One of the central ideas of ancap is that all arising problems and disputes should be resolved ex post facto—through a court (assuming that courts under ancap work perfectly fine, no questions there). But real problems are easier to prevent than to “clear the rubble,” and this may require prohibitions. What do you have to say about this? Suing for compensation and a pile of penalties is all well and good, but doesn’t this resemble the famous phrase “come back once they’ve been killed”? Perhaps, if only for the possibility of preventive measures (but not those that infringe upon reasonable rights and freedoms!), it is worth having at least a minimal “protection” state?
Minarchist
The central idea of ancap is more that the problems whose resolution has been usurped by the state today should be solved privately, and only when there is a market demand for their resolution. This means that the same problem may be solved differently at different times, in different places, and in different situations. In one case, a condominium finances the work of police patrols; in another, an insurance company compensates the victim for the costs of an attack; in a third case, people rely on the success of self-defense and do not intend to spend money on insurance or security. Each time, the situation is based on a multitude of individual choices, and generally, it doesn’t matter whether economic calculation, religious prejudices, or ethical preferences were behind them.
There is nothing terrible about a certain community providing solutions to a number of typical tasks for itself using a “protection” state. What is terrible is if this state provides protection forcibly, based on territorial criteria. But as long as state services are provided within the framework of individual contracts that imply free exit from them—then by all means.
Moreover, if someone’s culture implies a number of prohibitions, the observance of which is expected from everyone, including outsiders, then it will be quite natural for the carriers of such a culture to conduct prevention privately. An example is in the image below.
It is another matter that under ancap, the role of prisons differs somewhat, but that is a completely different story
In many cases, when discussing the problem of violence, only the use of force by ordinary citizens on their own initiative is taken as an example of this phenomenon. In the same case, if a forceful measure was applied under orders from above and within the framework of state law, it is as if it is not considered violence at all; this measure is already called a form of law enforcement. From such an absurd formulation usually comes the assumption that the problem of violence can be solved simply by pursuing some “correct” state policy. This point of view is actively promoted by supporters of Steven Pinker’s ideas; in the Russian-speaking space, the most active evangelist of these views is Ekaterina Schulmann. But let us look at why this will never work.
Firstly, the very attempt to divide coercive forceful measures into those that can be considered violence and those that cannot encounters a logical contradiction. The difference in when, to whom, and for what reason a coercive forceful measure was applied does not cancel the fact of its application, the involuntary nature of its character, and the intentional physical restriction of a person’s freedom. All of these are constituent factors of such a phenomenon as violence. It cannot be said that the exact same action at one time, for one reason, and toward one person is violence, while at another time, for another reason, and toward another person, it is no longer so. This is merely a subjective assessment of a specific person.
Precisely because of this, all coercive forceful measures entail the same problems and risks, no matter how they are justified. Looking from the point of view of practical results, there is no difference whether violence was applied by a police officer or an ordinary citizen, whether it was applied to a simple passerby or a gangster who has committed many crimes in the past; one can always encounter resistance, especially if the victim of the forceful measure is placed in a hopeless position. And in today’s world with rapidly developing technologies, this threatens the use of very dangerous and destructive means as tools of defense or weapons of revenge, up to weapons of mass destruction, the most accessible of which are viruses. Therefore, from a practical point of view, the use of forceful measures can be justified only in the case of immediate self-defense, since in such a case an act of violence is already being committed and it must be stopped to avoid the subsequent negative externalities. In all other cases, the only optimal strategy of behavior will be the application of methods of influence to the violator that differ from physical violence, such as reputation lowering and ostracism.
Secondly, and this is the most important point—the attempt to get rid of private violence with the help of state violence actually only deters it, but does not eradicate it. A vivid example of this can be the USSR. The intentions regarding private violence among the ideologues of authoritarian communism were very noble; by the method of the “iron fist,” they intended to eradicate interethnic and domestic conflicts. Obviously, parents will not beat a child, and an Azerbaijani will not attack an Armenian, if someone stands over all of them with a club. But no power is eternal. As soon as changes occur within it, all problems come to the surface. The conflict is reborn, and with new strength, given the stressful condition people are in due to years of forceful control over them. We were lucky that after the collapse of the USSR, those same Armenians and Azerbaijanis ended up with only assault rifles and tanks in their hands, rather than nuclear missiles and viruses. However, over time, they, and others as well, may acquire very dangerous means. Then we will face a catastrophic threat endangering the existence of all humanity, due to the problem of violence left unresolved by the “iron fist” method.
