During the invasion of Russian troops into the territory of Ukraine, an incident occurred that could have ended with extremely catastrophic consequences. We are talking about the events at the Zaporizhzhia NPP – the largest power plant in Europe. The details of this event are not so important; the main point here is that military actions were taking place around the nuclear power plant itself. Perhaps the probability of a catastrophe was extremely low, but it was still not zero. And had it happened, tens of millions of lives would have been at risk, as it would have been much worse than the well-known nuclear catastrophe at the Chernobyl NPP. Also, information has now emerged about biolaboratories located on the territory of Ukraine. The WHO recommended that Ukraine destroy dangerous pathogens to prevent their possible leakage.
Should this not demonstrate what the problem is with violence as a method of solving problems and achieving goals, and why we need to fight against it? War or any other violent conflict can lead to a catastrophe if it hits a nuclear plant, a warehouse with dangerous chemicals, or a biolaboratory with samples of deadly viruses, especially those of artificial origin, which were kept for strictly controlled experiments and for which it is unknown what to do if they suddenly break out.
As we can see, it is not even necessary to intentionally use nuclear, chemical, biological, or any other weapon of mass destruction to achieve exactly this mass destruction. In the modern world with a heap of dangerous technologies and means used at various enterprises and facilities, it can become merely an accidental result of even a small armed clash, not to mention a conflict as large-scale as the one currently taking place between Russia and Ukraine. Therefore, violence and war are extremely unacceptable; it is necessary to fight against all manifestations of violence immediately and everywhere, throughout the world. Those who are not in the territory of the conflicting countries likely believe they are completely safe. But this is absolutely not the case, for in the modern world, no one is safe as long as any violent conflicts remain possible.
Now we can clearly observe where violence as a method for solving problems and achieving goals leads. Regardless of who holds what views regarding the conflict in Donbas, the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, the relations between Ukraine and Russia, the state of affairs in both countries, or who is right and who is wrong, in all possible positions, the attempt to achieve something by violent—in this case, military—means can be called both the root cause and an aggravating factor of the existing problems.
Indeed, what can we expect in a world where governments and states declare themselves “monopolists” of the right to “legally” use violence to achieve certain goals. And now, the Russian government has simply exercised this “right to violence.” As any other government that relies on force instruments will do, if it seems profitable enough.
Some may justify what is happening by saying that it is a response to the violence of the Ukrainian government toward the residents of Donbas who are unwilling to submit to it. But even if that is the case—can any force measures be justified in this instance other than purely defensive ones? Can an invasion of peaceful cities with accompanying human casualties be justified? No, and again no! And if someone thinks otherwise, if someone considers the death of people to be an adequate and acceptable price for achieving some geopolitical goals, then their opinion can only be called the position of a rapist and a psychopath who does not care about human life. And I have said more than once that a position allowing for forceful coercion, the infliction of harm, and the killing of people simply has no right to exist.
Of course, actual rapists and psychopaths make up only a tiny percentage of society; far more people simply hold such a position due to their own stupidity and lack of understanding. It was a tiny percentage of people who were responsible for violent attacks throughout all of human history, while the vast majority of people never needed this—they have their own families, concerns, and goals, and in general, they simply feel an instinctive aversion to violence and would never be able to commit a murder with their own hands.
Understanding all this, we must first and foremost fight against violence as an approach to achieving any goals, against the existence of any force structures in society that may have an advantage in their potential for violence relative to ordinary people, and most importantly—against rapists for whom committing a murder costs nothing, and with such a position, they successfully advance either into force structures or government bodies. After all, as long as someone has the opportunity to freely commit violence, they will do so in pursuit of their goals at the first convenient opportunity. And if someone holds violent views and possesses power over certain force structures staffed by violent people, then even war ceases to be something surprising and unexpected.
Fight against violence and war. And stay with us to learn more about how we can deal with the problem of violence and achieve a free, non-violent society.
It is a fairly common assertion that the level of lethal violence (deaths of people at the hands of other people) in prehistoric times was extremely high and could normally reach as much as 50%. This means that half of the “savages” became victims of murder rather than dying of natural causes or other reasons. Such a claim is used, among other things, to refute the argument that humans possess natural inhibitors of aggression, calling the aversion to violence and non-violent relationships purely sociocultural inventions that have nothing to do with what humans are by nature.
