Тег: Violence

Democracy and liberalism will not limit a stationary bandit in violence

When discussing the issue of state violence and the restriction of freedom, one sometimes encounters the argument that this is not such a big problem, since in the modern world of democracies and liberalism, most states are limited in their ability to use force and violate the freedom of their citizens, and in this, they cannot cross a certain line. But in reality, no institutional factors prevent even the most democratic and liberal states from turning into brutal dictatorships. As long as they are stationary bandits and can “legitimately” use the instrument of violence, as long as they have agents capable of committing violent acts, and ordinary people have neither the right nor the possibility to resist violence, a tightening of social orders can be fully expected, provided there is only a pretext for it.

And recently, such a pretext appeared – the coronavirus pandemic. Of course, the pandemic must be fought, but the primary method chosen for this by many states was precisely violence and the forced restriction of freedoms. Moreover, there was no sense in such harsh measures, based on research on the effectiveness of different measures in the fight against the pandemic; also, using the example of Sweden, which has already returned to pre-COVID life, I showed how informing and encouraging less risky behavior ultimately yield better results than strict control and bans. Forceful coercion is a less effective tool in implementing any measures, unless coercion and the restriction of freedom is the goal in itself.

Before continuing the topic of COVID measures, I would like to recall one example of how states effectively destroyed the freedom of movement around the world by introducing passport and visa control. The pretext for this was the First and Second World Wars, during which states needed to control the movement of people. Was the control lifted after the wars ended, i.e., after the pretext for it disappeared? It was not! States took the opportunity to forever make any movement of people beyond the borders of their own “pens” strictly controlled.

During the coronavirus pandemic, borders turned out to be completely closed, but the essence of the matter is not only in that. In many countries, people were literally locked in their homes, deprived of work, and their movements were monitored, for example, using COVID apps. Now, a telling example of the implementation of such a policy is Australia, where people deprived of freedom literally have to fight with police, their movements are tracked by the state via a smartphone app, and violators of COVID norms face imprisonment and fines. Also, in many countries, police can easily beat and detain you, for example, for the lack of a mask or a vaccination passport (I am attaching a recent case from France to the post). This is also true for Russia, where police have already beaten and brutally detained people without masks many times.

Now I want to ask one question: is it possible to believe that after the pandemic ends, states will truly lift all restrictive measures and return to people the same freedom they had before? As far as I am concerned, relying on this would be great naivety. Of course, some freedoms will be returned, but at the same time, states will most likely retain some of the control. It is unlikely to be like in Sweden, where all COVID measures except for border ones have already been lifted, since this country did not rely on harsh coercive measures from the start. By the way, borders after the pandemic may also remain more controlled than before it, and it is quite likely that in this case, even Sweden will no longer be an exception. In general, one should not rely on the idea that for some miraculous reason states will not punish their citizens with police force, deprive them of freedom, and strictly control them simply because they are developed democracies. The question is not so much about political and social institutions as it is about the willingness and ability to commit violence.

The Stanford Prison Experiment – can a person become cruel if their social role requires it?

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Continuing the theme of experiments that allegedly demonstrate the violent nature of humans and their willingness to cause pain and harm to others if circumstances demand it, it is worth considering the Stanford Prison Experiment. This experiment is as well-known as the Milgram experiment we considered earlier. Its published data suggest a willingness of the majority of people to inflict pain on others on the orders of an authority figure. However, as an analysis of unpublished data showed, 56% of participants stopped as soon as they felt the victim was actually experiencing pain, and 72% of those who continued to participate did so because they did not believe in the authenticity of the experiment and the reality of the pain caused to the victim (and indeed there was no pain, only acting). But while in the case of the Milgram experiment the issue was merely about unpublished data, the Stanford Prison Experiment turned out to be completely baseless.

The participants of the experiment were divided into two categories—guards and prisoners—who lived in a simulated prison. All participants were expected to play their respective roles. But, as published data suggest, the experiment soon became truly dangerous. The guards began to cruelly abuse the prisoners, and a third of them displayed sadistic tendencies. Two prisoners were even excluded from the experiment due to the psychological trauma they suffered, and the experiment itself was stopped prematurely for ethical reasons. For nearly 50 years, many believed in the reality of these results and their corresponding conclusions. However, a series of pieces of evidence has recently been revealed that completely refutes this experiment. We will now consider some of them.