People who consider Konrad Lorenz’s conclusions regarding the nature of violence and his concerns about the risks it entails to be unfounded often refer to or use arguments from a piece titled “The Lorenzian Theory of Aggression and Peace Research: A Critique“. To avoid any misconceptions about the phenomenon of violence, let us examine what is wrong with this critique.
At the very beginning, an argument is made that Lorenz defines aggression as a combat instinct implemented toward members of one’s own species and is genetically innate, inherited from biological ancestors. However, according to the critics, this definition strips the term aggression of its meaning. In general, when discussing aggression and violence, the question of what we actually mean by “aggression” and “violence” almost always arises. In this context, it is reasonable to reduce these terms specifically to innate tendencies toward intraspecific violence in the form of inflicting physical harm (or the threat of inflicting it), as this is the object of study. Everything else, for example, the fact that aggression is subjectively defined differently by different people (for some, even an impolite greeting would be aggression), we do not take into account.
Based on the critique, such an understanding of aggression does not correlate with activities manifested not directly, but through social institutions developed by humans. Firstly, all institutions that apply coercive measures always work through coercive agents. You might say that if a person becomes a politician, they can sit in an office and issue inhumane orders, thereby committing acts of violence without actually performing any corresponding physical activity. However, these orders are worthless without the coercive agents who execute them directly; therefore, one must look specifically at them and their propensity for violence. Secondly, other social aspects, such as wealth, status, and skills (which were mentioned in the critique), do not provide such an opportunity on their own without methods of directly inflicting physical harm on a person, for example, using the same security forces. We cannot speak of violence where there has been no such direct impact. Of course, a person may attempt to harm another person through indirect influence via a chain of many instances; however, this chain will sooner or later encounter the need to apply a coercive measure. For example, some might say that a monopolist in the market can turn people into slaves using purely economic methods and even drive them to starve to death by unilaterally setting the cost of labor and products. However, to be a monopolist, one must have coercive agents (one’s own, or an agreement with the agents of an existing monopoly, such as the state) ready to destroy all competitors in the market through direct violence, especially those who refuse to make concessions and negotiate peacefully.
After this, Lorenz is criticized for mixing the behavioral models of quite different animal species and humans, arguing that the justification of a common origin of species is insufficient for this. However, it should not be forgotten that the unbreakable basis of the behavioral model of any living creature is always the biological processes occurring in its organism. It would be foolish to believe, for example, that by mere desire, due to some social factors or with the help of some supernatural forces, a highly developed primate, including a human, could ignore the action of hormones and receptors of the nervous system. And biological processes, in turn, are determined by genetics. Of course, one should not forget the gene-environment link—certain genes are activated in a certain environment. But this fact only confirms our correctness, if we consider two factors: humans share a large part of the genome with animals due to the same common origin, and Lorenz observed the same behavioral mechanisms regarding the manifestation of violent behavior in very different animal species. According to the critique, it is wrong to extrapolate observations of animals to humans, even if these observations coincide for a very wide range of species. Of course, I agree that Lorenz’s works may lack observations of specifically human behavior; however, based on the two factors described above (common genetic heritage and the observation of identical behavioral patterns in different species), it can be boldly presumed that his conclusions regarding the nature of violence are very likely true for humans as well. And referring to the social sciences, psychology, etc., which was also mentioned in the critique, makes no sense, as we are considering the biological and genetic component, which is more fundamental—these sciences cannot contradict biology or make changes to it. In the end, if someone still continues to deny these conclusions, it would be better to criticize them with observations of human behavior, corresponding systematization, and comparison with Lorenz’s conclusions, rather than simply pointing to the incorrectness of the fact of extrapolation.
