material. History also contains many cases where governments, even those quite democratic and liberal in their orders, deliberately neglected the freedoms and rights of people, or even persecuted and killed ordinary citizens.

Any etatist, even one adhering to the concept of a minimal coercive state, must renounce the recognition of any freedoms and rights for themselves in order to be consistent in their position. At any moment, any coercive power can do whatever it wants with a person. It cannot be limited solely to the performance of some specific tasks. If it has at its disposal agents capable of committing murder to fulfill one specific task, it means they can do so for any purpose whatsoever. A stationary bandit only needs a pretext or a reason to give the corresponding order. Does anyone disagree that this is exactly how it works?

Continuing to hold etatist views, a person must admit that within the framework of their preferred system, they will be treated as state property, livestock, and expendable material. Coercive power can neglect any person, or even deliberately sacrifice them. It may, of course, stand up for the protection of ordinary people, but only in cases when it is profitable to do so. And if it suddenly becomes profitable to neglect or sacrifice people, that is exactly what will happen.

Even direct democracy will not save them, where in theory the majority can still “dispose of” the minority, and in practice, this can be done unilaterally by a very small number of executors of the democratic will. For example, this will be done by some coercive structures, whose direct employees and managers will, of course, never be the majority. Nothing will prevent such a body from committing any act of violence, unless the citizens themselves are massively armed and ready to defend against encroachments on their lives.

If someone considers themselves an individual, wishes to possess freedoms, rights, and choice, then they categorically should not adhere to even minimal etatist views. Otherwise, their position will be absolutely inconsistent.

Why is there a significantly higher percentage of violent people in law enforcement agencies

than in society as a whole, and what this says about current social systems

Voluntarist, Bitarch

American statistics on domestic violence in police families show us interesting things. As it turns out, up to 40% of police officers in the USA practice violence against their loved ones. The level of violence in police families is up to 4 times higher than that in American society as a whole. It is worth noting that this is the result of several anonymous surveys of the officers themselves. Their families rarely complain about violence or seek help, as they do not expect it from the colleagues of their abusers. And officers are indeed rarely brought to actual charges of domestic violence—while 92% of reports are generally investigated, in the case of officers, this figure is only 42%. This means that the level of domestic violence in police families may actually be much higher than 40%. Also, among representatives of all professions in general, police officers turned out to be the most prone to domestic violence.

Of course, this is only American statistics, but there is no reason not to assume that employees of security forces will be significantly more violent than the rest of the population in all countries. And there is no need to be surprised by this. Obviously, it is more violent people—those who do not feel strong resistance or aversion to committing violence, and who have weaker empathy—who will be more inclined to choose a profession where the initiation of violence is a professional duty.

What does this mean for society? In effect, existing systems of social management and law enforcement worldwide, based on the “legitimate monopoly” of a certain body (the state) in the application of violence, become tools in the hands of violent people. A small percentage of abusers gains power over everyone else—normal people, who for the most part never commit violence. And obviously, these abusers will use coercive power in their own interests, not limiting themselves to certain norms and laws, or interpreting and rewriting them to suit themselves. Nor will they certainly renounce violence in their private lives, considering it generally a normal tool for achieving certain goals, or even resorting to it to relieve stress and aggressiveness, taking it out on the people around them.

It is important to understand that the issue is why some people commit violence. They may, of course, be provoked or prompted by certain events and goals, but more importantly—they simply do not feel sufficient resistance and aversion to violence, including having weaker empathy compared to other people. This is precisely how violence in human society can be explained, if we refer to the concept of the violence inhibition mechanism, which asserts that every normally developing individual possesses innate restraints against aggression toward other people, the presence of which is also important for the development of empathy.

Can we expect people capable of easily committing violence due to a lack of such restraints to limit its use only as a tool for maintaining the law and some kind of justice? No, of course not; for them, violence is the norm, they feel nothing negative toward it, and they will resort to it whenever they deem it necessary. That is why any social system, the enforcement of whose order requires violent reinforcement, can hardly be called just or working for the benefit of the ordinary person—such systems only provide advantages to abusers and strengthen their power over normal people.

Rozov, Bitarch, violence and Montelibero

Alex Rozov (an author of near-libertarian trans-utopias whom I rate quite highly) examined in his LiveJournal a set of concepts promoted by Bitarh and Voluntarist regarding the possibilities for radically reducing violence in human society.