First, as the experiment’s organizer Philip Zimbardo assured, the participants were free in their actions, and those playing the role of guards received no prior training. In reality, however, the guards were aware of the expected results of the experiment; they were given clear instructions on how to act in various situations, and efforts were made to instill in them the belief that they were assistants to the experimenters in this study.

Second, and very importantly, the participants understood the requirements of the experiment in advance and corresponded to them. As Zimbardo claimed, the requirements for participation were minimal. However, almost all potential participants understood, for example, that guards were required to be despotic, hostile, and aggressive. This led to the assumption that participants, due to a clear understanding of their role, may have played it to the fullest extent in order to ensure the success of the experiment. In fact, after some time, they stated that they were only playing a role. They also always understood that they were participants in an experiment, that they were being observed, and that none of it was real.

I would like to draw attention to one more point. Such an understanding of the upcoming role could have influenced the selection of participants in favor of those with tendencies toward more cruel behavior, since that was exactly the behavior required. And can an experiment for which more cruel people may have been selected say anything about the cruelty of the average person?

There are many other facts that cast doubt on the experiment. It is worth remembering the participants who had to leave it due to psychological trauma. One of them later admitted that he only simulated a psychosis because he did not like the experiment and wanted to leave as quickly as possible. The unrealistic nature of the experimental conditions should also be understood. And finally, the researchers did not provide all the data—out of 150 hours of the experiment, only 15% were recorded (6 hours of video and 15 hours of audio). Very little personal data was collected from the participants, which could have influenced the course of the experiment.

Sources:

  1. Thibault Le Texier (2019). Debunking the Stanford Prison Experiment;
  2. Ben Blum (2018). The Lifespan of a Lie.

The Milgram Experiment – is a person truly capable of easily harming another person on command?

Voluntarist, Bitarch

In 1963, psychologist Stanley Milgram decided to conduct a series of experiments to clarify a question: how much suffering are ordinary people willing to inflict on others, completely innocent people, if such infliction of pain is part of their job duties? He wanted to understand how the residents of Germany during the years of Nazism could have participated in the destruction of millions of innocent people in concentration camps.

The essence of Milgram’s experiment is that participants are assigned the role of the teacher (in reality, they think they receive this role by lot, but everything is arranged so that a plant actor always becomes the student). Then the “teacher” goes into another room, sits at a table before a high-voltage device, and reads a list of associative word pairs to the “student,” which the student was supposed to memorize. If the student did not memorize the words and subsequently gave a wrong answer to the teacher’s question, the teacher was to use the device to deliver an electric shock to the student. Starting from 15 volts, with each new error, he was to increase the shock in increments of 15 volts up to a maximum of 450 volts, after which he was to continue using the maximum shock. Of course, the actor playing the student received no shock, but only pretended to receive it and experience pain. In different variations of the experiment, the student and teacher were separated either by a soundproof wall (meaning the teacher could only hear the student knocking on the wall), or by an ordinary wall (meaning he could hear screams, pleas to stop, and complaints about supposed heart problems).

As for the results, for example, one series of trials showed that 26 out of 40 subjects (65%) increased the voltage to 450 volts and did not stop delivering electric shocks until the researcher gave the order to end the experiment. And only 5 subjects (12.5%) stopped at a voltage of 300 volts when the victims showed the first signs of distress. Replications of the experiment under different conditions and with different people showed approximately the same results.

What does this mean—that most people are indeed ready to discard all humanity and inflict pain, or even harm, on other people simply by the order of an authority? If we look at the data from Milgram’s experiment that were not published, it is easy to see that this is not the case at all. By analyzing data from 656 post-experimental questionnaires, researchers found that 56% of participants actually stopped the experiment at one point or another because they believed the person behind the wall was truly experiencing pain. Another study, examining 91 interviews conducted immediately after the experiments, showed that among the 46 participants who continued the experiment after the victim’s distress, 33 participants (72%) did so simply because they did not believe that the victim was actually being caused pain (which was indeed the case—the victim-actors only simulated it).