The critique also addresses Lorenz’s instinctive-hydraulic model. It explains the phenomenon of instinctive reactions triggering in the absence of a specific stimulus by the accumulation over time of a certain specific potential, which lowers the threshold necessary to trigger the reaction; this also explains spontaneous acts of aggression. This model is criticized due to the lack of neurophysiological evidence for its correctness. However, firstly, it has not been refuted, and secondly, Lorenz himself acknowledged the limitations of this model and the fact that it possesses a number of flaws; that is, in fact, he did not propose it as an absolutely correct and final solution.
Next, the influence of intraspecific aggression on the survival of species is criticized, especially in the case of humans. Statistics are provided as an example, showing that wars between different groups of people (including modern wars starting from the 19th century) have had a very insignificant effect on the survival of humanity. I will not argue that this conclusion is correct at the moment. However, here, Lorenz’s fears regarding the threat of violence to the survival of humanity should be linked to scientific and technical progress. After all, humans have become the most heavily armed species on the planet; they have already faced nuclear threats more than once, and every day the threats become more serious, as dangerous means become increasingly accessible for acquisition and reproduction by small groups of people and even individual individuals. In fact, the destructive potential of small groups and individual individuals is increasing every day. For example, viruses are a very accessible means of mass destruction, although other things could be devised. It is hard to argue with Lorenz’s fears here!
Another point in the critique caught my attention because it only confirms Lorenz’s theory rather than refuting it. But first, we need to remember something. As we know, Lorenz’s observations show that species with strong innate weaponry do not use it in intraspecific clashes. This primarily concerns hedgehogs, porcupines, venomous snakes, and insects; Lorenz also mentioned wolves, which do not bite their fellows in vulnerable places such as the belly or neck, and ravens, which in fights do not even try to peck out each other’s eyes with their very sharp beaks. The emergence of such mechanisms during evolution is quite logical; otherwise, representatives of these species would simply exterminate each other. As for poorly armed species, this mechanism manifests to a lesser extent, since either their representatives are unable to inflict serious harm on their fellows, or the latter can escape from the attack—meaning violence does not threaten them as much. For example, when Lorenz put two turtle doves—seemingly peaceful birds of the pigeon family—in one cage, the dislike of one bird for the other led to it severely maiming and almost killing the other during Lorenz’s absence. All because there was nowhere to run in this case.
In the case of humans, this mechanism also does not manifest very strongly, as their natural weaponry is quite weak. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that humans have inherited this mechanism to a certain extent; moreover, we can confirm this with observations regarding war, which the critique itself refers to, again, to prove the insignificance of the influence of violence on the survival of humanity. In many armies, more than half of the soldiers who were supposed to shoot simply could not pull the trigger. There is also mention of a refusal by one of the US army brigades to obey orders during the Vietnam War. Cases such as the mass killing in My Lai are a great exception and an abnormality for modern wars. In general, most soldiers considered the Vietnam War meaningless, and throughout its duration, a typical soldier spent only a few hours in combat. Also, a social study conducted by the information and education department of the US Department of Defense shows that during World War II, most soldiers actually tried to pretend they were busy with something rather than actually engaging in military affairs.
Based on this, it can be concluded that humans possess Lorenz’s violence-inhibiting mechanism. Although it is expressed in a weaker form than in heavily armed species, it nonetheless provides the prerequisites for solving the problem of violence, which concerned Lorenz so deeply and, in principle, is a cause for concern for any sane person. And, by the way, in the material we are considering, an attempt to criticize this specific theory is not even undertaken.
When viruses are considered weapons of mass destruction, many say that this is merely a hypothetical threat, impossible to implement in practice at the moment, unlikely to be implementable in the near future, and certainly never available for recreation by small organizations and ordinary people in home conditions. And since other possible weapons of mass destruction are even more inaccessible for recreation, there is no need to fear such a phenomenon as violence and try to eradicate it completely.