Indeed, archaeological evidence demonstrates cases of an extremely high level of lethal violence. Moreover, even in some primitive societies today, a significant portion of people still die from murder. However, the argument that murder is a natural and widespread phenomenon for humans is greatly exaggerated and based on individual, limited examples rather than general statistics. For instance, a study examining 600 human populations shows that throughout the history of Homo sapiens, the level of lethal violence was only 2%, and this includes cases of war and genocide [1]. Some studies also state that theories about the universality of war in human history lack empirical support, and data on high levels of prehistoric violence (for example, those presented in the work “War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage”) may be unjustifiably inflated [2][3].
Relying on the sample provided by the study of 600 human populations, as well as data from several other studies, let us analyze the level of lethal violence in different eras and in different human societies in more detail to confirm its rather low prevalence throughout human history.
The Old World
During the Paleolithic period in the Old World, the level of lethal violence was 3.97%. In archaeological excavations relating to this period, generally, few human remains were found, at best only a few dozen. However, excavations of the Natufian culture from the Epipaleolithic period in the territory of modern Israel draw attention. Of 400 human remains dating from 11,000 to 15,000 years ago, only 5 indicated a violent nature of death.
This example is taken from a study of prehistoric wars in Europe and the Near East [4]. The claim that wars were the cause of death for 15% of prehistoric people is called absurd in it. It also states that humans have no evolutionary predisposition to attack people from other social groups, and excavations related to the European Paleolithic show no evidence of wars, only extremely rare cases of cannibalism. Of course, this same study mentions the possibility of humans easily entering violent conflicts, based on the fact that wars did eventually arise later. But as we will see further, participation in violent conflicts never became something inherent to the majority of people.
The Neolithic, Mesolithic, and Bronze Age were also not characterized by a high level of lethal violence (3.59%, 3.39%, and 2.33%, respectively). However, the cases of the Iron Age and the Middle Ages require more detailed study, where the level of lethal violence, as claimed in the study of human populations, was 5.82% and 12.08%, respectively.
From the considered sample of Iron Age populations, cases of an extremely high level of lethal violence relate to Britain during the rule of the Roman Empire. For instance, one of the archaeological excavations in London, while demonstrating a large number of men killed by violence, explained this as “headhunting” by the Roman army and/or defeats in gladiatorial combat [5]. And the most “violent” Celtic excavations (though containing the remains of at most a few dozen people) relate to the Maiden Castle fortress.
On the other hand, all other major excavations, both in Britain and in other places such as Spain, Italy, the Near East, and North Africa, show an extremely low level of lethal violence. Many such pieces of evidence relating to the territory of modern Syria showed no cases of murder. The study providing them, covering 25 archaeological Mesopotamian excavations, shows that only 28 out of 1278 (i.e., 2.2%) of the examined remains have traces of healed cranial traumas related to violence. Based on evidence of bloody military conflicts and some level of violence in daily life in this territory, researchers expected to find a much larger number of traumas of this nature [6].
Such a difference between “violent” and “non-violent” Iron Age excavations may suggest that the emergence of organized armies was precisely the cause of the increase in the overall level of lethal violence in this period. But this says nothing about the violent nature of humans in general, since the professional soldiers who attack and kill other people are an overwhelming minority in society. And if we exclude from the sample only the London excavations relating to the actions of soldiers and gladiators of the Roman Empire, we get a lethal violence level of only 2.9%.
Similar results are shown by evidence from the Middle Ages, because in the case of the sample of archaeological excavations we are considering, the statistics of lethal violence are significantly increased by literally two battles: the Battle of Visby and the Battle of Aljubarrota. By excluding only these from the sample, we get a lethal violence level of only 3.3% (and this is without excluding other battles that left behind fewer remains).
Extremely interesting evidence is provided by more modern records of death and its causes for residents of London between 1629 and 1659, as well as in 1665. In the first case, out of 263,440 records, only 470 related to violent death (i.e., 0.18% of all deaths), and in the second, out of 97,306 records, only 30 (i.e., 0.03%) [7][8]. On average, although this is dozens of times higher than the modern global murder rate (and a hundred times higher than the murder rate in modern Britain), we clearly see that murderers in those times (as in any other times) constituted only an overwhelming minority of the population.
The New World
The level of lethal violence in the New World was 3.19% in the Archaic period, 3.52% in the Formative period, 5.28% in the Classic period, and 9.94% in the Post-Classic period.
The Archaic and Formative periods do not demonstrate a high level of lethal violence. A slightly higher level is observed in the Classic period, however, I would like to highlight the largest excavations from Central California. Among 2,182 remains, only 11 (i.e., 0.5%) had traces of violent death. Similar excavations from Central California, but relating to the Post-Classic period, also showed an extremely low level of lethal violence (less than 0.3%).