In total, we find that about 86-88% of Milgram’s experiment participants actually either stopped their participation as soon as it seemed to them that they were truly causing the victim pain, or continued only because they did not believe in the authenticity of the experiment and the victim’s pain. These conclusions, based on unpublished data, do not align with the results that were demonstrated in the original studies and shown to a wide audience. Perhaps the methodology of the experiment itself has nothing to be criticized, but the results were clearly cherry-picked to suit the views of the experimenters. An ordinary person cannot be forced to harm others simply by an order from above. And the multi-million victims of Nazism are the result only of the passive acceptance of the regime by the majority of people, while the acts of violence themselves were committed by a minority of security agents working directly for the Nazi state.

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In a world of violence, there is nowhere to escape to

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Support for certain social norms through coercive methods provided by states, as well as state violence in general, is often not considered a problem at all, since a person is supposedly absolutely free to move to the territory of another state whose conditions will satisfy them. This possibility is also frequently compared to a voluntary change of service provider, as in a free and competitive market. But this assertion is fundamentally incorrect, as several arguments tell us.

First and foremost, moving between states should not be compared to changing a private service provider or moving within a state due to the colossal difference in accompanying costs. As a rule, this requires significant funds, which is far from always achievable for people in difficult situations or living in poor countries. One should also consider the fundamental change in cultural environment, ways of life, and the need to learn a foreign language. For many people, these costs prove insurmountable; because of them, most people never leave their homeland and resign themselves to violent power in the absence of an opportunity to resist it.

One might say that while all these costs are serious, they do not make escaping violence unrealistic for a specific individual. After all, the minimum action required is simply to move to the territory of another country. But even this is difficult. Consider North Korea, from which it is almost impossible to leave; only a few manage to illegally cross the border, risking their lives. Or even less brutal dictatorships, such as Turkmenistan, which is also very hard to leave. It would be interesting to know how the residents of these countries would respond to the assertion that one can simply get up and leave.

In general, movement between states is possible only through border checkpoints; otherwise, forcible detention awaits you. That is, leaving a state is possible exclusively according to the rules imposed by it through force. And rules can change at any moment, becoming stricter. One does not have to look far for examples — just a month ago, leaving Afghanistan was no more difficult than leaving Russia, and now people are ready to cling to the landing gear of a plane to escape the violence of a new stationary bandit in the form of the Taliban. This also applies to civilized Western countries, where historically strict border controls and passport-visa regimes emerged as a means of tracking the movement of people during world wars but were not eliminated upon their conclusion. Additionally, those who are already being persecuted by the state cannot legally leave its territory.

And finally, living in a world where coercive power is the norm, you are not escaping from violence to non-violence; you are merely escaping from one perpetrator of violence to another. The fact that you crossed the border guarantees nothing. Upon entering the territory of another state, your fate is entirely in the hands of its government. It will set certain conditions, and if you do not meet them, you will be detained and sent back, even if you have already socialized in the new place. For instance, a number of countries return fugitives from North Korea. Not long ago, there was a case where Russia deported a woman to Afghanistan who had fled from the Taliban, who were trying to force her into marriage. And even from Western countries, people have often been deported to whom violent retribution threatened in their homeland, for example, because of their sexual orientation.

After all these arguments, it is hardly possible to speak at all about the idea that one can simply get up and run away from violence, especially state violence. In a world of stationary bandits possessing a coercive monopoly on power, doing this is extremely difficult, and in some cases completely impossible. Even in the most favorable scenario, you have no choice but to live without the threat of coercive power from above. Violence is in the foundation of every current social system, and this is another reason to fight it worldwide and as a phenomenon in general, rather than only its individual forms.

Question to Bitarkh

Bitarch, although I only recently became acquainted with libertarianism, I have already read about voluntarism and realized that it is exactly what I need! I am so tired of living among the abusers, boors, and rapists who surround me now! I wish a vaccine that destroys the ability to initiate aggressive violence would be invented as soon as possible, and along with it, universal prosperity would arrive! My father used to beat me, my ex-boyfriend beat me too, and once some thug even tried to rape me in an alleyway! Well, until the vaccine is invented, I want to ask for your help. Bitarch, I want to have a child with a strong Lorenz inhibitor, who would be guaranteed never to initiate violence and yet be able to stand up for themselves, just as you, strictly speaking, do. I am not a poor woman; I can sign a written waiver of alimony; all that is needed is conception from a carrier of a strong variant of the Lorenz inhibitor. Otherwise, there are two extremes around: either mama’s boys and wimps unable to protect themselves, or alpha males with testosterone overflowing and absolutely unrestrained in the manifestation of violence, but something in the middle is needed. Do you agree? And if so, how much do your services for the conception of non-violent offspring cost?