First of all, we need to look at the trends in the development of biotechnology. A great example is provided by an operation such as sequencing (in simpler terms, decoding) the genome. Just 20 years ago, sequencing one full human genome cost 100 million dollars, about 10 years ago – 1 million dollars, and now – 1 thousand dollars. Also, there are already quite cheap DNA/RNA synthesizers; some models can be bought for several tens of thousands of dollars, and it is quite expected that over time and with the development of technology, they will only become cheaper and more accessible. Furthermore, research has recently appeared regarding the use of Artificial Intelligence in solving quantum chemistry equations [1][2]. In the future, this will make it possible to determine the chemical and physical properties of molecules without conducting real tests, but only by virtually modeling their structure. I think it is obvious that this will greatly simplify the design of artificial viruses. And finally, let us not forget that modern vaccination and targeted treatment are based precisely on the introduction of artificial viral agents into humans, which deliver specific genetic material to the required cells and embed it into them. Factually, this is gene therapy, the reality of the technological implementation of which many for some reason also view skeptically and do not see prospects for its development and application in the near future. But do you still believe that the creation of dangerous artificial viruses is merely a hypothetical threat? Well, let’s look at real cases of this.
In 2011, virologist Yoshihiro Kawaoka conducted experiments to create a flu vaccine. He tried to recreate the strain of the virus that preceded the 2009-2010 epidemic to see how the virus had changed over 4 years. As a result, he modified it so that it became resistant to human immunity [3]. Naturally, his work began to be criticized, as humanity would have been powerless if this virus had left the laboratory walls. Additionally, the US government imposed a ban on the continuation of this research in 2014 (however, it was lifted in 2019). Moreover, Yoshihiro Kawaoka had previously managed to create a laboratory analog of the well-known Spanish flu, which killed up to 100 million people according to various estimates.
Also in 2018, a group of Canadian researchers published a scientific paper on recreating the causative agent of the horsepox virus – a close relative of smallpox (variola), one of the deadliest diseases in human history [4]. The cost of this project is estimated at approximately 100 thousand dollars. In doing so, the researchers sought to create a new, even safer vaccine against smallpox. However, a significant portion of the scientific community viewed this research critically and began to express indignation as to why the scientific journal PLOS One allowed the publication of such work at all, as this could help terrorists in creating biological weapons.
Along with all this, we should consider cases where viruses accidentally left laboratory walls and what consequences this led to, in order to understand what we will face if someone wants to release a dangerous virus into the wild intentionally. Moreover, this could already be done by some laboratory assistant at any research center that stores and studies samples of such viruses. We have simply been very lucky that none of these lab assistants had violent tendencies, or if they did, something held them back or they did not realize what dangerous weapon was in their hands. We will list 5 such cases [5]:
– In 1977, the H1N1 flu strain managed to escape from a Chinese institution and spread across the world. Fortunately, it caused only a mild illness and led to only a few fatal cases.
– From 1963 to 1978, three escapes of the smallpox virus occurred in the UK from two different laboratories. They were linked to low standards and poorly conducted laboratory practice. The smallpox outbreaks led to at least 80 fatal cases.
– In 1995, 10,000 people in Venezuela and 75,000 people in Colombia fell ill with a VEE strain that escaped from a laboratory. As a result of the outbreak, 311 people died, and neurological complications were found in 3,000 people.
– Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003 led to a global epidemic that infected 8,000 people and caused 774 deaths in 29 countries. Since the original epidemic, six escapes of the virus from laboratories have occurred – four in Beijing and one each in Singapore and Taiwan.
– In 2007, 278 animals in the UK were infected with foot-and-mouth disease after the virus escaped from a high-biosafety laboratory. Due to the outbreak, 1,578 animals had to be destroyed. This outbreak undermined agricultural production and exports in the UK and cost approximately 200 million pounds sterling.
Let’s also look at the current viral situation. In 2020-21, we had to deal with the coronavirus (by the way, this is one of the strains of the same SARS that left laboratory walls in 2003). Compared to other viruses, SARS-CoV-2 is not excessively contagious or deadly; to date, about 103 million people have had it, which is 1.3% of the planet’s population; about 2.2 million people died – 2.1% of all infected. Nevertheless, the pandemic led to a large number of social and economic problems.