The level of lethal violence in Mexican California, based on evidence from colonial missions sent there, was 10%, which is much higher than the indicators for Central California. However, it should be noted that almost half of the cases relate to actions of a military nature [9]. Furthermore, the total number of registered deaths was dozens of times smaller than the sample provided by Central Californian archaeological excavations.
Among the extremely violent examples, the Crow Creek massacre should be highlighted, in which an entire Indian settlement was destroyed at once by attackers whose identity is not reliably known. Once again, we can see that lethal violence statistics increase precisely due to violent attacks of a military nature by specific groups of people.
The question of the violent nature of some modern tribes
Claims about the extremely violent nature of prehistoric humans very often rely on an analogy with the high violence of some modern hunter-gatherer tribes, especially the Hiwi and Ache of South America, with 55% and 30% lethal violence, respectively. However, such an argument would be fundamentally incorrect, because if these tribes are compared with other similar tribes, the latter turn out to be far less violent [10]. There are also cases of entirely non-violent tribes, a well-known example being the Paliyan people of South India. In general, one cannot determine how inherent violence is to humans based on individual cases of extremely violent isolated tribes. Nor can one lightheartedly draw conclusions about the level of lethal violence in tribes of the past—an error made by some researchers [2].
Conclusions
From the statistics of 600 human populations and other evidence we have examined, we can conclude that lethal violence was not an excessively widespread phenomenon in human history. Also, as mentioned at the very beginning, theories about the universality of war in human history lack empirical support, and data on high levels of prehistoric violence may be unjustifiably inflated. In general, cases of populations with an extremely high level of lethal violence can easily be categorized as statistical outliers.
And most importantly—mass killings are most often associated with violent attacks by organized armies. Therefore, the bulk of all lethal violence is merely the result of the actions of a small percentage of people initiating attacks of a military nature. Against the backdrop of an extremely non-violent daily life throughout human history, this only proves that many people who entered battles and became victims of military attacks died from lethal violence, not that many people in general did. For was participation in battles the norm for the majority of people? Except for isolated cases—no.
Sources
1. Gómez, J. M., Verdú, M., González-Megías, A., & Méndez, M. (2016). The phylogenetic roots of human lethal violence. Nature, 538(7624), 233–237. doi:10.1038/nature19758;
2. Haas, J. & Piscitelli, M. (2013). The Prehistory of Warfare: Misled by Ethnography. Pp. 168-190 In: DP Fry ed. War peace and human nature: the convergence of evolutionary and cultural views. Oxford Univ. Press.;
3. Ferguson, R. B. (1997). War before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage. American Anthropologist, 99(2), 424-425;
4. Ferguson, R. B. (2013). The prehistory of war and peace in Europe and the Near East. Pp. 191-240 In: DP Fry ed. War peace and human nature: the convergence of evolutionary and cultural views. Oxford Univ. Press.;
5. Redfern, R. & Bonney, H. (2014). Headhunting and amphitheatre combat in Roman London England: new evidence from the Walbrook Valley. Journal of Archaeology Science 43: 214-226;
6. Sołtysiak, A. (2015). Antemortem Cranial Trauma in Ancient Mesopotamia. International Journal of Osteoarchaeology, 27(1), 119–128. doi:10.1002/oa.2478;
8. Champion, J. (1993). Epidemics and the Built Environment in 1665. Champion. Centre for Metropolitan Hist. Working Papers Ser 1 35-52;
9. Hackel, S. W. (2012). From Ahogado to Zorrillo: external causes of mortality in the California missions. The History of the Family 17: 77-104;
10. Gurven, M., & Kaplan, H. (2007). Longevity Among Hunter- Gatherers: A Cross-Cultural Examination. Population and Development Review, 33(2), 321–365. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2007.00171.x.
The fundamental difference between the idea of a free society and any statist ideology is not which specific model of social organization their proponents strive for, but the methods they use to realize these aspirations. If the difference consisted only of end goals, there would be no fundamental difference at all. Indeed, any model of socio-economic organization and system of relationships between subjects can be implemented in a free society based on the principle of non-violence, voluntary agreements, and within the framework of free associations. In contrast, political ideologies always propose one specific social model that must be mandatorily implemented for all people, including through violent coercion.
When people encounter an idea of social organization that is unfamiliar to them, they almost always start asking questions such as “how will such-and-such a problem be solved within the framework of this idea.” Such an approach to understanding ideas is not surprising, as most of them offer a specific and single solution for everyone. People are used to the idea that a universal goal must be chosen, mandatory for everyone under threat of violence. However, if one tries to explain the ideas of freedom within these boundaries, it will likely fail—the listener will evaluate your answer based on their own preferences and conceptions of possible solutions, which may not coincide with your positions at all. Obviously, in their eyes, this will make the ideas of freedom appear unattractive, or even completely untenable.