Post 1. What percentage of aggressive sociopaths are there in the human population—and what would happen if they were neutralized?

The author believes that a one-time removal of aggressive individuals from the human population would likely be insufficient, and to consolidate success, a “culturocide” is also necessary—that is, the abolition from culture of patterns that encourage and heroize aggressive violence.

Post 2. Violence inhibitor according to Voluntarist: the hypothesis of sectoral betrization as a style of a positive society

The author analyzes a series of articles on the violence inhibitor, noting that its appearance in humans is entirely evolutionarily grounded (the currently mainstream hypothesis of human self-domestication in scientific discourse), and also attempts to answer the question of to what extent it would be advisable to strengthen it (betrization is a term introduced by Stanisław Lem, referring precisely to the procedure of sharply increasing the violence inhibitor). The answer is discouraging: no single-step action will lead to the desired result, as society is regulated by mechanisms that are too complex. The author believes that the simple ability to defend oneself against immediate violence (which is ensured by the fact that the inhibitor’s action is temporarily weakened in a moment of immediate danger) does not provide sufficient feedback to bring society to the desired non-violent state; the readiness to retaliate stealthily is also important.

Thus, the difference in approaches is clearly highlighted. While Bitarh and Voluntarist, in exploring a mechanism that regulates human reactions, further speculate based on a fantastic premise about forcibly strengthening this mechanism in certain individuals, Alex Rozov considers natural human communities and the mechanisms that could lead them to the desired result (a society of free, prosperous individuals who highly value cooperation and development). His fantastic premises mostly lie in the technical sphere (technologies of war, information exchange, and organization) or boil down to the idea that the right people should gather in sufficient concentration and number.

Nevertheless, all three are convinced that removing individuals prone to aggressive violence from a community produces a powerful positive effect. I will note for myself that not all lustration is the same, and if a community is cleansed in such a way that those removed become its enemies, it could lead to serious problems in the future.

In Montelibero, we see so far that selecting people for the community who share the principle of non-aggression leads to a high level of cooperation. The removal of those with whom it is uncomfortable in the community currently happens through fairly soft rejection. I would prefer not to test how capable such a community would be to resist external aggression if the occasion arose, but so far, based on the general mood, it is not apparent that the chances of successfully repelling aggression are significantly higher or lower than those of any other cohesive community.

In other words, for now, we are managing with Rozov’s methods. Bitarh’s methods might be in demand for correcting the external background, but they are technically unavailable today. Rozov’s methods for the interaction of a free society with the outside world (creating a decentralized environment for conducting special operations to expand the space of freedom) are currently available to us to a minimal extent, at the level of maneuvering between state regulations.

That’s how things stand.

opasan pas – Montenegrin localization of the libertarian snake

There is only one killer, and the victims are thousands

Voluntarist, Bitarch

A very common mistake in the study of phenomena such as wars and genocides is the incorrect correlation between the number of those who actually committed killings and other forms of violence and the number of victims who suffered from that violence. Some may even think that the number of killers is roughly equal to the number of killed, which would mean that wars and genocides with millions of victims prove the capacity for brutal violence even in the average person. But to think this way would be a grave error.

One can recall that according to some military researchers, such as Dave Grossman, 98% of soldiers on the front line experience strong resistance to committing murder, and only 2% lack such resistance. The deaths of up to 2 million inhabitants of Cambodia under the Pol Pot regime were the fault of only 55-70 thousand Khmer Rouge (averaging about 30-40 killings per killer). And one researcher of the Rwandan genocide claims that there is nothing impossible about even 25 thousand people killing hundreds of thousands, if not a million people in 100 days—for this, one killer would have to commit on average only one killing every 2.5 days (or 40 killings in total).

In peaceful everyday life, as a rule, there are 2.5 violent crimes per one violent criminal. Less than 0.1% of people commit more than a dozen violent crimes. But what level can such “recidivism” reach in the case of wars, genocides, or repressions, when killing becomes something acceptable, permitted, or even required?

Let’s look at some well-known extreme cases. You have probably heard of the following figures at least once:
— the Croatian war criminal Petar Brzica, who personally killed up to 1,360 Serbs in one night (according to the most conservative estimates, 670 killings were committed);
— the NKVD officer Vasily Mikhailovich Blokhìn, who personally shot between 10,000 and 20,000 people throughout his service.