We should also look at other modern viral threats besides the coronavirus. One such example could be the “Nipah” virus. The disease can be asymptomatic (in which case the person simply becomes a spreader of the infection) or cause serious respiratory problems, encephalitis, cerebral edema, and mortality ranging from 40% to 75%. Furthermore, Dutch researchers claim that a Nipah outbreak could happen at any moment [6]. And what could happen if a sample of such a virus fell into the hands of a person with violent inclinations?
Besides all this, the topic of the viral threat is already being raised by some well-known and authoritative figures, for example, entrepreneur and billionaire Bill Gates [7]. Back in 2015, he predicted a pandemic and warned that the world was not ready for it. He explains this lack of readiness by the fact that large pandemics occur quite rarely, people forget about them and prefer to concentrate their attention on fighting more frequent disasters. A pandemic generally always seems like something that definitely will not happen in the next few years, therefore its threat is ignored. Bill Gates also expressed concern that viruses could be used for violent purposes and estimated the probability of an artificial pandemic to be higher than that of a natural one. Now let’s imagine such a scenario – someone intentionally releases a very contagious and deadly virus into the wild, and humanity is not ready for it at all?
I think there should be no more doubts that the creation of artificial viruses is a real task, which over time is becoming less expensive and more accessible for implementation. It may even not be necessary to create new viruses – it is enough to seize and use samples of already existing ones. Therefore, it is critically important for us to get rid of violence before the moment when someone, in an attempt to protect themselves from attacks, or some terrorist in pursuit of their violent goals, releases a very contagious and deadly virus into the wild, thereby bringing humanity to catastrophe.
Very foolish is the conservative who implements their dreams of ethnic purity and a traditional order of life through state violence in a mandatory manner toward the entire society. But a progressivist who uses this same method to promote a multicultural and LGBT agenda will be equally foolish. This is because, regardless of which ideas are promoted by this method, one must constantly use and maintain the instruments of violence in a state of “combat readiness.”
But power is never eternal. There is no method to leave power in the hands of one interest group forever, simply because different groups always exist within society. And when one of these groups gains enough strength and popularity to remove the previous group from power, the previous interests are removed along with them.
To make this clearer, let’s ask a question as an example, considering the current state of affairs in the Western world. European and American conservatives are extremely dissatisfied that their children are forced to study multiculturalism in schools and are taught tolerance toward LGBT. Sometimes it even goes as far as conservative parents having their children taken away by social services if they decide to shield them from such education. They are also dissatisfied that their funds are taken through taxation to provide aid and additional privileges to minorities and immigrants.
But who is to blame for this? The progressivists? Perhaps, as they are using the tools of force. But the conservatives themselves are also to blame. This is because they supported and nurtured the instrument of violence. And why be surprised that this instrument simply passed into the hands of other interest groups over time? What should conservatives be surprised about after they had previously killed, imprisoned, or forcibly treated those very same LGBT representatives, and then their children began to be mandatorily taught tolerance toward values of this kind? If conservatives had gotten rid of the instrument of violence, not used it to pursue their goals, then no one would have been able to to impose their orders upon them. Yes, the proponents of multiculturalism and LGBT representatives, whom they hate so strongly, would still exist. But they would not be able to force them how to live.
The moral of this story can be expressed by a single parable: you reap what you sow! If you sow violence, you yourself will become its victim; it is inevitable. Never count on the instrument of violence being yours and only yours. It is better not to facilitate the development of such an instrument—then no one will be able to use it against you.
I constantly hear criticism regarding the idea of eliminating aggressive violence from society using biotechnologies (the development of gene therapy). Skeptics argue that the propensity for violence is very complex, determined by many genes, and that identifying them is impossible. In reality, this is true, but only if one looks specifically for “violence propensity” genes, although this is absolutely unnecessary to solve the task at hand. Lorenz’s research describes the evolutionary path through which many animal species developed an “innate morality” of non-aggression toward members of their own species (in fact, this is not morality in the usual philosophical sense, but a behavioral instinct). For some reason, many have overlooked this, but Konrad Lorenz clearly indicates in his works that species with innate morality experience a strong feeling of aversion (i.e., a certain aggression-inhibiting mechanism is triggered) when they intend to cause harm to the body of a conspecific (for simplicity, we will henceforth call this the “Lorenz mechanism” after the discoverer). This contrasts sharply with the layman’s understanding of “propensity for violence.” For example, hedgehogs are quite aggressive in the conventional sense (since they are predators), but are incapable of causing physical harm to their own kind.