Of course, modeling possible solutions is important, and the resulting answer can still serve as a convincing argument; however, it cannot be anything more than a supplement to the main argumentation. And the main argumentation itself must show people what was mentioned in the previous paragraph—that a specific and mandatory solution does not exist!
But how, then, will a particular problem be solved? Very simply—in the way the person themselves wants, based on their own preferences and views. In whatever way each person approaches the solution to their problems, that is how they will be solved. As for questions and problems common to many people, they will be solved based on how people agree to solve them. Each person can unite in associations with other people to create their own social order, which extends to the members of that association.
Therefore, it is necessary to ask the listener how they themselves would solve a particular problem if the ability to make the decision were in their own hands, and if the implementation extended to those who have corresponding agreements with them or participate in the same association. Their answer to your question will also be an answer to their own question. Only in this way can the idea of a free society be explained most accurately and attractively. Only then can it be conveyed that it consists of a method—freedom of activity, agreement, and association, as well as non-violent coexistence—while the goals themselves can be completely different.
Of course, this will not sound convincing to those who unconditionally believe that the realization of their personal aspirations, or the aspirations of some association sharing their views, requires the violent coercion of other people to accept their ideals. In such a situation, it is likely necessary to use arguments demonstrating the negative externalities of violence and discrediting it as a phenomenon as a whole. But if even this does not sound convincing, then all that remains is to end the conversation. After all, explaining something to people who have strong violent convictions (or even tendencies toward committing violence) is simply pointless; they can only be pressured by condemnation, ostracism, and various sanctions, and one should prepare to defend oneself from them, for they will seek to force you into submission by power at the first opportunity.
In their ideas, proponents of coercive state power refer to so-called permissible (or even allegedly necessary) or “legitimate” violence, the commission of which should be a monopoly of a single agent (the state) in society. However, as a rule, no clear definition is given as to exactly what violence can be considered permissible, necessary, or legitimate, and in whose hands it should be. Everything comes down to goals: whatever goals a particular etatist adheres to—within those frameworks, violence is justified for them, and the “monopoly” on violence should belong to them and/or those who share their specific views. This is not changed even by an adherence to democracy, since a democrat would want the monopoly on violence to belong specifically to the proponents of democracy; they simply do not consider it important what their views on other issues may be.
For this reason, there can be no talk of any specific legitimacy of violence. For instance, an authoritarian conservative must understand that, in the opinion of an authoritarian communist, his place is two meters underground, and vice versa. Every proponent of violence has their own understanding of its legitimacy, which cannot be agreed upon.
A monopoly on violence cannot exist at all as a model implemented in practice. A stationary bandit’s “monopoly” on violence is lost as soon as other people, even within the same state, take power into their own hands. There are no eternal governments; sooner or later, there is either a change in power or a change in the views of some members of the current power (who, of course, eliminate from political life their very own colleagues of yesterday who held the previous views). And with the help of violence in new hands, and violence whose legitimacy is now justified differently, the achievements of those who previously considered violence legitimate only within the framework of their own views and monopolistically belonging only to their own hands are destroyed.
Moreover, the monopoly on violence is quite often violated by those who commit it in a private capacity. As long as there are people in society capable of committing violence under certain circumstances, statements about possessing a monopoly right to it will be an exaggeration. After all, “illegitimate” perpetrators of violence may even attempt to stage a coup. Would proponents of monarchy or democracy consider the Bolsheviks’ understanding of the applicability of violence to be legitimate? No. But in practice, that would change nothing.
In reality, the state can possess only a “comparative advantage in the application of violence,” which is what Max Weber wrote in his definition of the state itself. But this formulation was misunderstood by many or simply misreported, which led to the concept of a “monopoly on violence,” which does not exist in reality. And possessing only a comparative advantage in violence, rather than a fictitious monopoly over it, the statist cannot in any way guarantee that violence will work in their favor—someday this tool will be taken from them and used with full force against them, their supporters, and their ideas. And this once again speaks to why the tool of free activity and voluntary agreement is better compared to the tool of force.