Katya Latysh

I am glad that you liked the ideas I promote and that you believe it is necessary to eradicate violence. As for your delicate request—unfortunately, I cannot 100% guarantee perfect genetics on my part. Although I am a non-violent person, who knows, perhaps I am a carrier of recessive genes that determine a weak variant of the violence inhibitor. There is no genetic test yet to determine the variant of the Lorenz mechanism (the violence inhibitor). Moreover, it is unnecessary to ask me specifically—most people are non-violent anyway; it is unlikely that I can offer anything more than they can. You have simply been unlucky so far, crossing paths with those same 2% of crazed degenerates who have an extremely weak variant of the inhibitor. The distribution of degenerates can be quite uneven, and it is possible that you found yourself in an environment with an increased concentration of them. Perhaps a good solution would be to slightly change your surroundings and your social circle?

I also want to note—one child cannot fix the situation as a whole. If you have financial resources, perhaps it is worth considering investments in biotechnology, obtaining the appropriate education, or some other way to help eradicate violence in degenerates? After all, the sooner it becomes possible to create a genetic test for the violence inhibitor variant and gene therapy to strengthen it, the faster the problem of rapists will be solved and no one will ever apply violence to you again. And in this way, you will be able to precisely guarantee both the non-violence of your children and that they themselves will never encounter violence.

Think about this; if violence is so unpleasant to you and you have certain opportunities, perhaps then it would be a good idea to dedicate your life to the fight against violence and bring closer the day when this problem is finally solved?

Bitarch

The Role of Violence in the Survival of Species and Populations

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Intraspecific violence is often credited with the role of a mechanism important for maintaining the life of individual populations and even entire species. For example, violence is a tool for establishing a dominance hierarchy, excluding weak individuals from competition, allocating limited resources in favor of the strongest and most adapted members of the population, etc. To a certain extent, these statements are true, but what is definitely incorrect is to look at the phenomenon of violence in isolation from other factors—an error often made when presenting violence as a mechanism that works the same way in all cases.

Factors such as the innate armament of population members and the possibility of avoiding violence through flight play an important role in intraspecific violence. In cases where the armament of individuals is quite weak, the population is not limited by a strict habitat (it has room to expand), and individuals generally possess a good ability to flee, then certain benefits can indeed be derived from intraspecific violence without encountering an unacceptable level of negative externalities created by it. In short, in such cases, the benefits outweigh the losses.

But everything changes with an increase in the armament of individuals, with the limitation of their habitat, and if their ability to flee is less developed. The more pronounced these factors are, the more negative externalities the population will experience—violence will begin to threaten its survival. This was noted in ethological research by Konrad Lorenz, who also did not deny the positive aspects of violence, but at the same time took into account factors capable of turning this phenomenon into a catastrophe. He also described the concept of a mechanism that inhibits (restrains) intraspecific violence. I will provide an excerpt from his book “Aggression, or the So-called Evil”:

“A raven can knock out another raven’s eye with a single blow of its beak; a wolf can rip open another wolf’s jugular vein with a single bite. If reliable prohibitions did not prevent this, neither ravens nor wolves would have existed for a long time. A pigeon, a hare, and even a chimpanzee are unable to kill one of their own kind with a single blow or bite. Moreover, such poorly armed creatures possess an ability to flee that allows them to escape even from ‘professional’ predators, who are far more skilled in pursuit, capture, and killing than any superior fellow of their own species. Therefore, in the wild, it is usually impossible for such an animal to harm its own kind. Consequently, there is no selective pressure creating a prohibition against killing.”

From all this, a simple conclusion can be drawn: intraspecific violence can be useful, but only as long as factors such as armament and the inability to flee from violence do not become so pronounced as to create too many negative externalities. And the more pronounced these factors are, the greater the harm will be, which will ultimately lead to selective pressure toward stronger inhibitors of aggressive behavior among population representatives.