Although Lorenz himself wrote that in humans “innate morality” is very weak, nevertheless, its presence can be noticed in a significant part of society, perhaps even in the majority. You have probably noticed scenes in movies where someone wanted to take revenge for some offense, picked up a weapon, approached the unarmed offender, pointed the gun at them, but suddenly the attacker’s hands began to shake, they felt ill, and they could not fire. This is the behavioral pattern of species with a strong version of the Lorenz mechanism, but in humans, it is quite variable (unlike, for example, hedgehogs and snakes, where all individuals in the population have a strong version of this mechanism due to the pressure of natural selection). Accordingly, this trait is determined by alleles of one or several genes (different forms of the same gene located in the same sections of chromosomes). Given the high degree of variability of the strong/weak version of the Lorenz mechanism in different people, identifying the specific genes and the correct (desired) alleles is quite simple, even at the current technological level.
A rough research plan can be outlined. Activists openly demonstrate provocative behavior, for example, by showing their commitment to LGBT in places where homophobes are usually present, insulting them, but, importantly, not using any physical violence against them. If it is evident that a person is deeply offended by the insult, but nevertheless simply walks away (the ideal version is that they intended to strike but ultimately could not), we inform them that it was a scientific experiment, tell them they did well to restrain themselves, and take a DNA sample from them, marking it as “peaceful.” If, however, they attempt to hit the activist, we immediately stop the attack using pepper spray and take a DNA sample, marking it as “aggressor.” We repeat this numerous times to create samples of sufficient size.
Next, we send the collected materials to a laboratory for DNA decoding (sequencing). It could be to Silicon Valley — some of the numerous biotech startups there will surely be happy to receive the samples we have collected, as they cannot collect DNA samples in such an “aggressive” manner within California itself. Based on the comparison of the two samples, the specific genes responsible for the strength of the Lorenz mechanism and the required alleles (encoding the strong version) are identified. Once identified, it would be possible, for example, to create gene therapy for adults and a genetic test for pregnant women (which would make the woman seriously consider whether it is worth continuing the pregnancy).
First, I want to share with you a rather interesting piece of material regarding the topic of violence and private property titled “The Political Concept of Freedom“. The author argues that property rights always have a violent origin, as violence must be applied to maintain them.
Before providing my commentary, I will note in advance that we are considering both the private property rights of individuals and companies (supported by the right-libertarians) as well as collective property rights formed within voluntary associations (supported by the left-libertarians). However, we dismiss the situation in which property rights do not exist at all, because in such a state of affairs, it would be impossible to organize any effective redistribution of resources to solve various tasks, since then absolutely anyone could take any resource from anyone else at any moment regardless of the circumstances.
If the matter concerns the protection of immediate property, which you use frequently or are holding in your hands right now, there is no problem in maintaining it—you would have to be attacked with physical harm (or at least with a non-zero probability of such harm) for it to be taken. If violence as a phenomenon has not yet been eradicated from society, then you can quite reasonably use means of self-defense. By the way, they do not even have to be lethal; they could be pepper sprays, stun guns, ultra/infrasound. It will be sufficient to inflict only very unpleasant sensations on the aggressor, without long-term physical consequences, to force them to let go of your bag or leave the house. If violence has been eradicated, then simply no one will attack you.