At present, society, especially of the Western model, has adopted a model of so-called permissible, selective, or “legitimate” violence. It consists of the idea that violence is permissible toward a specific person based on a law adopted by the majority of people in a given territory. However, since this is a cultural norm, it cannot be viewed as a given; it is necessary to understand that in other societies, this norm may differ. For a significant part of human history and in a significant number of societies, a completely different model of non-selective violence was practiced. Today, the Taliban, who recently took power in Afghanistan, can specifically remind us of this. This model consists of the following:
Violence may be applied not only to the lawbreaker but also to their family, relatives, and friends; even random people who have committed very minor offenses, or those who have done nothing at all, may become victims of violence for the purpose of intimidating society and strengthening power;
The absence of freedom to agree or disagree with the established law, including through changing one’s location and residence due to restrictions on freedom of movement.
All other things being equal, proponents of non-selective violence have a better chance of victory compared to those who advocate for moderate violence. They will not hesitate to intimidate society, carry out brutal purges, and even organize mass killings and genocide. Due to a much greater willingness to commit violence, their violent potential is far higher.
But in reality, conditions are usually not equal. And one of the important conditions is the level of technological development. For example, this condition played a decisive role in the colonial conquests by Europeans, or in the recent fight against terrorism in the Middle East (including against the Islamic State). If this circumstance had not existed, if the level of technological development had been equal for everyone, then representatives of the Western world would simply have lost in the vast majority of battles. There would have been no colonization of lands already inhabited by other peoples, and there would be nothing to say about the fight against terrorist groups. The side resorting to less selective violence would have had much greater chances of winning, and in those cases, the consequences would have been fatal.
In the absence of significant technological superiority, the Western world could easily be conquered by a crowd of Taliban, ISIS members, or some other psychopaths simply armed with Kalashnikov rifles. If the order of selective violence is to be maintained, it cannot do without scientific and technological progress. But scientific and technological progress, in turn, creates certain risks of violence, including catastrophic ones. The time is not far off when even small organizations, or even individuals, will be able, for example, to recreate a dangerous virus or master ultra-high-capacity energy sources. It is terrifying to imagine what would happen if high technologies were applied for violent purposes. Furthermore, these technologies may eventually be seized by the same terrorists (technologies tend to pass from hand to hand), and then the technological gap will no longer play a role—in the case of weapons of mass destruction, one does not need to be more developed or stronger than the opponent; it is sufficient only to inflict unacceptable damage upon them.
Given the critical importance of scientific and technological progress, as well as the risks it creates, one can conclude that it is necessary to fight against violence. As long as violence is accepted as a given, different groups of people will choose different approaches between selective and non-selective violence. And those who choose the second option—the less civilized and more violent people—will pose a severe threat to the lives of those who advocate for selective or moderate violence. I would especially like to convey this thought to conservatives, who often dislike progress. All that remains is to fight violence as a phenomenon as a whole. Only by completely eradicating it can we get rid of the corresponding risks.
Coercive state measures are almost always justified as a necessary method of ensuring security. This position is held by all supporters of a monopoly on coercive power, regardless of their views. Even minarchists, who believe only the most minimal state is necessary, reduce this minimum precisely to the provision of security. And what can be said about those who hold authoritarian views?
Of course, people with such views have no questions regarding repressive coercive measures for the sake of fighting the coronavirus pandemic. And this is not surprising, for etatists have always said that coercive power, among other things, is necessary for such a case, to force everyone without exception to comply with restrictive measures and get vaccinated once the vaccine is ready; otherwise, ensuring security would simply be impossible. It is also worth noting that etatists very often consider it necessary to punish people for “victimless crimes,” that is, only potentially unsafe behavior. In this case, security is often equated with the stability of established social orders, and as a result, even a word spoken against these orders or the political force supporting them can become grounds for imprisonment, or something even worse.
To the supporters of coercive power, I can only say that if you are so deeply concerned about the issue of security, then why do you suddenly oppose the eradication of the greatest threat to security—violence? After all, it is not pandemics, and even less so the statements of dissenters, but specifically violence and its consequences that are the greatest threat to security! Yet why do you suddenly reject the proposal to better study the neurophysiological mechanism inherent in most people that inhibits violent behavior toward members of their own species (that is, the violence inhibitor), to determine its genetic nature, and, by resorting to the achievements of biotechnology, to develop a solution that would help correct the deficiency in the operation of this mechanism in the small percentage of people capable of committing acts of violence and, indeed, committing them?
Often, it even reaches the point where such people do not bother to familiarize themselves even slightly with the concept of the violence inhibition mechanism and begin to defend the importance of the feeling of aggression, without which a person would turn into a vegetable, although the discussion concerns only the inhibition of aggressive impulses in certain cases. Or they say that violence is important for fighting violence itself, although it is very easy to see what a foolish error is contained in such reasoning. And of course, the inhibition of violence does not contradict the capacity for self-defense, since the presence of an immediate threat to life is a stimulus that primarily activates a defensive reaction (for example, flight or, indeed, self-defense). And in the end, the vast majority of people are already incapable of violence. Even if you look, for example, at countries with the highest homicide rates, the killers themselves will turn out to be thousandths of a percent of the population (assuming that behind every murder stands a separate killer, although this is not the case).