In the case of wars, genocides, and repressions, one killer can indeed personally commit hundreds and thousands of killings. In principle, such figures can be expected from any person who is capable of easily committing murder without experiencing any resistance or disgust. Does a killer have any incentive to stop and kill less when they have been given an unlimited right to do so? It would be absurd to expect such a thing from a killer; rather, he will kill until the very end, and if the opportunity arises, he will personally kill hundreds and thousands of people.

Based on what we know about genocides, in practice, one average killer in a state of “violent omnipotence” is most likely to manage to commit several dozen killings. Of course, this still indicates that the actual killers in any situation are a tiny minority of people, meaning that the number of victims of mass killings significantly exceeds the number of killers themselves. Wars, genocides, and repressions never work on the principle of “one day a million people took to the streets and killed another million people.” If a million people were indeed killed somewhere, it means that only several tens of thousands of killers took to the streets with violent intentions.

Gun laws – a tool in the commission of genocides

A rather interesting pattern can be traced in a great many genocides. They were preceded by the introduction of regulations and bans on civilian weaponry. Often, such bans directly preceded the genocides. Very convenient for government thugs and other bandits, isn’t it? To strip the common people of their weapons, and then calmly and almost without any resistance exterminate the undesirable part of the population.

To advocate for gun laws and against the natural human right to defend one’s own life means supporting the exclusive armament of a minority of perpetrators. After all, bans only work against peaceful and law-abiding citizens, who would never in their lives use a weapon to commit an attack, but only for the purpose of self-defense. Meanwhile, government agents and lawless bandits will keep their weapons regardless. Is this really what opponents of the freedom of armament and self-defense desire—that governments hold totalitarian power over people, and bandits have complete freedom to commit violence without facing resistance from their victims?

What genocides can tell us about human violentness

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Recalling the genocide of the Tutsi ethnic group in Rwanda, it might seem to us that nearly the entire Hutu people, egged on by supporters of the idea of exterminating the Tutsis, simply turned into killers. Or we might recall how horrific Pol Pot’s regime was, when up to a quarter of Cambodia’s population perished. Do this and other similar examples of mass genocides show us that humans have no natural restraints against killing other people, and that with enough conviction, almost anyone could easily do it?

In assessing phenomena such as war or genocide, it is certainly not worth relying on subjective feelings. It would be much better to conduct detailed calculations. Based on the most widely accepted research, between 500 thousand and 662 thousand Tutsis died as a result of the genocide in Rwanda, with some estimates reaching 800 thousand deaths. But how many Hutus took part in the genocide? One study estimates the number of killers at 50 thousand people [1]. Another study estimates the number of genocide participants (those who attempted murder, committed murders, rapes, torture, and other forms of serious violence) at between 175 thousand and 210 thousand people [2]. At the start of the genocide, the population of Rwanda was over 7 million people.

What does this mean? According to the highest estimate, only 2.5-3% of the population of Rwanda, or 3-3.5% of the Hutu population itself, committed violence during the Tutsi genocide. According to the lowest estimate, the killers constituted less than 1% of the population. This is considering the fact that movements advocating for the extermination of the Tutsis called upon the Hutus to commit murders by all possible means and through all information channels. And the killings themselves were indeed mass in nature.

There should be no doubt that such a percentage of people could organize a genocide. It is unlikely that a person who is urged to kill, who feels no repulsion toward committing murder, and whose potential victims have no serious means of defense, would stop after only one or two episodes. Rather, one should expect that he would kill everyone who crossed his path. Small groups of such killers could wipe out thousands of people at once, especially if they were armed. The study that estimates the number of killers in the Rwandan genocide at 50 thousand people asserts that there is nothing impossible about even 25 thousand people being able to exterminate hundreds of thousands, if not a million people, in 100 days.

Another well-known example of genocide is the extermination of 1.5 to 2 million Cambodians by the “Khmer Rouge” from 1975 to 1979 under Pol Pot’s regime. The forces of the Khmer Rouge by 1975 can be estimated at 55 to 70 thousand people [3][4]. The population of Cambodia at the beginning of the genocide was about 7.8 million people. Based on these numbers, it is obvious that less than 1% of the population was responsible for the death of 20-25% of Cambodia’s population at that time.

Genocides cannot tell us that the majority of people are ready to carry out the extermination of groups or even entire peoples who do not share their views. The direct killers and other perpetrators of violence in genocides are an overwhelming minority of the total population. Therefore, they cannot serve as evidence of human violence; rather, the opposite is true—they only confirm that, for the most part, humans are non-violent.