Now let us briefly consider the case of humans. Their innate armament is quite weak, and they have not yet fully adapted to the artificial armament that emerged during the development of civilization and scientific and technical progress. But this armament, along with the current lack of possibility for significant expansion of living space (humans have already spread across almost all habitable territory on the planet), creates a great threat to the survival of humanity. Intraspecific violence may have been useful for the distant ancestors of humans, but since they began using artificial weaponry, the situation has changed fundamentally. It is also worth adding that when discussing violence, the characteristics of humans and human society that distinguish them from animals and the animal world are often overlooked. Violence has an extremely negative effect on human psyche and behavior. Violence also disrupts economic relationships. This creates even more negative externalities.

The Myth of the Attacker’s Advantage

Voluntarist, Bitarch

The idea of universal armament and armed self-defense is often attempted to be portrayed as untenable by resorting to the argument of the attacker’s advantage. After all, what difference does it make whether the victim is armed or not if the attacker is still better prepared for the clash, since he is the one who planned it, while the victim expects nothing. And in general, few attackers will risk encountering a stronger opponent; they will prefer to choose a weak victim and bypass a strong one. The attacker always has the advantage; he is most often stronger, and freedom of armament will only give him more of an advantage since he will be able to arm himself freely.

To begin with, it should be noted that it is precisely the restriction of the freedom to arm oneself that gives the attacker an advantage. The ban only works for law-abiding citizens. If we take statistics from the USA, then 94% of mass shootings occur in gun-free zones, and 80% of armed criminals obtained their weapons illegally, most often on the black market, rather than simply buying them in a regular gun store; furthermore, 57% of criminals fear armed citizens more than they fear the police. All these facts directly indicate that it is precisely the regulation and prohibition of armament that gives the attacker an additional advantage.

And even if, after this, the attacker still retains some advantage over the victim, in general, this still decides nothing. The attacker cannot guarantee success; in the best-case scenario for him, his chance of success is merely higher than that of his victim. However, the risk of his failure in the event that the victim is armed is also high, and he will expose himself to this risk with every attack. Victory in one individual clash will not make him a winner overall; soon he will face a failure that could cost him his own life. And violent criminals make up an overwhelming minority of the population; as analysis of Russian crime shows, in the worst case, we have one violent criminal per year per 695 people (and that is considering not only murders, rapes, and the infliction of serious physical harm, but also, for example, battery). This means that, purely statistically, rapists and violent criminals have no chance of defeating an armed civilian population, or even inflicting any serious harm on society.

There can be no rights and freedoms to violence

Voluntarist, Bitarch

To the question of whether a person has the right to commit violence, we have only one answer — they do not! No single person in the world should possess the right to initiate an act of violence against another person. But some people (most often supporters of authoritarian-conservative views and force-based methods of solving problems) may say that this is a restriction of freedom. Freedom to commit violence is a freedom like any other, which means we are contradicting ourselves and are authoritarians ourselves, wanting to forcibly impose a single life scenario on everyone.

This is a rather inadequate manipulation in essence, which ignores the fact that violence leads to people being deprived of their freedom. That is, when one person initiates an act of violence against another person, they thereby deprive them of their freedom. Accordingly, violence is non-freedom. The right to violence is the right to deprive people of their freedom. However, the elimination of violence, the striving for its complete eradication as a phenomenon as a whole, is the elimination of the factor that leads people to non-freedom. And no verbal manipulations will change the essence of the phenomenon of violence!

Self-defense and the inhibition of violence

Voluntarist, Bitarch

An important question is how self-defense fits into the concept of the Lorenz mechanism (LM)/violence inhibition mechanism (VIM). From a rational point of view, restraining violence is a good and useful thing. But would a person with a strong LM/VIM be unable to defend themselves from an immediate threat of violence?

Unfortunately, I have not yet been able to find specific studies linking self-defense and the LM/VIM concept. In the future, I will try to study the neurophysiological aspects of self-defense in more detail and combine them with similar aspects of violence inhibition. However, I will now put forward a hypothesis about such a relationship based on the evolutionary aspects of the development of LM/VIM, which can serve as a starting point for further research.