But why do etatists suddenly have such resistance to the idea of eradicating violence? If a person can potentially harm someone by transmitting a virus, you consider it necessary to maximally restrict their freedoms until they are vaccinated. But if a person can potentially harm someone by committing violence (and I remind you that this is a minority of people, while the majority are incapable of violence and never commit it), you consider restricting and “vaccinating” them unnecessary, or even risky? By your own logic of ensuring maximum security, you should support such measures first and foremost. Or is security actually not that important to you?
The necessity of violence as a phenomenon of human relations is most often justified by the fight against violence itself. Since there is a threat of violence in society from a small percentage of people, it must be countered with one’s own “benevolent” and “legitimate” violence. But this scheme only creates its own problems, some of which can be called completely absurd. A violent solution looks especially absurd in light of the fact that the vast majority of people never commit at least brutal violence (causing serious physical harm or murder) and are incapable of doing so. This is confirmed by both military data and crime statistics, even in extremely violent countries where police work is simply paralyzed (Latin American countries).
Most people are non-violent; they will not use force against anyone to achieve any goals, except in the case of an immediate threat to life. Consequently, the scheme of using violence to fight violence requires the existence of one category of violent actors so that they may allegedly protect everyone else from another category of violent actors. And such protection does not imply only defense against an already present violent threat. Most often, it implies the right of security agents chosen for this task to use violence against anyone who, in their opinion, could potentially create some threat to society and other people, including threats of a non-violent nature (since in practice it is impossible to limit security agents, who have the legitimate right to use violence against people, to only fighting violence; they will use it wherever they see fit).
Perhaps this solution is capable of working to some extent in the short term. But in the long term, it leads to the following absurd situation: society must intentionally maintain a certain level of violent actors among the non-violent majority, otherwise there will be no people to solve tasks requiring the initiation of violence. This means that this solution cannot in any way serve the goal of fighting violence, as it creates violence itself. Obviously, to solve the problem of violence, entirely different methods must be considered.
In justification of intraspecific violence as a completely normal phenomenon in nature, one sometimes hears the argument about the selfishness of the gene. Since all biological evolution is primarily the evolution of genes striving for the most efficient preservation and copying of themselves, and only after that the evolution of individuals and populations, then intraspecific violence is not a problem at all. On the contrary—if a carrier of a gene committed violence, they gained an advantage over their conspecifics and passed this gene on. This means that intraspecific violence is a useful tool in the evolution of genes, and no violence inhibitor, slowing down aggression toward representatives of one’s own species, can exist, as it would contradict the attainment of such an evolutionary advantage by specific genes.
The idea that the evolution of genes takes precedence over the evolution of individuals and populations is a correct theory that there is no sense in disputing. But genes do not exist in a vacuum. Genes are carried by specific individuals who are part of specific populations. How the relationships between these individuals unfold will become the decisive factor in the preservation and transmission of genes. And violence will indeed give an advantage to a specific gene, provided it does not mean that gene’s own elimination. But what if it does?
Let’s take those species whose representatives possess strong innate weaponry and have no significant possibility of escaping violence (for example, due to the limited habitat range of the population or an extremely social lifestyle). It is precisely in such species that the inhibition (restraint) of intraspecific violence is observed. When one wolf exposes its neck or belly to another wolf, the latter becomes unable to bite its conspecific; no raven will peck another raven in the eye with its very sharp beak, even during a fight for food; venomous snakes conduct territorial clashes according to clearly defined rituals, without using their venomous teeth and not even demonstrating them to their opponent; oryx antelopes also ritualize battles, while they can freely use their sharp horns against lions. There are many such examples.
What is the benefit of the gene in such behavior? It is that a violent attack on a conspecific, given the latter’s strong weaponry, can end with the death of the aggressor itself with an impermissibly high probability. This means that the gene will not be preserved or passed on; it will simply perish along with its carrier. Only those genes will be passed on whose carriers, in such a situation, do not get into fights unnecessarily (or more accurately, do not initiate them at all, but only defend themselves if someone else has already initiated one). That is, the most advantageous evolutionary strategy for a gene is “cooperation” (let’s call it that) with the gene responsible for inhibiting violent behavior in the carrier.