Sources:

  1. Jones, B. D. (2001). Peacemaking in Rwanda: the dynamics of failure;
  2. Straus, S. (2004). How many perpetrators were there in the Rwandan genocide? An estimate. Journal of Genocide Research, 6(1), March, 85–98;
  3. Carney, T. (1989). The Unexpected Victory. In Karl D. Jackson, ed., Cambodia 1975–1978: Rendezvous With Death. Princeton University Press, pp. 13–35;
  4. The Crime of Cambodia: Shawcross on Kissinger’s Memoirs New York Magazine, 5 November 1979.

What exactly in our brain makes us non-violent

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Extremely interesting and important results were demonstrated by experiments on the use of anti-aggressive agents in mice and rats. It turned out that some of them are capable of reducing the manifestation of attacking aggression on their part, while not affecting defensive aggression and other non-aggressive forms of behavior and social communication. To be more specific, we are talking about agonists that activate serotonin 5-HT1A/1B receptors.

These results align with the theory that many species possess innate inhibitors of aggressive behavior, which prevent causing harm and killing members of their own species. In the case of humans, a model of the violence inhibition mechanism (VIM) was even developed, which also explains the development of empathy. Based on this theory, violence in intraspecific relationships should be viewed as a pathological rather than a natural form of behavior. Especially since even in many territorial, social, and armed species, the level of lethal violence still does not exceed 1%, and according to various evidence, only no more than 2% of people do not experience strong resistance to committing murder.

We also see that defensive aggression, unlike attacking aggression, is indeed a natural form of behavior, and the work of the violence inhibitor does not stop it in the presence of an immediate threat to life in the environment. This was well demonstrated by the administration of the 5-HT1A agonist alnespirone to rats. It had an extremely selective effect; the strong reduction in aggressiveness did not prevent the rats from resorting to defensive behavior when encountering an aggressive peer.

Various genetic evidence demonstrates that certain variants of the 5-HT1A/1B receptor genes, as well as three other genes associated with the 5-HT system—TPH2, MAO A (also known as the “warrior gene”), and SERT—lead to increased aggressiveness in animals and humans. For example, in one study, impulsive and aggressive alcoholics were found to have differences in the 5-HT1B gene compared to healthy people and non-aggressive alcoholics. This study covered two different groups of people: Finns and a Native American tribe. Mutations in the MAO A gene have long been known as a cause of abnormal manifestations of aggression in men.

According to the violence inhibition mechanism model, the direct result of its dysfunction is calloused-unemotional (CU) traits in children and psychopathy in adults. Changes in the function of 5-HT1B receptors in certain parts of the brain were found in people with aggressive traits and psychopathic traits. A difference in the 5-HT1B gene genotype was present in children with calloused-unemotional traits.

It should be noted that dozens of genes and a large number of systems influence aggressiveness. However, the violence inhibitor remains a specific mechanism expressed by a limited number of receptors and genes. Firstly, this is simply important for inhibiting aggression most effectively. Secondly, other forms of pharmacological intervention, such as the use of antipsychotics (like haloperidol), beta-blockers, drugs affecting GABA neurotransmitters, and 5-HT2 receptor agonists and antagonists (many psychedelics belong to the former), result only in a non-selective reduction of aggressiveness, suppressing defensive aggression and other forms of behavior, and causing side effects.

Understanding the nature of the violence inhibitor and its limitation to a small number of receptors and genes can not only tell us a lot about violence itself, but also help in creating a solution aimed against it as a pathological form of behavior inherent in a minority of people. And the essence of such a solution is simple: returning to them the inhibiting control over aggression that is natural for the majority, through the use of appropriate pharmacological or even gene-therapeutic drugs.

This material briefly describes the content of the article titled “Neurophysiology and Genetics of the Violence Inhibition Mechanism“, which you may refer to for greater detail.

An ethological approach to the definition of aggression, violence, and self-defense

Libertarian Band has released a video on the ethological approach to defining the concepts of aggression, violence, and self-defense. Ethology, as a science that studies animal behavior and serves as a link between biological and sociological sciences in the study of human behavior, is a fairly precise tool for solving this problem. The ethological approach can provide us with clear answers regarding what should be considered aggression and violence, as well as where the boundaries of self-defense lie.

I recommend everyone watch this video and share it with others, so that there will be less confusion in the future during conversations about aggression, violence, and self-defense.