According to Konrad Lorenz’s theory, the inhibitor is most pronounced in species whose representatives possess strong innate weaponry and do not have a statistically significant opportunity to avoid violence by fleeing. These two factors exert evolutionary pressure to strengthen the LM/VIM, as they create a threat to the survival of the species. And how did evolution handle this threat? It is not that complicated. Non-aggressive members of the population encounter intra-species violence only when they are attacked. Aggressive individuals, however, initiate violence themselves. Because of this, they end up in violent clashes much more often, and therefore die more frequently than other individuals, failing to pass their genetic material to the next generation. Thus, violence is weeded out, while the strong version of the violence-inhibiting mechanism is reinforced.

But for non-violence to be reinforced, it is necessary that the victims of violence be able to defend themselves during a direct attack using their weaponry. Otherwise, the aggressor’s life would be under no threat, and it would be the less aggressive individuals who die, leading to the opposite effect, and eventually to the extinction of the species (unless its representatives choose flight as an alternative, as hamsters do, for example, scattering after only a few mutual bites). But since we still observe heavily armed species in nature whose representatives are not prone to fleeing from intra-species aggression, and we also observe a strongly expressed LM/VIM in them, it means that victims of violence can indeed use their weaponry for self-defense against aggressors.

How might this work? An immediate threat of violence leads to a defensive reaction from the victim, which may weaken the operation of the violence inhibitor for a short period of time. As soon as the immediate threat passes, everything returns to normal. At the same time, the possibility of weakening the inhibitor to a state where the affected individual becomes capable of initiating violence themselves is excluded. Otherwise, the threat to the survival of many species would continue to exist, because the number of violent individuals in their populations would not decrease as a result of acts of violence, but might even increase, as victims would become new aggressors.

Self-defense is a permissible and evolutionarily optimal strategy for eradicating violence in a population. And humans are not exempt from this. If everything stated above is correct, then humans should also be capable of self-defense during a direct attack when there is a threat to their life, even if they have a strong version of the LM/VIM inhibitor. At the same time, they would not be capable of initiating violence outside of situations that directly threaten life, as this would relate to other, successfully inhibited types of violent behavior. I will also add that all of this points to the realism of evolutionary strategies for fighting and eradicating violence based on armed self-defense during direct attacks by various types of aggressors.

The Importance of Fighting Violence

Voluntarist, Bitarch

In connection with the recent anniversary of the terrorist attacks committed by Anders Breivik in Norway, I would like to remind you of the importance of fighting violence. Although such a tragic event is not a global catastrophe, it is frightening to imagine what future Breiviks might present to us, especially considering what fruits of scientific and technical progress could end up in their hands. Perhaps it will be another shooting, which is very bad, but it will most likely not affect you personally. Or perhaps such a person will decide to use some high-tech means to cause as much harm to people as possible—for example, by constructing a dirty bomb, releasing a previously unknown strain of a very dangerous and deadly virus (a scenario I described in the material “The Reality of the Viral Threat“), or using some other extremely destructive means unknown to us now.

But the capacity to commit violence is not the norm for a human being. On the contrary, 98% of people experience disgust at least toward brutal violence, and all brutal violence is committed by no more than 2% of people. This is because a natural part of human nature is the violence inhibition mechanism (Lorenz’s mechanism (LM) according to Konrad Lorenz’s theory, or VIM according to James Blair’s model). A person with a strong version of LM/VIM will never be able to commit violence. It is committed only by those who suffer from a pathology of the violence inhibitor. Violence is a pathological state. Therefore, it must be fought in an appropriate manner.

If violent tendencies were noticed to a sufficient extent in childhood—when a person is unlikely to be able to make a decision to intentionally hide them until the time they can organize a terrorist attack—or if mass testing for the congenital variant of LM/VIM were practiced in society, both in childhood and when conducting relationships with people in adult life, and if gene therapy treatment were then applied to those in whom the LM/VIM pathology was discovered, many terrorist attacks, as well as much violence in general, could have been avoided.

Perhaps in the past we did not have a sufficient scientific and technical base for this. But now the time has come; biotechnology and gene therapy are developing at a rapid pace. And now it is not too late to start fighting violence to avoid a catastrophic scenario in the future and finally completely rid human society of pathological violence. Does anyone really want the appearance of a new Breivik, and one who is even more heavily armed?