This is a universal rule for biological evolution. Increasing weaponry of population representatives combined with frequent social contacts between them increases the negative consequences of intraspecific violence, at a certain point making them completely impermissible. As a result, only those genes survive whose carriers were able to compensate for this effect by suppressing violent behavior, meaning they were predisposed to have a sufficiently strong version of a violence inhibitor. The higher the weaponry of the population representatives, the less advantageous an evolutionary strategy violence becomes, and the more advantageous becomes the inhibition of violence.
This understanding should also be applied to humans—the most heavily armed species on the planet, whose weaponry is now growing at a giant pace along with the development of scientific and technical progress. The average person already possesses an inhibition of violence toward other people, but there remain those who suffer from a dysfunction of this neurobiological mechanism. Such people will sooner or later use weapons of mass destruction, which, with scientific and technical progress, are becoming increasingly accessible to recreate, especially regarding biological threats, where a catastrophic scenario could occur literally tomorrow. This means that violence is an evolutionarily failing strategy for humans!
Violence is a fairly common phenomenon in nature. This is especially observable in interspecies relationships. Representatives of different species are in a constant struggle for territory and resources; additionally, some become food for others. However, the situation changes when shifting to the consideration of intraspecies relationships. Of course, these are also frequently violent in nature, but this is far from always true. Under certain circumstances, a population will begin to develop inhibitors of intraspecies aggression. We will call this the violence inhibition mechanism, or more simply, the violence inhibitor.
The analysis of intraspecies aggression should begin with a look at its positive aspects, which will later allow us to avoid certain misunderstandings. Aggression, including that of a violent nature (i.e., inflicting physical harm, killing), allows stronger and healthier individuals in a population to prevent weaker and unhealthy ones from reproducing. Furthermore, it is simply beneficial for a specific individual capable of using it for their own survival and the transmission of their genes. It also serves as a tool in creating and maintaining a dominance hierarchy that coordinates the actions of individuals. Finally, since aggressive behavior prevents different individuals or groups of individuals from remaining close for too long, it leads to their uniform dispersal throughout the available living territory, and thus to a uniform distribution of limited resources.
One might get the impression that committing violence against fellow clan members is not just useful, but vital for the survival of specific individuals (and the genes they carry), as well as for populations as a whole. But one should not make the mistake of viewing violence in isolation from environmental circumstances. In this case, two of the most important factors are the presence of strong innate weaponry among population representatives and their inability to escape from violence. The stronger these two factors are, the higher the risks of violence. At a certain point, they become too high for the benefits derived from violence to compensate for them. Violence ceases to be an evolutionarily optimal model of behavior. And these risks can grow to the point where individuals simply exterminate each other in violent clashes, and the population comes to an end.
As an example of such a scenario, one can cite the well-known Universe 25 experiment, in which a mouse population raised in supposedly paradise-like conditions went extinct in less than 5 years. The experiment was poorly executed; the conditions were far from paradise. But the main error was the design of the enclosure, which allowed the 65 largest males to use force to block all others’ access to females and food. This triggered a chain of events that led to the extinction of a population limited in space and extremely violent in its order. In more intelligently designed enclosures, where it is impossible to establish such a violent dominance hierarchy, mouse populations can live for decades [1].
As we can see, weaponry and the lack of an opportunity to escape violence prove to be a problem for the survival of the population. However, it is precisely this that creates evolutionary pressure to develop inhibitors of intraspecies aggression among its representatives, which solves this problem. If population representatives possess strong innate weaponry, then the individuals most inclined toward violence who initiate attacks will encounter the weaponry of their fellow members, and this can often lead to their death. Resistance from an armed victim who has nowhere else to run can also be fatal for the aggressor. Even several victories in such a situation do not guarantee success for the aggressor, since there is still a high probability that one of the attacks will end in a lethal outcome for them. Meanwhile, less violent individuals will perish less frequently, as they do not initiate attacks themselves but only defend against them. They will encounter the risk of dying from violence less often than their aggressive counterparts, and thus will more frequently produce offspring.
As a result, natural selection will move toward the development of strong inhibitors that prevent the infliction of physical harm and the killing of fellow members, as individuals lacking such inhibitors will be removed from the population and unable to pass on their genes. The mechanism responsible for such inhibitors is the violence inhibitor. Overall, we obtain an evolutionary model of non-violence, according to which violence is eradicated as a phenomenon of intraspecies relationships in the course of biological evolution.