1) A contract within a contractual jurisdiction (CJ), under which the CJ will make certain efforts to prevent the violation of your property rights. The most obvious option for real estate is a contract between the CJ and utility providers (electricity, gas, water) regarding their disconnection in case of squatting or non-payment of rent. 2) Physical fencing of property with a fence and an access control system: a barrier, a door with an electronic lock. 3) For situational protection, when the owner wants to prevent anyone from entering their territory (for example, angry workers who want to seize a factory), a guard at the entrance or a human chain. 4) For any items containing electronic components (from planes, yachts, and cars to household appliances, phones, and headphones), blocking use without entering an access code, retina scan, fingerprint, or RFID tag. 5) Network-based reputation systems (available globally via the internet), where violators of private property can be listed, which would lead to denial of service, boycott, or ostracism. 6) A system of options. This is already widespread in Silicon Valley IT companies. The hired employee is financially interested in the success of the enterprise; they will profit from the growth of the company’s capitalization and are not interested in stealing the employer’s property, as under the terms of the contract, these options will be forfeited in the event of illegal actions by the employee.
As we can see, the protection of property does not necessarily require violence, except perhaps in the case of the immediate seizure of property that you are using at that moment; however, this is already an aggressive attack on you, in which case self-defense is permissible. Property rights and violence are not necessarily one and the same.
There is an argument that fighting a phenomenon such as violence will in no way help eliminate our current hierarchy of dominance and the monopoly on power. Firstly, many doubt that methods against violence can be applied to the leaders of the dominance hierarchy—they work in closed office buildings, travel in armored cars, and their homes are cordoned off by security, meaning there is no way to approach or reach them. Secondly, they may be people who are not themselves prone to committing acts of violence. Perhaps some of them are intellectuals, incapable of even hitting someone lightly, and they have no need for it anyway, since an entire army of pawns, already prone to violence, does all the dirty work for them. Sometimes the second argument is even considered alleged proof that the problem of the dominance hierarchy and monopoly power does not stem from violence.
To refute this argument, we must always remember exactly this army of pawns. Behind political leaders stand the security structures in which many agents work. And it is these agents who enter into direct contact with us; it is through them that all orders given from above are carried out. The cause of our problems and the goal of our activity is the elimination of their violent nature. Looking at it realistically, we cannot stop the leader of the dominance hierarchy, liquidate him during self-defense during a direct attack, or even in the future, with the development of technology, inject him with a gene therapy needle. But this may be completely unnecessary and even useless given that he himself may be a person not prone to committing acts of violence. However, we will always be able to apply all these measures to his servants, since they, again, enter into direct contact with us when applying aggressive violence against us.
As soon as all the pawns are stopped or liquidated in the process of self-defense against their attack, their leader will simply lose his power; he will no longer be able to realize any aspirations toward us. That is precisely why it is sufficient to work only with the violence of the pawns who enter into direct contact with us; without them, the leader of the dominance hierarchy is absolutely worthless!
Against the backdrop of recent blockings of conservative groups and resources by Western corporations, as well as in view of longer-standing claims against me regarding my calls to participate in the blocking of propagandist Vladimir Solovyov’s YouTube channel, I would like to express my, and in general the libertarian/voluntarist, position regarding freedom of speech.
As we know, the idea of voluntarism is to eradicate any manifestation of violence and coercive force in relationships between people, that is, to achieve a state of maximum freedom of activity, agreement, and association. It can be said immediately that the blocking of content of any kind by any platform is not a violent act, and therefore it is not something that a voluntarist can oppose. However, in the modern world, a situation has arisen where large social platforms are heavily dependent on states; they are in close cooperation with them (especially with police and intelligence services), and also frequently receive monopoly privileges and subsidies from them. Effectively, they operate to some extent using tax funds taken from people, and as long as this remains true, many believe they can be nothing other than public services to which freedom of speech should apply in an absolute (or nearly absolute, with minor caveats) degree. I also frequently encounter the opinion that even in a free society, pressure must be exerted on any large social platforms so that they also support full freedom of speech.
However, let us not forget that the main problem for us is violence. It must be fought. And in the course of this struggle, the dissemination and popularization of violent ideas must under no circumstances be allowed, as this will only provoke new acts of violence, which will lead to many negative externalities (about which I have spoken a lot in the materials of my channel and public page) and may eventually turn into a total catastrophe for us all (someone, wishing to solve their problems through violence, might even use weapons of mass destruction, for example, by releasing a very dangerous virus).
Understanding this will allow us to formulate an answer regarding what policy should be applied now on so-called public social platforms, and what is necessary when exerting pressure (except for forceful pressure, which is obviously unacceptable) on any platforms of this kind in general. And that is: freedom of speech is permissible in all cases except for cases of calls to violence.
Ideas based on coercive imposition should not be allowed for publication on such platforms. People who call for the initiation of violence against anyone should be blocked; general ostracism can also be applied to them until they decide to renounce violent aspirations. Calls for the punishment of people by state authorities are also unacceptable, since such punishments are implemented by forceful methods. Of course, this does not apply to calls for self-defense by any means in the event of the initiation of violence by an aggressor, as this action is aimed at stopping an act of violence already being committed and eliminating the associated negative externalities.
Conclusion: violent people must be subjected to ostracism, and violent ideas must not be allowed for publication and dissemination on social platforms. Pressure (of course, non-violent) must also be exerted on any social platforms to achieve the blocking of people and materials that call for violence. In the case of materials of another nature, everything is settled privately: each platform decides for itself what to publish and what not, and each person decides whether to use a particular platform and whether to introduce personal sanctions against it if they do not like the content published there.
Sometimes, as an argument regarding the impossibility of implementing any serious attempts to achieve a free society while violent state power still exists, the fact is cited that the state’s enforcement agents (i.e., the stationary bandit) will simply stop all related activities. For this reason, in particular, it is impossible to practice agorism—all agorists will be caught and imprisoned as economic criminals evading taxes and engaging in “illegal” entrepreneurship. And without the practice of agorism, it is impossible to build social institutions alternative to the state, that is, to create the initial infrastructure of a free society. This will also prevent the balancing of the Balance of Violence Potential—law enforcement will simply imprison those who produce and distribute self-defense weapons at the very beginning of the process. And without the BVP, there can be no talk of opposing the stationary bandit. However, there is a solution to this problem: it is necessary to make it so that the state cannot apply force, and one way to achieve this is to organize an overload of its enforcement structures, analogous to a DDoS attack on online services.
To begin with, it is still necessary to address the issue of self-defense weapons. Naturally, their production and distribution will require financial resources, even if the cheapest and most accessible options of such weapons are used. These can be collected through crowdfunding; it is also possible that anonymous patrons, beyond the reach of the state’s enforcement structures, will appear. With sufficient funds, the production and distribution of weaponry will not be a problem. Look, for example, at the situation with the production and distribution of drugs. Despite persecution by the authorities, they are produced quite successfully, albeit underground, and there are always people willing to make “dead drops” for them—many people are not afraid of punishment from the stationary bandit. This example shows us that engaging in the underground production of self-defense weapons and finding people willing to distribute them is entirely realistic.
Next, the self-defense weapons fall into the hands of the people. Of course, it will not be possible to provide them to the entire population immediately; however, even a small percentage of people will be enough, especially if they are chosen carefully. The best candidates are those most likely to become victims of persecution and violence by other people, or those who already are. What will this lead to? To a sharp increase in injured and deceased persecutors and rapists. The police will be overwhelmed with cases of this kind. Furthermore, the representatives of the enforcement structures themselves may become victims if they attempt to use force against people, as there is a significant probability they will encounter an owner of a self-defense weapon. And let us not forget the protests and rallies that occur from time to time, where law enforcement will also suffer if they decide to attack an armed crowd.
All of this will simply overload the enforcement structures of the stationary bandit. They will lose the ability to effectively perform their duties. Due to the workload, they will be far from worrying about economic criminals—agorists will be able to quietly conduct their activities and expand the agoristic infrastructure. Even an attempt to introduce total control over citizens will not help—this will only hit the economic position of the authorities and diminish their enforcement capabilities.
Of course, some will say that people themselves will suffer from this, as there will be no one left to protect them, including from a judicial point of view, since the state courts, again, will be overloaded. But this is already a question of agoristic activity, during which self-defense measures and independent conflict resolution institutions can be organized. By the way, in the event of the state’s inefficiency due to the overload of its structures, many people in search of protection will decide to join these alternative solutions themselves, which will only expand agoristic activity and infrastructure.