This conclusion is supported by observations of animal behavior. The concept of the violence inhibitor was first formulated by ethologist Konrad Lorenz. According to his theory, this mechanism is most developed in species whose representatives are capable of easily killing an individual of approximately their own size. Describing his observations of wolves, he showed how the violence inhibitor is activated when one wolf demonstrates gestures of submission to another—exposing vulnerable areas such as the neck or belly. As a result, the stunned aggressor cannot continue the attack. Similarly, observations of crows confirmed that they do not peck out each other’s eyes, even during clashes [2][3]. Indeed, the sharp teeth of a wolf and the beak of a crow are powerful weapons; a single bite or strike to a vulnerable spot is enough to seriously injure, or even immediately kill, another individual. The presence of such weaponry led representatives of these species to develop corresponding inhibitors during biological evolution.
A large number of such observations from various researchers were listed by ethologist Ireneus Eibl-Eibesfeldt. Many animals exhibit ritualization of intraspecies battles, which prevents the use of strong weaponry. This is true even for arthropods, such as fiddler crabs, which do not open their claws wide enough to injure their opponent during clashes. Similar restraint of aggression is characteristic of many species of fish, lizards, and mammals. A notable example is the oryx antelope, which handles its sharp horns carefully in clashes with conspecifics but uses them to their full extent when defending against lions. It is also worth mentioning poisonous snakes, many of which writhe, exaggerate their size, and push each other during clashes, but do not bite and do not even display their weapon [4][5].
At the same time, violence is inhibited to a lesser extent in poorly armed species. Compared to crows, doves with less sharp beaks are not restrained in their aggression and are even capable of killing a conspecific if the latter is deprived of the opportunity to escape, for example, if placed in a cage [2]. Animals that lead a solitary lifestyle are also quite aggressive. Consider hamsters, which generally will fight to the death if several individuals are placed in one cage. In nature, however, they scatter after only a few mutual bites [4]. If we examine the case of a solitary lifestyle in more detail, in its evolutionary influence, it can be equated to escape. Thus, violence does not threaten the survival of bears, who outside the mating season encounter each other too rarely for the occasional clashes to affect the population as a whole.
Based on observations of animal behavior, neurobiologist James Blair suggested that humans possess a similar mechanism that inhibits aggressive behavior. He subsequently developed a model of the violence inhibition mechanism (English: Violence Inhibition Mechanism, or abbreviated VIM). In its development, his goal was to explain the emergence of psychopathy as a result of the malfunction of this mechanism [6][7].
According to the VIM model, the violence inhibitor is activated when a person observes distress signals from other people, such as a sad facial expression or crying. As a result, the person begins to experience aversion and ceases aggressive actions. The violence inhibitor is also a prerequisite for the development of moral emotions in humans (i.e., sympathy, guilt, remorse, and empathy) and the ability to identify moral transgressions in actions consisting of causing harm to people.
As can be understood from the evolutionary model of non-violence we are considering, the development of a fairly strong version of the violence inhibitor could not have bypassed modern humans, as their ancestors began inventing artificial weaponry. Furthermore, population density has increased significantly over history, and the human population has already occupied the entire available habitat on the planet. However, due to rapid social and scientific-technological progress, the violence inhibitor has not had enough time to fully adapt to new circumstances, which creates the problem of violence in human society. But this issue, as well as the general issue of violence inhibition in humans, will be examined in detail in the following topics of the cycle.
Right now, it is important to understand that violence in human society is not an evolutionarily optimal model of behavior. It cannot be so for any highly armed beings limited in their habitat, since the risks of violence increase as weaponry increases, while there is nowhere to run from it. These risks become especially catastrophic in the case of a high-tech civilization due to the possibility of creating weapons of mass destruction. And humanity is exactly such a civilization. All this creates the prerequisites for the necessity of eradicating violence and achieving a non-violent society in which there is no place for forced forms of relationships, as the most evolutionarily optimal model of social organization.
Sources:
1. Khokhlovsky, P. (2020). “Universe 25: crushing criticism of myths and new conclusions”: https://tjournal.ru/analysis/212316-vselennaya-25-razgromnaya-kritika-mifov-i-novye-vyvody;
2. Lorenz, K. (1949). Er redete mit dem Vieh, den Vögeln und den Fischen (King Solomon’s Ring);
3. Lorenz, K. (1963). Das sogenannte Böse. Zur Naturgeschichte der Aggression (Aggression: the so-called “evil”);
4. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. (1970). Ethology: The Biology of Behavior, pp. 314—325;
5. Dolnik, V. R. (1993). Ethological excursions through the forbidden gardens of the humanities;
6. Blair, R. J. R. (1992). The Development of Morality. Department of Psychology, University College, London;
7. Blair, R. J. R. (1995). A cognitive developmental approach to morality: investigating the psychopath. Cognition 57, 1—29. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(95)00676-P.
